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Market Design Powers of the European Commission?

Part of the book series: Munich Studies on Innovation and Competition ((MSIC,volume 13))

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Abstract

In order to prepare the basis for the following discussion, it is useful, first, to highlight the main features that distinguish Article 7 and Article 9 as legal bases for the adoption of remedies. In that regard, the first section of the present chapter shall only provide an overview. In so far as the features are problematic, they will be addressed in more detail below. Second, in view of its paramount importance for the present study, the Alrosa case will be presented in detail; a first comment on the criticism that relates directly to the judgment shall also be made. The full importance of the questions addressed in this study will become apparent in the third section of the present chapter: It will place the Alrosa case in the broader context of the overall development of the Commission’s practice.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) Regulation 1/03 the imposition of a fine is possible if the Commission finds that an undertaking infringes Article 101 or 102 TFEU at least negligently.

  2. 2.

    Article 16 Regulation 1/03.

  3. 3.

    Pursuant to recital 13, 2nd sentence, Regulation 1/03, “[c]ommitment decisions should find that there are no longer grounds for action by the Commission without concluding whether or not there has been or still is an infringement.” Instead of all see only Schweitzer (2010), 547, and AG Kokott, opinion in C-547/16 (Gasorba, 2017), 32.

  4. 4.

    Best Practices (2011), 129ff; Manual of Procedures (2012), Module 16, 56ff.

  5. 5.

    See Kellerbauer (2011), 8.

  6. 6.

    For this distinction see eg Metha/Centella (2010), 396ff; Schweitzer (2010), 549; Richter (2012), 640f; Kellerbauer/Ortiz Blanco/Jörgens/Centella (2013), 10.117ff; Laina/Laurinen (2013), 306; Colombani/Kloub/Sakkers (2014), 8.715.

  7. 7.

    See Sect. 6.2.3.1.2 below.

  8. 8.

    Whish/Bailey (2012), 262; similarly Kellerbauer/Ortiz Blanco/Jörgens/Centella (2013), 10.109.

  9. 9.

    The literature on the case is abundant: see only eg Le More (2007); Temple Lang (2009); Schweitzer (2010); Frenz/Ehlenz (2010); Körber (2010); Klees (2010); Hennig (2010b); Brenner (2010); Idot (2010); Muguet-Poullennec/Barbier de La Serre (2010); Cavicchi (2011); Cengiz (2011); Kellerbauer (2011); Messina/Ho (2011); Wagner-Von Papp (2012); Jones/Sufrin (2014), 983ff.

  10. 10.

    See GC, T-170/06 (Alrosa, 2007), 8ff.

  11. 11.

    See GC, T-170/06 (Alrosa, 2007), 18.

  12. 12.

    See GC, T-170/06 (Alrosa, 2007), 19.

  13. 13.

    See GC, T-170/06 (Alrosa, 2007), 20f.

  14. 14.

    See GC, T-170/06 (Alrosa, 2007), 22.

  15. 15.

    See GC, T-170/06 (Alrosa, 2007), 23ff.

  16. 16.

    See GC, T-170/06 (Alrosa, 2007), 92ff.

  17. 17.

    See GC, T-170/06 (Alrosa, 2007), 100f.

  18. 18.

    See GC, T-170/06 (Alrosa, 2007), 105.

  19. 19.

    See GC, T-170/06 (Alrosa, 2007), 131.

  20. 20.

    See GC, T-170/06 (Alrosa, 2007), 108ff.

  21. 21.

    See GC, T-170/06 (Alrosa, 2007), 124.

  22. 22.

    See GC, T-170/06 (Alrosa, 2007), 125.

  23. 23.

    See GC, T-170/06 (Alrosa, 2007), 128.

  24. 24.

    See GC, T-170/06 (Alrosa, 2007), 141.

  25. 25.

    See GC, T-170/06 (Alrosa, 2007), 134.

  26. 26.

    See GC, T-170/06 (Alrosa, 2007), 138.

  27. 27.

    See GC, T-170/06 (Alrosa, 2007), 146 and 150ff.

  28. 28.

    See GC, T-170/06 (Alrosa, 2007), 176.

  29. 29.

    See GC, T-170/06 (Alrosa, 2007), 186f.

  30. 30.

    See GC, T-170/06 (Alrosa, 2007), 201.

  31. 31.

    See opinion of AG Kokott in C-441/07 P (Alrosa, 2009), 43.

  32. 32.

    See opinion of AG Kokott in C-441/07 P (Alrosa, 2009), 49.

  33. 33.

    See opinion of AG Kokott in C-441/07 P (Alrosa, 2009), 53.

  34. 34.

    See opinion of AG Kokott in C-441/07 P (Alrosa, 2009), 55 and 60.

  35. 35.

    See Sect. 2.2.1.2.1 with footnote 19 above.

  36. 36.

    See opinion of AG Kokott in C-441/07 P (Alrosa, 2009), 56 and 79.

  37. 37.

    See opinion of AG Kokott in C-441/07 P (Alrosa, 2009), 57.

  38. 38.

    See opinion of AG Kokott in C-441/07 P (Alrosa, 2009), 58f.

  39. 39.

    See opinion of AG Kokott in C-441/07 P (Alrosa, 2009), 71 and 74.

  40. 40.

    See opinion of AG Kokott in C-441/07 P (Alrosa, 2009), 78.

  41. 41.

    See opinion of AG Kokott in C-441/07 P (Alrosa, 2009), 83.

  42. 42.

    See opinion of AG Kokott in C-441/07 P (Alrosa, 2009), 85 and 88.

  43. 43.

    See opinion of AG Kokott in C-441/07 P (Alrosa, 2009), 122 and 233ff.

  44. 44.

    See opinion of AG Kokott in C-441/07 P (Alrosa, 2009), 128f.

  45. 45.

    See opinion of AG Kokott in C-441/07 P (Alrosa, 2009), 175f.

  46. 46.

    See opinion of AG Kokott in C-441/07 P (Alrosa, 2009), 182 and 192.

  47. 47.

    See opinion of AG Kokott in C-441/07 P (Alrosa, 2009), 199f.

  48. 48.

    See opinion of AG Kokott in C-441/07 P (Alrosa, 2009), 203ff.

  49. 49.

    CJ, C-441/07 P (Alrosa, 2010), 37.

  50. 50.

    CJ, C-441/07 P (Alrosa, 2010), 35ff and 47.

  51. 51.

    CJ, C-441/07 P (Alrosa, 2010), 48.

  52. 52.

    CJ, C-441/07 P (Alrosa, 2010), 61.

  53. 53.

    CJ, C-441/07 P (Alrosa, 2010), 41.

  54. 54.

    CJ, C-441/07 P (Alrosa, 2010), 42.

  55. 55.

    CJ, C-441/07 P (Alrosa, 2010), 62ff.

  56. 56.

    CJ, C-441/07 P (Alrosa, 2010), 120.

  57. 57.

    CJ, C-441/07 P (Alrosa, 2010), 88ff.

  58. 58.

    CJ, C-441/07 P (Alrosa, 2010), 88ff.

  59. 59.

    See the references in Sect. 2.2, footnote 9 above; moreover Barbier de la Serre (2012), 99: “big cause for concern”; Jenny (2015): “worst decision of the EU Court of Justice”.

  60. 60.

    See MEMO/10/285.

  61. 61.

    See Mische/Višnar (2010), 22.

  62. 62.

