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It Takes Two to Tango. Patents and Markets in the Periphery and the Centre. Prebisch Dancing with Hilty

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Abstract

Since 1995, the TRIPs Agreement has provided an international framework for domestic patent law. Reto Hilty and the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition have led an effort among patent scholars to map patent ‘flexibilities’ included in the TRIPs Agreement. These flexibilities allow developing countries to adapt their national patent law to their developmental needs.

Said legal scholars have argued in favour of regulatory sovereignty and room for manoeuvre under TRIPs but they have seldom stated for what purpose this policy space should be preserved. In this contribution, we draw on the work of Raul Prebisch to explore one possible, productive way of using the flexibility of the TRIPs Agreement.

Prebisch was a twentieth century Argentinian structuralist economist and a leading specialist of economic development in Latin America. Over the past 15 years, Prebisch’s work has received renewed attention. Prebisch’s structural analysis deviates from the dominant schools of neoclassical economics, institutional economic analysis in legal scholarship and free trade ideology in international economic law. Nevertheless, Prebisch's writings remain relevant to patent theory.

We derive a patent policy from Prebisch’s economic writings and subsequently argue that Prebisch’s patent vision can be implemented under today’s TRIPs Agreement as interpreted by Reto Hilty.

The authors research the socio-political context of IP legislation in Argentina to pay tribute to the multifaceted and international scholarship of Reto Hilty and his recent interest in Latin America, particularly in Argentina. As neither of the authors masters the Spanish language, they had to resort to available English sources. Many thanks to Latin American colleagues, amongst whom Prof. Guillermo Vidaurreta and Pedro Henrique Batista, for their valuable information. Any mistakes or misinterpretations, remain the authors’.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Yglesias (2012).

  2. 2.

    Spruk (2019), p. 5. Also see the references cited there.

  3. 3.

    Lewis (1992); Edwards et al. (2009).

  4. 4.

    Dosman (2008).

  5. 5.

    Lin (2012), p. 5; Simon (2019), pp. 339–345.

  6. 6.

    Also named after the German-British UN-employed development economist Hans Singer, who came to similar conclusions independently from Prebisch.

  7. 7.

    Harvey et al. (2010); Arezki et al. (2014).

  8. 8.

    In the 1930s, Prebisch had served as the Director-General of the Argentinian Central Bank under the conservative military government of General Uriburu. In 1943, he was forced to leave his position by a new military government, linked to Juan Peron. Prebisch became a fierce criticus of the populist President Peron but did not object to working with the military government that succeeded him, writing the Prebisch Plan for economic development in 1955. All in all, Prebisch was seen as a conservative voice on the Argentinian domestic political scene. See Dosman (2008).

  9. 9.

    Sikkink (1988).

  10. 10.

    Prebisch (1976); Prebisch (1981); Prebisch (1984).

  11. 11.

    Lin (2012).

  12. 12.

    Dosman (2008).

  13. 13.

    E.g., Margulis (2017).

  14. 14.

    E.g., Fajardo (2022).

  15. 15.

    Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994. Hilty also took an interest in bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs) with IP provisions, see Grosse Ruse-Khan et al. (2013).

  16. 16.

    Lamping et al. (2014).

  17. 17.

    Ibid. See also Hilty (2015); Hilty (2011b).

  18. 18.

    The First Industrial Revolution had started in England from the 1780s onwards but the rate of innovation slowed down towards the 1820s to 1840s. The First Industrial Revolution was powered by coal and steam engines and made strides in industries ranging from iron to textiles. See Hobsbawm (1996).

  19. 19.

    Mokyr (1999).

  20. 20.

    See Abbenhuis and Morrell (2019). Since the end of the Cold War, we are in the middle of the ‘Second Globalisation’.

  21. 21.

    Pinilla and Rayes (2019).

  22. 22.

    Pinilla and Rayes (2019); Spruk (2019), p. 2.

  23. 23.

    Spruk (2019), p. 2. Argentina’s exports represented around 0.8% of the world trade during the early 1850s and reached levels of almost 4% in the 1920s. See Fig. 1 Pinilla and Rayes (2019), p. 445. According to economic scholars, only Canada and Japan increased their share at a faster rate than Argentina.

  24. 24.

