Abstract
Plato’s dialogues are masterpieces of conversation: both on the level of the text, which presents Socrates in conversation with different types of interlocutors to the reader, and on the text-external level, where Plato implicitly adresses his reader. The early dialogues are characterized in particular by a special conversation practice of Socrates aimed at bewilderment and—as a result—the aporia of the interlocutors. Conversations stagnate, produce confusing results and the course of argumentation sometimes seems to be incoherent. This essay presents, after preliminary remarks on the dimensions of the Platonic dialogue, selected passages from the Meno, which show how Plato marks errors or inaccuracies in the argumentation of his figures, which ultimately lead to the aporia or to unsatisfactory results. Plato makes those (not inevitable) mistakes visible and comprehensible to the reader, so that the reader can understand the progression of the dialogue and overcome the (sometimes erroneous) conclusion.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
For the grouping of Plato’s dialogues, see Söder 2017, pp. 23–27.
- 3.
For example, large parts of the Gorgias or the Hippias minor.
- 4.
The “geometry lesson” with the slave in the Meno could be cited as an example. But also large parts of the Charmides or Laches fall into this category.
- 5.
- 6.
Concerning the different types of interlocutors, as far as I know, there is no comprehensive work. Their importance is already emphasised by Teloh 1986.
- 7.
If it were only about the dialogue form in which a philosophical problem is to be discussed, neither the detailed characterisation of the individual figures in the dialogue nor the high variance with regard to the different types of Socrates’ interlocutors and their special properties would be necessary. Cf. Rowe 2007, pp. 10–11.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
- 11.
- 12.
This was already noticed by the ancient Plato commentator Proclus in relation to the typical Socratic irony, which this dialogue only uses towards the sophists. In the later dialogues this is not present anymore; cf. Proclus In tim. 1, 62, 26–28.
- 13.
For this development, see Nehamas 1990, pp. 12–14.
- 14.
- 15.
This is most prominently the case in the Politeia.
- 16.
This is best seen in the figure of Cephalus in the Politeia: The conversation between Cephalus and Socrates has (at least for Cephalus) a rather casual character. But as the conversation gets deeper, Cephalus withdraws from the conversation with the excuse that he now has to sacrifice; he hands the conversation over to his son. Rosen 2005, pp. 30–31 comments: “Cephalus bequeaths the argument to his son, since he himself must now attend to the sacrifices. The symbolism is obvious; at this point, the conversation leaves the dimension of social conventions and turns to argument.”
- 17.
- 18.
Kaiser also speaks of an internal dialogue level (“interne Dialogebene”) in 2017, p. 233.
- 19.
Many interlocutorsin the early dialogues introduce the definitions with the remark that it would not be difficult (οὐ χαλεπόν) to say what this or that thing is; cf. Alc. I 106b7–8, Lach. 190e4, Lys. 206c8 and Men. 71e1.
- 20.
- 21.
See below nn. 25 and 26.
- 22.
- 23.
Sileni were originally nature demons in animal form and were later assigned to the entourage of Dionysus. Finally, the equation of Silen and Satyr took place (see the further excerpt from the Symposium above; cf. Martens 2004, pp. 24–25. The passage here probably refers to figures that could be bought. For the topic of Satyr and Silenus in the Symposium and for parallels in other texts, see Usher 2002.
- 24.
Compare, for instance, the extensive list of accusations against Socrates in the Gorgias. There Callicles is indignant that Socrates deliberately intends to misinterpret (490c9–d1 and 491a1–3), talks nonsense (490e4), deliberately uses sophistical tricks (497a7), asks meaningless questions (497b7–8), is aggressive (505d4) and even quarrelsome (515b5). See also Hipp. min. 373b4–5, Charm. 169c, Euthyphr. 11b.
- 25.
This is how Euthyphro behaves, for example, in the dialogue of the same name (Euthyphr. 15e).
- 26.
Cf. Hipp. min. 369b8–c8.
- 27.
For the sake of readability, this article uses the generic form “reader”, which of course always refers to people of all gender identities.
- 28.
This is assumed by some interpreters; see, for example, Usener 1994 or Kersting 1999. Blößner (1997, 2011) emphasized that Plato expected and even intended that the dialogues are read several times. For interesting observations on this, see Blößner 1997, pp. 284–288. On the importance of reading for understanding a work, see Quintilian inst. orat. 10,1,19: lectio libera est nec actionis impetu transcurrit; sed repetere saepius licet, sive dubites sive memoriae penitus adfigere velis. repetamus autem et retractemus, et ut cibos mansos ac prope liquefactos demittimus, quo facilius digerantur, ita lectio non cruda, sed multa iteratione mollita et velut confecta, memoriae imitationique tradatur.
- 29.
