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Exclusive Rights for a Purpose

Intellectual Property as a Framework Regulation of Innovation Markets

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A Critical Mind

Part of the book series: MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law ((MSIP,volume 30))

Abstract

The following glimpse into Hanns Ullrich’s academic œuvre draws on one of his most distinctive theories about the relation between intellectual property, competition and market regulation: the perception of the intellectual property system as a “framework regulation of innovation markets” and the concomitant understanding of intellectual property rights as “exclusive rights for a purpose”. This shines a spotlight on the double-edged nature of intellectual property as a private right, on the one hand, and a regulatory tool, on the other. Intellectual property rights are exclusive rights by design, but their purpose transcends the proprietary power afforded by them. This chapter addresses the conflict between ‘form’ and ‘function’ that arises if the existence or exercise of intellectual property rights is not aligned with their regulatory purpose.

Dr. Matthias Lamping is a Senior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Kenneth J Arrow, ‘Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention’ in Richard R Nelson (ed), The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity (Princeton University Press 1962), 615.

  2. 2.

    Friedrich A Hayek, ‘Der Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren’ (1968) 56 Kieler Vorträge 1, translated by Marcellus S Snow and reprinted as Friedrich A Hayek, ‘Competition as a Discovery Procedure’ (2002) 5 Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 9.

  3. 3.

    Hanns Ullrich, ‘Intellectual Property: Exclusive Rights for a Purpose – The Case of Technology Protection by Patents and Copyright’ (2012a) Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property & Competition Law Research Paper No. 13-01, 20; see also Joachim Bußmann, ‘Patentrecht und Marktwirtschaft’ 79 GRUR 1977, 130.

  4. 4.

    Hanns Ullrich (2012a, supra n 3) 8, with further references in n 19.

  5. 5.

    Hanns Ullrich, ‘Die wettbewerbspolitische Behandlung gewerblicher Schutzrechte in der EWG’ (1984) 33 GRUR Int 89, 92: id., ‘Intellectual Property, Access to Information, and Antitrust’ in Rochelle Dreyfuss, Diane L Zimmerman and Harry First (eds), Expanding Boundaries of Intellectual Property (Oxford University Press 2001) 365; id., ‘GRUR – Teil A’ in Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (eds), Wettbewerbsrecht, Band 1, VII. Abschnitt (5th edn, Beck 2012c).

  6. 6.

    See Hanns Ullrich, ‘FRAND Access to Open Standards and the Patent Exclusivity: Restating the Principles’ (2017), Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 17-04, 6; id. (2012a, supra n 3) 20.

  7. 7.

    See CJEU, 9.7.1985, Case 19/84 Pharmon / Hoechst [1985] ECR 2281, ECLI:EU:C:1985:304, para. 25.

  8. 8.

    Hanns Ullrich, ‘The Interaction Between Competition Law and Intellectual Property Law: An Overview’ in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Isabela Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2005: The Interaction Between Competition Law and Intellectual Property Law (Hart 2007) xiii, 28; id., ‘National, European and Community Patent Protection: Time for Reconsideration’ in Ansgar Ohly and Diethelm Klippel (eds), Geistiges Eigentum und Gemeinfreiheit (Mohr Siebeck 2007) 61, 94; id., ‘Propriété Intellectuelle, Concurrence et Regulation: Limites de Protection et Limites de Contrôle’ (2009) 23 RIDE 399; id. (2012a, supra n 3), 10, 20 (at n 90); id., ‘Harmonizing Patent Law: The Untameable Union Patent’ (2012b) Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law Research Paper No. 12-03, 29, 32, 56 et passim; id., ‘Mandatory Licensing Under Patent Law and Competition Law: Different Concerns, Complementary Roles’ in Reto M. Hilty and Kung-Chung Liu (eds), Compulsory Licensing: Practical Experiences and Ways Forward (Springer 2015), 333, 335, 371; id., (2017, supra n 6), 1, 6, 22 et passim.

  9. 9.

    Hanns Ullrich (2012b, supra n 1).

  10. 10.

    Hanns Ullrich, ‘Anti-Unfair Competition Law and Anti-Trust Law: A Continental Conundrum?’ (2005) EUI Working Paper Law No. 2005/01, 14, 41.

