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When Goods May Be Carried on Deck

  • Chapter
The Carrier's Liability for Deck Cargo

Part of the book series: Hamburg Studies on Maritime Affairs ((HAMBURG,volume 33))

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Abstract

The carrier’s liability for deck cargo, which shall be further developed in Chap. 6, is closely connected with the question of whether the goods have been stowed on deck with authorisation or not.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Art. 25.1(b) of the Rotterdam Rules and on the national level for example: Section 486 paragraph 3 of the German HGB and Section 267 paragraph 1(2) of the 2012 Danish and Norwegian draft versions with suggested amendments to Chapter 13 of the 1994 NMCs (for their full names – see Sect. 4.1.4.5).

  2. 2.

    See Sect. 4.1.2.2.

  3. 3.

    According to the author’s opinion this unofficial translation is erroneous. The better translation would be “shall be stated” – see footnote 59.

  4. 4.

    Translation: Axel Ax:son Johnsons institut för sjörätt och annan transporträtt (2006), p. 105.

  5. 5.

    Hodges and Glass (2010), p. 245.

  6. 6.

    Mitcheson v Nicol, (1852) 7 Ex. 929 (Court of Exchequer), p. 937.

  7. 7.

    Royal Exchange Shipping Co Ltd v WJ Dixon & Co “Dixon”, (1887) 12 App. Cas. 11 (House of Lords), p. 16.

  8. 8.

    If not already expressly included. The 1994 NMCs for example include all contracts of carriage by sea under their scope of application and most provisions are equally applicable to contracts covered by a bill of lading as well as contracts covered by another or no transport document.

  9. 9.

    Gorton (2012), p. 38. Sweden: (Lag (1915:218) om avtal och andra rättshandlingar på förmögenhetsrättens område; Denmark: Lov nr. 242 af den 8 maj 1917 om aftaler og andre retshandler på formuerettens område; Norway: Lov 31. mai 1918 nr. 4 om avslutning av avtaler, om fuldmagt og om ugyldige viljeserklæringer and; Finland: Lag om rättshandlingar på förmögenhetsrättens område 13.6.1929/228.

  10. 10.

    Adlercreutz (1995), p. 45; Skovby (1995), p. 66.

  11. 11.

    Schmidt (1962), p. 44.

  12. 12.

    Adlercreutz (1996), p. 42.

  13. 13.

    Krüger (1973), pp. 494–495.

  14. 14.

    Adlercreutz (1996), pp. 61–62; Custom or practice of the trade is explicitly listed as an authorisation ground in 13:13 (263) in the NMCs and shall be dealt with separately below – see Sect. 5.3.1.

  15. 15.

    ND 2001.9 “Götaland” (Hovrätten för Västra Sverige (Swedish court of appeal)).

  16. 16.

    The parties called the printed electronic note a “through bill of lading”, but the court emphasised that it was properly not a bill of lading.

  17. 17.

    ND 2005.574 “Federal MacKenzie” (Sø- og Handelsretten (Danish court of first instance)).

  18. 18.

    Although the formulation “allowed by the contract of carriage” indicates that deck carriage could not be authorised through a subsequent agreement, the statement ought not to limit the parties’ freedom of contract in such a fashion: UNCITRAL (1978), p. 261.

  19. 19.

    ND 1928.417 “Glitne” (Bergen byrett (Norwegian court of first instance)).

  20. 20.

    It should be noticed in this regard that charter parties generally specify the terms to a greater extent than bills of lading and are usually not intended to be supplemented by terms in a subsequently issued transport document: Bomgren (1956), pp. 510–511; Treitel et al. (2011), pp. 101–102.

  21. 21.

    Nordic civil law knows no parol evidence rule. Hence, unlike in England, where the topic has been subject to discussion – cf. Sect. 5.2.2.1 below – there is no doubt in the Nordic countries that the bill of lading is only one item of evidence among others and cannot be held to exclusively contain the contract.

  22. 22.

    Hellner et al. (2005), p. 154.

  23. 23.

    Adlercreutz (1996), p. 64.

  24. 24.

    Bernitz (1991), p. 28.

  25. 25.

    Ibid., p. 36; Woxholth (2005), pp. 196–197.

  26. 26.

    Bernitz (1991), pp. 32–35; Andersen (2002), p. 364.

  27. 27.

    Woxholth (2005), pp. 203–204.

  28. 28.

    Adlercreutz (1996), p. 68.

  29. 29.

    In light of how any shipper today can learn of a carrier’s general terms over the Internet, it can be presumed that the circumstances would have to be extraordinary in order for a shipper to justifiably claim that it was not (and should not have been) aware of the carrier’s standard terms.

  30. 30.

    Adlercreutz (1996), p. 68.

  31. 31.

    Gezelius (1964), p. 56.

  32. 32.

    The provision states basically that if a party (here the carrier), having received an offer from the other party (here the shipper), replies to that offer in the belief that he is accepting the offer as expressed by that other party but is in reality giving a new offer (because the answer does not correspond with the initial offer), the other party is obliged to inform the party (giving the new offer) of this without reasonable delay if the other party is aware of its counterparty’s misconception and does not want to accept the new offer; otherwise it will become bound by the new offer through its passivity. Equivalent provisions are found in 1:6 paragraph 2 of the 1918 Norwegian, the 1917 Danish, and the 1929 Finnish Contracts Acts.

  33. 33.

    SvJT 1922 rf s 73 (Svea Hovrätt (Swedish court of appeal)).

  34. 34.

    NJA 1949 s. 724 (Högsta domstolen (Swedish Supreme Court)).

  35. 35.

    Schmidt (1962), p. 44.

  36. 36.

    ND 1928.417 “Glitne” (Bergen byrett (Norwegian court of first instance)).

  37. 37.

    Gezelius (1964), p. 56.

  38. 38.

    ND 1919.398 “Thure” (Högsta domstolen (Swedish Supreme Court)).

  39. 39.

    Adlercreutz (1996), p. 69.

  40. 40.

    NJA 1949 s. 724 (Högsta domstolen (Swedish Supreme Court)).

  41. 41.

    NJA 1948 s. 611 (Högsta domstolen (Swedish Supreme Court)).

  42. 42.

    ND 1919.398 “Thure” (Högsta domstolen (Swedish Supreme Court)).

  43. 43.

    Adlercreutz (1996), p. 69.

  44. 44.

    Auren (1995), p. 74.

  45. 45.

    Ibid., p. 74; Honka (1997), p. 59.

  46. 46.

    Regeringens proposition 1993 /1994:195, p. 226.

  47. 47.

    UNCTAD (1991), p. 119.

  48. 48.

    See Sect. 4.1.2.2.

  49. 49.

    Auren (1995), p. 75.

  50. 50.

    Regeringens proposition 1993 /1994:195, p. 226.

  51. 51.

    NOU 1993 :36, p. 28; Betænkning nr 1215 /1990, p. 52.

  52. 52.

    See Sect. 4.1.2.2.

  53. 53.

    ND 1997.161 “Bakkafoss” (Hæstiréttur Íslands (Icelandic Supreme Court)). The case was decided under the Icelantic Maritime Act of 1985, whose provisions on deck cargo (Section 41) and liability limitation (Section 70) correspond to the Earlier Nordic Maritime Codes – see the introduction to Sect. 4.1.

  54. 54.

    See Sect. 6.2.3.4. The fact remains, however, that such deck stowage is presumably authorised under 13:13 (263), with the effect that the liability issue will be settled in accordance with the general principles under 13:25 (275) as opposed to 13:34 (284).

  55. 55.

    Betænkning nr 1215 /1990, p. 52. Although the consignee in Nordic law is generally considered a contractual party to the contract of carriage, in this aspect he has the position and interest of a third party: Grönfors and Gorton (1982), pp. 98–99 and 303–304.

  56. 56.

    Regeringens proposition 1993 /1994:195, p. 226; Betænkning nr 1215 /1990, p. 52.

  57. 57.

    Regeringens proposition 1993 /1994:195, p. 226.

  58. 58.

    Cf. the deviating English position given account of under Sect. 5.2.2.5 below.

  59. 59.

    In the unofficial translation of the 1994 Swedish Maritime Code used for the purposes of this work – see Sect. 5.1.1 above – this part has been translated with “shall be indicated”, which does not only (if the perception of the author of this work is correct) wrongly suggest that a general term would suffice, but is also in breach with the tradition under the 1891 SMC to translate “state” under the Hague-Visby Rules into “ange”: See e.g. Section 168 paragraph 2 of the 1891 SMC, adopting Art. I(c) of the Hague-Visby Rules. It must be presumed, furthermore, as has been stated above – see Sect. 4.1.4.4 – that where a provision is based on the Hamburg Rules as in the present case, the Nordic drafters’ intention was to adopt the provision as expressed there. Art. 9.2 of the Hamburg Rules is held to require a term tailored to the contract at issue – see Sect. 3.2.2.

  60. 60.

    Treitel et al. (2011), p. 97.

  61. 61.

    Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board the Ardennes v Owners of the Ardennes “Ardennes”, (1950) 84 Ll. L. Rep. 340 (King’s Bench Division), p. 59.

  62. 62.

    Carver and Colinvaux (1982), p. 59.

  63. 63.

    Treitel et al. (2011), p. 105.

  64. 64.

    Some cases supporting the view that a bill of lading evidences the contract: Sewell v Burdick “Zoe”, (1884) 10 App. Cas. 74 (House of Lords), p. 105; Moss Steamship Co Ltd v Whinney, [1912] AC 254 (House of Lords), pp. 258–259, 261 and 264; Crooks & Co v Allan, (1879) 5 QBD 38 (Queen’s Bench Division), p. 40. Some cases supporting the view that a bill of lading contains the contract: Glyn Mills Currie & Co v East and West India Dock Co, (1882) 7 App. Cas. 591 (House of Lords), p. 596; Chartered Mercantile Bank of India, London and China v Netherlands India Steam Navigation Co Ltd, (1883) 10 QBD 521 (Court of Appeal), p. 528; Fraser v Telegraph Construction & Maintenance Co, (1872) 7 QB 566 (Court of Queen’s Bench), p. 571. In the two latter cases however, it can be argued that the parties’ had given the bill of lading contractual force by way of agreement. The cases thus may be compatible with the view given account of in this section that the bill of lading evidences the contract but that the parties can agree otherwise: Carver and Colinvaux (1982), pp. 62–63.

  65. 65.

    Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board the Ardennes v Owners of the Ardennes “Ardennes”, (1950) 84 Ll. L. Rep. 340 (King’s Bench Division), p. 59; Parsons Corp and Others v CV Scheepvaartonderneming Happy Ranger “Happy Ranger”, [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 357 (Court of Appeal), p. 362.

  66. 66.

    Hodges and Glass (2010), p. 246.

  67. 67.

    See Sect. 5.2.2.3 below.

  68. 68.

    Royal Exchange Shipping Co Ltd v WJ Dixon & Co “Dixon”, (1887) 12 App. Cas. 11 (House of Lords).

  69. 69.

    Scrutton and Eder (2011), p. 187; Carver and Colinvaux (1982), p. 680. Cf. however Lord Watson in obiter in “Dixon”: Royal Exchange Shipping Co Ltd v WJ Dixon & Co “Dixon”, (1887) 12 App. Cas. 11 (House of Lords), p. 19. The author queries why a general implied term, such as the term to stow under deck should not yield to a special implied term (based on the individual contractual relationship) in accordance with the general rule of interpretation that special provisions precede over general (in particular as it seems now to be clear under English law that the bill of lading is only evidence of the contract of carriage).

  70. 70.

    See Sect. 5.2.1.1 above. Also in US law, implied terms have proven sufficient to authorise deck stowage: English Electric Valve Co Ltd v Hoegh Mallard, 1987 AMC 1351 (United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit 1987).

  71. 71.

    Aikens et al. (2006), pp. 132–133. And, pursuant to the author’s understanding, not because of the principle that specific conditions override printed terms as held by Hodges and Glass: Hodges and Glass (2010), p. 239, footnote 10.

  72. 72.

    A similar but different scenario is that the parties have decided upon conclusion of the initial contract that it shall be subject to the terms in the bill of lading. In “Armour v Walford” the judge gave several reasons for his decision, one of which was the actual acceptance of the bill of lading and another a clause in the initial contract of carriage making the contract subject to “the conditions, terms and/or exceptions of our Bills of Lading”: Armour & Co Ltd v Leopold Walford (London) Ltd, [1921] 3 KB 473 (King’s Bench Division).

  73. 73.

    Armour & Co Ltd v Leopold Walford (London) Ltd, [1921] 3 KB 473 (King’s Bench Division), p. 477.

  74. 74.

    See for example: Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board the Ardennes v Owners of the Ardennes “Ardennes”, (1950) 84 Ll. L. Rep. 340 (King’s Bench Division); Nelson Pine Industries Ltd v Seatrans New Zealand Ltd “Pembroke”, [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 290 (High Court of New Zealand).

  75. 75.

    Although Hodge and Glass do make the reservation that the carrier might better take the bill of lading under protest to ensure that no waiver of the breach is inferred: Hodges and Glass (2010), p. 239.

  76. 76.

    Scrutton and Eder (2011), p. 89.

  77. 77.

    One can for example argue either that it was the parties’ initial intention that any relative to the contract of carriage contradictory terms in the bill were to take precedence or that the shipper at a later stage tacitly agreed to those contradictory terms by accepting the bill of lading.

  78. 78.

    Treitel et al. (2011), p. 104; Aikens et al. (2006), p. 131.

  79. 79.

    Because they are familiar with the trade practice or because it follows from their previous course of dealing: British Crane Hire Corp Ltd v Ipswich Plant Hire Ltd, [1975] QB 303 (Court of Appeal (Civil Division)), p. 311; Hardwick Game Farm v Suffolk Agricultural and Poultry Producers Association Ltd, [1968] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 547 (House of Lords), pp. 104–105.

  80. 80.

    Aikens et al. (2006), p. 131.

  81. 81.

    As for the definition of “custom” and the difference between custom and a mere implied term originating in the parties’ presumed intention – see Sect. 5.3.2.1 below.

  82. 82.

    See Sect. 5.2.1.2 above.

  83. 83.

    The term originates in the case “Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking”, where Lord Denning stated that a clause in a mechanically generated parking ticket referring to the defendant’s general terms posted at the entrance of a garage, which excluded liability for personal injury, was “so wide and so destructive of rights that the court should not hold any man bound by it unless it is drawn to his attention in the most explicit way. […] In order to give sufficient notice, it would need to be printed in red ink with a red hand pointing to it – or something equally startling.”: Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking, [1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 289 (Court of Appeal (Civil Division)), p. 170.

  84. 84.

    Scrutton and Eder (2011), p. 89.

  85. 85.

    Hodges and Glass (2010), p. 246.

  86. 86.

    Svenska Traktor Aktiebolaget v Maritime Agencies (Southampton) Ltd, [1953] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 124 (Queen’s Bench Division).

  87. 87.

    Cf. US case law. In “Hong Kong Producer”, the court did not separate a part of a clause giving the carrier a liberty to stow on deck from a part shifting the burden of proof in violation of the US 1936 COGSA and instead rejected the clause as a whole: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc v Hong Kong Producer, 1969 AMC 1741 (United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit 1969), pp. 540–543.

  88. 88.

    Lord Pilcher, uttering the well-known words at p. 130: “A mere general liberty to carry goods on deck is not in my view a statement in the contract of carriage that the goods are in fact being carried on deck. To hold otherwise would in my view do violence to the ordinary meaning of the words of Art. I(c) of the Act.”

  89. 89.

    Svenska Traktor Aktiebolaget v Maritime Agencies (Southampton) Ltd, [1953] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 124 (Queen’s Bench Division), p. 130. The opposite view has been taken in other jurisdictions, that a carrier issuing a clean bill lading (i.e. without a statement on deck stowage) has exercised the option granted to him by a liberty clause to stow the cargo on or under deck in favour of under-deck carriage – see footnote 47 in Chap. 3.

  90. 90.

    Armour & Co Ltd v Leopold Walford (London) Ltd, [1921] 3 KB 473 (King’s Bench Division).

  91. 91.

    Ibid., p. 478.

  92. 92.

    Ibid., p. 481. An opposite position has been taken for example in France: “Nanoula” DMF 740 (Cour d’Appel D’Aix (French court of appeal), 18 June 1985). As for the effect of deck stowage on cargo insurance – see Sect. 2.2.1.

  93. 93.

    Nelson Pine Industries Ltd v Seatrans New Zealand Ltd “Pembroke”, [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 290 (High Court of New Zealand).

  94. 94.

    A finding seemingly made in obiter as the clause was held in either case to be overruled by an express term in the liner booking note stating that all cargo was to be loaded under deck: Ibid., p. 292.

  95. 95.

    Hodges and Glass (2010), p. 247.

  96. 96.

    Armour & Co Ltd v Leopold Walford (London) Ltd, [1921] 3 KB 473 (King’s Bench Division), p. 478.

  97. 97.

    Hodges and Glass (2010), pp. 238–239.

  98. 98.

    Treitel et al. (2011), p. 654.

  99. 99.

    Svenska Traktor Aktiebolaget v Maritime Agencies (Southampton) Ltd, [1953] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 124 (Queen’s Bench Division), pp. 131–133.

  100. 100.

    See footnote 55.

  101. 101.

    Murray et al. (2007), p. 349.

  102. 102.

    Aikens et al. hold that the wording merely reflects the time-honoured description of a contract of carriage, as contained in or evidenced by the bill of lading: Aikens et al. (2006), p. 168.

  103. 103.

    Leduc & Co v Ward, (1888) 20 QBD 475 (Court of Appeal).

  104. 104.

    Partenreederei M/S Heidberg v Grosvenor Grain & Feed Co Ltd “Heidberg (No. 2)”, [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 287 (Queen’s Bench Division (Commercial Court)), p. 310.

  105. 105.

    Treitel et al. (2011), pp. 107–108.

  106. 106.

    Hodges and Glass (2010), p. 246.

  107. 107.

    Ibid., p. 239.

  108. 108.

    Treitel et al. (2011), p. 236.

  109. 109.

    See Sect. 5.2.1.4 above.

  110. 110.

    In “Svenska Traktor” for example, a liberty clause was effective against the consignees (the plaintiffs): Svenska Traktor Aktiebolaget v Maritime Agencies (Southampton) Ltd, [1953] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 124 (Queen’s Bench Division).

  111. 111.

    A reason for this ought to be the acceptance in Nordic and English law of a liberty clause as authorising ground for deck stowage – see Sect. 5.6.2.1 below.

  112. 112.

    Wooder (1991), p. 141.

  113. 113.

    See Sect. 5.3.1.1 below.

  114. 114.

    See e.g. Section 3 of the 1990 Swedish Sale of Goods Act (Köplag (1990:931)) and 1:1 paragraph 2 of the 1915 Swedish Contracts Act (Lag (1915:218) om avtal och andra rättshandlingar på förmögenhetsrättens område).

  115. 115.

    See Sect. 4.1.2.2.

  116. 116.

    Wikander (1936), p. 302.

  117. 117.

    Regeringens proposition 1993 /1994:195, p. 226.

  118. 118.

    After which Chapter 13 of the 1994 NMCs is modelled, without the Nordic countries however having ratified the Hamburg Rules – see Sect. 4.1.4.3.

  119. 119.

    Which translates into the Swedish term “handelsbruk”. The unofficial English translation of the 1994 Swedish Maritime Code used for the purpose of this study somewhat unfortunately, however, “re-translates” “handelsbruk” into “practice of the trade” (instead of “usage of the trade”) – see Sect. 5.1.1 above. The terms ought, however, to mean essentially the same thing.

  120. 120.

    The law contains no guidance as to a more precise definition of “custom” and its application. On a scale, it is held to lie between (1) being an implied term and (2) falling under the classical doctrine of “customary law” (Swedish “sedvanerätt”), which was used traditionally to supplement and partly overrule the general legal system with trade practices in certain field of trade, such as in maritime law or sales law. It is not the former because it does not require a declaration of intent, nor is it the latter because it does not require the existence of an opinio juris as under the classical doctrine of customary law and it does not override mandatory law: Karlgren (1960), pp. 45–77.

  121. 121.

    Eckhoff (1993), p. 219; Karlgren (1960), pp. 63–65.

  122. 122.

    See Sect. 5.2.1.1 above.

  123. 123.

    Karlgren (1960), p. 61. See also the cases “Bakkafoss” cited in Sect. 5.2.1.3 and “Pembroke” in Sect. 5.2.2.4 above, where the absence of a trade practice ought to have been a reason for the courts’ seemingly narrow construction of two liberty clauses.

  124. 124.

    Auren (1995), p. 76.

  125. 125.

    ND 1918.241 “Juno” (Bergens sjøret (Norwegian court of first instance)).

  126. 126.

    ND 1943.430 “Juliane” (Oslo byrett (Norwegian court of first instance)).

  127. 127.

    See Sect. 5.3.1.2 (Nordic law) and Sect. 5.3.2.2 (English law) below.

  128. 128.

    Falkanger et al. (2011), p. 300.

  129. 129.

    Eckhoff (1993), p. 219.

  130. 130.

    Ibid., p. 206; Karlgren (1960), pp. 48–49 together with 60.

  131. 131.

    Eckhoff (1993), p. 220.

  132. 132.

    Ibid., p. 220; Karlgren (1960), pp. 65–72.

  133. 133.

    This seems to be a material difference in comparison with Section 160 of the 1891 SMC and its Nordic equivalents. As the Hague-Visby Rules do not contain any provision on the matter however (Art. III.4 applies only to the data listed in Art. III.3), the member states are free to regulate the matter as they see fit.

  134. 134.

    Tiberg (1995), pp. 334–335.

  135. 135.

    Cf. however Art. 25.4 of the Rotterdam Rules, requiring the transport document not only to evidence deck carriage based on agreement but also custom. With regard to law as authorisation ground, the drafters, somewhat contradictory, held that a third party should be aware of statutory requirements: Berlingieri (2008), p. 283.

  136. 136.

    ND 1918.241 “Juno” (Bergens sjøret (Norwegian court of first instance)).

  137. 137.

    It should be noted that before 1936 deck carriage based on custom needed to be specified in the contract of carriage – see Sect. 4.1.2.2.

  138. 138.

    The carriage was executed in December.

  139. 139.

    ND 1943.430 “Juliane” (Oslo byrett (Norwegian court of first instance)).

  140. 140.

    ND 1956.526 “Seine” (Sø- og Handelsretten (Danish court of first instance)).

  141. 141.

    Authority for the existence of a custom is found, however, in the US. In “Konica Business Machines” from 1998, the Court of Appeal confirmed a statement made by the District Court that “[b]y 1991 on-deck stowage of containers on containerships was a well established custom of the trade in ocean transportation on a world-wide basis”: Konica Business Machines v Sea-Land Consumer, 1998 AMC 2705 (United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit 1998), pp. 2707–2708.

  142. 142.

    See Sect. 4.1.4.5.

  143. 143.

    NOU 2012 :10, p. 64. It should be mentioned here that a similar acknowledgment was made during the drafting of the Rotterdam Rules: UNCITRAL A/CN.9/552, p. 25.

  144. 144.

    Lehrberg (1995), p. 91.

  145. 145.

    Auren (1995), pp. 78–79.

  146. 146.

    In 2002 about 65 % of the container-carrying vessels capacity was on or above deck: UNCITRAL (2002), p. 25.

  147. 147.

    Karlgren (1960), p. 71.

  148. 148.

    See Sect. 2.4.

  149. 149.

    Auren (1995), p. 79.

  150. 150.

    Sturley et al. (2010), p. 127.

  151. 151.

    In “Hoegh Mallard” the Court of Appeal stated in obiter that it considered it custom to stow an open top container on deck but decided the issue on the grounds that the contract contained an implied term to stow on deck: English Electric Valve Co Ltd v Hoegh Mallard, 1987 AMC 1351 (United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit 1987). In “O’Connell Machinery”, the court in obiter considered it a reasonable deviation to stow a flatrack on deck, although the decision was ultimately based on the absence of a causal connection between the deck stowage and the loss: O’Connell Machinery Co Inc v Americana 1986 AMC 2822 (United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit 1986) Cf. however “ETS Gustave Brunet”, where the District Court held that it was not proven that on deck stowage of overheight open top containers was a port custom or practice in the circumstances relevant in that case: ETS Gustave Brunet SA v Nedlloyd Rosario, 1997 AMC 803 (United States District Court, Southern District of New York 1996).

  152. 152.

    In the US, unlike in Nordic and English law, unauthorised deck stowage is considered a deviation within the meaning of Art. IV.4 of the Hague Rules. Under Section 1304 paragraph 4 of the 1936 US COGSA (corresponding in large to Art. IV.4 of the Hague Rules) a carrier will not be liable in the case of deviation, if the deviation is deemed reasonable. In effect, thus, authorised deck stowage (i.e. a non-deviation) will have the same effect as the finding that a deviation was reasonable: the carrier will not be liable. For this reason, US courts sometimes – seemingly rather arbitrarily – tend to “skip” the question of whether an act or omission was authorised or not, stating simply that in either case (whether having committed a deviation or not) the carrier is not liable, because if the act or omission were to amount to a deviation, it would be reasonable. Consequently, one must proceed with caution when drawing parallels to a US decision regarding foreign law, because the threshold for a reasonable deviation is obviously lower than for a finding of non-deviation.

  153. 153.

    As stated under Sect. 5.3.1.1 above, a practice may be used as a means of interpretation, even where it is not a custom or forms a part of the parties’ agreement.

  154. 154.

    Nelson Pine Industries Ltd v Seatrans New Zealand Ltd “Pembroke”, [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 290 (High Court of New Zealand), p. 292.

  155. 155.

    ND 1997.161 “Bakkafoss” (Hæstiréttur Íslands (Icelandic Supreme Court)), p. 163.

  156. 156.

    Wooder (1991), pp. 131–132.

  157. 157.

    Hodges and Glass (2010), p. 245; Williams (2005), p. 107; Wooder (1991), pp. 141–142. Cf. however Tetley, who does not separate the matter of authorisation from the matter of exclusion and consequently holds that the only possibility for the carrier to stow cargo on deck with authorisation is to fulfil the express requirements of Art. I(c). As Art. I(c) is silent as to custom, Tetley reaches the conclusion that deck cargo is only authorised when so stated in the bill of lading: Tetley (2008), pp. 1571–1572.

  158. 158.

    Carver and Colinvaux (1982), p. 692.

  159. 159.

    Lewison (2011), p. 270.

  160. 160.

    Hutton v Warren, 1 (1936) M & W 466 (Court of King’s Bench), p. 475.

  161. 161.

    Carver and Colinvaux (1982), pp. 692–693.

  162. 162.

    Ibid., pp. 687 and 692. See also the cases “Bakkafoss” cited in Sect. 5.2.1.3 and “Pembroke” in Sect. 5.2.2.4 above, where the absence of a trade practice ought to have been a reason for the courts’ seemingly narrow construction of two liberty clauses.

  163. 163.

    Carver and Colinvaux (1982), p. 692.

  164. 164.

    Ibid., p. 685. See how the principle is applied in common law in Sects. 6.2.2.1 and 6.2.2.2 and under the 1971 COGSA in Sect. 6.2.3.1.

  165. 165.

    Carver and Colinvaux (1982), p. 687.

  166. 166.

    It is a separate matter that a custom needs to be reasonable in order to qualify as a custom in the first place – see the following presentation.

  167. 167.

    In the US, by contrast, deck stowage without authorisation will be a deviation. The carrier will not be liable, however, where the deviation was reasonable – see footnote 152.

  168. 168.

    Royal Exchange Shipping Co Ltd v WJ Dixon & Co “Dixon”, (1887) 12 App. Cas. 11 (House of Lords).

  169. 169.

    Carver and Colinvaux (1982), pp. 686–688.

  170. 170.

    Carver and Colinvaux use the expression “definite and uniformly adopted”: Ibid., p. 696.

  171. 171.

    Sucre Export SA v Northern River Shipping Ltd “Sormovskiy 3068”, [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 266 (Queen’s Bench Division (Admiralty Court)), p. 443; Scrutton and Eder (2011), p. 25; Williams (2005), p. 107; Carver and Colinvaux (1982), pp. 692–713.

  172. 172.

    Hodges and Glass hold that it might not be necessary for the usage of custom to be uniform. They hereby refer to older case law cited in Carver and Colinvaux (1982), pp. 686–688: Hodges and Glass (2010), p. 249. These cases cited in Carver and Colinvaux, however, precede “Dixon”, and to the author’s understanding the current legal position was established only through “Dixon”. Thus, whereas before 1886 a mere trade practice might have been effectively invoked to prove that it was reasonable to stow cargo on deck, through “Dixon” an implied term on under-deck stowage was established, so that ever since only an agreement, custom or law can authorise deck stowage, in spite of reasonableness.

  173. 173.

    Dixon v Royal Exchange Shipping Co Ltd “Dixon”, (1885) 1 TLR 490 (Court of Appeal), p. 490. Affirmed by: Royal Exchange Shipping Co Ltd v WJ Dixon & Co “Dixon”, (1887) 12 App. Cas. 11 (House of Lords).

  174. 174.

    Treitel et al. (2011), p. 654; Sfyris (2000), p. 32.

  175. 175.

    Dixon v Royal Exchange Shipping Co Ltd “Dixon”, (1885) 1 TLR 490 (Court of Appeal), p. 490. Affirmed by: Royal Exchange Shipping Co Ltd v WJ Dixon & Co “Dixon”, (1887) 12 App. Cas. 11 (House of Lords). Cf. however, Hodges and Glass, who take “Milward v Hibbert” as an example of an English decision where a custom to stow cargo on deck may be established in relation to a port: Hodges and Glass (2010), p. 249. To the author’s understanding, however, the custom established in “Milward v Hibbert” in the port of London related not to the right to stow on deck, but to the duty for underwriters to contribute by way of general average in respect of cargo so stowed. The jury held that there was no such duty. As to the collateral question regarding the carrier’s right to stow (pigs) on deck, the jury held that the cargo was shipped according to the usual course of the trade (pigs shipped in and on board vessels trading between Waterford and London): Milward v Hibbert, (1842) 3 QB 120 (Court of Queen’s Bench), p. 460.

  176. 176.

    Cf. the US, where it has been held sufficient that the practice to stow on deck is established in the port of shipment: St Johns NF Shipping Corp v Companhia Geral Commercial do Rio de Janerio, 1923 AMC 1131 (United States Supreme Court 1923); Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc v Hong Kong Producer, 1969 AMC 1741 (United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit 1969); Konica Business Machines v Sea-Land Consumer, 1998 AMC 2705 (United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit 1998). However, even to require – as in the US – only that the practice to stow on deck is sufficiently established in the port of shipment might not lower the requirement of prevalence in practice, as a usage to stow on deck presumably cannot be established independently from the trade where the actual deck carriage is performed. See e.g. “ETS Gustave Brunet” on the question of whether deck stowage was a reasonable deviation. The court distinguished the case before it from “Hoegh Mallard” among other regards on the basis that whereas “Hoegh Mallard” had concerned the trade from Oakland to England by way of a Pacific Northwest-Northern Europe route, “ETS Gustave Brunet” concerned the Port of New York and a voyage through the North Atlantic: ETS Gustave Brunet SA v Nedlloyd Rosario, 1997 AMC 803 (United States District Court, Southern District of New York 1996), p. 822. Distinguished from: English Electric Valve Co Ltd v Hoegh Mallard, 1987 AMC 1351 (United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit 1987).

  177. 177.

    Williams (2005), p. 107.

  178. 178.

    Hodges and Glass (2010), p. 250.

  179. 179.

    Evans & Son (Portsmouth) Ltd v Andrea Merzario Ltd, [1976] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 165 (Court of Appeal), p. 170.

  180. 180.

    Dixon v Royal Exchange Shipping Co Ltd “Dixon”, (1885) 1 TLR 490 (Court of Appeal), p. 490.

  181. 181.

    Cooke et al. (2007), p. 152. It should be noted that deck stowage justified on the latter ground would be based on an implied agreement and not custom.

  182. 182.

    Ibid., p. 963.

  183. 183.

    Regeringens proposition 1993 /1994:195, p. 226; Jantzen (1938), p. 150.

  184. 184.

    The issue surfaced briefly at the drafting of the Hamburg Rules. The Working Group ultimately did not adopt a suggestion to add after “statutory rules or regulations” either the words “obtaining in the port of loading” or the words “obtaining in the port of unloading”: UNCITRAL (1975), p. 238. It has been presumed however, in an annotation on the Rotterdam Rules that deck stowage based on law is authorised whether required by the law of the country of contract, the country of flag or the country in which the port of loading, transhipment or discharge is situated: Baatz et al. (2009), p. 76.

