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Antitrust for Small and Middle Size Undertakings and Image Protection from Non-Competitors

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Abstract

The scope of this International Report is to foster a debate on whether small and medium-sized enterprises should be treated differently or not from other legal entities (and in particular large enterprises) under competition law provisions.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Austria, Belgium, Brazil (not published in the present volume), Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States of America.

  2. 2.

    For more information about the role of SMEs, see OECD, SME and Entrepreneurship Outlook, 2005, p. 17, available at http://www.oecd.org/cfe/oecdsmeandentrepreneurshipoutlook-2005edition.htm.

  3. 3.

    See Bailey, United Kingdom, Part I, Chap. 14, p. 235; Zammit, Italy, Part I, Chap. 10, p. 160. Communication from the commission to the council, the European parliament, the European economic and social committee and the committee of the regions “Think Small First” a “Small Business Act” for Europe, 25.6.2008, COM(2008) 394 final.

  4. 4.

    For more information about the role of SMEs, see OECD, SME and Entrepreneurship Outlook, 2005, p. 17.

  5. 5.

    Small Business Act, COM (2008) 394, final 25 June 2008.

  6. 6.

    For more information about the role of SMEs, see OECD, SME and Entrepreneurship Outlook, 2005, p. 17.

  7. 7.

    See Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Minimizing regulatory burden for SMEs. Adapting EU Regulation to the needs of micro-enterprises. Brussels, 23.11.2011, COM (2011) 803 final, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0803:FIN:EN:PDF.

  8. 8.

    OECD, SME and Entrepreneurship outlook 2005, p. 15.

  9. 9.

    OECD, SME and Entrepreneurship outlook 2005, p. 362.

  10. 10.

    See hereto OECD, SME and Entrepreneurship outlook 2005.

  11. 11.

    OECD, SME and Entrepreneurship outlook 2005.

  12. 12.

    OECD, SME and Entrepreneurship outlook 2005, p. 7.

  13. 13.

    See Zammit, Italy, Part I, Chap. 10, p. 160.

  14. 14.

    See Moldén, Sweden, Part I, Chap. 12, p. 192 f.

  15. 15.

    See Boudou et al., France, Part I, Chap. 7, p. 104 ff.

  16. 16.

    See, for instance, Moldén, Sweden, Part I, Chap. 12, p. 192.

  17. 17.

    OJ 2003 L 124, p. 36.

  18. 18.

    See the Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Minimizing regulatory burden for SMEs. Adapting EU Regulation to the needs of micro-enterprises, Brussels, 23 November 2011, COM (2011) 803 final, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0803:FIN:EN:PDF.

  19. 19.

    See OECD, SME and Entrepreneurship outlook 2005.

  20. 20.

    OECD, SME and Entrepreneurship outlook 2005, p. 17.

  21. 21.

    OECD, SME and Entrepreneurship outlook 2005, p. 17.

  22. 22.

    Official exchange rate on 5 October 2012.

  23. 23.

    OECD, SME and Entrepreneurship outlook 2005, Country report Japan.

  24. 24.

    National Report Brazil, not published in the present volume, p. 1. Official exchange rate on 20 December 2012.

  25. 25.

    ECJ, case C-309/99, Wouters v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandsche Orde van Advocaten, ECR 2002 I-1577, pt 57. R. Whish, D. Bailey, Competition Law 2011, p. 84; A. Calvo Caravaca, 2010 Derecho Antitrust Europeo, Vol. I, p. 179. While this International Report focuses on Competition Laws as defined herein, some national reports has also covered state aid and unfair competition rules.

  26. 26.

    Van Bael & Bellis, Competition Law of the European Community, 2010, p. 17; ECJ, case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser v Macrotron, ECR 1991 I-1979, pt 21.

  27. 27.

    Van Bael & Bellis, Competition Law of the European Community, 2010, p. 18–19.

  28. 28.

    See Varanini, United States of America, Part I, Chap. 15, p. 258.

  29. 29.

    See Dreher & Körner, Germany, Part I, Chap. 8, p. 130.

  30. 30.

    See Dreher & Körner, Germany, Part I, Chap. 8, p. 134.

  31. 31.

    See Dreher & Körner, Germany, Part I, Chap. 8, p. 131, referring to Section 35 of the German Act against Restraints on Competition.

  32. 32.

    There is also a specific jurisdiction rule about local anticompetitive practices that indirectly refers to SMEs; see Boudou et al., France, Part I, Chap. 7, pp. 190 ff.

  33. 33.

    See Neyrinck, Belgium, Part I, Chap. 3, pp. 44 ff.

  34. 34.

    See Varanini, United States of America, Part I, Chap. 15, pp 258 and 260.

  35. 35.

    See Varanini, United States of America, Part I, Chap. 15, p. 258.

  36. 36.