    Messina/Ho (2011), 750; similarly also Hennig (2010a), 141f and 180f and (2010b), 448 and 450f.

  63. 63.

    See Klees (2009), 379; Muguet-Poullennec/Barbier de la Serre (2010), 40; Hennig (2010b), 452; Gerard (2013b), 15f; Botteman/Patsa (2013), 362f; Jenny (2015), 713ff and 760.

  64. 64.

    Wils (2006), 352; Brenner (2010), 1336; Frenz/Ehlenz (2010), 308; Klees (2011), 18; Schweitzer (2011), 646f; Wagner-Von Papp (2012), 943ff and 949; Lugard/Möllmann (2013), 9; Gerard (2013b), 30; von Kalben (2018), 66ff.

  65. 65.

    Eg Waelbroeck (2009), 235f; Klees (2009), 379; Körber (2010), 82; Muguet-Poullennec/Barbier de la Serre (2010), 40; Hennig (2010b), 452; Waelbroeck/Frisch (2013), 683; Gerard (2013b), 16.

  66. 66.

    See Hennig (2010b), 452; Wagner-Von Papp (2012), 948.

  67. 67.

    See Wagner-Von Papp (2012), 948. Wagner-Von Papp disputes the standard argument that the power to impose fines allows the Commission to extract disproportionate commitments (944ff). In his view, the decisive factors that may lead to disproportionate commitments are the Commission’s “power to vary sanctions outside the procedure at hand” (948) and the Commission’s ability “to transform any deterrent effect of future private litigation into a bargaining chip for extracting further-reaching commitments” (949).

    See also Budzinski/Kuchinke (2012), 274, who refer to speculations that E.On’s commitment to divest its transmission grid [COMP/39.388 (German electricity wholesale and balancing market, 2008)] was the result of a “cross policy deal”, in which the Commission closed two other procedures “in spite of an excellent state of evidence” in consideration for E.On’s commitment.

  68. 68.

    Frenz/Ehlenz (2010), 308.

  69. 69.

    Wils (2006), 352.

  70. 70.

    See Waelbroeck (2009), 233f; Schweitzer (2011), 646f and 657; Wagner-Von Papp (2012), 950; Botteman/Patsa (2013), 362.

  71. 71.

    See Sect. 2.2.1.4.1.1, footnote 53 above.

  72. 72.

    See Sect. 2.2.1.3.1.1, footnote 36 above.

  73. 73.

    Frenz/Ehlenz (2010), 307: “Damit sind auch keine offensichtlich geeigneten oder der Kommission bekannten Alternativen neben den Zusagen mit in die Bewertung einzustellen […] Eine elegantere Lösung bieten hingegen die Schlussanträge von GA Kokott, welche eine Einbeziehung offensichtlicher oder bekannter Alternativen offenlassen, die neben den Zusagen der Unternehmen Berücksichtigung finden können”; Klees (2011), 19: “Gibt es keine alternativen Zusagen, entfällt die Prüfung der Erforderlichkeit; die Verhältnismäßigkeitsprüfung reduziert sich dann auf eine bloße Geeignetheitsprüfung”; Wagner-Von Papp (2012), 939f: “Where the Commission is faced with only one offer of commitments, the residual proportionality review under the ECJ’s Alrosa judgment is completely eliminated”; see also Muguet-Poullennec/Barbier de la Serre (2010), 39: “si la Commission n’est pas tenue d’examiner les solutions alternatives moins contraignantes que celles qui lui sont proposées par les parties, comment le Tribunal peut-il exercer un contrôle de proportionnalité minimal?”; Prek/Lefèvre (2016), 90: “the Commission is under a duty to examine the necessity of commitments only if the undertakings concerned offer less burdensome commitments that are equally appropriate.”

  74. 74.

    See Hennig (2010b), 449 and 450f; Klees (2010), 691 and 693.

  75. 75.

    See Schweitzer (2011), 647; Wagner-Von Papp (2012), 950.

  76. 76.

    Eg Kellerbauer (2011), 1.

  77. 77.

    Temple Lang (2009), 133; Brenner (2010), 1335; Falconi (2011), 45; Lianos (2013), 445.

  78. 78.

    Hennig (2010b), 448; Kellerbauer (2011), 6.

  79. 79.

    See, on the one hand, Schweitzer (2011), 645: “Eine Kritik am Alrosa-Urteil setzt […] nicht notwendig am Ausgang des Verfahrens an. Viel spricht dafür, dass die Kommission auf der Grundlage der ihr vorliegenden Informationen ohne offenkundigen Beurteilungsfehler davon ausgehen durfte, dass die vollständige Beendigung der vertraglichen Beziehungen zwischen De Beers und Alrosa unter dem Gesichtspunkt von Art. 102 AEUV, insbes. zur Beseitigung der aus den Vertragsbeziehungen folgenden Marktabschottung, geboten war”. On the other hand, see O’Donoghue/Padilla (2013), 907: “It is difficult to see how a general restriction on Alrosa having any trading relationship with De Beers for the affected products would be compatible with proportionality in a final infringement decision under Article 7”. See also Gyselen (2014), 255 together with fn 21, who mentions the Alrosa-case as an example in which the Commission makes binding commitments “although it knows full well that they are not (all) necessary but certainly (more than) sufficient to address its concerns”; Jenny (2015), 741f: “It could have been difficult for the Commission […] to justify [under Article 7] that the complete cessation of all commercial transactions for an indefinite period was the minimum remedy acceptable to alleviate the competition problem identified”. The position of Wagner-von Papp (2012) on the substance of the case is not clear to me: On the one hand, he is of the opinion that the commitment to discontinue all purchases of rough diamonds constituted an “overkill” for a theory of harm under Article 102 TFEU and that such a commitment would only have been justified to meet a theory of harm under Article 101 TFEU (963f). On the other hand, he acknowledges that the Commission was right to prohibit even limited ad hoc sales of diamonds by Alrosa to DeBeers in auctions, because these would have amounted to infringements of Article 102 TFEU (969 fn 158).

  80. 80.

    See Sect. 2.2.1.3.1.2 with footnote 42 above.

  81. 81.

    See Sect. 2.2.1.4.1.2 with footnote 55 above. See also Brenner (2010), 1335, who rightly argues that the failure of Alrosa’s action was mostly due not to the discretion granted by the Court of Justice to the Commission, but to the fact that Alrosa’s interest in maintaining some of its supplies to De Beers caused anticompetitive concerns.

    Wagner-von Papp (2012), 969 fn 158, criticises the silence of the judgment of the CJ on the question whether ad hoc sales of diamonds by Alrosa to DeBeers in auctions would have amounted to an infringement of Article 102 TFEU. According to Wagner-von Papp, this silence “could be interpreted as implying […] that a commitment decision could be based on a theory of harm that is erroneous as a matter of law, provided only that the undertaking offers commitments”. In my view, this criticism is justified only to the extent that it is directed against the ambiguity of the CJ’s judgment. On the substance, I think that the judgment should not be interpreted in the way suggested by Wagner-von Papp. According to my interpretation, the CJ followed AG Kokott’s reasoning that ad hoc sales would have amounted to infringements of Article 102 TFEU.

  82. 82.

    See the apposite remark of Muguet-Poullennec/Barbier de la Serre (2010), 39: “Peut-être la Cour s’est-elle un peu laissée emporter par la volonté d’étayer sa thèse, en contrepoint de celle qui avait été exposée par le Tribunal”.