  11. 11.

    Erhard Kantzenbach, Die Funktionsfähigkeit des Wettbewerbs (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1967), 16 et seq.

  12. 12.

    Joseph A Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (2nd edn, Harper & Row 1942) 83.

  13. 13.

    See Thomas Eilmansberger, ‘How to Distinguish Good from Bad Competition under Article 82 EC’, (2005) 42 CML Rev 138, with further references.

  14. 14.

    Plato, The Republic of Plato (first published 375 BC, MacMillan 1921), Book VIII, paras. 562, 564.

  15. 15.

    Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. I: The Spell of Plato (1st edn, Routledge 1945) 96, 109, 226 et seq.; id., The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. II: The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath (1st edn, Routledge 1945) 42; Wolfgang Fikentscher, Recht und wirtschaftliche Freiheit, 1. Band: Die Freiheit des Wettbewerbs (1st edn, Mohr Siebeck 1992), 160, 173; id., Die Freiheit und ihr Paradox (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 1997), 9, 13 et seq., 22 et. seq., 58, 71 et passim.

  16. 16.

    Joseph A Schumpeter (1942, supra n 11).

  17. 17.

    The concept of a ‘social market economy’, to which the European Union has explicitly committed itself according to Art 3(3) of the TEU, has its origin in German ‘ordoliberalism’. See David J Gerber, ‘Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neoliberalism, Competition Law and the “New” Europe’ (1994) 42 Am J Comp L 25, 69 et seq.; id., Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus (Oxford University Press 2001) 233 et seq., 261 et seq.; Jürgen Basedow, Von der deutschen zur europäischen Wirtschaftsverfassung (Mohr Siebeck 1992); Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, ‘Zur Wirtschaftsverfassung in der Europäischen Union’ in Rolf Hasse, Josef Molsberger and Christian Watrin (eds), Ordnung in Freiheit (Gustav Fischer 1994) 263 et seq.

  18. 18.

    Wolfgang Fikentscher (1997, supra n 14) 44: “Wer sich an Wirtschaftswachstum als Wirtschaftsziel bindet, verkauft seine marktwirtschaftliche Seele an den Teufel der Planwirtschaft.”

  19. 19.

    Protocol (No 27) to the TEU on the Internal Market and Competition (OJ 115/309) states that “the internal market as set out in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union includes a system ensuring that competition is not distorted”. Art 101 of the TFEU prohibits agreements, decisions and practices “which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market”. The provision “should be read in the context of the provisions of the Preamble to the Treaty [...] relating to ‘the elimination of barriers’ and to ‘fair competition’, both of which are necessary for bringing about a single market” (CJEU, 13.07.1966, Case 32/65 Italy / Council [1966] ECR 389, at 405, ECLI:EU:C:1966:42). The same applies to Art 102 of the TFEU, which is “an application of the general objective of the [...] institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted” (CJEU, 13.02.1979, Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche / Commission [1979] ECR 461, para. 38, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36). By the same token, Art 107 of the TFEU prohibits state aids “in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition” (emphasis added where italicised).

  20. 20.

    Thomas R Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population (Johnson 1798).

  21. 21.

    Winston Churchill (*1874, †1965).

  22. 22.

    See John M Clark, ‘Toward a Concept of Workable Competition’ (1940) 30 Amer Econ Rev 241; id., ‘Competition and the Objectives of Government Policy’ in Edward Chamberlin (ed), Monopoly and Competition and their Regulation (first published 1954, MacMillan 1986) 317; id., Competition as a Dynamic Process (Brookings 1961) 178.

  23. 23.

    All of this also means that the intellectual property system will work better in some markets and industries than in others. If competition is the operating system of intellectual property protection, the functioning of the intellectual property system as a market framework regulation will depend on the reliability of that operating system (supra n 2 and 3). The more the competitive pattern of a market is influenced by factors that cannot be controlled by competing on the merits, the more difficult it is to reconcile the ‘one size fits all’ approach of intellectual property protection with the market’s capacity as a discovery procedure and price-setting mechanism.

