Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Article 34

General rule regarding third States

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

Abstract

Art 34 contains the Convention’s general rule regarding the effects of treaties in respect of third States. For States who have not expressed their consent to be bound by its terms, a treaty constitutes res inter alios acta. The underlying notion, embodied in the maxim pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt (agreements neither harm nor benefit third parties), may appropriately be described as the negative facet of the principle of pacta sunt servanda and is founded on the principles of sovereignty and independence of States. While the pacta tertiis rule is not valid in an absolute manner, this does not alter the fact that a treaty generally has only a relative effect, ie is valid inter partes.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 30, 226, para 1; see also Fitzmaurice V 75 et seq (Draft Art 3); Waldock III 18; Reuter VI 120; PCIJ Status of Eastern Carelia (Advisory Opinion) PCIJ Ser B No 5, 27 (1923).

  2. 2.

    Rousseau I (1970), p. 184.

  3. 3.

    Fitzmaurice V 84.

  4. 4.

    Sinclair (1984), p. 98; Aust (2013), pp. 227–231 deals with the subject matter on five pages only.

  5. 5.

    See Fitzmaurice V 72.

  6. 6.

    Cf Final Draft, Commentary to Art 30, 226, para 4. For a recent assessment see Proelss (2014b), pp. 222–253 (partly relying on the first edition of this commentary).

  7. 7.

    Boyle and Chinkin (2007), p. 239.

  8. 8.

    Sinclair (1984), p. 101.

  9. 9.

    Waldock VI 67; see also Villiger (2009), Art 34 MN 4.

  10. 10.

    Cf Roxburgh (1917), p. 6. For a critical appraisal of the role of Roman law in relation to international law, see Winkler (1932), pp. 2–6.

  11. 11.

    See Roxburgh (1917), pp. 6–18.

  12. 12.

    The critique raised by Scelle (1934), pp. 367–379 is based on a general refusal of any relative approach to public international law.

  13. 13.

    For an overview on the historical background, see PCIJ Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex PCIJ Ser A/B No 46, 115 et seq (1932).

  14. 14.

    PCIJ Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex PCIJ Ser A/B No 46, 141 (1932).

  15. 15.

    PCIJ Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Merits) PCIJ Ser A No 7, 29 (1926); see also The Factory at Chorzów (Claim for Indemnity) (Merits) PCIJ Ser A No 17, 45 (1928); Customs Régime between Germany and Austria (Protocol of March 19th, 1931) (Advisory Opinion) PCIJ Ser A/B No 41, 48 (1931).

  16. 16.

    Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v United States) (1928) 2 RIAA 829, 842.

  17. 17.

    PCIJ Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder PCIJ Ser A No 23, 20 (1929).

  18. 18.

    ICJ Anglo-Iranian Oil [1952] ICJ Rep 93, 109 (original emphasis).

  19. 19.

    Waldock III 18 et seq with further references; see also the decision of the ECJ Brita C-386/08 [2010] ECR I-1289, paras 42, 44.

  20. 20.

    Fitzmaurice V 69 et seq.

  21. 21.

    Fitzmaurice V 75.

  22. 22.

    Fitzmaurice V 83; see also Dinstein (2006), p. 331.

  23. 23.

    Cf § 328 et seq German Civil Code; Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 of the United Kingdom.

  24. 24.

    Fitzmaurice V 81 (Draft Art 19).

  25. 25.

    Fitzmaurice V 100 et seq.

  26. 26.

    Fitzmaurice V 100.

  27. 27.

    Translation by Fitzmaurice V 101 (original emphasis).

  28. 28.

    Fitzmaurice V 101. Art 17 LoN Covenant reads in its relevant parts: “(1) In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State which is not a Member of the League, or between States not Members of the League, the State or States not Members of the League shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem just. If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Articles 12 to 16 inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the Council. […] (3) If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a Member of the League, the provisions of Article 16 shall be applicable as against the State taking such action.”

  29. 29.

    McNair (1961), pp. 333–336.

  30. 30.

    Consequently, a treaty may permissibly confer benefits on a third State. See Ago [1964-I] YbILC 90; de Luna [1964-I] YbILC 90; cf also Waldock III 21; Final Draft, Commentary to Art 32, 228, para 3.

  31. 31.

    Fitzmaurice V 102; Waldock III 21, 25; see also Waldock VI 71.

  32. 32.

    PCIJ Free Zones of Upper Savoy and District of Gex PCIJ Ser A/B No 46, 147 et seq (1932).

  33. 33.

    Cf Rosenne [1964-I] YbILC 89; Pal [1964-I] YbILC 89; Jiménez de Aréchaga [1966-I/2] YbILC 90.

  34. 34.

    However, see the critique raised by Reuter VI 125 stating that the terms “third” and “non-party” are not wholly equivalent.

  35. 35.

    Fitzmaurice V 83.

  36. 36.

    Cf Art 59 ICJ Statute: “The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”

  37. 37.

    See ICJ Nuclear Tests (Australia v France) [1974] ICJ Rep 253, para 46; Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v France) [1974] ICJ Rep 457, para 49.

  38. 38.

    ICJ Nicaragua (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [1984] ICJ Rep 392, para 59 et seq; cf also Right of Passage (Preliminary Objections) [1957] ICJ Rep 125, 146.

  39. 39.

    Cf ICJ Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v Mali) [1986] ICJ Rep 554, para 46.

  40. 40.

    See eg Art 12 para 1 lit b, Art 12 para 2 lit a, Art 20 para 2, Art 40 para 2, Art 47, Art 76, Art 77 para 1 VCLT; see also Waldock III 19. The concept of the ‘witness State’ (which is not mentioned in the VCLT) is not associated with the category of States mentioned above; see David (2011), Art 34 MN 19. Its sole effect is that the respective State acts as witness of the conclusion of a treaty to which it is not a party; an example worth mentioning is the 1979 Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt 17 ILM 1469 whose conclusion was witnessed by US President Carter. There is no need to further explain that the ‘witness State’ is a third State under the VCLT.

  41. 41.

    Fitzmaurice (2002), p. 43 et seq.

  42. 42.

    Lauterpacht I 98.

  43. 43.

    See McNair (1961), p. 203 et seq.

  44. 44.

    Cahier (1974), p. 601; Sinclair (1984), p. 99.

  45. 45.

    For a detailed assessment see Proelss (2014b), pp. 235–242.

  46. 46.

    Cf UNSC Res 687 (1991), 3 April 1991, para 25; UNSC Res 748 (1992), 31 March 1992, para 7; UNSC Res 917 (1994), 6 May 1994, para 12; UNSC Res 1333 (2000), 19 December 2000, para 17.

  47. 47.

    Tomuschat (2011), pp. 210–216.

  48. 48.

    ECJ Brita C-386/08 [2010] ECR I-1289, para 52.

  49. 49.

    ECJ Brita C-386/08 [2010] ECR I-1289, paras 44, 52.