  83. 83.

    See eg Hennig (2010a), 179f; Kellerbauer (2011), 8.

  84. 84.

    See Kellerbauer (2011), 8; Ortiz Blanco/Jörgens/Kellerbauer (2013), 13.31.

  85. 85.

    See Sect. 2.2.1.4.1.1 with footnotes 52 and 53 above.

  86. 86.

    See Sect. 2.2.1.3.1.1 with footnote 36 above.

  87. 87.

    See Sect. 2.2.1.4.1.1 with footnote 51 above.

  88. 88.

    See Sect. 2.2.1.3.1.1 with footnote 34 above.

  89. 89.

    But see Muguet-Poullennec/Barbier de la Serre (2010), 40: “[…] le fait de savoir que l’on propose des engagements allant au-delà de ce que pourrait imposer la Commission ne signifie pas qu’ils sont soumis de façon volontaire. La conscience d’être forcé à faire quelque chose n’affecte pas la réalité de la contrainte exercée”.

  90. 90.

    See also Bueren (2011), 753, who rightly underlines that the question of voluntariness is not a psychological, but a normative question: “Freiwilligkeit in diesem Sinne bedeutet also, dass eine [Erklärung] dem Rechtsinhaber normativ zugerechnet werden kann”.

  91. 91.

    See also Georgiev (2007), 1019: “the defendant is not required to enter into settlement proceedings and has voluntarily surrendered some of the regular procedural guarantees”; Sadowska (2014), text after figure 1: “By entering into a settlement (voluntarily) and offering the commitments, the firm implicitly agrees on their final shape. Its active role in the settlement means there is a questionable role for the principle of proportionality”; Podszun (2012), 64: “Die regelmäßig durch versierte Anwälte vertretenen Unternehmen sind in ihrer Entscheidung rechtlich ebenso wie wirtschaftlich frei, sich gegen den Vorwurf eines Kartellrechtsverstoßes nach Belieben zu wehren”; Schweitzer (2011), 647: “[Das Abstellen des EuGH auf die Freiwilligkeit der Zusagen] ist in dem Maße überzeugend, in dem der Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz allein die Interessen der beteiligten Unternehmen schützen soll”; Kreße (2014), 26: “Weshalb die Unternehmen […] nicht mehr in der Lage sein sollen, Chancen und Risiken der möglichen Verhaltensweisen gegeneinander abzuwägen und sich für die wirtschaftlich sinnvollere Verhaltensweise zu entscheiden, ist nicht ersichtlich”; Kipiani (2014), 623.

  92. 92.

    Dunne (2014), 437.

  93. 93.

    See for the term and a critical discussion Wagner-Von Papp (2012), 937ff; generally on the remaining possibility for the concerned undertakings to offer several sets of commitments see Muguet-Poullennec/Barbier de la Serre (2010), 40; Klees (2010), 692; Hennig (2010b), 452f; Lianos (2013), 445.

  94. 94.

    Klees (2010), 692; Hennig (2010b), 452f.

  95. 95.

    See Sadowska (2014), 55, and Sect. 2.2.2.2.1 with footnote 77 above.

  96. 96.

    See Sect. 2.2.1.4.1.1 with footnote 53 above; also Schweitzer (2011), 646.

  97. 97.

    See Wagner-Von Papp (2012), 940 fn 47.

  98. 98.

    GC, T-24/90 (Automec II, 1992); see also eg Jones/Sufrin (2014), 1071ff.

  99. 99.

    See Wagner-Von Papp (2012), 940 fn 47, who argues that such a challenge of a commitment decision is deemed to fail due to the broadness of the Commission’s discretion in prioritising cases. But see M. Jaeger (2011), 302, who relies on GC, T-427/08 (CEAHR, 2010) to illustrate that the General Court exercises intense control over the Commission’s discretion in prioritising cases. See also GC, T-108/07 (Spira, 2013), as a further example that demonstrates the intensity of the control exercised by the General Court over the Commission’s discretion in prioritising complaints.

  100. 100.

    Critically in particular Klees (2010), 693.

  101. 101.

    See Sect. 2.2.2.1 with footnote 71 above.

  102. 102.

    In spite of the Court’s mistakable formulation that the Commission is only obliged to take the commitments that have been offered to it by the concerned undertakings into account, some commentators interpret the judgment as requiring the Commission to take also the market test observations of third parties into account:

    See Brenner (2010), 1335: “Nach den Ausführungen des EuGH beschränkt sich zwar die Prüfung der Kommission auf die vorgebrachten Verpflichtungszusagen und die Kommission muss nicht selbstständig weniger belastende Optionen prüfen; ausdrücklich ausgenommen von dieser Beschränkung der Prüfungspflicht sind indes die Interessen Dritter. Mit der Erfassung der Drittinteressen über den Markttest dürften diese ebenso wie die vorgebrachten Verpflichtungszusagen zum berücksichtigungspflichtigen Sachstand gehören”.

    Kellerbauer (2011), 7, who interprets the CJ’s Alrosa judgment as meaning that the Commission must take less onerous proposals of third parties into account, but has discretion in rejecting them.

    De Bronnet (2012), Art. 9, 11: “Die Kommission ist zwar nicht gehalten, selbst nach weniger einschneidenden Alternativen zu den bei ihr eingereichten Zusagen zu suchen. Gleichwohl hat die Kommission alle ihr bekannten Alternativen mit gleicher Eignung, die von ihr angenommenen Wettbewerbsprobleme auszuräumen, daraufhin zu überprüfen, ob sie mildere Mittel zur Lösung der fraglichen Wettbewerbsprobleme darstellen, mit denen die Interessen des die Verpflichtungszusage anbietenden Unternehmens und Dritter nicht oder weniger stark beeinträchtigt werden”.

    Sadowska (2014), 49: “Under Article 9, the Commission needs only to make sure that accepted commitments address its concerns […] and that they do not manifestly go beyond what is necessary to address these concerns. However, the Commission is under no obligation to seek out less onerous solutions than the ones proposed to it”. Similarly also ibid, 190.

    As will be explained below, the Commission appears to interpret the judgment in the same way.

  103. 103.

    See Sect. 2.2.1.4.1.1 with footnote 53 above.

  104. 104.

    Critically Klees (2010), 691 fn 35, who is of the opinion that an alternative solution only needs to be sufficiently effective. The question will be further discussed below (Sect. 3.2.1.2 with footnote 104 and Sect. 3.4.1.2.2 with footnotes 891ff).

  105. 105.

    See Sect. 2.2.1.3.1.1 with footnote 37 above.

  106. 106.

    See the opinion of AG Kokott, Sect. 2.2.1.3.1.1 with footnote 31 above.

  107. 107.

    In the literature, under- and over-enforcement errors are also referred to either as Type I and Type II errors or as false negatives and false positives; see Whish/Bailey (2012), 193; in the context of remedies Gautier/Petit (2014), 5.

  108. 108.

    See Sect. 2.2.1.4.1.1 with footnote 53 above.

  109. 109.

    See Schweitzer (2011), 647.

  110. 110.

    See Hjelmeng (2013), 1029: “[Despite the rather broad limits for the Commission’s discretion drawn up by the Court] there can […] be no doubt that the principle of proportionality plays an important role in the context of Article 9 decisions, and that the concerns of the Commission in this respect must be related to at least potential infringements of Article 101 or 102.”

  111. 111.

    Klees (2010), 693 (“bis zur Unkenntlichkeit verstümmelt”).

