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Can Private Learn From Public Governance?

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Nonprofit-Organisationen und Märkte

Part of the book series: Marktorientiertes Nonprofit-Management ((MNM))

Abstract

Corporate governance is importantly based on Agency Theory and relies on extrinsic incentives to align the interests of managers, employees and shareholders. This paper argues that in view of recent corporate scandals, private governance can learn from public governance: (1) Goal-oriented intrinsic motivation of agents should be supported by fixed incomes and an extensive selection process of employees; (2) Extrinsic, but non-monetary incentives (e.g. conferring orders and titles) can be used; (3) The power of actors should be restricted by a clear division of power, appropriate rules of succession and institutionalised competition for positions in firms.

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Authors
  1. Bruno S. Frey
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  2. Matthias Benz
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Bernd Helmig Robert Purtschert Reinbert Schauer Dieter Witt

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© 2007 Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag | GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden

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Frey, B.S., Benz, M. (2007). Can Private Learn From Public Governance?. In: Helmig, B., Purtschert, R., Schauer, R., Witt, D. (eds) Nonprofit-Organisationen und Märkte. Marktorientiertes Nonprofit-Management. Deutscher Universitätsverlag, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8350-9384-3_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8350-9384-3_1

  • Publisher Name: Deutscher Universitätsverlag, Wiesbaden

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-8350-0551-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-8350-9384-3

  • eBook Packages: Business and Economics (German Language)

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