Zusammenfassung
Wie verhalten sich Firmen auf Märkten? Welche Preise setzen sie, und welchen Output stellen sie her? Welche Qualitätsentscheidungen treffen sie? Produzieren Firmen generell zu minimalen Kosten? Wie verhalten sich marktmächtige Firmen, d.h. Monopolisten oder Oligopolisten, gegenüber den Nachfragern und gegenüber (potentiellen) Konkurrenten? Welche strategischen Interaktionen ergeben sich zwischen oligopolistischen Firmen? Welche Auswirkungen haben vertikale Beziehungen zwischen den Firmen auf verschiedenen Stufen der Wertschöpfungskette?
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Bühler, S., Jaeger, F. (2002). Grundmodelle in der Industrieökonomik. In: Einführung in die Industrieökonomik. Springer-Lehrbuch. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-56065-1_3
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