Abstract
We test the intuitively plausible suggestion that collective action is more easily achieved if cooperation is necessary to avoid losses compared to the situation where cooperation is necessary to increase gains. An experiment using different 2-person repeated Prisoner’s Dilemmas as a simple example of a collective action situation was conducted and refutedthis suggestion.
The order of authorship is pseudo-randomized. Useful suggestions and comments by Norman Braun, Bernd Lahno, and Jeroen Weesie are gratefully acknowledged. Financial support was provided by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) under grant PGS 50-370.
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Snijders, C., Raub, W. (1996). Does “The Motivating Power of Loss” Exist? An Experimental Test of the Effect of Losses on Cooperation. In: Liebrand, W.B.G., Messick, D.M. (eds) Frontiers in Social Dilemmas Research. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-85261-9_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-85261-9_12
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