  112. 112.

    Klees (2010), 693: “Vor diesem Hintergrund muss sich der Gerichtshof fragen lassen, ob es nicht die systematisch sauberere Lösung gewesen wäre, sich gleich ganz von dem Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz im Rahmen des Art. 9 VO Nr. 1/2003 zu lösen.” See also Wagner-Von Papp (2012), 943, who speaks of “the ECJ’s de facto elimination of judicial review of the proportionality of commitments”; similarly Jenny (2015), 762.

  113. 113.

    Jenny (2015).

  114. 114.

    Commission Best Practices (2011), 115. See also the Antitrust Manual of Procedures (2012), Module 16, 45: “[c]ommitments which are not related to the concerns […] will not be accepted by the Commission”. For the sake of completeness, it should, however, be added that in the Antitrust Manual of Procedures (2012), Module 16, 46, the Commission refers yet again to a less comprehensive proportionality test that does not expressly take the interests of third parties into account: “The Commission should […] verify that: (a) the commitments are sufficient to address its competition concerns; and (b) the undertakings have not offered less onerous commitments that also address the concerns adequately.” However, the less comprehensive version of the proportionality test in the Manual of Procedures can be explained with the fact that interests of third parties are being dealt with in the sections of the Manual that concern the market test pursuant to Article 27(4) Regulation 1/03 (Module 16, 56ff). Moreover, the Commission states expressly in the Manual (Module 16, 3) that the Manual must be construed in the light of the Best Practices and that the latter takes priority in all respects.

  115. 115.

    See Sect. 2.2.1.4.1.1, footnote 53 above.

  116. 116.

    See eg COMP/39.592 (Standard & Poor’s, 2011), 78; COMP/39.654 (Reuters, 2012), 93; COMP/39.847 (E-Books, 2013), 121; COMP/39.678 (Deutsche Bahn I, 2013), 98; COMP/39.939 (Samsung, 2014), 120; COMP/39.398 (Visa, 2014), 101.

  117. 117.

    See COMP/39.230 (Rio Tinto, 2012), 130; COMP/39.595 (Continental/United/Lufthansa/Air Canada, 2013), 141. The former decision derives that additional requirement from the Alrosa judgment of the Court of Justice.

  118. 118.

    COMP/39.736 (Siemens/Areeva, 2012), 102.

  119. 119.

    Eg COMP/37.966 (Distrigaz, 2007), 29; COMP/39.388 (German electricity wholesale and balancing market, 2008), 60; COMP/38.636 (Rambus, 2009), 54ff; COMP/39.386 (Long-term electricity contracts France, 2010), 70; COMP/39.596 (BA/AA/IB, 2010), 153ff; COMP/39.316 (GdF, 2010), 58, 66 and 82ff; COMP/39.317 (E.ON Gas, 2010), 57; COMP/39.654 (Reuters, 2012), 78, 85, 87 and 90; COMP/39.727 (CEZ, 2013), 40ff; COMP/39.767 (BEH, 2015), 114ff; COMP/40.153 (Amazon, 2017), 183ff; see also Gerard (2013b), 29f.

  120. 120.

    COMP/39.530 (Microsoft – tying, 2009), 108ff.

  121. 121.

    See for the criticism of the Commission’s use of undertakings under Regulation 17/62 the references in Sect. 2.3.1.2, footnote 195 below.

  122. 122.

    Mestmäcker (2000), 441; see also Mestmäcker/Schweitzer (2014), § 21, 60.

  123. 123.

    Mestmäcker (2000), 441.

  124. 124.

    K. Schmidt (2003), 1242 (“Flucht in die Formlosigkeit”).

  125. 125.

    Eg Klees (2009), 377; Brenner (2010), fn 39; Körber (2010), 82 and 91; Wagner-von Papp (2012), 961 fn 123.

  126. 126.

    For a different overall assessment of the literature on commitments see Sadowska (2014), 37: “Generally speaking, most commentators view the introduction of Article 9 commitment decisions as a positive development in the EU competition enforcement, considering all the benefits of this mechanism”.

  127. 127.

    See eg Georgiev (2007), 1033: “Settlements have a role to play in the modern administrative state”; Podszun (2012), 62: “[…] Entwicklung hin zu einer modernen, flexiblen Rechtsdurchsetzung. Durch Kooperation können Maßnahmen von denjenigen, die die Folgen zu tragen haben, besser beeinflusst werden. Das ist grundsätzlich begrüßenswert […] Die lautstarke Kritik am Vorgehen der Behörden in der Fachöffentlichkeit scheint demgegenüber zum Teil überzogen”; Botteman/Patsa (2013), 373: “necessary component of any mature antitrust system”; Lugard/Möllmann (2013), 3: “An antitrust enforcement system based solely on infringement procedures without any room for negotiated outcomes would undoubtedly be inefficient and inappropriate”; Gerard (2013b), 27: “Even if the commitment procedure requires adjustments, that possibility should be preserved, it is submitted, because it responds to a concrete need to guarantee the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement in highly (or increasingly) dynamic markets”.

  128. 128.

    Wils (2006), 349f; Botteman/Patsa (2013), 367; Sadowska (2014), 38.

  129. 129.

    Schweitzer (2011), 647: “Bliebe die Verplichtungsentscheidung gemäß Art. 9 Abs. 1 VO 1/2003 ein Instrument von dem – entsprechend den ursprünglichen Vorstellungen – nur vereinzelt Gebrauch gemacht würde, so wäre die Lockerung der wettbewerbsrechtlichen Bindungen mit Blick auf die verfahrensökonomischen Zielsetzungen unter Umständen hinzunehmen. […] Die Rechtsförmigkeit der europäischen Wettbewerbspolitik scheint aber in dem Maße gefährdet, in dem die Verpflichtungsentscheidung zum dominanten Instrument der Rechtsdurchsetzung wird”. Similarly already Gippini-Fournier (2008), 411.

  130. 130.

    Overviews over the Commission’s decisional practice can be found eg in Rab/Monnoyeur/Sukhtankar (2010), 171ff; Schweitzer (2011), 659ff; Falconi (2011), 45f; Whish/Bailey (2012), 259f; Gyselen (2014); Lugard/Möllmann (2013), 5f; Hjelmeng (2013), 1019f; Dunne (2014), 406ff; Kipiani (2014), annexe 2.

  131. 131.

    Temple Lang (2006), 270.

  132. 132.

    See eg Georgiev (2007), 997 fn 119; Schweitzer (2010), 551 fn 23 and (2012), 2 fn 2; Cengiz (2011), 137 fn 44; Lugard/Möllmann (2013), 2 fn 3; Botteman/Patsa (2013), 348 fn 5; Gerard (2013b), 1 fn 4; Sadowska (2014), 11 fn 43; see also, albeit with a reference to Botteman/Patsa instead of to Temple Lang, Marsden (2013), 3 fn 6, and, without any reference, Rab/Monnoyeur/Sukhtankar (2010), 171; Dunne (2014), 406; Jenny (2015), 709.

  133. 133.

