Abstract
As economists, we know that we do not know, and cannot know, the desirable degree and pattern of redistribution. But we agree on procedures: redistribution is desirable if it is voluntary—either in the form of private charity or by way of government transfers based on a general consensus. As economists, we know that giving may be in the interest of the giver and that, owing to externalities or economies of scale, collective giving may be more efficient than individual giving. As long as collective giving is voluntary, it is a Pareto improvement. The same is true for social insurance and social regulation. There is much scope for such a Paretian social policy that makes nobody worse off.
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Vaubel, R. (1996). Reforming the Welfare State in Western Europe. In: Giersch, H. (eds) Fighting Europe’s Unemployment in the 1990s. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61134-6_7
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