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Consequences of Review

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Judicial Review of Legislation

Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 5))

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Abstract

The consequences of identifying an intrusion upon higher law can be placed along a spectrum of possible outcomes of which setting aside is but one of the available options. The one end of this spectrum can be classified as “strong” review, the other as “weak” review. Strong-form review amounts to leaving the legislature no room to respond to a court that strikes down legislation on account of it violating higher law, bar an amendment of such higher law. Weak-form review refers to systems of judicial review where it is constitutionally foreseen that the judiciary does not enjoy the last word in interpreting and applying higher law, but where it has to share this jurisdiction to varying degrees and through different methods with the legislature. This chapter studies strong- and weak-form review in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and South Africa in order to determine to which extent these forms are to be found in the three systems.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Georg Vanberg, The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), at 1.

  2. 2.

    Stephen Gardbaum, “The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism”, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 707 (2001), at 712–713; Tushnet, supra note 284, at 174.

  3. 3.

    For example, s. 79(3) of the German Constitution (1949); s. 9(2) of the Czech Constitution (1992).

  4. 4.

    Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights. Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), at 18–42.

  5. 5.

    Cf. Paul Rishworth, Grant Huscroft, Scott Optican and Richard Mahoney, The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2003).

  6. 6.

    Sections 2 and 6 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990.

  7. 7.

    Ibid., at s. 4.

  8. 8.

    Cf. Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Ontario: Thomson Carswell, 2007), at 839–850.

  9. 9.

    See generally, Hogg and Bushell, supra note 239, at 75.

  10. 10.

    For example, Gardbaum, supra note 708.

  11. 11.

    Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113 (1973).

  12. 12.

    Christine A. Bateup, “Expanding the Conversation: American and Canadian Experiences of Constitutional Dialogue in Comparative Perspective”, 21 Temple Int. Comp. L. J. 1 (2007), at 21.

  13. 13.

    Lorraine Eisenstat Weinrib, “Canada’s Constitutional Revolution: From Legislative to Constitutional State”, 33 Israel L. Rev. 13 (1999), at 34–37.

  14. 14.

    Ibid., at 27–28.

  15. 15.

    Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza, supra note 220, at par. 46.

  16. 16.

    These courts are, the Supreme Court [formerly the House of Lords]; Judicial Committee of the Privy Council; Courts-Martial Appeal Court; in Scotland, the High Court of Justiciary sitting otherwise than as a trial court or the Court of Session; in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, the High Court or the Court of Appeal.

  17. 17.

    For example, R. v. Her Majesty’s Attorney General (Appellant) Ex parte Rusbridger (Respondent), supra note 323, at par. 46.

  18. 18.

    S. 4(6)(b) of the HRA.

  19. 19.

    Hansard, HC, 21 October 1998, col. 1300.

  20. 20.

    S. 4(4)(b) of the HRA.

  21. 21.

    Wadham et al., supra note 57, at 98–100.

  22. 22.

    Schedule 2 of the HRA.

  23. 23.

    Such as in R. (H.) v. Mental Health Review Tribunal, [2001] EWCA Civ 415.

  24. 24.

    David Feldman, “Remedies for Violations of Convention Rights Under the Human Rights Act”, 6 Eur. Hum. Rights L. Rev. 691 (1998), at 698. Interestingly, David Jenkins, “Common Law Declarations of Unconstitutionality”, 7 Int J. Const. L. 183 (2009), argues that British courts have an inherent ability to issue “common law declarations of unconstitutionality” where legislation offends common law rights in addition to, or apart from Convention rights.

  25. 25.

    Ibid.; s. 8 of the HRA; Leigh and Lustgarten, supra note 579, at 527–531.

  26. 26.

    Cf. Richard Clayton QC, “Remedies for Breach of Human Rights. Does the Human Rights Act Guarantee Effective Remedies?”, in Jeffrey Jowell and Jonathan Cooper (eds.), Delivering Rights: How the Human Rights Act is Working 147 (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2003), at 159.

  27. 27.

    R. v. Her Majesty’s Attorney General (Appellant) Ex parte Rusbridger (Respondent), supra note 323, at par. 46 (per Lord Hutton).

  28. 28.

    For example R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Anderson and Taylor [2002] UKHL 46, [2002] CrAppR 167 (declaration regarding s. 29 of the Crime (Sentences) Act (1997) followed in secs. 303(b)(I), 332 and schedule 37, point 8 of the Criminal Justice Act (2003); Bellinger v. Bellinger, [2003] UKHL 21, [2003] 2 AC 467 (declaration regarding s. 11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act (1973) followed in Gender Recognition Act (2004)). See also the examples mentioned by Wadham et al., supra note 57, at 95–97. For the impact on dialogue, see Roger Masterman, “Interpretations, Declarations and Dialogue: Rights Protection under the Human Rights Act and Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities”, Pub. L. 112 (2009), at 116–117. See also Kavanagh, supra note 86, at 410, who remarks that this shows that the dialogue metaphor has been overstated in relation to declarations of incompatibility.