  50. 50.

    ECJ Council v Front Polisario C-104/16 P ECLI:EU:C:2016:973, paras 100–108.

  51. 51.

    The Statute of the ICTY is contained in the annex to a report of the UN Secretary-General (UN Doc S/25704 [1993] and S/25704/Add.1 [1993]) and was adopted on 25 May 1993 by Resolution 827 of the UN Security Council (see UN Doc S/RES/827 [1993] of 25 May 1993).

  52. 52.

    ICTY The Prosecutor v Simić et al (Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance) (Trial Chamber) ICTY-IT-95-9-PT (18 October 2000), para 46; confirmed in ICTY The Prosecutor v Milutinovic et al (Trial Chamber) ICTY-IT-05-87-PT (17 November 2005), paras 36–37; ICTY The Prosecutor v Milutinovic et al (Appeals Chamber) ICTY-IT-05-87-AR108bis.1 (15 May 2006), para 8. For a potential interpretation of this jurisprudence see Acquaviva (2011), pp. 193–197; Proelss (2014b), pp. 237–240. See also Zimmermann (2006), p. 343, indicating that the exercise of jurisdiction over nationals of a third State by the ICTY can, in light of the pacta tertiis rule, only be justified by reference to the validity of the principle of universal jurisdiction under customary international law.

  53. 53.

    Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 1125 UNTS 609.

  54. 54.

    ICJ Nicaragua (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 219; see also Greenwood (2007), pp. 45, 76.

  55. 55.

    Bothe (2016), pp. 591, 677.

  56. 56.

    See Zegveld (2002), p. 10 with further references.

  57. 57.

    Proelss (2014b), p. 242.

  58. 58.

    Reference can be made here to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations as interpreted by ICJ LaGrand [2001] ICJ Rep 466, para 77; Avena Case [2004] ICJ Rep 12, para 40, and to the Rome Statute; see Milanović (2011), p. 25 et seq.

  59. 59.

    Milanović (2011), p. 39; Chinkin (1993), p. 121.

  60. 60.

    Exceptions are Chinkin (1993), pp. 18–22; Cahier (1974), pp. 597–605; Roxburgh (1917), pp. 31–33. The issue was neither addressed by the ILC in its Commentary to the Final Draft nor by SR Waldock in his third report.

  61. 61.

    Roxburgh (1917), p. 32; see also Schweisfurth (1985), p. 655 et seq; Cahier (1974), p. 598 et seq.

  62. 62.

    Lake Lanoux (France v Spain) (1957) 12 RIAA 281, 315 (emphasis added).

  63. 63.

    See Doehring (2004), p. 154 et seq (MN 347).

  64. 64.

    Chinkin (1993), p. 20.

  65. 65.

    Art 2 para 6 UN Charter reads: “The Organization shall ensure that States which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.”

  66. 66.

    1340 UNTS 184.

  67. 67.

    1184 UNTS 2.

  68. 68.

    Cf Art 5 para 4 MARPOL; Art II para 3 of the 1978 Protocol to SOLAS. For further examples, see Handl (1997), pp. 217, 222.

  69. 69.

    Wolfrum (1990), p. 139 et seq; König (1990), p. 168 et seq; Núñez-Müller (1994), p. 261; Wetzel (1973), p. 13.

  70. 70.

    Thienel (2016), p. 164 et seq, who at the same time admits that ʻindirect obligationsʼ cannot easily be distinguished from obligations in terms of Art 34 (p. 186).

  71. 71.

    See Proelss (2004), pp. 132–135.

  72. 72.

    Jennings and Watts (1992), p. 1264, n 4.

  73. 73.

    See Fitzmaurice V 100–101.

  74. 74.

    However, see Handl (1997), p. 223 who with a view to the NMFT clauses contained in MARPOL and SOLAS argues that the third State effect does not derive from the treaty clauses themselves but from the autonomous behaviour of the flag State.

  75. 75.

    The same line of argument is applied to Art 2 para 6 by Vitzthum (2002), Art 2 para 6 MN 23.

  76. 76.

    See also Ago [1966-I/2] YbILC 67: “[T]he Commission had henceforth established the principle of inequality as between the aggressor State and the others, and […] in contemporary international law, an aggressor State was no longer to be regarded as being on an equal footing with other States.”

  77. 77.

    1949 North Atlantic Treaty 34 UNTS 243.

  78. 78.

    See the Alliance’s Strategic Concept of 1999, NATO Press Release NAC-S (99) 65, Rutten (2001), p. 24.

  79. 79.

    Jennings and Watts (1992), p. 1264; Kunz (1947), p. 125; Kelsen (1950), p. 110. See also Elias [1964-I] YbILC 73 and Lauterpacht I 98 who state that “[t]he Article in question imposes no legal obligation upon non-member States” on the one hand but examines that “with the growing integration of international society, collective treaties may, by general consent, be held to produce not only actual compliance but also legal rights and obligations in relation to States which are not parties thereto” on the other.

  80. 80.

    Shaw (2008), p. 929; Crawford (2012), p. 385. Note that reference to custom would be superfluous if Art 2 para 6 and Art 102 UN Charter would not per se conflict with the pacta tertiis rule.

  81. 81.

    Vukas (2011), para 16; Talmon (2012), para 28 et seq with further references; see also the mediative position taken by Jessup (1947), p. 135; Villiger (2009), Art 34 MN 9.

  82. 82.

    See Fitzmaurice V 88.

  83. 83.

    This is admitted by Fitzmaurice V 88.

  84. 84.

    Annex 2 to the written statement of the Kingdom of Norway, 16 April 2009, available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/141/15650.pdf. Accessed 22 November 2017.

  85. 85.

    See the references collected by Talmon (2012), paras 55–65.

  86. 86.

    See eg UNSC Res 232 (1966), 16 December 1966, UN Doc S/RES/232 (1966), para 7; UNSC Res 314 (1972), 28 February 1972, UN Doc S/RES/314 (1972), para 2 (“[u]rges all States to implement fully all Security Council resolutions establishing sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, in accordance with their obligations under Article 25 and Article 2, paragraph 6, of the Charter of the United Nations”); UNSC Res 388 (1976), 6 April 1976, UN Doc S/RES/388 (1976), para 3; UNSC Res 409 (1977), 27 May 1977, UN Doc S/RES/409 (1977), para 2; UNSC Res 1368 (2001), 12 September 2001, UN Doc S/RES/1368 (2001), para 3; UNSC Res 1455 (2003), 17 January 2003, UN Doc S/RES/1455 (2003), paras 5–7. However, see UNSC Res 661 (1990), 6 August 1990, UN Doc S/RES/661 (1990), para 5, UNSC Res 670 (1990), 25 September 1990, UN Doc S/RES/670 (1990), para 1, and UNSC Res 1373 (2001), 28 September 2001, UN Doc S/RES/1373 (2001), para 1 et seq, obliging all States to act accordingly.

  87. 87.