    Cardenas (2003) as discussed in Pinilla and Rayes (2019), p. 445.

  25. 25.

    Pinilla and Rayes (2019), pp. 448–449, 459. For more on ‘import substitution’, see Sect. 3.

  26. 26.

    This paragraph is based on Spruk (2019) and the sources cited there; see also Lewis (1992); Edwards et al. (2009).

  27. 27.

    For the term ‘corporatism’, see Schmitter (1974).

  28. 28.

    On import substitution, see further, Sect. 3.1.

  29. 29.

    Ley N° 111 de 11 de octubre de 1864 sobre las Patentes de Invención. The present contribution is based on the English translation: Law No. 111 of October 11, 1864 on Patents (available at https://wipolex-res.wipo.int. Accessed March 9, 2023). Two partial patent acts were enacted in Argentina before the APA 1864 (For details, see Vidaurreta (2007), p. 91). The patent act of 1864 was in force until the Patent Act No. 24.481 which was adopted in 1995: Ley N° 24.481 de 20 de septiembre de 1995, de Patentes de Invención y Modelos de Utilidad; Law No. 24.481 of September 20, 1995 on Patents for Inventions and Utility Models.

  30. 30.

    Spruk (2019), p. 2.

  31. 31.

    For some comparative notes, see, Ladas (1930), pp. 23–24. Also see Dreyfuss and Pila (2018), pp. 3–22; Kurz (2000).

  32. 32.

    See https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Argentina_1994?lang=en#s41. Accessed May 2, 2023.

  33. 33.

    Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (open for signature March 20, 1883, entered into force July 7, 1884, last amended September 28, 1979) 828 UNTS 305 (hereafter Paris Convention).

  34. 34.

    Vidaurreta (2007), p. 153.

  35. 35.

    The APA 1864 shows quite some resemblance with the French Patent Act of 1791. A detailed, comparative analysis of both acts will not be reported upon here.

  36. 36.

    Also see article 3 and article 46 in fine APA 1864 in this regard.

  37. 37.

    See Simon (2019), pp. 339–345. We wrote the paragraphs on Prebisch’s theory mainly on the basis of the following primary sources, in the order of importance: Prebisch (1962); Prebisch (1959); Prebisch (1964); Prebisch (1954); Prebisch (1976).

  38. 38.

    See Sect. 1.

  39. 39.

    For ‘growth with redistribution’, see Chenery et al. (1979).

  40. 40.

    Cf. Lewis (1954).

  41. 41.

    Pioneered by David Ricardo. See Ricardo (1817).

  42. 42.

    Lin and Chang (2009).

  43. 43.

    Pinilla and Rayes (2019); Bulmer-Thomas (2003), pp. 46–81. Also see Sect. 2.

  44. 44.

    Bulmer-Thomas (2003), pp. 82–116.

  45. 45.

    The contemporary school of New Structural Economics tends to look more favourable upon arguments based on comparative advantage than Prebisch did. See Lin (2012).

  46. 46.

    Prebisch (1962).

  47. 47.

    Cf. ‘Middle Income Trap’, see Gill and Kharas (2015).

  48. 48.

    Prebisch (1962).

  49. 49.

    Prebisch (1954); Dosman (2008), pp. 327–328.

  50. 50.

    Prebisch (1962), p. 18.

  51. 51.

    For both points, see Waterbury (1999).

  52. 52.

    Dosman (2008), pp. 327–328, 453.

  53. 53.

    Baer (1972).

  54. 54.

    Love (1980).

  55. 55.

    Amin (1974); Frank (1970).

  56. 56.

    See, e.g., Prebisch (1959).

  57. 57.

    Sherwood (1998), p. 79; Gruben (1992), p. 20.

  58. 58.

    Prebisch (1959), p. 252.

  59. 59.

    Prebisch (1962), p. 16.

  60. 60.

    Ho (2012), p. 889.

  61. 61.

    Ho (2012), p. 889.

  62. 62.

    UNCTAD (1975).

  63. 63.

    Bulmer-Thomas (2003), pp. 46–81.

  64. 64.

    Similar to ‘European patents’ under the European Patent Convention 1973.

  65. 65.