    Schweitzer (2012), 2: “almost all infringement proceedings outside the hardcore-cartel arena ultimately end with a commitment decision”; Barbier de la Serre (2012), 98 and 99: commitment procedure has become “the normal procedure”; Gerard (2013b): “enforcement mechanism of choice in the modernization era” (1) and “default mechanism to enforce antitrust principles in the EU” (22); Botteman/Patsa (2013), 347: “tool of choice”; Podszun (2012), 52: “Lieblingskind der Behördenmitarbeiter”; Jones/Sufrin (2014), Preface vi: “outside the cartel area, Commission infringement decisions under Article 7 Regulation 1/2003 are now a rarity”; Prek/Lefèvre (2016), 66: “Outside the field of cartels […] there are now far more commitment decisions than prohibition decisions”; Jenny (2015), 702: “enforcement decisions have become the exception […] and commitment decisions have become the norm”; von Kalben (2018), 106: “außerhalb der […] Hardocore Kartelle das Hauptinstrument der EU-Wettbewerbsrechtsdurchsetzung”.

  134. 134.

    Commission, Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003, SWD(2014) 230/2, 179.

  135. 135.

    Further statistical overviews have been provided eg by Klees (2010), 688f and (2011), 15 fn 9; Bougette/Marty (2012), 25f; Podszun (2012), 51; Botteman/Patsa (2013), 349f; Gyselen (2014), 248; Commission, Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003, SWD(2014) 230/2, 184ff.

  136. 136.

    Barbier de la Serre (2012), 98f fn 31 and 32: He mentions also that three quarters of Article 102 cases and two thirds of Article 101 cases were decided applying the commitment procedure.

  137. 137.

    Schweitzer (2011), 639. Schweitzer does not mention which is the last decision she took into account. Since the Article was published in July 2011, I took that date.

  138. 138.

    Lübking/von Koppenfels (2012), 68.

  139. 139.

    Lugard/Möllmann (2013), 3f.

  140. 140.

    Almunia (2013), 2.

  141. 141.

    Gerard (2013b), 6f.

  142. 142.

    Mariniello (2014), 2.

  143. 143.

    Italianer (2013), 3. See also Gerard (2013b), 8 fn 33, who incorrectly depicts Italianer’s numbers as including cartels. In the speech, Italianer expressly stated that these numbers relate to “cases other than cartels” and that the Commission had taken 60 decisions in cartel cases in the same period. Sadowska (2014), 11f, arrives at the same figures as Italianer.

  144. 144.

    Gautier/Petit (2014), 3 and 21.

  145. 145.

    Commission, Policy Brief 3/2014, 3; Brenner (2014), 672 fn 3; OECD (2016), 14.

  146. 146.

    Wils (2015), 3f.

  147. 147.

    Von Kalben (2018), 106f.

  148. 148.

    See also Budzinski/Kuchinke (2012), 268: “there is a lack of empirical evidence concerning the increasing number of deals”. See also Wagner-Von Papp (2012), 941 fn 51, who suggests – albeit in a different context – that statistical problems may be caused by the coding of the non hard-core decisions. Moreover, approaches may diverge as regards the question what counts as one decision and what counts as several decisions.

  149. 149.

    See the references in Sect. 2.3.1.1.1, footnote 133 above.

  150. 150.

    See Commission, Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003, SWD(2014) 230/2, 10, where the Commission emphasises the priority given to the prosecution of cartels by stating that almost 50% of its antitrust decisions concern cartels.

  151. 151.

    See also Kipiani (2014), 508: “En Europe, nous sommes encore loin du schéma américain où les autorités de concurrence négocient en tout point avec les entreprises. Cette culture du “plea bargaining” n’est pas encore d’actualité”; Wils (2015), 9: “Compared to the more than 90 % of civil antitrust cases brought by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission that are resolved through consent decrees, the European Commission’s 63 % figure for commitment decisions does not appear particularly high.”

  152. 152.

    Ducore (2006), 228 fn 2; Georgiev (2007), 999; Hennig (2010a), 48 fn 139 and 95; Forrester (2010), 640; Ginsburg/Wright (2013), 1; OECD (2016), 13, all report that both the DoJ and the FTC settle around 90% of their respective cases. I have not verified whether these figures are correct. Gerard (2013b), 7 fn 30, refers to only 60% or 70% consent decrees. These figures seem, however, to be outdated: In support of the 60% figure, Gerard cites Epstein (2007), 1, who on his part relies on articles that date from 1992 and 1984. In support of the 70% figure, Gerard cites an article that dates from 1995.

  153. 153.

    C-132/19 P, Canal+ (pending).

  154. 154.

    CJ, C-547/16 (Gasorba, 2017).

  155. 155.

    See Sect. 5.1.4 below.

  156. 156.

    COMP/38.348 (REPSOL, 2006).

  157. 157.

    GC, T-274/06 (El Mareny, 2007); T-45/08 (Evarista Molina, 2008). The latter case was confirmed on appeal, CJ, C-36/09 P (2010).

  158. 158.

    GC, T-148/10 (Hynix, 2013).

  159. 159.

    See Botteman/Patsa (2013), 359f.

  160. 160.

    GC, T-76/14 (Morningstar, 2016).

  161. 161.

    GC, T-873/16 (Canal+, 2018).

  162. 162.

    GC, T-342/11 (CEES, 2014).

  163. 163.

    COMP/39.398 (Visa, 2010).

  164. 164.

    GC, T-447/12.

  165. 165.

    COMP/39.398 (Visa, 2014). The amended commitments were made binding on 26 February 2014; Visa’s appeal was removed from the register of the General Court on 30 April 2014.

  166. 166.

    GC, T-491/07 (Cartes Bancaires, 2012), 427ff. On appeal, the CJ set aside the judgment and referred the case back to the General Court. The judgment of the CJ does, however, not deal with the remedy, see CJ, C-67/13 P (Cartes Bancaires, 2014). The findings of the General Court regarding the remedy will be discussed in more detail below (Sect. 3.3.1.5.1.2 with footnotes 396ff).

  167. 167.

    Podszun (2012), 48, 49, 54f; Lugard/Möllmann (2013), 4 and 11; see also Gerard (2013b), 19: “paradigmatic shift”.

  168. 168.

    On the popularisation of the term “paradigm” in the wake of Kuhn’s work “The structure of scientific revolution” (1962) see Rose (2004), 30ff: “Trotz zahlreicher Erläuterungen und Präzisierung des Paradigmabegriffes und schließlich eines weitgehenden Verzichts auf diesen Begriff, hat Kuhn die explosionsartige und inflationäre Ausbreitung und Popularisierung dieses Begriffes in nahezu allen Bereichen des geistigen und kulturellen Lebens und die damit einhergehenden Mißdeutungen nicht verhindern oder abwenden können.” Rose (30 fn 78) also refers to an anecdote about an ice cream that was sold in the U.S. under the name “paradigm shift”.

  169. 169.

    But see Podszun (2012), 54f, who interprets the Commission’s use of the commitment procedure as an expression of a fundamental change of the questions guiding the Commission’s action. According to Podszun, those guiding questions have changed from whether the Commission’s action is lawful and in particular proportionate to whether the Commission’s action is efficient and leads to more competition, in particular consumer welfare.

  170. 170.

    See Gerard (2013b), 17, who borrows the term from Ginsburg/Wright (2013). See also Waelbroeck (2009), who speaks of “a new settlement culture”.

  171. 171.

    By “negotiated solutions” I understand not only the cases in which a company gives a “commitment” or an “undertaking” to act in a determined way, but generally all the cases in which the company modifies its practices in agreement with the Commission in order to eliminate concerns that have been raised. Such “genuine settlements” must be distinguished from an informal closure of a file for other reasons: For instance, the Commission may find that the practice is compatible with the competition rules; the practices or agreements may be completely abandoned or expire, so that a decision becomes superfluous. For that distinction see Waelbroeck (2009), 225; Bourgeois (1993), 90. Van Bael (1986), 64, suggested to restrict the term settlements “to situations where something is actually being settled in consideration of concessions that are made”.