    See Art 2 para 1 UNCLOS.

  88. 88.

    Cf Williams and Schabas (2008), Art 12 MN 10.

  89. 89.

    See Crawford (2012), p. 458 et seq with further references.

  90. 90.

    Williams and Schabas (2008), MN 15 (footnote omitted).

  91. 91.

    However, see Boyle and Chinkin (2007), p. 240 et seq.

  92. 92.

    See Arts 87, 89, 92 para 1 UNCLOS.

  93. 93.

    Higher Administrative Court of Hamburg (Germany) 13 Natur und Recht 388, 389 (1991).

  94. 94.

    Willisch (1987), p. 114 et seq; Fitzmaurice (2002), p. 119.

  95. 95.

    Cf in contrast Art 22 para 2 of the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity: “Contracting Parties shall implement this Convention with respect to the marine environment consistently with the rights and obligations of States under the law of the sea.”

  96. 96.

    Proelss (2004), p. 135 et seq. Art 3 para 1 lit b reads: “The present Convention shall apply to […] ships not entitled to fly the flag of a Party but which operate under the authority of a Party.”

  97. 97.

    Birnie et al (2009), pp. 389, 406; Valenzuela (1999), p. 491; Fitzmaurice (2002), p. 120; see also Proelss (2004), p. 129 et seq.

  98. 98.

    This reasoning is advanced by Kasoulides (1997), p. 132 et seq; Birnie et al (2009), p. 406; Valenzuela (1999), p. 491.

  99. 99.

    ICJ North Sea Continental Shelf [1969] ICJ Rep 3, para 72.

  100. 100.

    See also the report by Shultz, Secretary of State, reprinted in Cumulative Digest of United States Practice in International Law (1981–1988), p. 2081: “As with all other MARPOL 73/78 regulations in force for them, States bound by Annex V will be required to apply Annex V regulations to all ships, including those of non-party States, using their ports or otherwise under their jurisdiction.”

  101. 101.

    1833 UNTS 3. Art 218 para 1 UNCLOS reads: “When a vessel is voluntarily within a port or at an off-shore terminal of a State, that State may undertake investigations and, where the evidence so warrants, institute proceedings in respect of any discharge from that vessel outside the internal waters, territorial sea or exclusive economic zone of that State in violation of applicable international rules and standards established through the competent international organization or general diplomatic conference.”

  102. 102.

    See Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 350; Lagoni (1991), p. 144; Valenzuela (1999), p. 496 (“no evidence that port states have resorted to this extended method of enforcement”); Kasoulides (1997), p. 138.

  103. 103.

    Contra Thienel (2016), p. 186.

  104. 104.

    Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UNGA Res 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970, UN Doc A/RES/2625 (XXV).

  105. 105.

    Proelss (2004), pp. 134–135. The notion seems to originate, as far as its applicability to States is concerned, in continental legal thinking; see eg Seidl-Hohenveldern (2001), p. 156; Scupin (1960), pp. 723–733; Verdross and Simma (1984), pp. 272–321.

  106. 106.

    See only Seidl-Hohenveldern (2001), p. 156; Scupin (1960), p. 723.

  107. 107.

    Cf also written reply of the Legal Adviser for the US Department of State Hansell to a letter by Glennon, Legal Counsel of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, reprinted in Digest of United States Practice in International Law (1978), p. 702.

  108. 108.

    However, see Villiger (2009), Art 36 MN 2.

  109. 109.

    Rosenne [1964-I] YbILC 84.

  110. 110.

    See also Pal [1964-I] YbILC 89; Waldock III 31; PCIJ Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig (Pecuniary Claims of Danzig Railway Officials who Have Passed into the Polish Service, against the Polish Railways Administration) PCIJ Ser B No 15, 17 et seq (1928).

  111. 111.

    Dinstein (2006), p. 334 (original emphasis); Fitzmaurice (2002), p. 104 et seq.

  112. 112.

    ICJ Barcelona Traction (Second Phase) [1970] ICJ Rep 3, para 44 (emphasis added).

  113. 113.

    ICJ Barcelona Traction (Second Phase) [1970] ICJ Rep 3, para 33.

  114. 114.

    ICJ Barcelona Traction (Second Phase) [1970] ICJ Rep 3, para 91; see also ICJ South West Africa (Second Phase) [1966] ICJ Rep 6, para 88.

  115. 115.

    Jiménez de Aréchaga (1956), p. 349. See also Ragazzi (1997), p. 212; Talmon (2006), p. 293 et seq. The commentary to the ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts does, as far as Art 48 is concerned, also not refer to “legal standing” but only to “legal interest in invoking responsibility”; cf ILC Report 53rd Session [2001-II/2] YbILC 116. But see the recent decision of the ICJ Whaling in the Antarctic [2014] ICJ Rep 226, paras 30–41.

  116. 116.

    Art 386 reads in its relevant part: “In the event of violation of any of the conditions of Articles 380–386, or of disputes as to the interpretation of these Articles, any interested Power can appeal to the jurisdiction instituted for the purpose by the League of Nations.”

  117. 117.

    Jiménez de Aréchaga (1956), p. 350.

  118. 118.

    Lauterpacht I 154; see also the position of the Algerian delegation, reproduced in Waldock VI 67.

  119. 119.

    Cf McNair (1986), p. 220.

  120. 120.

    See Fitzmaurice V 88: “illegal”.

  121. 121.

    Waldock II 57.

  122. 122.

    Thienel (2016), p. 187 et seq.

  123. 123.

    Thienel (2016), p. 166.

  124. 124.

    Thienel (2016), p. 167.

  125. 125.

    Laly-Chevalier (2006), Art 35 MN 3. See also ILC Report 16th Session [1964-II] YbILC 173, 181: “one of the bulwarks of the independence and equality of States”.

  126. 126.

    Vukas (2011), MN 3.

  127. 127.

    Simma (1994), p. 358 (footnote omitted).

  128. 128.

    Tomuschat (1988), p. 11; see also Chinkin (1993), p. 25 et seq.

  129. 129.

    See eg Kearney and Dalton (1970), p. 557; Fitzmaurice (2002), p. 45; see also Lachs [1964-I] YbILC 71.

  130. 130.

    Tunkin [1964-I] YbILC 71; Tunkin [1966-I/2] YbILC, 61; Tunkin [1966-I/2] YbILC, 66; Waldock [1966-I/2] YbILC 72; de Luna [1966-I/2] YbILC 60; de Luna [1966-I/2] YbILC 70; Briggs [1966-I/2] YbILC 61; Briggs [1966-I/2] YbILC 68; Jiménez de Aréchaga [1966-I/2] YbILC 64; Castrén [1966-I/2] YbILC 61; Bartoš [1966-I/2] YbILC 63; however, see Lachs [1966-I/2] YbILC 61: “[T]he source of the obligations of the aggressor State lay both in the rules on State responsibility and in the law of treaties, but the effects were felt mainly in the law of treaties.”