    Similar to ‘European patents with unitary effect’ (Unified patents). See Desaunettes-Barbero et al. (2023); Plomer (2015).

  66. 66.

    Our terminology.

  67. 67.

    Although Argentina wanted to join the Convention as early as 1966. See Law No. 17.011 of November 10, 1966, on Approval of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.

  68. 68.

    Dreyfuss and Pila (2018), pp. 432–441.

  69. 69.

    From 1930 to 1935, Prebisch was first Under-Secretary of Finance and Agriculture and later adviser to the Ministers of Finance and of Agriculture. In other words, he never worked for the Ministry of the Interior and, therefore, was never directly in charge of the Patent Office. See Simon (2019), p. 339.

  70. 70.

    Notably the arrangements for follow-on innovation (see Articles 27–32) and non-working (Article 47) which will not be further elaborated upon here.

  71. 71.

    Winham (2005), pp. 3–25.

  72. 72.

    Hilty (2017); Hilty and Slowinski (2014). For more on this legitimation theory, see Drahos (1996); Van Overwalle and van Zimmeren (2009). Also see Burk and Lemley (2009); Lemley (2015); Machlup (1959); Merges (2011).

  73. 73.

    Hilty developed the idea that patents are not a booster for innovation per se but an instrument of competition and innovation policy in many of his writings. The following paragraphs are based on Hilty (2017); Hilty (2012); Hilty (2011a); Hilty (2011b); Hilty and Slowinski (2014). In the same sense, Ullrich (2009), pp. 399, 442; Ullrich (2015), p. 333. Also see, Van Overwalle and Léonard (2024) Van Overwalle (2022).

  74. 74.

    Hilty has written extensively on the need for compulsory licenses to address dysfunctional behavior of IP owners, see Hilty (2017); Hilty (2015); Hilty (2012); Hilty, Liu (eds) (2015). Also, in his analyses of proprietary versus more open models, Hilty stressed the need for limitations, see Hilty (2012); Hilty (2011b); Hilty and Köklü (2013).

  75. 75.

    Hilty (2012), p. 5, with reference to Lehmann: “Competition restraints in order to boost Competition”.

  76. 76.

    Hilty (2011a, b).

  77. 77.

    Hilty never, as far as we are aware, admitted to any influence on his work by the school of NIE, but the influences are clear to us.

  78. 78.

    North (1991), p. 97.

  79. 79.

    North (1991), pp. 97–112; North (1990).

  80. 80.

    Faundez (2016).

  81. 81.

    Coase (1937); Coase (2000).

  82. 82.

    Hilty (2012).

  83. 83.

    See Gervais (2003).

  84. 84.

    Lamping et al. (2014).

  85. 85.

    Patent Declaration (2014), p. 1.

  86. 86.

    Patent Declaration (2014), p. 3.

  87. 87.

    Patent Declaration (2014), p. 3.

  88. 88.

    Patent Declaration (2014), p. 3.

  89. 89.

    Patent Declaration (2014), p. 4.

  90. 90.

    Patent Declaration (2014), p. 4.

  91. 91.

    Patent Declaration (2014), p. 8.

  92. 92.

    Patent Declaration (2014), p. 9.

  93. 93.

    Patent Declaration (2014), p. 10.

  94. 94.

    Patent Declaration (2014), p. 5.

  95. 95.

    Patent Declaration (2014), p. 7. On purpose-bound protection, see Lamping (2010).

  96. 96.

    Patent Declaration (2014), p. 7.

  97. 97.

    Patent Declaration (2014), p. 9.

  98. 98.

    See above.

  99. 99.

    Lin (2012).

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  1. Leuven University, Leuven, Belgium

    Geertrui Van Overwalle

  2. Hamburg Institute for Social Research, Hamburg, Germany

    Lodewijk Van Dycke

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  3. Institut für Europarecht, Internationales Recht und Rechtsvergleichung, Universität Wien, Wien, Österreich

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Van Overwalle, G., Van Dycke, L. (2024). It Takes Two to Tango. Patents and Markets in the Periphery and the Centre. Prebisch Dancing with Hilty. In: Thouvenin, F., Peukert, A., Jaeger, T., Geiger, C. (eds) Kreation Innovation Märkte - Creation Innovation Markets. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-68599-0_52

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