  172. 172.

    See Gippini-Fournier (2008), 399: “cases were often settled on account of commitments under Regulation 17/62”; Schweitzer (2010), 548 fn 7: “[…] practice of informal settlements, which the Commission frequently made conditional on commitments offered by the undertakings concerned”; Hennig (2010a), 111: “Bereits unter der [VO 17/62] hat die Kommission nicht selten Verpflichtungszusagen von Unternehmen informell entgegengenommen”; Bueren (2011), 445f: “Unter der VO 17/62 wurden zahlreiche Fälle auf informeller Ebene durch Verhandlungen über Abstellungsmaßnahmen […] beendet. […] gängige Praxis der Kommission, […] Verpflichtungserklärungen entgegenzunehmen”; Ortiz Blanco/Jörgens/Kellerbauer (2013), 13.01: “[…] a high number of cases were indeed resolved by way of a settlement”; ibid., 13.08: “For a long time, the Commission has accepted commitments to settle antitrust proceedings on an informal basis”; O’Donoghue/Padilla (2013), 918f; Wils (2015), 9f; Blockx (2018), 96f.

  173. 173.

    See for the following remarks in particular the more detailed accounts of Bourgeois (1993), 93f; Müller-Tautphaeus (2003), 300ff and 418; Saitzek (2008), 5ff; Sofianatos (2009), 79ff; Hennig (2010a), 111ff and 339ff; Bueren (2011), 446f, all with references to the Commission’s practice. Moreover eg Temple Lang (2006), 267f; Wils (2006), 346f; Georgiev (2007), 992 and 995f; Falconi (2011), 42; McGeown/Orologas (2013), 2f; Jenny (2015), 703ff. For numerous examples of the Commissions practice to accept undertakings under Regulation 17/62 see also Temple Lang (1993), 368 fn 90.

  174. 174.

    OJ 1985 L 85/1 (Woodpulp, 1984), 149; OJ 1988 L 65/19 (Hilti, 1987), 103; OJ 1988 L 284/41 (Napier Brown, 1988), 85f.

  175. 175.

    Eg COMP/35.473 (Argev, 2003).

  176. 176.

    Eg OJ 1989 L 226/25 (UIP, 1989); COMP/37.398 (UEFA, 2003); COMP/38.284 (Air France/Alitalia, 2004); Sofianatos (2009), 79: “La Commission a fait une utilisation importante [d’engagements] en subordonnant l’exemption d’une entente à des conditions et charges détaillées dans sa décision”; Saitzek (2008), 23; Hennig (2010a), 346.

  177. 177.

    CJ, C-43/82 (VBVB, 1984), 52; see also C-142/84 (BAT Reynolds, 1987), 23; opinion of AG Lenz in C-360/92 P (Publishers Association, 1994), 35f; GC, T-395/94 (Transatlantic Container Line, 2002), 264.

  178. 178.

    On commitments in opposition procedures see Saitzek (2008), 23f; generally on the opposition procedure see Waelbroeck (1986), 272ff.

  179. 179.

    For the lack of statistics regarding the adoption of commitments under regulation 17/62 also Blockx (2018), 96.

  180. 180.

    Georgiev (2007), 1000; Botteman/Patsa (2013), 349 rely on Georgiev in order to claim that, since the entry into force of Regulation 1/03, the Commission has “relied on commitments to a much greater extent than it had relied on informal settlements under the previous regime”.

  181. 181.

    Georgiev (2007), 1000.

  182. 182.

    See the references in Sect. 2.3.1.2, footnote 173 above. Examples from the Commission’s practice are Amadeus/Sabre (XXIst Report on Competition Policy, 95); Baccarat (XXIst Report on Competition Policy, 98); ETSI (XXVth Report on Competition Policy, 131); MD Foods (XXVth Report on Competition Policy, 136).

  183. 183.

    Georgiev (2007), 1000.

  184. 184.

    See van Bael (1986), 64f, who mentioned that at the time less than 5% of the Commission’s settlements were published; Sofianatos (2009), 81; Hennig (2010a), 112f and 345.

  185. 185.

    XXIXth Report on Competition Policy (1999), 25; see also van Bael (1986), 62. As has been rightly pointed out by Hennig (2010a), 112 fn 562, this figure comprises all informal settlements. It is not limited to cases in which the closure of the proceedings was conditional on a commitment or other negotiated solution.

  186. 186.

    See also Forrester (2010), 639, who states with regard to the system of Regulation 17/62 that “[i]f notifications received express or informal endorsement from the Commission, such approval was usually conditioned upon the making of concessions”.

  187. 187.

    But see Wils (2006), 346, who reports that “[s]ettlements were usually described in the Commission’s annual Report on Competition Policy, but often without much detail”; also Jones/Sufrin (2014), 993, who state that settlements “were frequently publicised”.

  188. 188.

    Schweitzer (2012), 2: “[…] a pronounced shift can be observed since the entry into force of Regulation 1/03, away from adversarial competition law enforcement towards negotiated deals”.

  189. 189.

    See also Wils (2014a), 7, who presents figures showing that under Regulation 17/62, the Commission adopted on average 7.5 prohibition decisions and 2 exemption decisions with conditions or obligations per year, while under Regulation 1/03 it has adopted on average 7 prohibition decisions and 3 commitment decisions per year. Wils’ figures comprise hardcore cartel decisions.

  190. 190.

    Wils (2015), 12; see also OECD (2016), 14.

  191. 191.

    See Barbier de la Serre (2006), 133f: “[En ce qui concerne la procédure d’engagements introduite par l’article 9], cela consiste un peu pour la Commission à faire du neuf avec du vieux”; consenting Sofianatos (2009), 82; see also Hennig (2010a), 114: “Im Grunde wurde […] das bereits vor der Reform seitens der Kommission praktizierte […] Verfahren des informellen Settlements auf eine gesetzliche Grundlage gestellt”.

  192. 192.

    Eg Whish (2006), 564 and 571; Georgiev (2007), 1033; Wils (2015), 12.

  193. 193.

    See Articles 23(2)(c) and 24(1)(c) Regulation 1/03. Also eg Temple Lang (2006), 286; Wils (2006), 346; Schweitzer (2010), 548; Rab/Monnoyeur/Sukhtankar (2010), 173; Hennig (2010a), 114; Ritter (2012), Art. 9, 1f; Sadowska (2014), 10. Prior to the modernisation, the Commission was confined to a reopening of the procedure. Choné/Souam/Vialfont (2014), 169, consider the Commission’s power to render a commitment legally binding and to impose fines for non-compliance as “the major innovation compared to the earlier framework”.

  194. 194.

    Eg Wils (2006), 346; Ritter (2012), Art. 9, 2.

  195. 195.

    See in particular van Bael (1986), 82ff; Bourgeois (1993), 98ff; von Winterfeld (1995); Van Bael (1995), 242.

  196. 196.

    According to Sousa Ferro (2005), 459, one can oppose concerns that the Commission uses the Article 9 procedure to extract overbroad remedies by stating that the introduction of the Article 9 procedure has not changed anything in that respect, since the same problem existed with merely informal undertakings.

  197. 197.