    See Andrejaš, Croatia, Part I, Chap. 4, p. 67; Bailey, United Kingdom, Part I, Chap. 14, p. 236 and 237; Papp et al., Hungary, Part I, Chap. 9, p. 142.

  37. 37.

    See Dreher & Körner, Germany, Part I, Chap. 8, p. 134.

  38. 38.

    See Article 42 TFEU (ex-36 TEC); on block exemptions in general, see R. Whish & D. Bailey, Competition Law 2011, p. 168.

  39. 39.

    See Article 125 quater, Council Regulation 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products, OJ 2007 L 299, p. 1, according to which “an organization of producers shall not be recognized when it holds a dominant position in a market”.

  40. 40.

    OECD (2012), Promoting Compliance with competition law, p. 211, available at http://search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP(2011)20&docLanguage=En.

  41. 41.

    See Bailey, United Kingdom, Part I, Chap. 14, and Dreher & Körner, Germany, Part I, Chap. 8.

  42. 42.

    See OFT, SMEs missing out on benefits of competition, press release of 24 May 2005, available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2005/92-05.

  43. 43.

    Bailey, United Kingdom, Part I, Chap. 14, p. 241

  44. 44.

    Bailey, United Kingdom, Part I, Chap. 14, p. 241.

  45. 45.

    See Dreher & Körner, Germany, Part I, Chap. 8, p. 133.

  46. 46.

    See Part I: Neyrinck, Belgium, Chap. 3; Andrejaš, Croatia, Chap. 4; Poulsen, Denmark, Chap. 6; Zammit, Italy, Chap. 10; Moldén, Sweden, Chap. 12; Birkhäuser, Switzerland, Chap. 13; Varanini, United States of America, Chap. 15.

  47. 47.

    OECD (2012), Promoting Compliance with competition law, p. 264.

  48. 48.

    OECD (2012), Promoting Compliance with competition law, p. 264.

  49. 49.

    B. Lasserre, Market Definition: a resilient feature of competition enforcement?, Contribution to the 39th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy, Fordham Competition Law Institute, September 2012, available at http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/article_fordham_sept12.pdf.

  50. 50.

    J. Leibowitz (2005) The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/050510goodbadugly.pdf.

  51. 51.

    OECD (2012), Promoting Compliance with competition law, p. 209.

  52. 52.

    OECD (2012), Promoting Compliance with competition law, p. 209.

  53. 53.

    See Bailey, United Kingdom, Part I, Chap. 14, p. 7.

  54. 54.

    OECD (2012), Promoting Compliance with competition law, cited, p. 209.

  55. 55.

    OECD(2012), Promoting Compliance with competition law, cited, p. 209.

  56. 56.

    J. Leibowitz (2005), The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/050510goodbadugly.pdf.

  57. 57.

    B. Lasserre, Market Definition: a resilient feature of competition enforcement?, Contribution to the 39th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy, Fordham Competition Law Institute, September 2012, available at http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/article_fordham_sept12.pdf, p. 12; ECJ, case C-322/81, NV Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v European Commission, ECR 1983 3461.

  58. 58.

    See, on this point, OECD (2012), Promoting Compliance with competition law, p. 283.

  59. 59.

    See Bailey, United Kingdom, Part I, Chap. 14, p. 242.

  60. 60.

    See above, p. 3.

  61. 61.

    See Section 20 of the German Act against Restrictions of Competition.

  62. 62.

    See Dreher & Körner, Germany, Part I, Chap. 8, 134 ff.

  63. 63.

    See Fussenegger, Austria, Part I, Chap. 2, pp. 32 and 33.

  64. 64.

    See for instance Papp et al., Hungary, Part I, Chap. 9, p. 144.

  65. 65.

    See for instance Papp et al., Hungary, Part I, Chap. 9, pp. 146 and 147.

  66. 66.

    B. Lasserre, Market Definition: a resilient feature of competition enforcement?, Contribution to the 39th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy, Fordham Competition Law Institute, September 2012, available at http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/article_fordham_sept12.pdf, p. 15.

  67. 67.

    Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 101 (1) TFEU, OJ 2001C 368, p. 13, para 3. See also R. Whish & D. Bailey, Competition Law, 2011, p. 140.

  68. 68.

    See Bailey, United Kingdom, Part I, Chap. 14, p. 3. Official Exchange rate on 5 September 2012.

  69. 69.

    See Varanini, United States of America, Part I, Chap. 15, p. 260.

  70. 70.

    See Varanini, United States of America, Part I, Chap. 15, p. 261.

  71. 71.

    Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 101 (1) TFEU, OJ 2001C 368, p. 13, para 3.

  72. 72.

    Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 101 (1) TFEU, OJ 2001C 368, p. 13, para 50.

  73. 73.

    Official Exchange rate on 5 September2012.

  74. 74.

    Notice of the Commission: Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 2004C 101, p. 7, para 52.

  75. 75.

