Abstract
Deductive equilibrium analysis in game theory exhibits some serious shortcomings. It often fails to determine a unique equilibrium solution in games with multiple equilibria. In such games, even a completely rational player using deductive equilibrium analysis in determining his strategy is uncertain which equilibrium strategies will be employed by his opponents.
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List of References
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© 1998 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Berninghaus, S.K., Ehrhart, K.M., Keser, C. (1998). Coordination Games: Recent Experimental Results. In: Operations Research Proceedings 1997. Operations Research Proceedings, vol 1997. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58891-4_40
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58891-4_40
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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