    See Botteman/Patsa (2013), 351f: They observe that the Commission “made noticeably more use of commitment decisions, relative to prohibition decisions, to conclude Article 102 TFEU investigations” after the delivery of the opinion of AG Kokott. Jenny (2015) claims that the Commission’s use of commitment decisions “slowed down” after the Alrosa judgment of the General Court (751), but that the judgment of the Court of Justice is “one of the major reasons” for the – alleged – overall increase in commitment decisions (702 and 762).

  198. 198.

    See Sect. 2.3.1.1.1 with footnote 148 above.

  199. 199.

    Against the possibility of quantitative statements about the impact of the Alrosa judgement on the Commission’s commitment practice also Wagner-Von Papp (2012), 940, with further reasons. It must, however, be acknowledged that subsequent to the Alrosa judgment of the General Court and prior to the Alrosa judgment of the Court of Justice, members of the Commission’s services stated that the Commission would “continue to mainly rely on Article 7 prohibition decisions” [Lowe/Maier-Rigaud (2008), 611].

  200. 200.

    Botteman/Patsa (2013), 351f expressly acknowledge this by stating that the increase in commitments after AG Kokott’s opinion “may be purely coincidental”. See also Wagner-Von Papp (2012), 942, who cautions against the fallacy of the “post hoc, ergo propter hoc” argument for causation.

  201. 201.

    See Budzinski/Kuchinke (2012), 279 fn 29; Wagner-Von Papp (2012), 959.

  202. 202.

    Instead of all see only O’Donoghue/Padilla (2013), 896ff; Wagner-Von Papp (2012), 959; OECD (2016), 25ff, all with further references.

  203. 203.

    Wagner-Von Papp (2012), 959.

  204. 204.

    For the discussion whether there is a right of access to the file under the Article 9 procedure see Sect. 4.1.1.2.2.2.1 with footnote 24 below.

  205. 205.

    See Jenny (2015), 732ff; OECD (2016), 31; Botta/Wiedemann (2018), 72; von Kalben (2018), 152ff.

  206. 206.

    Budzinski/Kuchinke (2012), 280; Sadowska (2014), 6.

  207. 207.

    Falconi (2011), 47; OECD (2016), 31: “It could well be that for complex negotiations the cost increases and the whole enforcement action might take longer than a regular investigation.”

  208. 208.

    See Mariniello (2014), 4, according to whom Article 7 procedures are on average only 17% slower than Article 9 procedures (28.5 versus 24.3 months) and even 15% faster where Article 102 TFEU cases are concerned (26 against 22.7 months). According to Lugard/Möllmann (2013), 7, the overall difference in duration is even less significant. They state that on average, a commitment procedure lasts approximately 22 months and an infringement procedure approximately 23 months. But see also Gerard (2013b), 9, who presents a chart indicating that the duration of commitment procedures is less long than that of infringement procedures; von Kalben (2018), 154, presents figures indicating that the commitment procedure is 25% faster than the infringement procedure.

  209. 209.

    Lugard/Möllmann (2013), 7; Marsden (2013), 2 fn 5.

  210. 210.

    COMP/39.985 (Motorola, 2014): 25 months.

  211. 211.

    COMP/39.939 (Samsung, 2014): 27 months.

  212. 212.

    COMP/39.816 (Gazprom, 2018): The Commission opened proceedings in September 2012 and adopted the commitment decision in May 2018.

  213. 213.

    See also the Commission’s staff working document accompanying the report on the functioning of Regulation 1/03, COM(2009)206 final, 104, where the Commission explains the long duration of some commitment procedures with the fact that the procedures in question were initiated under Regulation 17/62.

  214. 214.

    To date, no commitment decision has been challenged by the undertaking that offered the commitment; see also Kellerbauer (2011), 3 fn 24; Wagner-Von Papp (2012), 959 fn 114.

  215. 215.

    Article 278 TFEU and Article 60 of the Statute of the Court of Justice.

  216. 216.

    GC, T-201/04 R (Microsoft I, 2004).

  217. 217.

    Temple Lang (2006), 274; O’Donoghue/Padilla (2013), 897 together with fn 72; I have not verified whether statistic evidence supports this conclusion.

  218. 218.

    Sadowska (2014), 54.

  219. 219.

    See Budzinski/Kuchinke (2012), 282: They point out that the “self-interest factors [of a competition authority] can be boiled down to (i) demonstrating activity by frequent interventions, and (ii) showcasing interventions as being a success”. See also Forrester (2010), 649, who emphasises that competition authorities “are accountable to the outside world, and need to show results”.

  220. 220.

    See Rab/Monnoyeur/Sukhtankar (2010), 175: “In a situation where the Commission’s investigation into a suspected infringement does not produce sufficiently strong and convincing evidence to support the finding of an infringement, Article 9 provides an alternative process for resolving the case and addressing competition concerns”.

  221. 221.

    See Budzinski/Kuchinke (2012), 284.

  222. 222.

    See eg Podszun (2012), 52f: “sachnähere und in der Regel angemessene Entscheidungen”; Cengiz (2011), 135: “superior in terms of their problem-solving capacity”; Sadowska (2014), 7: “Negotiations over commitments bring together the Commission’s expertise in competition law compliance and the undertaking’s sector specific knowledge”.

  223. 223.

    CJ, C-441/07 P (Alrosa, 2010), 35; see also Hennig (2010b), 450.

  224. 224.

    Budzinski/Kuchinke (2012), 275.

  225. 225.

    See the Commission’s staff working document accompanying the report on the functioning of Regulation 1/03, COM(2009)206 final, 102: “As commitment decisions result from the parties’ initiative and willingness to offer commitments, the same parties tend to be more readily inclined to implement their own voluntary commitments”; Manual of Procedures (2012), Module 16, 8: “The fact that the commitments are not imposed by the Commission but voluntarily submitted and implemented only after discussions with the parties as well as a market test may also facilitate the later implementation of the commitments”. See also Budzinski/Kuchinke (2012), 279; McGeown/Orologas (2013), 5; Wathelet (2015), 554: “it is a truism that undertakings are more likely to adhere to a negotiated solution rather than one that has been imposed upon them”.

  226. 226.

    See Forrester (2010), 645; Rab/Monnoyeur/Sukhtankar (2010), 175; Schweitzer (2012), 2; O’Donoghue/Padilla (2013), 896f.

  227. 227.

    See in particular Mariniello (2014), 6: “From the Commission’s perspective, proactive remedies can be a useful tool. Despite the criticism of proactive remedies in the legal literature […], they might be justifiable on economic grounds. Proactive remedies allow the Commission to offer the elimination of a fine in exchange for remedies that can affect market structure, increase competition and therefore potentially lead to higher welfare levels of consumers”. See also Botteman/Patsa (2013), 357: “The commitment procedure may provide scope for the formulation of remedies that are more successful at resolving the EC’s concerns and restoring effective competition in the market to the benefit of consumers. [In fact], remedies imposed through commitment decisions may be more creative and go further than what the EC could have imposed under infringement proceedings”; similarly also Cook (2006), 211f; Hjelmeng (2013), 1030 and 1036f; O’Donoghue/Padilla (2013), 898; Sadowska (2014), 7; OECD (2016), 32.

  228. 228.

    See Wagner-Von Papp (2012), 959; Dunne (2014), 401.

  229. 229.

    Wagner-Von Papp (2012), 959.

  230. 230.

