Abstract
An introduction to environmental ethics with special attention to issues arising from the practice of agriculture and the argument that nature has intrinsic value.
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Notes
- 1.
Some philosophers draw a distinction between intrinsic and inherent values, but that is not necessary in order to understand Marie’s basic point. For the most part, we can treat intrinsic and inherent as having the same meaning.
- 2.
There are strong connections between utilitarianism and instrumental value and between intrinsic value and deontological theories (see Chapter 3), but it would be oversmplistic just to assume that these connections hold.
- 3.
Specific references for selected examples of Callicott’s work, and other authors or schools mentioned in the text, can be found in the references.
- 4.
- 5.
This does not contradict my earlier claim that any system of values requires some foundation in intrinsic value. There would be nothing valuable on such a world, and indeed the whole talk of ethical theory or moral principles would make no sense.
- 6.
My thanks to James Stephens for this suggestion.
- 7.
This phrasing is a bit convoluted, but necessary for accuracy. The second variation on anthropocentrism, if coupled with moral realism, might agree that something could have intrinsic value even if nobody in fact valued it for its own sake: the valuers might simply be wrong about their moral judgments.
- 8.
Generally anthropocentric views will have more options here: they might, for example, appeal to a moral sense, intuition, or natural emotion. Some of these options may be open to the non-anthropocentric, but they fit less well together.
- 9.
All references in this section will be to Leopold (1966). See bibliography for full citation.
- 10.
However, in other essays, ‘land’ is used as a pejorative term: “There is much confusion between land and country. Land is the place where corn, gullies, and mortgages grow. Country is the personality of land, the collective harmony of its soil, life, and weather” (p. 177).
- 11.
Indeed, I have argued that it is often the most important consideration, if understood correctly.
- 12.
- 13.
Callicott has taken this even further, pointing out that the land ethic “could fairly be called a case of earth chauvinism” (p. 262) – although he thinks it’s a perfectly justified form of chauvinism.
- 14.
- 15.
- 16.
It is interesting to note in this regard that the largest designated ‘Wilderness Area’ in the U.S., the Boundary Waters Canoe Area (BWCA) was in fact fairly extensively logged up through the early twentieth century.
- 17.
One response to some of these issues has been a split between deep ecology and “social ecology,” the latter most closely associated with Murray Bookchin. See Chase (1987).
- 18.
For a more detailed discussion see the essays by Sessions and Plumwood in Warren (1996).
- 19.
Hence Comstock’s (1996) term for such theories: “extensionist environmental ethics.”
- 20.
For a detailed discussion, and a scathing critique of the latter (see Ferry 1995).
- 21.
The second condition is not quite precise enough: X must somehow contribute to the intrinsic value of Y, such that our effect on X diminishes the value of Y. That is, there must be a direct causal link between what we do to X and Y’s diminution of intrinsic value; it can’t just be a coincidence.
- 22.
Although arguments in favor of conservation tillage often follow similar lines of argument as those adduced against clear-cutting of trees.
References
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Comstock, G. (2001). Vexing nature? On the ethical case against agricultural biotechnology. Boston, MA: Kluwer.
Ferry, L. (1995). The new ecological order. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Jamieson, D. (1995). Ecosystem health: Some preventative medicine. Environmental Values, 4, 333–344.
Leopold, A. (1966). A Sand County Almanac. New York: Ballantine (originally copyrighted by Oxford University Press in 1949).
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Russow, LM. (2010). Environment. In: Comstock, G.L. (eds) Life Science Ethics. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-8792-8_5
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