  131. 131.

    ILC Report 16th Session [1964-I] YbILC 181, see also Final Draft, Commentary to Art 31, 227, para 3.

  132. 132.

    See Wetzel (1973), pp. 165–184.

  133. 133.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 70, 268, para 1.

  134. 134.

    Wetzel (1973), pp. 184–186.

  135. 135.

    Cf Waldock [1964-I] YbILC 96: “The possibility of treaties creating objective regimes was one of considerable delicacy”.

  136. 136.

    See Waldock III 28–32.

  137. 137.

    McNair (1961), p. 255 (original emphasis).

  138. 138.

    McNair (1961), p. 256.

  139. 139.

    ICJ South West Africa Opinion (separate opinion McNair) [1950] ICJ Rep 146, 153.

  140. 140.

    ICJ South West Africa Opinion [1950] ICJ Rep 128, 133–136.

  141. 141.

    ICJ South West Africa Opinion (separate opinion McNair) [1950] ICJ Rep 146, 156.

  142. 142.

    ICJ South West Africa Opinion (separate opinion McNair) [1950] ICJ Rep 146, 156.

  143. 143.

    Fitzmaurice V 92 (original emphasis).

  144. 144.

    Fitzmaurice V 92.

  145. 145.

    Fitzmaurice V 98.

  146. 146.

    Fitzmaurice V 98 (original emphasis).

  147. 147.

    Fitzmaurice V 92.

  148. 148.

    Fitzmaurice V 98.

  149. 149.

    Fitzmaurice V 79.

  150. 150.

    See Fitzmaurice V 92, 97.

  151. 151.

    Viewed from today’s perspective, the situation referred to by Fitzmaurice would be covered by Art 36 para 2 VCLT (→ Art 36 MN 26–28).

  152. 152.

    Fitzmaurice V 92.

  153. 153.

    Fitzmaurice V 80 et seq. Note that Draft Art 18 para 1 referred to the conditions contained in Draft Art 17 para 1 lit a. This fact has prompted some sources to count three relevant provisions in the fifth report of SR Fitzmaurice.

  154. 154.

    Waldock III 26 et seq (Draft Art 63).

  155. 155.

    Waldock III 28.

  156. 156.

    Waldock III 32.

  157. 157.

    Waldock III 32.

  158. 158.

    Waldock III 29–31.

  159. 159.

    Waldock III 33; see also Waldock [1964-I] YbILC 97.

  160. 160.

    Waldock III 33.

  161. 161.

    Waldock [1964-I] YbILC 104.

  162. 162.

    Elias [1964-I] YbILC 97; El-Erian [1964-I] YbILC 99; Ruda [1964-I] YbILC 100; Jiménez de Aréchaga [1964-I] YbILC 101; Castrén [1964-I] YbILC 101; Pal [1964-I] YbILC 102; Paredes [1964-I] YbILC 103; Liu [1964-I] YbILC 105; critical also Amado [1964-I] YbILC 102; Tunkin [1964-I] YbILC 103; Tabibi [1964-I] YbILC 104. The draft article was generally supported only by Verdross [1964-I] YbILC 99; de Luna [1964-I] YbILC 100; Rosenne [1964-I] YbILC 103.

  163. 163.

    Waldock [1964-I] YbILC 96.

  164. 164.

    See de Luna [1964-I] YbILC 100; Jiménez de Aréchaga [1964-I] YbILC 101; Castrén [1964-I] YbILC 101; Tabibi [1964-I] YbILC 104.

  165. 165.

    Verdross [1964-I] YbILC 99; Ruda [1964-I] YbILC 100; Yasseen [1964-I] YbILC 101.

  166. 166.

    Tsuruoka [1964-I] YbILC 100; Jiménez de Aréchaga [1964-I] YbILC 101; de Luna [1964-I] YbILC 99; Briggs [1964-I] YbILC 103; contra Rosenne [1964-I] YbILC 104; Lachs [1964-I] YbILC 107; Waldock [1964-I] YbILC 108. It was rightly observed by Yasseen [1964-I] YbILC 101, though, that the provision concerned would have resulted in widening the scope of the presumption of acceptance by third States recognized under Art 36 of the Convention. See also Yasseen [1964-I] YbILC 107; de Luna [1964-I] YbILC 99; Jiménez de Aréchaga [1964-I] YbILC 101; Paredes [1964-I] YbILC 102; Tabibi [1964-I] YbILC 104.

  167. 167.

    Waldock [1964-I] YbILC 105.

  168. 168.

    Waldock [1964-I] YbILC 108.

  169. 169.

    Tunkin [1964-I] YbILC 103.

  170. 170.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 34, 231, para 4. But note that according to Bederman (2012), p. 342, n 88, the wording of Art 36 para 1, which refers in its third alternative to “all States”, at least suggestive of erga omnes obligations”. See → Art 36 MN 23.

  171. 171.

    Cf Simma (1986), p. 202; David (2011), Art 34 MN 10 et seq; Tomuschat (1988), p. 14 with further references.

  172. 172.

    See eg Dahm et al (2002), pp. 619–632; Subedi (1994), p. 167; Sinclair (1984), p. 104.

  173. 173.

    Similar Reuter (1995), p. 124.

  174. 174.

    For a detailed examination of the relationship between the two concepts, see Ragazzi (1997), pp. 18–42.

  175. 175.

    ICJ Barcelona Traction (Second Phase) [1970] ICJ Rep 3, para 33.

  176. 176.

    ICJ Barcelona Traction (Second Phase) [1970] ICJ Rep 3, para 34; ICJ Genocide Case (Preliminary Objections) [1996] ICJ Rep 595, para 31.

  177. 177.

    ICJ East Timor [1995] ICJ Rep 90, para 29; Construction of a Wall Opinion [2004] ICJ Rep 136, para 155.

  178. 178.

    ICJ Construction of a Wall [2004] ICJ Rep 136, para 157.

  179. 179.

    Vitzthum (2016), MN 120; Boyle and Chinkin (2007), p. 240; Ragazzi (1997), p. 41 et seq; but see Dahm et al (2002), p. 625 et seq.

  180. 180.

    ICJ Barcelona Traction (Second Phase) [1970] ICJ Rep 3, para 34.

  181. 181.

    Tams (2005) p. 123 (original emphasis).

  182. 182.

    ICJ Construction of a Wall [2004] ICJ Rep 136, paras 157–159.

  183. 183.

    ICJ Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons [1996] ICJ Rep 226, para 79.

  184. 184.

    ICJ Construction of a Wall [2004] ICJ Rep 136, para 157 (original emphasis).

  185. 185.

    ICJ Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal) [2012] ICJ Rep 422, para 99. Cf also ICJ Genocide Convention Opinion [1951] ICJ Rep 15, 23: “[T]he principles underlying the Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obligation” (emphasis added).

  186. 186.