    Eg Budzinski/Kuchinke (2012), 281f; Hjelmeng (2013), 1030; Mariniello (2014), 5; Choné/Souam/Vialfont (2014), 170 and 177.

  231. 231.

    See Edwards/Padilla (2010), 673; Budzinski/Kuchinke (2012), 281f; Hjelmeng (2013), 1030: “under-deterrence may occur because infringements are perceived as less risky in light of the prospects of settling the case”. But see also Gerard (2013b), 12: “[T]he loss in repressive utility resulting from the Commission’s acceptance of commitments appears relative, notably as it is able to maintain a high level of general deterrence by adopting a tough stance in remaining infringement cases”.

  232. 232.

    Hjelmeng (2013), 1030; Mariniello (2014), 5.

  233. 233.

    See Manual of Procedures (2012), Module 16, 10.

  234. 234.

    Edwards/Padilla (2010), 669: “[…] the competition authority will be willing to settle when the potential sacrifice in consumer welfare resulting from litigation […] and the litigation costs […] exceed the cost of settling in terms of lost fines and diminished deterrence”; similarly at 674f.

  235. 235.

    See eg Commission, MEMO/09/235 (Intel, 2009); Engelsing/Schneider (2008), 4-23-168.

  236. 236.

    Rab/Monnoyeur/Sukhtankar (2010), 175f.

  237. 237.

    Wils (2006), 349. In his view, this systemic bias stems from the fact that “the benefits of infringement decisions for the enforcement of Articles [101 and 102 TFEU], namely the public censure, deterrence, disgorgement of illicit gains and punishment, and facilitation of follow-on actions for compensation, are strictly negative from the perspective of the undertakings that are the addressees of the infringement decisions”.

  238. 238.

    Budzinski/Kuchinke (2012), 284f: “[…] consensual arrangements are well-suited to the self-interest of competition authorities, in particular if the threat of unfavourable court decisions is prevalent. Thus, if a competition authority does not act completely altruistic and unselfish, it should be prone to enter such arrangements”. See also Sadowska (2014), 47: “potential bias on the part of the Commission in favour of commitment decisions”.

  239. 239.

    For the area of hardcore cartels, there is a legal constraint: The last sentence of Recital 13 of Regulation 1/03 provides that “[c]ommitment decisions are not appropriate in cases where the Commission intends to impose a fine”. In the Manual of Procedures (2012) (Module 16, 13), the Commission expressly acknowledges this legal constraint and states that “[c]onsequently, [it] does not apply the Article 9 procedure to secret cartels that fall under the Notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases”.

  240. 240.

    For the argument that an undertaking’s inclination to enter into a disproportionate commitment depends on its risk aversion see Wils (2006), 351; Cengiz (2011), 136; Wagner-Von Papp (2012), 944.

  241. 241.

    Sadowska (2014), 9.

  242. 242.

    Edwards/Padilla (2010), 670f.

  243. 243.

    In the Manual of Procedures (2012), Module 16, 11f, the Commission indicates that, when deciding on whether to adopt a commitment decision, it will take the necessity to deter other undertakings or to establish a strong precedent into account.

  244. 244.

    See Temple Lang (2006), 290f; Whish (2006), 564; Georgiev (2007), 1030; Sofianatos (2009), 82; Rab/Monnoyeur/Sukhtankar (2010), 176; Schweitzer (2010), 548f, (2011), 649 and (2012), 11 and 15f; Cengiz (2011), 138; Falconi (2011), 47; Lugard/Möllmann (2013), 7; Dunne (2014), 406f; Whish/Bailey (2012), 167f; Jones/Sufrin (2014), 989; Brenner (2014), 676.

  245. 245.

    For an emphasis of the differences see in particular Whish (2006), 564; Schweitzer (2011), 649; Whish/Bailey (2012), 168; AG Kokott, opinion in C-547/16 (Gasorba, 2017), 45ff. But see Georgiev (2007), 1030: “settling with the Commission is equivalent to receiving an individual exemption of the kind that was available under Regulation 17/62”.

  246. 246.

    Rab/Monnoyeur/Sukhtankar (2010), 176; Cengiz (2011), 138; Schweitzer (2012), 11.

  247. 247.

    See Forrester (2010), 639: “The system of notification committed the Commission to be ready to consider, to react, and to advise in response to requests for guidance by the private sector”. But see also the strand of case law cited in Sect. 2.3.1.2, footnote 177 above, according to which it was in the first place for the concerned undertakings to submit alternatives, if the Commission raised concerns regarding the initial notification.

  248. 248.

    See Sofianatos (2009), 82: “les décisions d’engagements […] sont vouées à remplir le vide que laisse la suppression de la négociation au stade de l’exemption”; Dunne (2014), 407: “guiding role that [the notification procedure] granted to the Commission […] [is] discernible in within many commitment decisions”; also Forrester (2010), 639 and Whish/Bailey (2012), 167.

  249. 249.

    See Sofianatos (2009), 82, who extends the argument also to negative clearance decisions pursuant to Article 2 Regulation 17/62; also Schweitzer (2011), 649: “nicht ein bloßes Äquivalent der früheren Genehmigungsentscheidungen und Negativatteste”.

  250. 250.

    See Sect. 2.3.1.2 with footnote 172 above.

  251. 251.

    See Whish (2006), 564; consenting Sofianatos (2009), 82.

  252. 252.

    Schweitzer (2011), 649: “Keineswegs soll [das Instrument der Verpflichtungsentscheidungen] zu einem Ersatz für das frühere Notifizierungsverfahren werden. Es dient nicht primär dem Interesse der Unternehmen an Rechtssicherheit, sondern dem Interesse der Kommission an der zügigen Beilegung von Wettbewerbsproblemen”; AG Kokott, opinion in C-547/16 (Gasorba, 2017), 36ff.

  253. 253.

    See Sect. 5.1.2 with footnote 49 below.

  254. 254.

    See Schweitzer (2011), 649, who emphasises that the Commission applies the commitment procedure only selectively.

  255. 255.

    The terminology is not consistent. Without expressing a preference for either term, I will use the term “more economic approach”.

  256. 256.

    Cengiz (2011), 136; Wagner-Von Papp (2012), 964; Botteman/Patsa (2013), 352f; Gerard (2013b), 13; Mestmäcker/Schweitzer (2014), § 21, 54; Sadowska (2014), 180; Jenny (2015), 734, who goes as far as to argue that the Commission uses the Article 9 procedure to “bypass the constraints of a more economic approach in the name of enforcement effectiveness” (703).

  257. 257.

    See only the contributions in Schmidtchen/Albert/Voigt (2007); Drexl/Podszun/Kerber (2011); Basedow/Wurmnest (2011); Bourgeois/Waelbroeck (2013); also Ackermann (2010), 22, Kersten (2010), 297ff, and Podszun (2012), 53f.

  258. 258.

    See Wagner-Von Papp (2012), 964; Gerard (2013b), 13; (2013a), 33f; Perrot (2013), 294; Botteman/Patsa (2013), 352f; Wils (2014b), 7f with further references in fn 58.

  259. 259.

    On the potential negative effects of the more economic approach on legal certainty see eg Kerber/Christiansen (2006), 217ff; Drexl (2009), 679; de Hautecloque (2009), 95f; Hancher/de Hautecloque (2010), 329.

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Reiter, K. (2020). Prolegomena. In: Market Design Powers of the European Commission?. Munich Studies on Innovation and Competition, vol 13. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-60711-4_2

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