Abstract
The main purpose of this chapter is to examine three arguments – from Hare, Marquis and Harman – that, whether by design or not, place the permissibility of the early abortion in doubt. Each of the three arguments is grounded in positions that seem to assign at least some moral significance to the loss incurred by a merely possible person when that person is left out of existence altogether. Those positions are, in turn, at odds with the account of the moral significance of loss that Variabilism itself suggests.
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Notes
- 1.
See part 1.6 above. See also Chapter 5.
- 2.
Hare (1975), p. 218.
- 3.
Hare (1975), p. 211.
- 4.
Parfit (1987), pp. 381–90.
- 5.
Hare (1975), p. 218 (citing his review, Hare (1973), of Rawls, who himself was famously worried about utilitarianism’s failure “to take seriously the distinction between persons.” Rawls (1972), p. 27).
- 6.
Hare (1975), p. 208.
- 7.
Hare (1975), p. 208.
- 8.
Hare (1975), p. 208.
- 9.
Hare (1975), p. 212.
- 10.
Hare (1975), p. 212.
- 11.
Hare (1975), p. 219.
- 12.
Sher (1977), p. 186.
- 13.
Hare (1975), p. 219.
- 14.
If we accept Rabinowicz’s Principle of Normative Invariance – as I do – we will think Hare’s point here is correct. See note 61 above.
- 15.
Hare (1975), p. 202.
- 16.
Hare (1975), pp. 205–206.
- 17.
Marquis (1989), pp. 183–202, and Marquis (2008), pp. 422–426.
- 18.
Marquis (2008), p. 422.
- 19.
The account of why death is often bad that follows this note in the text roughly comports with Marquis’s view but isn’t drawn directly from it. Rather, it derives more directly (2008) from Feldman (1994). For a brief account of the loss of death as something that is incurred by a person who does or will exist, see part 2.2.3 above.
- 20.
For a clear and very precise discussion, see Louis M. Guenin (2008), p. 59 ff.
- 21.
Marquis (2008), p. 425.
- 22.
Marquis (2008), pp. 425–426.
- 23.
David Lewis presented something like this view in his defense of the psychological continuity account of personal identity against the brain splitting paradoxes. He imagined the two surviving persons prior to twinning to simply overlap in space for some period of time and then – if the twinning in fact takes place – going on to enjoy their separate lives. See Lewis (1970), pp. 17–40.
- 24.
Marquis (2008), p. 426.
- 25.
Cynthia Cohen has recently argued in favor of the “14 day or later rule” as offering the best account of when human embryos begin to have the same moral significance as living human beings. Among other things, such a rule suggests that even if the earlier embryo is itself owed some form of special respect, stem cell research may proceed in view of the fact that the embryonic stem cells themselves would be taken from the blastocyst, and the embryo at that point destroyed, at day five or six. She, in part, supports that rule by reference to the twinning argument. See Cohen (2007), pp. 67–69, 72–73 and 84.
- 26.
Marquis (2008), p. 426 (2008).
- 27.
Harman (2000), p. 310.
- 28.
Harman (2000), p. 318.
- 29.
Harman (2000), p. 318 (2000).
- 30.
Harman (2000), p. 320.
- 31.
Harman (2000), p. 321.
- 32.
Harman (2000), p. 311.
- 33.
Harman (2000), pp. 311–312.
- 34.
Harman (2000), p. 311.
- 35.
Harman (2000), p. 313.
- 36.
Harman (2000), p. 313.
- 37.
Harman (2000), p. 313. Harman does leave open the possibility that the early abortion may require justification on grounds having nothing to do with the fetus. I assume that the reference here is to the odd case where the early abortion imposes a substantial loss on an individual other than the fetus. Harman (2000), p. 312.
- 38.
Harman (2000), p. 311.
- 39.
It is not clear to me why parental love would be appropriate in the case where there is no early abortion but never in the case where the early abortion does take place. After all, the woman may choose the early abortion very reluctantly – for the sake of, say, an already-existing child; she may in that case subjectively feel love for the fetus or even potentially for the merely possible person. And clearly, if parental love is appropriate in the case where there is no early abortion, then it is appropriate in the case where there is a miscarriage as well. Harman, however, considers and replies to objections along those lines. Harman (2000), pp. 319–320.
- 40.
See Harman (2004), p. 98 (“… we do have some reasons to create every happy child we could create. But there are reasons to benefit.… These reasons are very different from reasons against harming.…”). See generally Harman (2009).
- 41.
Harman (2004), p. 106.
- 42.
Harman (2004), pp. 106–107.
- 43.
Harman (2004), p. 107.
- 44.
Harman (2000), p. 321.
- 45.
See parts 2.2.1 and 2.6 above.
- 46.
Harman (2000), p. 317.
- 47.
I am grateful to Elizabeth Harman for this point.
- 48.
See, for example, Sider (1993), pp. 117–132.
References
Cohen, Cynthia. 2007. Renewing the Stuff of Life: Stem Cells, Ethics and Public Policy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Feldman, Fred. 1994. Confrontations with the Reaper. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Guenin, Louis M. 2008. The Morality of Embryo Use. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hare, R.M. 1973. “Rawls’ Theory of Justice.” Philosophical Quarterly 23(92): 241–252.
Hare, R.M. 1975. “Abortion and the Golden Rule.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 4(3): 201–222.
Harman, Elizabeth. 2000. “Creation Ethics: The Moral Status of Early Fetuses and the Ethics of Abortion.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 28 (4): 310–324.
Harman, Elizabeth. 2004. “Can We Harm and Benefit in Creating?” Philosophical Perspectives 18: 89–113.
Harman, Elizabeth. 2009. “Harming as Causing Harm.” In Harming Future Persons, eds. M.A. Roberts and David Wasserman. Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 137–154.
Lewis, David. 1970. “Survival and Identity.” In The Identities of Persons, ed. Amelie Rorty. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, pp. 17–40.
Marquis, Don. 1989. “Why Abortion Is Immoral.” Journal of Philosophy 86: 183–202.
Marquis, Don. 2008. “Abortion and Human Nature.” Journal of Medical Ethics 34: 422–426
Parfit, Derek. 1987. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rawls, John. 1972. A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sher, George. 1977. “Hare, Abortion, and the Golden Rule.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 6(2): 185–190.
Sider, Ted. 1993. “Asymmetry and Self-Sacrifice.” Philosophical Studies 70(2): 117–132.
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Roberts, M.A. (2010). Three More Arguments Against Early Abortion. In: Abortion and the Moral Significance of Merely Possible Persons. Philosophy and Medicine(), vol 107. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3792-3_4
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