    Schweisfurth (1985), p. 668; Tams (2005), pp. 120–128 with further references. The recent judgment of the ICJ Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal) [2012] ICJ Rep 422 does not contradict the view advocated here. In this judgment, the Court limited the erga omnes effect attributed to the common interest concerned (which, again, implied a jus standi of any State party to bring a claim against the alleged offender State) to the States parties to the Convention against Torture. Such ‘obligations erga omnes partes’ do not at all affect the nature and scope of the pacta tertiis rule.

  187. 187.

    See eg Boyle and Chinkin (2007), p. 239 et seq; Subedi (1994), p. 177 et seq.

  188. 188.

    Sinclair (1984), p. 104.

  189. 189.

    Reuter (1995), p. 124 et seq.

  190. 190.

    Reuter (1995), p. 125.

  191. 191.

    Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v United States) (1928) 2 RIAA 829, 850.

  192. 192.

    See Khan (2004), p. 29 et seq.

  193. 193.

    Cf David (2011), Art 34 MN 10, who draws the same conclusion with regard to the parallel situation of treaties providing for freedom of usage of a waterway, which is located on one or several States’ territories. See also Fitzmaurice V 99; Cahier (1974), p. 670. While the ICJ indicated in ICJ Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v Mali) [1986] ICJ Rep 554, para 46 that a delimitation agreement only has legal and binding effect as between the parties to it, that judgment does not militate against the position advocated here, since in the case concerned, the end point of the frontier lied on the border of a third State not a party to the proceedings.

  194. 194.

    See Reuter (1995), p. 125; cf also Gaja (2011), Art 38 MN 16.

  195. 195.

    ICJ Territorial Dispute (Libya v Chad) [1994] ICJ Rep 6, para 73; see also ICJ Temple of Preah Vihear (Merits) [1962] ICJ Rep 6, 34 et seq; ICJ Aegean Sea Continental Shelf [1978] ICJ Rep 3, para 85.

  196. 196.

    1946 UNTS 3. The Convention entered into force on 6 November 1996, but has only 22 parties so far.

  197. 197.

    ICJ Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros [1997] ICJ Rep 7, para 123.

  198. 198.

    For a closer analysis of the relationship between the 1978 Convention and the pacta tertiis principle, see Fitzmaurice (2002), pp. 77–82.

  199. 199.

    ILC Report 26th Session [1974-II/1] YbILC 204.

  200. 200.

    Similar Reuter (1995), p. 128; but see Sinclair (1984), p. 105 et seq.

  201. 201.

    Final Draft, Commentary to 32, 229, para 8 (emphasis added).

  202. 202.

    For a virtually exhaustive analysis of relevant practice, see Fitzmaurice (2002), p. 84 et seq.

  203. 203.

    PCIJ Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder PCIJ Ser A No 23, 19–22 (1929).

  204. 204.

    The German government unilaterally terminated the passage right through the Canal by note of 14 November 1936 [1936-II] RGBl 361. The issue of whether one must consider States Parties to the Treaty of Versailles, which after having received that note failed to reserve their rights or to protest against it, as having acquiesced to Germany’s unilateral measure, need not be decided here. Suffices it to refer to the fact that a right of freedom of passage existed at the time of conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles. See Lagoni (2008), MN 9 et seq.

  205. 205.

    PCIJ SS ‘Wimbledon’ PCIJ Ser A No 1, 24 (1923) (emphasis added).

  206. 206.

    PCIJ SS ‘Wimbledon’ PCIJ Ser A No 1, 24, 28 (1923) (emphasis added).

  207. 207.

    1888 Convention Respecting the Free Navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal, reprinted in (1909) 3 AJIL Supp 123.

  208. 208.

    265 UNTS 299.

  209. 209.

    Cf Fitzmaurice (2002), p. 102.

  210. 210.

    Chinkin (1993), p. 86.

  211. 211.

    Treaty to Facilitate the Construction of a Ship Canal (1909) 3 AJIL Supp 127–129.

  212. 212.

    PCIJ SS ‘Wimbledon’ PCIJ Ser A No 1, 26 (1923).

  213. 213.

    Cf Fitzmaurice (2002), p. 105 et seq.

  214. 214.

    16 ILM 1040.

  215. 215.

    1856 Convention between the United Kingdom, France and Russia Respecting the Aaland Islands 114 CTS 406.

  216. 216.

    [1920] Official Journal of the League of Nations, Special Supp No 3, 18 et seq.

  217. 217.

    See Lauterpacht (1958), p. 312, n 50; Cahier (1974), p. 666 et seq.

  218. 218.

    Wengler (1964), pp. 609–610, n 4; Fitzmaurice (2002), p. 100; however, see the critical remarks by Ragazzi (1997), p. 35.

  219. 219.

    [1920] Official Journal of the League of Nations, Special Supp No 3, 17.

  220. 220.

    ICJ South West Africa Opinion (separate opinion McNair) [1950] ICJ Rep 146, 154.

  221. 221.

    Klein (1980); see also Dahm (1958), pp. 22–25.

  222. 222.

    Dahm (1958), p. 23. Note that the element of territorial competence originates from the suggestion made by SR Waldock (→ MN 37).

  223. 223.

    Fitzmaurice (2002), p. 71. Against this background, and bearing in mind the case of the Åland Islands (→ MN 49), the assertion that status treaties differ from law-making treaties in that they do not address the formulation of abstract and general rules appears to be somewhat artificial. But see Klein (1980), p. 78 et seq.

  224. 224.

    Klein (1980), pp. 209–213.

  225. 225.

    Klein (1980), p. 224.

  226. 226.

    Contra Schweisfurth (1985), p. 666.

  227. 227.

    See also Gaja (2011), Art 38 MN 16 n 47; Simma (1986), p. 205 et seq; Fitzmaurice (2002), p. 129.

  228. 228.

    Cf ICJ Temple of Preah Vihear (Merits) (separate opinion Alfaro) [1962] ICJ Rep 39, 40: “Failure to protest in circumstances when protest is necessary according to the general practice of States in order to assert, to preserve or to safeguard a right does likewise signify acquiescence or tacit recognition”.

  229. 229.

    See Cahier (1974), p. 665 et seq; but see Salerno (2011), p. 240 et seq, who attempts to justify the concept of objective regimes by referring to the alleged need to fill the normative gaps that result from the structural deficiencies of the international law-making process.

  230. 230.

    ICJ Reparation for Injuries [1949] ICJ Rep 174, 185.

  231. 231.

    McNair (1961), p. 259.

  232. 232.

    Fitzmaurice (2002), p. 92.

  233. 233.

    See also David (2011), Art 34 MN 11.

  234. 234.

    402 UNTS 71.

  235. 235.

    Cf only Birnie (1986), pp. 249–260; Fitzmaurice (2002), p. 123; Simma (1986), p. 196.

  236. 236.

    See eg Watts (1992), p. 124 et seq.

  237. 237.

    Simma (1986), p. 200.

