Metaprocesses and the Regulation of Behavior

Abstract

Within modern psychology, scientific rigor in the study of behavior has often been equated with a rejection of higher-order processes which were associated with mentalistic and introspectionistic concepts. It seems as if psychology had to wait for computer scientists to show that higher-order processes are indispensable for demonstrating complex problem-solving. Meanwhile psychologists have begun to reintroduce higher-order processes into their models (e.g., Brown, 1978; Flavell, 1976; Kluwe 1982; Reitman, 1973; Sternberg, 1979). For example, “metacognition” has become a frequently used term during recent years. Presumably, metacognitive processes monitor cognitive processes and coordinate and control them on the basis of (“metacognitive”) knowledge about various characteristics of the cognitive processes. For instance, children learn to improve their memory performance after they find out about the facilitating effects of memory checks, semantic categorization, and other higher-order cognitive processes.