Skip to main content

‘Rules vs. Standards’ or Standards as Delegation of Authority for Making (Optimally Differentiated) Rules

  • Chapter
Book cover Internationalisierung des Rechts und seine ökonomische Analyse

Abstract

On June 28, 2007, the US Supreme Court decided in the ‘Leegin’ case1 that resale price maintenance should no longer be per se prohibited in US antitrust law. Beginning with GTE Sylvania (1977) the court has reversed former per se prohibitions of vertical restraints and replaced them step by step through a rule of reason approach, as now for resale price maintenance. This development follows a more positive and differentiated assessment of vertical restraints by economists. Since it can be demonstrated that under certain conditions resale price maintenance might also be welfare-enhancing, many economists think that a per se prohibition is no longer appropriate (Motta 2004, 377). The general debate about ‘per se rules vs. rule of reason’ in US antitrust law is nearly as old as the law itself. Whereas a per se prohibition means that a business behavior is forbidden per se, i.e. without considering the specific circumstances in a case, a rule of reason approach allows for a much more differentiated analysis of the circumstances and effects in that particular case. In the last two decades — not only in the US, but also in Europe — a growing tendency to more rule of reason instead of per se rules can be observed. The main reason for this development is the insight of modern industrial economics that many business behaviors do not have generally positive or negative effects on competition or welfare. Often a greater differentiation and a deeper analysis of the circumstances and effects seem necessary for distinguishing between pro- and anticompetitive behaviors (Kerber and Schwalbe 2008, 230–235). A rule of reason analysis appears to be more appropriate. These developments also are the basis of the ‘more economic approach’ in European competition policy (Röller 2005). In combination with new theoretical and empirical methods for the quantitative analysis of the welfare effects this has led to a tendency for a greater case-by-case approach.

Leegin Creative Leather Products Inc vs. PSKS Inc., 551 U.S. (2007), Sup Ct (USA).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 89.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 129.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Christiansen, A., and W. Kerber (2006): Competition Policy with Optimally Differentiated Rules Instead of “Per se Rules vs. Rule of Reason”, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 2(2), 215–244

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Crane, D.A. (2007): Rules versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, Washington and Lee Law Review 64, 49–110

    Google Scholar 

  • Diver, C.S. (1983): The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, The Yale Law Journal 93(1), 65–109

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Easterbrook, F.H. (1992): Ignorance and Antitrust, in: Jorde, T.M. and D.J. Teece (eds.), Antitrust, Innovation, and Competitiveness, New York: Oxford University Press, 119–136

    Google Scholar 

  • Ehrlich, I. and R.A. Posner (1974): An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 257–286

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eucken, W. (1952): Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck

    Google Scholar 

  • Fon, V., and F. Parisi (2007): On the Optimal Specificity of Legal Rules, Journal of Institutional Economics 3(2), 147–164

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hayek, F.A. (1973): Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Vol. I: Rules and Order, Chicago: Chicago University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Heyer, K. (2005): A World of Uncertainty: Economics and the Globalization of Antitrust, Antitrust Law Journal 72(2), 375–422

    Google Scholar 

  • Joskow, P.L. (1992): Transaction Costs Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 18(1), 95–116

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kaplow, L. (1992): Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, Duke Law Journal 42, 557–629

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kaplow, L. (1995): A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11(1), 150–163

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaplow, L. (2000): General Characteristics of Rules, Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 502–528

    Google Scholar 

  • Kerber, W., and U. Schwalbe (2008): Economic Principles of Competition Law, in: Säcker, F.-J., Hirsch, G., and F. Montag (eds.), Competition Law: European Community Practice and Procedure-Article-by-article Commentary of the EC Competition Law, Vol. 1, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 202–391

    Google Scholar 

  • Motta, M. (2004): Competition Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Parisi, F. (2004): Rules versus Standards, in: Rowley, C.K., and F. Schneider (eds.), Encyclopedia of Public Choice, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 510–516

    Google Scholar 

  • Parisi, F., Fon, V., and N. Ghei (2004): The Value of Waiting in Lawmaking, European Journal of Law and Economics 18, 131–148

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Röller, L.-H. (2005): Economic Analysis and Competition Policy Enforcement in Europe, in: van Bergejik, P.A.G., and E. Kloosterhuis (eds.), Modelling European Mergers. Theory, Competition Policy and Case Studies, Cheltenham: Elgar, 11–24

    Google Scholar 

  • Schäfer, H.-B. (2006): Rules versus Standards in Rich and Poor Countries: Precise Legal Norms as Substitutes for Human Capital in Low-Income Countries, Supreme Court Economic Review 14, 113–134

    Google Scholar 

  • Sullivan, K.M. (1992): The Justices of Rules and Standards, Harvard Law Review 106, 22–123

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vanberg, V. (2005): Market and State: The Perspective of Constitutional Political Economy, Journal of Institutional Economics 1, 23–49

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Van den Bergh, R.J., and P.D. Camesasca (2006): European Competition Law and Economics. A Comparative Perspective, London: Sweet & Maxwell

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Thomas Eger Jochen Bigus Claus Ott Georg von Wangenheim

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2008 Gabler | GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Kerber, W. (2008). ‘Rules vs. Standards’ or Standards as Delegation of Authority for Making (Optimally Differentiated) Rules. In: Eger, T., Bigus, J., Ott, C., von Wangenheim, G. (eds) Internationalisierung des Rechts und seine ökonomische Analyse. Gabler. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8350-5582-7_36

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics