Abstract
In 1996 I presented at a Monetary Conference of the Cato Institute in Washington a paper entitled The Implementation and Maintenance of a Monetary Constitution (Bernholz 1986a/1987). I had the good luck to have James Buchanan (Buchanan 1986/1987) as my discussant. Good luck because he turned his attention not to the monetary but to the constitutional problems involved. For I had asked and at least to a certain degree answered the following questions:
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1.
Under which conditions can a monetary constitution emerge which is favourable to price stability.
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2.
Which conditions must be fulfilled so that such a monetary constitution has a good chance to be maintained for a long time.
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Bernholz, P. (2002). On Conditions Favouring the Introduction and Maintenance of Stable Monetary Regimes and of Free Constitutions. In: Brennan, G., Kliemt, H., Tollison, R.D. (eds) Method and Morals in Constitutional Economics. Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-04810-8_23
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