Abstract
As a prominent Confucian thinker in early seventeenth century China, Liu Zongzhou 劉宗周 (1578–1645) was the last towering figure who stood in the line of transmission of Song-Ming Neo-Confucian philosophy. Since Liu confessed that the development of his thought was greatly influenced by his studies on the teachings of his predecessor Wang Yangming 王陽明, many researchers used to view Liu merely as an internal critic and revisionist of Wang’s thought (Tang 1990: 468–494; Tang 1991: 230–255; Mou 1979: 451–541; Lao 1981: 566–623). It has not been until the most recent decade that a number of researchers have tended to emphasize the uniqueness of Liu’s thinking (Lin 1997; Huang 2001).
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Notes
- 1.
According to Liu’s Chronological Biography, Liu started out having doubts about, then endorsed, and then strongly criticized Wang Yangming’s teachings to develop his own thought (Liu 1997: 5.488).
- 2.
Needless to say, a widely shared belief in Song-Ming Neo-Confucian metaphysics is that humans’ original nature is what humans are endowed with from the creative principle of the universe. Mou Zongsan refers to this interconnectedness between humans and the universe as “the way of heaven and the human nature and destiny are interrelated” (天道性命相貫通) (Mou 1968: 1.417).
- 3.
Here Tang uses the term “pure consciousness” to characterize the moral heart/mind. He states, “The meaning of ‘heart/mind’ is ‘original heart/mind’ and is identical with pure consciousness” (Tang 1991: 241). Since the Confucian moral heart/mind is a transcendental capacity as well as a transcendental criterion of morality, it is pure. Tang clearly explains this
- 4.
point: “Consciousness is pure when it withdraws itself from outer or inner empirical objects, purifies itself from what is mixed with, and sees itself as a pure subjectivity or a pure spiritual light. Chinese thinkers usually use the words jue 覺 or ming-jue 明覺 to describe this pure consciousness. Jue may be translated as ‘awareness’ or ‘sensibility’ or ‘consciousness.’ In the West, when people talk about awareness or sensibility, they think of objects to become aware of or to be sensed. When consciousness is mentioned, it is usually associated with being conscious of something. However, in such Western philosophies as Kant’s and Husserl’s, there is the idea of pure consciousness—consciousness as pure subjectivity without connection with the object. So I use the words ‘pure consciousness’ as a translation of the Chinese word jue when it does not imply any connection with the objects and is not mixed with the objects with impression or ideas gotten from the subjects.” (Tang 1991: 240)
- 5.
Liu’s emphasis on the inseparability of the moral and material natures is also applicable to his discussion of the principle-vital energy (li-qi 理氣) relationship. Liu says, “What fills heaven and earth is vital energy” and “Principle is the principle of vital energy, it is certainly not prior to vital energy and not outside vital energy” (Liu 1997: 2.483). Elsewhere I have provided a detailed examination of this idea of inseparability and suggest that it is seriously wrong to categorize Liu as a materialistic philosopher. The emphasis on the idea that the moral and material natures, principle and vital energy, the metaphysical and
- 6.
the transcendent and immanent are all inseparable, arose from what Shu-hsien Liu (Liu Shuxian 劉述先) calls “a tendency toward immanent monism” which was wide spread among Confucian scholars in the late Ming. The tendency is taken as a way to counter the subtle inversion of Buddhist philosophy into Confucian philosophy; however, it is basically a theoretical mistake. Because it overemphasizes inseparability at the expense of irreducibility, it tends to reject all the Confucian distinctions. In other words, it overlooks the truth that the moral nature cannot be reduced to the material nature even though they are inseparable in moral practice (Cheng 2008: 445–449).
- 7.
It is noted that Wang Yangming has reservations about using the term “tranquility” because it is easily mistaken as the quiescent state (動靜之靜) that is opposed to the active state (動靜之動) of the heart/mind. Wang was concerned that such a misunderstanding might lead one to cultivate quietism. Yangming’s reservations are clear from the following passage in the Record of Practicing What Has Been Transmitted (Chuan xi lu 傳習錄).
- 8.
I asked, “When one’s heart/mind is preserved in peace and tranquility, can it be called the state of equilibrium before one’s feelings are aroused?”
The Teacher said, “Nowadays when people preserve their heart/mind, only their vital energy is calm. When they are peaceful and tranquil, it is only their vital energy that is peaceful and tranquil. That cannot be considered as the state of equilibrium before feelings are aroused.” “If it is not equilibrium, isn’t it perhaps the way to achieve it?” “The only way is to get rid of selfish human desires and preserve the Principle of Nature. When tranquil, direct every thought to removing selfish human desires and preserving the Principle of Nature, and when active, direct every thought to doing the same. One should never mind whether or not one is at peace and tranquil. If one depends on that peace and tranquility, not only will there be the fault of gradually becoming fond of quietness and tired of activity, but there will be many defects latent in that state of heart/mind. They cannot be eliminated but will grow as usual when something happens. If one regards following principle as fundamental, when is it that one will not be peaceful and tranquil? But if one regards peace and tranquility as fundamental, he is not necessarily able to follow principle.” (Wang 1992: 1.13–14; Chan 1963b: 30–31 mod.)
- 9.
There was a widespread rejection of the idea of “beyond good and evil” (Wang Yangming’s first dictum) among scholars in the late Ming. It is because the later scholars of Wang’s school, especially Wang Ji 王畿 and the Taizhou school 泰州學派, took the idea to extremes that then gave rise to a stress on the idea of good (Tang 1991: 230–235). Liu was no exception to the rejection. Yet, this is not the crucial difference between Liu and Yangming, as there is enough evidence in Liu’s writings to show that Liu understood the idea of beyond good and evil in terms of “the absolute good” (zhi shan 至善). (Liu 1997: 2.484–485, 518–519)
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Cheng, Cy. (2010). Liu Zongzhou on Self-Cultivation. In: Makeham, J. (eds) Dao Companion to Neo-Confucian Philosophy. Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2930-0_16
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