  238. 238.

    Simma (1986), p. 201.

  239. 239.

    Art X reads: “Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to exert appropriate efforts, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to the end that no one engages in any activity in Antarctica contrary to the principles or purposes of the present Treaty.”

  240. 240.

    Cahier (1974), p. 664; see also Crawford (2012), p. 254 n 32.

  241. 241.

    Klein (1980), p. 72 et seq. An alternative interpretation is suggested by Simma (1986), p. 196 et seq.

  242. 242.

    19 ILM 837. For a discussion on the appropriateness of the term ‘Antarctic Treaty System’, see Orrego Vicuña (1988), p. 22; Auburn (1982), p. 147.

  243. 243.

    Cf Simma (1986), pp. 202–208; Fitzmaurice (2002), pp. 125–130.

  244. 244.

    Klein (1980), p. 117.

  245. 245.

    1920 Treaty Concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen 2 LNTS 7.

  246. 246.

    See Klein (1980), p. 117 with further references.

  247. 247.

    Lee (1983), p. 546 et seq.

  248. 248.

    See the statement of Koh, President of the 3rd UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, reproduced in Nordquist et al (1985), pp. 11–16.

  249. 249.

    Cf Arts 89 and 137 UNCLOS.

  250. 250.

    Cf Arts 56 and 77 UNCLOS. For a detailed analysis of the status of these zones, see Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 142 et seq; Proelss (2006) pp. 222, 228–230.

  251. 251.

    Arts 2 and 49 UNCLOS.

  252. 252.

    See also Vasciannie (1989), pp. 89–93.

  253. 253.

    For an in-depth analysis, see Eustis (1977), p. 217 et seq. But see the rather ambiguous statement made in ICJ Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v Colombia) [2012] ICJ Rep 624, para 125.

  254. 254.

    Fitzmaurice (2002), p. 113 et seq. See the clear statement made by ICJ Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v Colombia) (declaration Mensah) [2012] ICJ Rep 762, para 8; see also ICJ Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v Colombia) (declaration Cot) [2012] ICJ Rep 768, para 19.

  255. 255.

    See Vasciannie (1989), pp. 93–97.

  256. 256.

    Lee (1983), pp. 553–566. A frequently mentioned example is the establishment of rights to a 200-mile EEZ; see Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 17 et seq. Cf also ICJ Continental Shelf (Tunisia v Libya) [1982] ICJ Rep 18, para 100.

  257. 257.

    1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 1046 UNTS 120.

  258. 258.

    See Implications of the Entry into Force of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the International Maritime Organization, 6 January 2003, IMO Doc LEG/MISC/3/Rev.1, 48.

  259. 259.

    However, see the considerations of Fitzmaurice (2002), p. 118 with regard to the 1995 Implementation Agreement.

  260. 260.

    Proelss (2004), p. 142.

  261. 261.

    Different to the Fish Stocks Agreement, the 1994 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI UNCLOS on the one hand and UNCLOS on the other are to “be interpreted and applied together as a single instrument” (Art 2 para 1 of the 1994 Agreement).

  262. 262.

    1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 34 ILM 1547.

  263. 263.

    Juda (1997), p. 155; Ziemer (2000), p. 193 et seq; Davies and Redgwell (1996), p. 265 et seq.

  264. 264.

    de Yturriaga (1996), p. 179.

  265. 265.

    Dahm et al (2002), p. 631; see also Ziemer (2000), p. 193 et seq.

  266. 266.

    Dahm et al (2002), pp. 625–631.

  267. 267.

    For a brief overview on the terminology, see Durner (2000), p. 17 et seq.

  268. 268.

    Cf Art 4 of the Agreement: “Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the rights, jurisdiction and duties of States under the Convention. This Agreement shall be interpreted and applied in the context of and in a manner consistent with the Convention.” For an analysis of possible consequences, see Proelss (2004), p. 155 et seq, p. 173 et seq.

  269. 269.

    Art 33: “(1) States Parties shall encourage non-parties to this Agreement to become parties thereto and to adopt laws and regulations consistent with its provisions. (2) States Parties shall take measures consistent with this Agreement and international law to deter the activities of vessels flying the flag of non-parties which undermine the effective implementation of this Agreement.”

  270. 270.

    Proelss (2004), pp. 158–163; Davies and Redgwell (1996), p. 274; see also the comment made by Oxman, reproduced in Delbrück (1997), p. 111: “[P]rofound conviction of public benefit is, in itself, [not] sufficient to generate law binding on those who disagree.”

  271. 271.

    Franckx (2000), pp. 62–71; Fitzmaurice (2002), p. 118 et seq.

  272. 272.

    Similar Örebech et al (1998), p. 123 et seq.

  273. 273.

    1890 UNTS 175.

  274. 274.

    Klabbers (1997).

  275. 275.

    Klabbers (1997). Note that even if the regime of the continental shelf would legitimate the coastal State to exercise sovereign rights over wrecks located on its shelf, this would not necessarily imply the existence of territorial competence.

  276. 276.

    Similar Lagoni (2006), p. 350.

  277. 277.

    1947 UNTS 404.

  278. 278.

    Cahier (1974), p. 677; see also Schweisfurth (1985), p. 665.

  279. 279.

    The terms ‘third States’ and ‘third organizations’ are defined in Art 2 para 1 lit h VCLT II; for details see Gautier (2011), Art 2 VCLT II MN 17–19.

  280. 280.

    ILC Report 34th Session [1982-II/2] YbILC 1, 42.

  281. 281.

    See also Klimis (2011), Art 34 VCLT II MN 4.

  282. 282.

    Klimis (2011), Art 34 VCLT II MN 7.

  283. 283.

    Reuter VI 125. The same criticism had already been raised in relation to Art 34 of the 1969 Convention; see above → MN 5.

  284. 284.

    Cf Geiser (1972), p. 181.

  285. 285.

    See → Art 35 MN 24.

  286. 286.

    For references see Klimis (2011), Art 34 VCLT II MN 9-19; Laly-Chevalier (2006), Art 35 VCLT II MN 7–15.

  287. 287.

    See also Reuter II 91, para 99.

  288. 288.

    For details see → Art 35 MN 23-24. Cf also Manin (1986), p. 470: “[…] il n’a jamais été possible de se référer à des hypothèses concrètes vraiment consistantes […]”.

  289. 289.

    Rosas (1998), p. 125 et seq; Proelss (2014a), p. 221 et seq.

