Skip to main content

Accustomed Swiss Thoroughness and Accuracy in Executive Stock Option Programs?

  • Conference paper
Aktuelle Entwicklungen im Finanzdienstleistungsbereich
  • 176 Accesses

Abstract

Executive Stock Options (ESOs) give top-managers the right, granted by their company, to buy shares of their company’s stock for a predetermined within a fixed period of time, possibly after a vesting period. In the meantime ESOs are adopted in companies all over the world, mainly for reasons of enhancing executives’ incentives to work harder and realizing a situation of optimal risk sharing between shareholders and top-management.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 69.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 89.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Achleitner, A.-K./ Wichels, D. (2002). Stock-Option-Pläne als VergĂĽtungsbestandteil wertorientierter Entlohnungssysteme. In: A.-K. Achleitner/ P. Wollmert (Eds.): Stock Options. Stuttgart, pp. 1–24.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fama, E.F./ Jensen, M.C. (1983). Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, June, pp. 301–325.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hall, B.J./ Liebman, J.B. (1999). The Taxation of Executive Compensation. National Bureau of Economic Research, Tax Policy and the Economy. Vol. 14, 2000.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hall, B.J./ Murphy, K.J. (2003). The Trouble with Stock Options. Working Paper. Forthcoming Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 17(3), Summer 2003.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hall, B.J./ Murphy, K.J. (2002). Stock options for undiversified executives. Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 33, pp. 3–42.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Helbling, C. (1998). Mitarbeiteraktien und Mitarbeiteroptionen in der Schweiz. ZĂĽrich.

    Google Scholar 

  • Herzog, P./ Hänni, R. (Eds.) (2001). Employee Ownership: Employee Stock Plans, Stock Option Plans, Phantom Stock Plans in Switzerland. Brochure, KPMG Fides, ZĂĽrich.

    Google Scholar 

  • Holmstrom (1982) Moral Hazard in Teams. Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 13, pp. 324–340.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hull, J.C. (2003). Options, Futures, and other Derivatives. 5th. ed., Upper Saddle River (NJ).

    Google Scholar 

  • Hull, J./ White, A. (2003). Accounting for Employee Stock Options. Working Paper. Forthcoming Journal of Derivatives Accounting, Vol. l, No. 1.

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnson / Tian (2000). Indexed Executive Stock Options. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 57, pp. 35–64.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Körnert, J. (1999). Aktienoptionsprogramme fĂĽr FĂĽhrungskräfte als Finanzierungs-und Motivationsinstrument. Freiberg Working Papers N. 16, Freiberg.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lambert, R.A./ Larcker, D.F./ Verrecchia, R.E. (1991). Portfolio Considerations in Valuing Executive Compensation. Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 29:1, pp. 129–149.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Madrick, J. (2003). A Theory of Corporate Greed. New York Times, February 20, 2003.

    Google Scholar 

  • Menichetti, M.J. (1999). Anreizeffizientes Design von Executive Stock Options. In: A. Egger/ O. GrĂĽn/ R. Moser (Eds.): Managementinstrumente und-konzepte. Stuttgart, pp. 511–527.

    Google Scholar 

  • Menichetti, M.J. (1996). Aktien-Optionsprogramme fĂĽr das Top-Management. Der Betrieb, Vol. 49, No. 34, pp. 1688–1692.

    Google Scholar 

  • Meulbroek, L.K. (2001). The Efficiency of Equity-Linked Compensation: Understanding the Full Cost of Awarding Executive Stock Options. Financial Management, Vol. 30, pp. 5–30.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Milgrom, P.R./ Roberts, J. (1992). Economics, Organization and Management. Englewood Cliffs (NJ).

    Google Scholar 

  • Neue ZĂĽrcher Zeitung (2003). Kein Anreiz durch deutsche Aktienoptionen. 26.06.2003, p. 24.

    Google Scholar 

  • Risi, A. (1999). Mitarbeiteroptionen und-aktien. ZĂĽrich.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sterchi, M./ Locher, R. (2001). Mitarbeiteroptionen im Lichte der Aktienkursschwankungen. Der Schweizer Treuhänder, 11/2001, pp. 1067–1074.

    Google Scholar 

  • Winter, S. (2000). Optionspläne als Instrument wertorientierter ManagementvergĂĽtung. Frankfurt/M.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Menichetti, M.J. (2004). Accustomed Swiss Thoroughness and Accuracy in Executive Stock Option Programs?. In: Geberl, S., Kaufmann, HR., Menichetti, M.J., Wiesner, D.F. (eds) Aktuelle Entwicklungen im Finanzdienstleistungsbereich. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-2651-7_17

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-2651-7_17

  • Publisher Name: Physica, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-0192-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-7908-2651-7

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics