Towards Conventional Stability in Europe

Abstract

This is not a traditional paper. It is impossible to write a comprehensive introduction on the issue of conventional stability without drastically exceeding the format of background papers for Pugwash Conferences. On the other hand, due to the complexity which is characteristic of conventional stability, even an introduction would not be worthwhile if it did not at least give an idea of the various determining factors and their interdependencies. For this reason, I chose to present a structured overview of the core aspects and arguments, instead of writing a traditional paper. In the following I will touch upon eight topics crucial for the understanding of conventional stability:

• the political goals behind the striving for stabilization in the conventional realm;

• the two military effects of conventional stability: deterrence against intentional attack and structural provisions against inadvertent crisis escalation;

• the net-deterrence equation, or why detente can enhance deterrence; the dynamics of crisis escalation and how it can be interrupted;

• an operational definition of conventional stability;

• the need for a much better integration of arms control policies and force modernization;

• outlines of a stability-oriented modernization;

• outlines of a stability-oriented arms control regime.