References

  • Acquaviva G (2011) Non-State Actors from the Perspective of International Criminal Tribunals. In: d’Aspremont J (ed) Participants in the International Legal System: Multiple Perspectives on Non-State Actors in International Law. Routledge, London/New York, pp 185–203

    Google Scholar 

  • de Aréchaga J (1956) Treaty Stipulations in Favour of Third States. AJIL 50(2):338–357

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Aust A (2013) Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 3rd edn. CUP, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Auburn FM (1982) Antarctic Law and Politics. Hurst, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Bederman DJ (2012) Third Party Rights and Obligations in Treaties. In: Hollis DB (ed) The Oxford Guide to Treaties. OUP, Oxford, pp 328–346

    Google Scholar 

  • Birnie P (1986) The Antarctic Regime and Third States. In: Wolfrum R (ed) Antarctic Challenge, Vol 2. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, pp 239–262

    Google Scholar 

  • Birnie P, Boyle AE, Redgwell C (2009) International Law and the Environment, 3rd edn. OUP, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Bothe M (2016) Friedenssicherung und Kriegsrecht. In: Vitzthum W, Proelß A (eds) Völkerrecht, 7th edn. De Gruyter, Berlin, pp 591–682

    Google Scholar 

  • Boyle AE, Chinkin C (2007) The Making of International Law. OUP, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Cahier P (1974) Le problème des effets des traités à l’égard des États tiers. RdC 143:589–735

    Google Scholar 

  • Chinkin C (1993) Third Parties in International Law. Clarendon Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Churchill RR, Lowe VA (1999) The Law of the Sea, 3rd edn. Manchester University Press, Manchester

    Google Scholar 

  • Crawford J (2012) Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th edn. OUP, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Dahm G (1958) Völkerrecht, Vol I. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart

    Google Scholar 

  • Dahm G, Delbrück J, Wolfrum R (2002) Völkerrecht Band I/3, 2nd edn. De Gruyter, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • David E (2011) Article 34. In: Corten O, Klein P (eds) The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties. OUP, Oxford, pp 887–896

    Google Scholar 

  • Davies PGG, Redgwell C (1996) The International Legal Regulation of Straddling Fish Stocks. BYIL 67:199–274

    Google Scholar 

  • Delbrück J (1997) New Trends in International Lawmaking – International ‘Legislation’ in the Public Interest. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Dinstein Y (2006) The Interaction between Customary International Law and Treaties. RdC 322:243–427

    Google Scholar 

  • Doehring K (2004) Völkerrecht, 2nd edn. C.F. Müller, Heidelberg

    Google Scholar 

  • Durner W (2000) Common Goods. Nomos, Baden-Baden

    Google Scholar 

  • Eustis R (1977) Procedures and Techniques of Multinational Negotiation: The LOS III Model. VaJIL 17:217–256

    Google Scholar 

  • Fitzmaurice M (2002) Third Parties and the Law of Treaties. MPYUNL 6:37–137

    Google Scholar 

  • Franckx E (2000) Pacta tertiis and the Agreement for the Implementations of the Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. TulJICL 8:49–81

    Google Scholar 

  • Gaja G (2011) Article 38. In: Corten O, Klein P (eds) The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties. OUP, Oxford, pp 949–958

    Google Scholar 

  • Gautier P (2011) Article 2 VCLT II. In: Corten O, Klein P (eds) The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties. OUP, Oxford, pp 57–65

    Google Scholar 

  • Geiser J-J (1972) Les effets des accords conclus par les organisations internationales – Etude en droit international des Organisations Internationales à la lumière de la Convention de Vienne de 1969. IUHEI, Geneve

    Google Scholar 

  • Greenwood C (2007) Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law. In: Fleck D (ed) The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, 2nd edn. C.H. Beck, Munich, pp 45–78

    Google Scholar 

  • Handl G (1997) Regional Arrangements and Third State Vessels: Is the pacta tertiis Principle Being Modified? In: Ringbom H (ed) Competing Norms in the Law of Marine Environmental Protection. Kluwer Law International, London, pp 217–240

    Google Scholar 

  • Jennings R, Watts A (1992) Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol I/2, 9th edn. Longman, Harlow

    Google Scholar 

  • Jessup PC (1947) A Modern Law of Nations. Macmillan, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Juda L (1997) The 1995 United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: A Critique. ODIL 28:147–166

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kasoulides GC (1997) Global and Regional Port State Regimes. In: Ringbom H (ed) Competing Norms in the Law of Marine Environmental Protection. Kluwer Law International, London, pp 121–138

    Google Scholar 

  • Kearney RD, Dalton RE (1970) The Treaty on Treaties. AJIL 64(3):495–561

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kelsen H (1950) The Law of the United Nations. Lawbook Exchange, Union

    Google Scholar 

  • Khan DE (2004) Die deutschen Staatsgrenzen. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen

    Google Scholar 

  • Klabbers J (1997) On Maritime Cemeteries and Objective Régimes: The Case of the M/S Estonia. http://ise.elnet.ee/record=b2475273~S1*est. Accessed 22 November 2017

  • Klein E (1980) Statusverträge im Völkerrecht. Springer, Berlin

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Klimis E (2011) Article 34 VCLT II. In: Corten O, Klein P (eds) The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties. OUP, Oxford, pp 897–901

    Google Scholar 

  • König D (1990) Durchsetzung internationaler Bestands- und Umweltschutzvorschriften auf hoher See im Interesse der Staatengemeinschaft. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Kunz JL (1947) Revolutionary Creation of Norms of International Law. AJIL 41(1):119–126

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lagoni R (1991) Die Abwehr von Gefahren für die marine Umwelt. BDGVR 32:87–158

    Google Scholar 

  • Lagoni R (2006) Marine Archäologie und sonstige auf dem Meeresboden gefundene Gegenstände. AVR 44:328–362

    Google Scholar 

  • Lagoni R (2008) Kiel Canal. In: Wolfrum R (ed) The Max Planck encyclopedia of public international law. OUP, Oxford. http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1305. Accessed 29 November 2017

    Google Scholar 

  • Laly-Chevalier C (2006) Article 35 VCLT II. In: Corten O, Klein P (eds) Les Conventions de Vienne sur le droit des traités: commentaire article par article. Bruylant, Brussels, pp 1453–1464

    Google Scholar 

  • Lauterpacht H (1958) The Development of International Law by the International Court, 2nd edn. Stevens, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Lee LT (1983) The Law of the Sea Convention and Third States. AJIL 77(3):541–568

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Manin P (1986) La Convention de Vienne sur les accords entre Etats et organisations internationales ou entre organisations internationales. AFDI 32:454–473

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McNair A (1961) The Law of Treaties. OUP, London

    Google Scholar 

  • McNair A (1986) The Law of Treaties. OUP, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Milanović M (2011) Is the Rome Statute Binding on Individuals? (And Why We Should Care). JICJ 9:25–52

    Google Scholar 

  • Nordquist M, Nandan S, Rosenne S (1985) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Vol 1. Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht

    Google Scholar 

  • Núñez-Müller M (1994) Die Staatszugehörigkeit von Handelsschiffen im Völkerrecht. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Örebech P, Sigurjonsson K, McDorman TL (1998) The 1995 United Nations Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement: Management, Enforcement and Dispute Settlement. IJMCL 13:119–141