  185. 185.

    Tiberg (1995), p. 334.

  186. 186.

    NOU 1993 :36, p. 28. Cf. however: Skovby (1996), p. 577. 13:13 of the Finnish Code similarly to the Swedish 13:13 authorises deck stowage based on “law, ordinance or official decision”.

  187. 187.

    Cf. however: Gezelius (1964), p. 56.

  188. 188.

    As stated already in relation to custom, this seems to be a material difference in comparison with Section 160 of the 1891 SMC and its Nordic equivalents.

  189. 189.

    Tiberg (1995), pp. 334–335.

  190. 190.

    See Sect. 5.3.1.1 above.

  191. 191.

    Ibid., p. 334.

  192. 192.

    Hodges and Glass (2010), p. 245.

  193. 193.

    See footnote 157.

  194. 194.

    Sucre Export SA v Northern River Shipping Ltd “Sormovskiy 3068”, [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 266 (Queen’s Bench Division (Admiralty Court)), p. 443.

  195. 195.

    See Sect. 5.3.2.1 above.

  196. 196.

    Hodges and Glass (2010), p. 254. In US case law, the stowage on deck based on a provision of the IMDG Code, permitting the carrier to stow calcium hypochlorite on deck, has been held a reasonable deviation (US courts as stated above – see footnote 152 – seem to have a preference to settle cases on deck stowage on the matter of their reasonableness rather than deciding in the first place whether the stowage was authorised (read: not a deviation)) when the deck stowage enabled jettison in case of fire: Standard Commercial Tobacco Co Inc v Recife, 827 F.Supp. 990 (United States District Court, Southern District of New York 1993).

  197. 197.

    Tiberg (1995), p. 334.

  198. 198.

    Regeringens proposition 1993 /1994:195, p. 245.

  199. 199.

    Cf. for example US, French and Belgian law, under which an option or liberty to stow on deck in the absence of a subsequent statement that the cargo is de facto stowed on deck will only be considered an option not exercised – see footnote 47 in Chap. 3.

  200. 200.

    See Sect. 5.2.1.3 above.

  201. 201.

    Svenska Traktor Aktiebolaget v Maritime Agencies (Southampton) Ltd, [1953] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 124 (Queen’s Bench Division).

  202. 202.

    See Sect. 6.3.1.1.2.

  203. 203.

    Cf. however, Tetley, who does not separate the matter of when cargo is authorised and when it is effectively excluded from the scope of the Rules pursuant to Art. I(c). This is a more natural position under US and Canadian law (which is Tetley’s main area of expertise), where deck cargo is considered a deviation and, thus unauthorised deck stowage will become subject to a test of reasonableness under Art. IV.4 of the Hague Rules regime. Where the deviation is held reasonable, the carrier will not be liable: Tetley (2008), p. 1589. Cf. the Nordic countries and England, which do not consider unauthorised deck stowage a “deviation” within the meaning of Art. IV.4 of the Hague-Visby Rules.

  204. 204.

    With the reservation in Nordic law that a standard liberty clause cannot be invoked under a contract covered by a bill of lading vis-à-vis the consignee or a third party holder in good faith, in the absence of a statement on the bill that the cargo may or shall be carried on deck pursuant to 13:13 (263) paragraph 2 of the NMCs.

  205. 205.

    Nelson Pine Industries Ltd v Seatrans New Zealand Ltd “Pembroke”, [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 290 (High Court of New Zealand).

  206. 206.

    Svenska Traktor Aktiebolaget v Maritime Agencies (Southampton) Ltd, [1953] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 124 (Queen’s Bench Division).

  207. 207.

    See Sect. 5.2.2.2 above.

  208. 208.

    See Sect. 3.2.3.

  209. 209.

    The bills of lading in some of the most cited US cases on custom (or reasonable deviation), including inter alia Konica Business Machines v Sea-Land Consumer, 1998 AMC 2705 (United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit 1998), English Electric Valve Co Ltd v Hoegh Mallard, 1987 AMC 1351 (United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit 1987) and ETS Gustave Brunet SA v Nedlloyd Rosario, 1997 AMC 803 (United States District Court, Southern District of New York 1996), contained an option to stow on deck which was not recognised by the US courts as authorising deck stowage in accordance with the principle established in the 1920s by the Supreme Court in St Johns NF Shipping Corp v Companhia Geral Commercial do Rio de Janerio, 1923 AMC 1131 (United States Supreme Court 1923).

  210. 210.

    Mitcheson v Nicol, (1852) 7 Ex. 929 (Court of Exchequer).

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  1. International Max Planck Research School, Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law, Hamburg, Germany

    Lina Wiedenbach

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Wiedenbach, L. (2015). When Goods May Be Carried on Deck. In: The Carrier's Liability for Deck Cargo. Hamburg Studies on Maritime Affairs, vol 33. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46851-7_5

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