See, for example, Gooch 1987, p. 200 in relation to the Meno: “While the printed word cannot answer his questions in new speech, the stability of written argument does allow him to retrace the path to the conclusion. When he walks the argument’s course again, he may see that its end is not inevitable.” Similarly, Kersting 1999, p. 42 in relation to the Politeia.
- 30.
- 31.
Similarly, in relation to the Meno, Blößner 2011.
- 32.
Erler 1987.
- 33.
This has previously been remarked by Szlezák 1985, pp. 138–139. For the learning progress that the Platonic dialogue can initiate in its reader, see Cotton 2014, esp. pp. 265–266. For the involvement of the reader in the dialogues, see also Hoerber 1960, p. 94, Westermann 2002, pp. 48–49, Blößner 2011, Kaiser 2017.
- 34.
For this, see Erler 1987, p. 8.
- 35.
For comments by the figures in the Platonic dialogues as clues for the reader, see Humar 2017a, pp. 244–273 with further literature references and some examples from other dialogues.
- 36.
Erler 2017, p. 92.
- 37.
- 38.
- 39.
- 40.
- 41.
The Greek text follows here and in the following the edition by J. Burnet (Platonis Opera, rec. Ioannes Burnet, Vol. 1–5, Oxford 1900–1907, and more often). The translations from the Meno are by the author.
- 42.
- 43.
On relativism in the first definition, see Hallich 2013, pp. 36–39.
- 44.
Examples in definitions are often rejected by Socrates; see, for example, Euthyphr. 6d–e and Lach. 190e–192b. These passages are also named in Hallich 2013, p. 39 n. 9.
- 45.
- 46.
Men. 73a6–7: τί δέ; οὐκ ἀνδρὸς μὲν ἀρετὴν ἔλεγες πόλιν εὖ διοικεῖν, γυναικὸς δὲ οἰκίαν;
- 47.
For the inserted εὖ, see Weiss 2001, p. 25.
- 48.
From Men. 87d8–e1 it becomes clear that excellent (agathoi) people are excellent if they have aretē.
- 49.
This is presented explicitly as derived from Gorgias (Socrates had asked for a definition of Gorgias). Aristotle mentions that Gorgias’ educational program consisted in learning his teachings by heart, cf. Arist. Soph. El. 183b35–184a2: For even those who taught eristic verbal contests, the educational program was similar to that of Gorgias. For some gave out rhetorical texts to learn by heart, others eristic texts, and each of them promised to apply their speeches to the often [sc. held] speeches for and against a matter. Therefore, the instruction for the pupils was quick, but unprofessional [i.e. without scientific basis]. καὶ γὰρ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἐριστικοὺς λόγους μισθαρνούντων ὁμοία τις ἦν ἡ παίδευσις τῇ Γοργίου πραγματείᾳ· λόγους γὰρ οἱ μὲν ῥητορικοὺς οἱ δὲ ἐρωτητικοὺς ἐδίδοσαν ἐκμανθάνειν, εἰς οὓς πλειστάκις ἐμπίπτειν ᾠήθησαν ἑκάτεροι τοὺς ἀλλήλων λόγους. διόπερ ταχεῖα μὲν ἄτεχνος δ’ ἦν ἡ διδασκαλία τοῖς μανθάνουσι παρ‘ αὐτῶν·—My translation. Hence, it is not surprising that Meno can offer a (maybe heard) definition but cannot explain it. Anderson (1971, p. 225) comments: “Trained by Gorgias, Meno is a man with an excellent memory, but very little understanding;”
- 50.
ΣΩ. […] ἀλλ᾽ ἆρα καὶ παιδὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετή, ὦ Μένων, καὶ δούλου, ἄρχειν οἵω τε εἶναι τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ δοκεῖ σοι ἔτι ἂν δοῦλος εἶναι ὁ ἄρχων;
- 51.
ΣΩ. […] ἄρχειν φῂς οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι. οὐ προσθήσομεν αὐτόσε τὸ δικαίως, ἀδίκως δὲ μή; MEN. Oἶμαι ἔγωγε· ἡ γὰρ δικαιοσύνη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀρετή ἐστιν. ΣΩ. Πότερον ἀρετή, ὦ Μένων, ἢ ἀρετή τις;
- 52.
These conversation steps are carried out in 74a1–6.
- 53.
ΣΩ. Πάλιν, ὦ Μένων, ταὐτὸν πεπόνθαμεν· πολλὰς αὖ ηὑρήκαμεν ἀρετὰς μίαν ζητοῦντες, ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ νυνδή· τὴν δὲ μίαν, ἣ διὰ πάντων τούτων ἐστίν, οὐ δυνάμεθα ἀνευρεῖν.
- 54.
Cf. Hallich 2013, p. 51.
- 55.