  29. 29.

    Hansard, HC, 21 October 1998, col. 1300.

  30. 30.

    Clayton, supra note 732, at 159.

  31. 31.

    Richard Clayton QC, “Judicial Deference and ‘Democratic Dialogue’: The Legitimacy of Judicial Intervention under the Human Rights Act 1998”, Pub. L. 33 (2004), at 46–47.

  32. 32.

    Janet L. Hiebert, “Parliamentary Bill of Rights: An Alternative Model?”, 69 Mod. L. Rev. 7 (2006), at 21.

  33. 33.

    A. and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, supra note 230.

  34. 34.

    Ibid., at par. 35.

  35. 35.

    Secretary of State for the Home Department v. MB (FC), [2007] UKHL 46, par. 44 (per Lord Bingham of Cornhill); Thomas Poole, “Tilting at Windmills? Truth and Illusion in the ‘the Political Constitution’”, 70 Mod. L. Rev. 250 (2007), at 271.

  36. 36.

    Poole, ibid., at 273–274.

  37. 37.

    Stressing a strict separation of powers, see Kortmann, supra note 627, at 11–12.

  38. 38.

    R.J.B. Schutgens, “Het rechtsgevolg van onverbindendverklaring: Naar een stelsel van materiële vernietiging”, Themis 96 (2006) explains that it is all but impossible to find examples of lower courts not following the highest courts in holding that legislation is ineffective. Cf. Hoge Raad, 18 February 2005, NJ 2005, 283 (Aujeszky) where the Supreme Court even went so far as to state that courts presiding over civil law proceedings must in principle follow the decision of the highest administrative law court.

  39. 39.

    Parliamentary Proceedings II, 2001–2002, 28, 331, nos., 2, 9.

  40. 40.

    Harmonisation Act judgment, supra note 105, at par. 3.1. Similarly, Heringa supra note 107, at 68–69.

  41. 41.

    For an idea of the absolute nature of the bar on constitutional review was construed traditionally, one only has to consider the dicta expressed by the Supreme Court in the Van den Bergh judgment, supra note 473, at par. 33, that acts of parliament have to be treated as if they were above any suspicion.

  42. 42.

    Harmonisation Act judgment, supra note 105, at par. 3.4.

  43. 43.

    Ibid., at par. 3.6.

  44. 44.

    Ibid., at par. 3.1.

  45. 45.

    Discussed in § 258.

  46. 46.

    Parliamentary Proceedings II, 1974–1975, at 2325, 2431; Van Houten, supra note 107, at 57–58, sketches the debate.

  47. 47.

    Parliamentary Proceedings II, 1976–1977, 13 872, no. 7, at 9.

  48. 48.

    See § 95.

  49. 49.

    For example, Hoge Raad, 16 May 1986, NJ 1987, 251, where the Supreme Court stressed that it is not the duty of the courts to assess the value or public import of the interests affected by government decisions at their own discretion, and that they must exercise their powers of review with restraint.

  50. 50.

    Van Raalte v. The Netherlands of 21 February 1997, Publ. Eur Court H.R., Reports, 1997-I, par. 24; Hoge Raad, 12 October 1984, NJ 1985, 230; Hoge Raad, 23 October 1988, NJ 1989, 740.

  51. 51.

    Cf. A.K. Koekkoek, Rechter en bestuur in constitutioneel perspectief (Utrecht: Lemma, 2001), at 35–41.

  52. 52.

    Ibid., at 37 (quoting A.W. Heringa).

  53. 53.

    Cf. Alkema, supra note 623, at 4–14.

  54. 54.

    Hoge Raad, 12 May 1999, BNB 1999, 271.

  55. 55.

    Ibid., at paras. 3.15–3.16.

  56. 56.

    For example, Hoge Raad, 21 March 2003, NJ 2003, 691 (Waterpakt); Hoge Raad, 1 October 2004, NJ 2004, 679.

  57. 57.

    Cf. R.J.B. Schutgens, Onrechtmatige wetgeving (Deventer: Dilligentia, 2009), on the topic of unlawful legislation.

  58. 58.

    J.E.M. Polak, “Zit er nog muziek in verbods- en gebodsacties ter zake van wetgeving?”, Overheid en Aansprakelijkheid 168 (2004), at 171. R.A.J. van Gestel and M.S. Groenhuijsen, “Geen rechterlijk bevel tot wetgeving, of toch?”, Nederlands Juristenblad 2050 (2006), argue that no serious democratic deficit would arise, if a national court were to order the Dutch parliament to pass legislation in order to fulfil its obligations under EU law.

  59. 59.