    Google Scholar 

  • Orrego Vicuña F (1988) Antarctic Mineral Exploitation: The Emerging Legal Framework. CUP, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Proelss A (2004) Meeresschutz im Völker- und Europarecht. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Proelss A (2006) Ausschließliche Wirtschaftszone. In: Vitzthum W (ed) Handbuch des Seerechts. C.H. Beck, Munich, pp 222–264

    Google Scholar 

  • Proelss A (2014a) Dispute Settlement in Multi-Layered Constellations: International Law and the EU. GYIL 57:221–254

    Google Scholar 

  • Proelss A (2014b) The Personal Dimension: Challenges to the pacta tertiis rule. In: Tams CJ, Tzanakopulos A, Zimmermann A (eds) Research Handbook on the Law of Treaties. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp 222–253

    Google Scholar 

  • Ragazzi M (1997) The Concept of International Obligations erga omnes. Clarendon Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Reuter P (1995) Introduction to the Law of Treaties, 2nd edn. Kegan Paul International, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosas A (1998) Mixed Union – Mixed Agreements. In: Koskenniemi M (ed) International Law Aspects of the European Union. Kluwer, The Hague, pp 125–148

    Google Scholar 

  • Rousseau J-J (1970) Droit international public, Vol 1. Dalloz, Paris

    Google Scholar 

  • Roxburgh RF (1917) International Conventions and Third States. Longmans, Green & Co, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Rutten M (2001) From St-Malo to Nice – European Defence Core Documents. Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union

    Google Scholar 

  • Salerno F (2011) Treaties Establishing Objective Regimes. In: Cannizzaro E (ed) The Law of Treaties beyond the Vienna Convention. OUP, Oxford, pp 225–243

    Google Scholar 

  • Scelle G (1934) Précis de droit des gens, Vol 2. Dalloz, Paris

    Google Scholar 

  • Schweisfurth T (1985) International Treaties and Third States. ZaöRV 45:653–674

    Google Scholar 

  • Scupin H-U (1960) Grundrechte und Grundpflichten der Staaten. In: Strupp K, Schlochauer H-J (eds) Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts, 2nd edn, Vol 1. W. de Gruyter & Company, Michigan, pp 723–733

    Google Scholar 

  • Seidl-Hohenveldern I (2001) Lexikon des Rechts: Völkerrecht, 3rd edn. Luchterhand, Neuwied

    Google Scholar 

  • Shaw MN (2008) International Law, 6th edn. CUP, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Simma B (1986) The Antarctic Treaty as a Treaty Providing for an ‘Objective Regime’. Cornell ILJ 19:189–209

    Google Scholar 

  • Simma B (1994) From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law. RdC 250:217–228

    Google Scholar 

  • Sinclair I (1984) The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 2nd edn. University Press, Manchester

    Google Scholar 

  • Subedi SP (1994) The Doctrine of Objective Regimes in International Law and the Competence of the United Nations to Impose Territorial or Peace Settlements on States. GYIL 37:162–205

    Google Scholar 

  • Talmon S (2006) Kollektive Nichtanerkennung illegaler Staaten. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen

    Google Scholar 

  • Talmon S (2012) Article 2(6) UN Charter. In: Simma B, Khan D-E, Nolte G, Paulus A (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary. OUP, Oxford, pp 252–279

    Google Scholar 

  • Tams CJ (2005) Enforcing obligations erga omnes in International Law. CUP, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Thienel T (2016) Drittstaaten und die Jurisdiktion des Internationalen Gerichtshofs – Die Monetary Gold-Doktrin. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Tomuschat C (1988) Völkerrechtlicher Vertrag und Drittstaaten. BDGVR 28:9–50

    Google Scholar 

  • Tomuschat C (2011) International Organizations as Third Parties under the Law of International Treaties. In: Cannizzaro E (ed) The Law of Treaties beyond the Vienna Convention. OUP, Oxford, pp 206–224

    Google Scholar 

  • Valenzuela M (1999) Enforcing Rules against Vessel-Source Degradation of the Marine Environment: Coastal, Flag and Port State Jurisdiction. In: Vidas D, Østreng W (eds) Order for the Oceans at the Turn of the Century. Kluwer Law International, The Hague, pp 485–506

    Google Scholar 

  • Vasciannie S (1989) Part XI of the Law of the Sea Convention and Third States: Some General Observations. CLJ 48:85–97

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Verdross A, Simma B (1984) Universelles Völkerrecht, 3rd edn. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Villiger M (2009) Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Nijhoff, Leiden

    Google Scholar 

  • Vitzthum WG (2002) Article 2. In: Simma B (ed) The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd edn. OUP, Oxford, pp 140–147

    Google Scholar 

  • Vitzthum W (2016) Begriff, Geschichte und Rechtsquellen des Völkerrechts. In: Vitzthum W, Proelß A (eds) Völkerrecht, 7th edn. De Gruyter, Berlin, pp 1–60

    Google Scholar 

  • Vukas B (2011) Treaties, Third-Party Effect. In: Wolfrum R (ed) The Max Planck encyclopedia of public international law. OUP, Oxford. http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1450. Accessed 29 November 2017

    Google Scholar 

  • Watts A (1992) International Law and the Antarctic Treaty System. CUP, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Wengler W (1964) Völkerrecht, Vol I. Springer, Berlin

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Wetzel RG (1973) Verträge zugunsten und zu Lasten Dritter nach der Wiener Vertragsrechtskonvention. Dissertation, Göttingen

    Google Scholar 

  • Williams SA, Schabas WA (2008) Article 12. In: Triffterer O (ed) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2nd edn. C.H. Beck, München, pp 672–689

    Google Scholar 

  • Willisch J (1987) State Responsibility for Technological Damage in International Law. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Winkler CH (1932) Verträge zu Gunsten und zu Lasten Dritter. Noske, Leipzig

    Google Scholar 

  • Wolfrum R (1990) Recht der Flagge und billige Flaggen. BDGVR 31:121–147

    Google Scholar 

  • de Yturriaga J (1996) Fishing in the High Seas: From the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to the 1995 Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. AYIL 3:149–181

    Google Scholar 

  • Zegveld L (2002) The Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law. CUP, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Ziemer J (2000) Das gemeinsame Interesse an einer Regelung der Hochseefischerei. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Zimmermann A (2006) Violations of Fundamental Norms of International Law and the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in Criminal Matters. In: Tomuschat C, Thouvenin JM (eds) The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order. Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, pp 335–354

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Public International Law and European Law, Law Faculty, Trier University, Trier, Germany

    Alexander Proelss

Authors
  1. Alexander Proelss
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. European Legal Studies Institute, University of Osnabrück, Osnabrück, Germany

    Oliver Dörr

  2. Faculty of Law, Department of Public Law/International Law, University of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria

    Kirsten Schmalenbach

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Proelss, A. (2018). Article 34. In: Dörr, O., Schmalenbach, K. (eds) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-55160-8_37

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-55160-8_37

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-662-55159-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-55160-8

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation