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An Axiomatic Approach to the Efficiency of Non-Cooperative Equilibrium in Economies with a Continuum of Traders

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Equilibrium Theory in Infinite Dimensional Spaces

Part of the book series: Studies in Economic Theory ((ECON.THEORY,volume 1))

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Abstract

This is a reprint of Technical Report 274, IMMSSS, Stanford, 1978. Substantial parts of it have appeared in P. Dubey, A. Mas-Colell, and M. Shubik: “Efficiency Properties of Strategic Market Games: An Axiomatic Approach,” J. Econ. Theory 22, 1980, and in A. Mas-Colell: “On a Theorem of Schmeidler, ” J. Math. Econ., 1984. Needless to say, the author is gratified and thankful that the editors have found enough valuable left to request its publication in this volume.

This work was supported by National Science Foundation Grant SOC7706000 at the Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University. I am indebted to Mr. Ch. Kahn for detecting a gap in the proof of an earlier version and, for useful discussion and suggestions, to P. Dubey, W. Heller, L. Hurwicz, A. Postlewaite, M. Shubik, W. Thomson, and the participants of the IMSSS seminar where this paper was presented in July 1978. The usual caveat applies.

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Mas-Colell, A. (1991). An Axiomatic Approach to the Efficiency of Non-Cooperative Equilibrium in Economies with a Continuum of Traders. In: Khan, M.A., Yannelis, N.C. (eds) Equilibrium Theory in Infinite Dimensional Spaces. Studies in Economic Theory, vol 1. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-07071-0_15

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-07071-0_15

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-08114-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-07071-0

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