  24. 24.

    Friedrich A Hayek (2002, supra n 2) 10.

  25. 25.

    The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) acknowledged this long before assuming jurisdiction on intellectual property matters. In order to secure the functioning of the Internal Market, the CJEU defined the ‘specific subject matter’ of intellectual property rights as a means of reconciling the respect for national property regimes (Art 345 TFEU) with the need to ensure the free movement of goods and services in the EU. Consequently, the specific subject-matter of a patent has been defined as guarantee “to use an invention with the view to manufacturing industrial products and putting them into circulation for the first time, either directly or by the grant of licences to third parties” (see, for example, CJEU, 31.10.1974, Case 15/74 Centrafarm / Sterling Drug [1974] ECR 1147, ECLI:EU:C:1974:114, para. 9). Similarly, the specific subject-matter of a copyright has been defined as “the right to exploit commercially the marketing of the protected work, particularly in the form of licences granted in return for payment of royalties” (see, for example, CJEU, 20.01.1981, Joined Cases 55/80 and 75/80 Musik-Vertrieb Membran GmbH / GEMA [1981] ECR 147, ECLI:EU:C:1981:10, para. 12). At the same time, the CJEU has made clear from the very beginning that the right of first sale enables the inventor or creator “to obtain a reward for his creative effort without, however, guaranteeing that he will obtain such reward in all circumstances” (CJEU, 14.07.1981, Case 187/80 Merck / Stephar and Exler [1981] ECR 2063, ECLI:EU:C:1981:180, para. 10). Unfortunately, the European Commission has not always been this reasonable: “The central function of intellectual property rights is to protect the moral rights in a right holder’s work and ensure a reward for the creative effort. But it is also an essential objective of intellectual property law that creativity should be stimulated for the general public good” (see Microsoft (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) Commission Decision 2007/53/EC of 24.3.2004 [2007] C(2004)900 final, para. 711).

  26. 26.

    See Carl Christian von Weizsäcker, ‘Rechte und Verhältnisse in der modernen Wirtschaftslehre’ (1981) 34 Kyklos 345; Michael Lehmann, ‘Eigentum, geistiges Eigentum, gewerbliche Schutzrechte – Property Rights als Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen zur Förderung des Wettbewerbs’ (1983) 32 GRUR Int. 360 et seq.; Hanns Ullrich (2001, supra n 5) 371 et seq.; id. (2009, supra n 8) 399, 407 et seq.; Hanns Ullrich and Andreas Heinemann, ‘GRUR – Teil B’ in Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (eds), Wettbewerbsrecht, Band 1, VII. Abschnitt (5th edn, Beck 2012c) annot 42 et seq.; Josef Drexl, ‘Abuse of Dominance in Licensing and Refusal to License: A “More Economic Approach” to Competition by Imitation and to Competition by Substitution’, in Claus D Ehlermann and Isabela Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2005: The Interaction Between Competition Law and Intellectual Property Law (Hart 2007) 647.

  27. 27.

    See John C Stedman, ‘Invention and Public Policy’ (1947) 12 Law Contemp Probl 649, 667 et seq.; William F Baxter, ‘Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis’ (1966) 76 Yale L J 267, 269 et seq.; Hanns Ullrich, Standards of Patentability for European Inventions (Verlag Chemie 1977) 195 et seq.; Paul Demaret, Patents, Territorial Restriction and EEC Law (Verlag Chemie 1978) 9 et seq.; Georges Friden, ‘Recent Developments in EEC Intellectual Property Law’ (1989) 26 CML Rev. 193, 211; Friedrich-Karl Beier, ‘Missbrauch einer beherrschenden Stellung durch Ausübung gewerblicher Schutzrechte?’ in Harm P Westermann and Wolfgang Rosener (eds), Festschrift für Quack (De Gruyter 1991), 20 (at n 11).

  28. 28.

    Hanns Ullrich (1984, supra n 5) 92.

  29. 29.

    From the perspective of intellectual property, a lack of competition by imitation and substitution constitutes an anomaly which is incompatible with the system’s fundamental operating conditions. To operate properly as a market framework regulation, the intellectual property system requires effective competition both pre and post grant.

  30. 30.

    The bitter-sweet temptation to squeeze out the market’s willingness to pay is therefore only problematic if the protected subject-matter constitutes an ‘essential facility’ (see Matthias Lamping, Patentschutz und Marktmacht (Heymanns 2010) 239 et seq., with further references) – i.e. an asset to which access is indispensable for competing and which is non-duplicable in the sense that there is no actual or potential substitute to it (ibid., 293 et seq., 314 et seq.). In these cases, the right to exclude enables the right holder to control market access and thus puts him or her in a position which comes with a “special responsibility” (CJEU, 13.02.1979, Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche [1979] ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, para. 38) that prevents him or her from setting prices ad libitum.

  31. 31.

    Leif Wenar, ‘Rights’ in Edward N Zalta (ed), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Stanford University 2020).

  32. 32.

    See Friedrich Carl von Savigny, System des heutigen römischen Rechts (1st edn, Veit 1840) Erster Band, § 4, p 7, §§ 52 and 53, p 331 et seq.; Bernhard Windscheid, Die Actio des römischen Civilrechts vom Standpunkte des heutigen Rechts (1st edn, Buddeus 1856) 3, 234.

  33. 33.

    See Otto Bähr, Der Rechtsstaat: eine publicistische Skizze (1st edn, Wigand 1864) 52 (at n 11); Rudolf von Jhering, Geist des römischen Rechts auf den verschiedenen Stufen seiner Entwicklung (1st edn, Breitkopf und Härtel 1865) Dritter Teil, Erste Abteilung, §§ 60 and 61, p 307 et seq.

  34. 34.

    August Thon, Rechtsnorm und subjectives Recht – Untersuchungen zur allgemeinen Rechtslehre (1st edn, Böhlau 1878) 147 et seq., 216 et seq.; Edmund Bernatzik, ‘Kritische Studien über den Begriff der juristischen Person und über die juristische Persönlichkeit der Behörden insbesondere’ (1890) 5 AöR 169, 260 et seq.; Georg Jellinek, System der subjektiven öffentlichen Rechte (1st edn, Mohr 1892) 40 et seq.; Ferdinand Regelsberger, Pandekten (1st edn, Duncker & Humblot 1893) § 14, p 74 et seq.

  35. 35.

    Hanns Ullrich (2012a, supra n 3) 20.

  36. 36.

    See Christine Godt et al., (2022) Boundaries of Information Property (Intersentia 2022).

  37. 37.

    See Hanns Ullrich (2012a, supra n 3) 4 et seq., 8 et seq.; id. (2001, supra n 7) 365, 378 et seq., 381 et seq.; see also Thomas Dreier, ‘Balancing Proprietary and Public Domain Interests: Inside or Outside of Proprietary Rights?’ in Rochelle Dreyfuss, Diane L Zimmerman, and Harry First (eds), Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property – Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society (Oxford University Press 2001) 295; Reto Hilty, ‘Ungereimtheiten auf der urheberrechtlichen Wertschöpfungskette’ in Reto Hilty, Josef Drexl and Jan Nordemann (eds), Schutz von Kreativität und Wettbewerb – Festschrift für Ulrich Loewenheim (Beck 2009) 119, 125 et seq.; id., ‘Renaissance der Zwangslizenzen im Urheberrecht?’ (2009) 111 GRUR 633.

  38. 38.

    See Hanns Ullrich (2012a, supra n 3) 20 et passim.

  39. 39.

    Ibid.

  40. 40.

    For general remarks on the form and function of rights, see Leif Wenar (2020, supra n 30) 2.

  41. 41.

    Hanns Ullrich (2012a, supra n 3) 11.

  42. 42.

    Ibid, 3.

  43. 43.

    Ibid, 4.

  44. 44.

    Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust – A Drama (first published 1808, John Murray 1823) 203, verse n. 3415.

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    Matthias Lamping

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    Christine Godt

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    Matthias Lamping

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Lamping, M. (2023). Exclusive Rights for a Purpose. In: Godt, C., Lamping, M. (eds) A Critical Mind. MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, vol 30. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-65974-8_10

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