The Emergence of Theoretical Physics in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century

Abstract

The relationship between natural sciences and human thought has long been at the centre of philosophical debate and has of course been the subject of a variety of interpretations. Beginning in the middle of last century developments in scientific disciplines accelerated the dissolution of the idealist and positivist synthesis and opened the way for a (partially) new role for philosophy: the critical analysis of the results and the methodologies of science. In this century neo-Kantian discussions about the conditions determining the possibility of scientific knowledge, the neopositivist analysis of scientific theories, phenomenological attempts to achieve a closer grasp of reality, sociological emphasis on the role of shared values, and linguistic explanations have shared the stage to various degrees. In addition, far-reaching criticism of the general scientific approach to knowledge and of its technological implications has stressed the limits not only of the scientific concept of truth but also, and more radically, the possibility of the subject’s access to “rational” knowledge free of historically determined values, interests, emotions, and feelings. From this point of view man’s very nature precludes the possibility of critical enquiry based on rational criteria of extratemporal validity. Controversial postmodernist trends stress differences rather than unity and localize and relativize values and meanings. There is a widespread belief that “the positive knowledge of science may not ultimately be for the best, as the downside of scientifically produced military and industrial technics becomes quite unavoidably apparent” [1].