    S. v. Makwanyane, supra note 32, at par. 151: “[W]ith effect from the date of this order, (…) legislation sanctioning capital punishment which [is] in force in any part of the national territory (…) [is] declared to be inconsistent with the Constitution and, accordingly, to be invalid. 2. (…) and with effect from the date of this order: (a) the State is and all its organs are forbidden to execute any person already sentenced to death under any of the provisions thus declared to be invalid; and (b) all such persons will remain in custody under the sentences imposed on them, until such sentences have been set aside in accordance with law and substituted by lawful punishments.”

  60. 60.

    Cf. Rautenbach and Malherbe, supra note 22, at 254.

  61. 61.

    S. 172(1)(b) of the Constitution.

  62. 62.

    Fose v. Minister of Safety and Security, 1997 (7) BCLR 851 (CC), 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC), at paras. 67–70, 83, 92.

  63. 63.

    Permanent Secretary of the Department of Education, Eastern Cape v. Ed-U-College (PE) (Section 21) Inc, 2001 (2) BCLR 188 (CC), 2001 (2) SA 1 (CC), at par. 23.

  64. 64.

    For example, Government of the RSA v. Grootboom, supra note 189, at par. 97.

  65. 65.

    National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice, 2000 (1) BCLR 39 (CC), 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC), at par. 70.

  66. 66.

    For example, according to s. 172(1)(b)(i) of the Constitution a declaration of invalidity may include an order that limits the retrospective effect of the declaration.

  67. 67.

    National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice, supra note 771, at paras. 65–66.

  68. 68.

    Fourie v. Minister of Home Affairs (SCA), supra note 25; Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v. Minister of Home Affairs (CC), supra note 25.

  69. 69.

    Ibid. (SCA), supra note 25, at paras. 15–17, 20, 49; ibid. (CC), supra note 25, at paras. 12, 32.

  70. 70.

    Ibid. (SCA), supra note 25, at paras. 38–49.

  71. 71.

    Ibid. (CC), supra note 25, at paras. 115–161.

  72. 72.

    For example, in Richter v. Minister for Home Affairs and Others, supra note 671, at paras. 53–55, the Court was quite clear and decisive about the importance of civil and political rights such as the right to vote, while it tends to stress caution in the field of socio-economic rights, such as in Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal, supra note 680, at paras. 29–30, regarding the right to health care in s. 27 of the Constitution.

  73. 73.

    See §§ 289–291.

  74. 74.

    Government of the RSA v. Grootboom, supra note 189.

  75. 75.

    Cautious because the Constitutional Court held that the right to housing in s. 26 of the Constitution does not entail an immediate right to housing and did not to recognise a minimum core of protection to which the applicants could lay claim, see Government of the RSA v. Grootboom, supra note 189, at paras. 33, 94–95.

  76. 76.

    Government of the RSA v. Grootboom, supra note 189, at paras. 96–99.

  77. 77.

    Rosalind Dixon, “Creating Dialogue about Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-form Versus Weak-form Judicial Review Revisited”, 5 Int. J. Const. L. 391 (2007), at 412–413. She mentions plans announced by the Cape municipality in 2001 to provide formal housing to thousands of people living in informal settlements that had still not come to fruition more than four years later, as well as plans in Gauteng to provide water, sewerage and electricity to residents in the informal settlement of Diepsloot, which had come to very little a number of years on (at 414–415).

  78. 78.

    Ibid., at 413–415.

  79. 79.

    R.J. de Beer and S. Vettori, “Enforcing Socio-economic Rights”, Potchefstroom Electr. L. J. 1 (2007), at 3.

  80. 80.

    Gardbaum, supra note 708, at 711.

  81. 81.

    Such as in the case of A. and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, supra note 230. See § 307.

  82. 82.

    Gardbaum, supra note 708, at 745–746.

  83. 83.

    See § 309.

  84. 84.

    See § 311.

  85. 85.

    Parliamentary Proceedings II, 2001–2002, 28, 331, no. 9, at 11–12.

  86. 86.

    Bogdanor, supra note 298, at 246, observed about adopting the HRA, that there was “neither the political will nor the consensus to do more”.

  87. 87.

    For example, Hoge Raad, 16 May 1986, NJ 1987, 251. See § 312.

  88. 88.

    See §§ 311–313.

  89. 89.

    On the failures of parliamentary sovereignty in South Africa, see §§ 55–64.

  90. 90.

    As Tushnet, supra note 710, at 75, opines on the basis of American jurisprudence: “At any particular time, courts might be exercising strong-form review in some areas, weak-form review in others.”

  91. 91.

    See §§ 320–324.

  92. 92.

    For example, Dixon, supra note 783, at 413–415.

  93. 93.

    See Tushnet, supra note 710, at 161–264.

  94. 94.

    Waldron, supra note 7, at 1353–1355.

  95. 95.

    On a similar note, see Dyzenhaus, supra note 211, at 48.

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  1. School of Law, Tilburg University, PO Box 90153, 5000, LE, Tilburg, The Netherlands

    Dr. Gerhard Van Der Schyff

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Van Der Schyff, G. (2010). Consequences of Review. In: Judicial Review of Legislation. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 5. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9002-7_7

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