Abstract
We consider a general class of two agent allocation problems and identify the complete class of first best rules. By first best rules we mean allocation rules for which we can find efficient, strategyproof and budget balanced mechanisms. We show that the only first best rules are the fixed share allocation rules.
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Mitra, M. (2011). Two Agent Allocation Problems and the First Best. In: Abergel, F., Chakrabarti, B.K., Chakraborti, A., Mitra, M. (eds) Econophysics of Order-driven Markets. New Economic Windows. Springer, Milano. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-88-470-1766-5_19
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-88-470-1766-5_19
Publisher Name: Springer, Milano
Print ISBN: 978-88-470-1765-8
Online ISBN: 978-88-470-1766-5
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