Abstract
This paper deals with information and policy announcements in non- cooperative dynamic games. It fits in the discussion on time inconsistency of optimal policy under forward looking expectations. For some simple examples results are derived in the field of memory strategies and in the field of consistent, credible and cheating strategies.
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© 1986 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Meijdam, L., de Zeeuw, A. (1986). On Expectations, Information and Dynamic Game Equilibria. In: Başar, T. (eds) Dynamic Games and Applications in Economics. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 265. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61636-5_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61636-5_2
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