Abstract
We define axiomatically a concept of value for games without transferable utilities, without introducing the usual symmetry axiom. The model, a generalization of a previous paper extending Nash’s bargaining problem, attempts to take into account the affinities between the players, defined by an a priori set of “distances”. This new value concept in then applied to compute the value of a reinsurance model. It is shown that the exchange of risks between insurance companies can be formulated as a n-person cooperative game without transferable utilities. The determination of an “optimal reinsurance treaty” is then shown to coincide with the computation of the value of the corresponding game. A complete example is given.
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© 1979 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Lemaire, J. (1979). Reinsurance as a Cooperative Game. In: Brams, S.J., Schotter, A., Schwödiauer, G. (eds) Applied Game Theory. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_16
Publisher Name: Physica, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-0208-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-662-41501-6
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