- 56.
Socrates assures himself of this again in 78c7.
- 57.
[ΣΩ.] πότερον προστιθεῖς τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ, ὦ Μένων, τὸ δικαίως καὶ ὁσίως, ἢ οὐδέν σοι διαφέρει, ἀλλὰ κἂν ἀδίκως τις αὐτὰ πορίζηται, ὁμοίως σὺ αὐτὰ ἀρετὴν καλεῖς; MEN. Oὐ δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ κακίαν. MEN. πάντως δήπου. ΣΩ. δεῖ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ δικαιοσύνην ἢ σωφροσύνην ἢ ὁσιότητα προσεῖναι, ἢ ἄλλο τι μόριον ἀρετῆς· […] ΣΩ. Oὐκοῦν τούτων ἕκαστον ὀλίγον πρότερον μόριον ἀρετῆς ἔφαμεν εἶναι, τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα; MEN. Nαί. ΣΩ. εἶτα, ὦ Μένων, παίζεις πρός με;
- 58.
Men. 80 a1–b7.
- 59.
This of course presupposes that Plato is always aware of the error in the dialogues himself; there are significant indications for this. For the general transparency of logical conclusions for the reader see Geiger 2006, especially p. 20. Blößner also assumes this transparency and shows that in Politeia Book 1 Plato lets his figures interact in a specific way in order to make the reader aware that a premise has not yet been proved; so this one could find out at which point in the argumentation the error is to be found and in addition of what kind the error is and what one would have to do to avoid it; see Blößner 1991, pp. 69–70. For another example, see Blößner 1997, p. 286. Seeck 1997 also rejects errors in thinking at Plato.
- 60.
Holzhausen 1994, p. 134.
- 61.
See also Klein 1965, p. 81.
- 62.
Ibid.
- 63.
That Socrates has a whole arsenal of rhetorical devices is manifest in the other dialogues; see Humar 2017a in detail.
- 64.
Klein 1965, pp. 79–80: “[…] Meno’s acceptance of Socrates ‘addition’ means that Meno repudiates his own statement.”
- 65.
Hallich 2013, p. 75 also notes: “Die Parallelität zwischen der (modifizierten) dritten und der zweiten Bestimmung der Tugend ist so augenfällig, dass erstaunlich ist, dass Menon sie nicht bemerkt.” What function this part has with regard to the reader and his understanding is not discussed by Hallich.
- 66.
For example, 79a3, b2, b5 and 6, b9 etc. Cf. Klein 1965, p. 80.
- 67.
This is also dealt with in the Protagoras; see Prot. 361a–b. See also Politeia VI, 492e3–5.
- 68.
[ΣΩ.] τόδε γάρ μοι εἰπέ· εἰ ἔστιν διδακτὸν ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, μὴ μόνον ἀρετή, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῦ καὶ διδασκάλους καὶ μαθητὰς εἶναι; MEN. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. ΣΩ. Oὐκοῦν τοὐναντίον αὖ, οὗ μήτε διδάσκαλοι μήτε μαθηταὶ εἶεν, καλῶς ἂν αὐτὸ εἰκάζοντες εἰκάζοιμεν μὴ διδακτὸν εἶναι;
- 69.
- 70.
- 71.
ΣΩ. Eἰ δέ γε μὴ διδάσκαλοι, οὐδὲ μαθηταί; MEN. Φαίνεται οὕτως. ΣΩ. Ἀρετὴ ἄρα οὐκ ἂν εἴη διδακτόν;
- 72.
This is also noted, inter alia, by Ionescu 2007, p. 122.
- 73.
Gooch 1987, p. 201.
- 74.
For the distinction between the two terms, see Hoerber 1960, pp. 91–92.
- 75.
Cf. Ionescu 2007, p. 137.
- 76.
Similarly, according to the interpretation of Hoerber 1960, Plato seems to want to show at another place in the dialogue that it is important in a conversation to either define terms precisely or at least to avoid vague terms. Thus, his Socrates uses the key words epistēmē and phronēsis synonymously several times in the discussion of knowledge and its distinction from true opinion, leading to false assumptions; cf. Hoerber 1960, p. 90.
- 77.
- 78.
Arieti 1991, p. 201: “[…] the cast of characters in frequently a clue to Plato’s intent.”
- 79.
See Hoerber 1960, p. 99: “The characterization of Meno and Anytus in the Meno makes it clear that any insight into cause or any knowledge based on the Ideas is beyond their ken, and that Meno and Anytus must continue to live in the world of opinion […].”
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Humar, M. (2023). Dimensions of Conversation and the Value of Socratic Conversations in the Platonic Dialogues. In: Strosetzki, C. (eds) The Value of Conversation. Palgrave Macmillan, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-67200-6_2
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