    Zammit, Italy, Part I, Chap. 10, pp. 174 and 175. Notice of the Commission: Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 2004C 101, p. 7, para 52.

  76. 76.

    See, for instance, the German experience, Dreher & Körner, Germany, Part I, Chap. 8, p. 134.

  77. 77.

    On the complaints system before the European Commission, see Van Bael & Bellis, 2010, p. 986.

  78. 78.

    See ex multis Birkhäuser, Switzerland, Part I, Chap. 13, p. 223.

  79. 79.

    See Dreher & Körner, Germany, Part I, Chap. 8, p. 138. See, for instance, Bundeskartellamt: https://www.bkms-system.net/bkwebanon/report/clientInfo?cin=2bkarta151.

  80. 80.

    Zammit, Italy, Part I, Chap. 10, p. 177.

  81. 81.

    Zammit, Italy, Part I, Chap. 10, p. 177.

  82. 82.

    See Dreher & Körner, Germany, Part I, Chap. 8, p. 138.

  83. 83.

    See http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/FurtherInfo/whistleblowing_infoW3DnavidW2631.php.

  84. 84.

    See, for instance, Andrejaš, Croatia, Chap. 4; Poulsen, Denmark, Chap. 6; Papp et al., Hungary, Chap. 9.

  85. 85.

    See Fussenegger, Austria, Part I, Chap. 2, p. 34; Boudou et al., France, Part I, Chap. 7, pp. 123 ff; Zammit, Italy, Part I, Chap. 10, pp. 176 and 177.

  86. 86.

    See about the access to the file before the European Commission: Van Bael & Bellis, 2010, p. 1042.

  87. 87.

    L. Idot, Access to evidence and files of Competition Authorities in J. Basedow, S. Franq, L. Idot: International Private Antitrust Litigation, 2012, p. 20. See also J. Suderow, El acceso a las pruebas en expedientes de la Comisión Europea y los límites establecidos por su programa de Clemencia, in L. Velasco et al.: La aplicación privada del Derecho de la Competencia, 2011, p. 535.

  88. 88.

    See Birkhäuser, Switzerland, Part I, Chap. 13, p. 225.

  89. 89.

    See, for instance, Andrejaš, Croatia, Part I, Chap. 4, and Bailey, United Kingdom, Part I, Chap. 14, pp. 247 ff; OFT, Involving third parties in Competition Act investigations, OFT 451, April 2006, para. 3.22.

  90. 90.

    See Varanini, United States of America, Part I, Chap. 15, p. 259.

  91. 91.

    See, about the leniency process before the European Commission, Van Bael & Bellis, 2010, p. 1125. A. Calvo Caravaca, 2010 Derecho Antitrust Europeo, Vol. I, p. 347.

  92. 92.

    V. Bael & Bellis, Competition Law of the European Community 2010, p. 1125.

  93. 93.

    V. Bael & Bellis, Competition Law of the European Community 2010, p. 1127.

  94. 94.

    See Birkhäuser, Switzerland, Part I, Chap. 13, p. 229.

  95. 95.

    See, for instance, Andrejaš, Croatia, Part I, Chap. 4, p. 72.

  96. 96.

    See Bailey, United Kingdom, Part I, Chap. 14, p. 251, and Birkhäuser, Switzerland, Part I, Chap. 13, p. 229.

  97. 97.

    See Boudou et al., France, Part I, Chap. 7, p. 122.

  98. 98.

    See Boudou et al., France, Part I, Chap. 7, p. 122. Van Bael & Bellis, 2010, p. 1125. A. Calvo Caravaca, 2010 Derecho Antitrust Europeo, Vol. I, p. 571.

  99. 99.

    See Bailey, United Kingdom, Part I, Chap. 14, p. 251.

  100. 100.

    See, for instance, horizontal agreements: taxi drivers (Sweden, Brazil, Hungary), plumbers (Sweden), bus transporters (Sweden, UK), driving schools (Brazil), bakeries (Brazil and Italy), pasta producers (Italy), funeral service providers (Sweden, Brazil); vertical agreements: funeral service providers (Hungary); abuse of dominance: transport providers (UK), pharmaceutical companies (UK), funeral service providers (UK).

  101. 101.

    A. Calvo Caravaca, 2010 Derecho Antitrust Europeo, Vol. I, p. 571.

  102. 102.

    A. Calvo Caravaca, 2010 Derecho Antitrust Europeo, Vol. I, p. 572.

  103. 103.

    See Varanini, United States of America, Part I, Chap. 15, p. 259.

  104. 104.

    See V. Bael & Bellis, Competition Law of the European Community 2010, p. 1125.

  105. 105.

    See Boudou et al., France, Part I, Chap. 7, p. 108.

  106. 106.

    See Boudou et al., France, Part I, Chap. 7, pp. 108 and 119.

  107. 107.

    See Boudou et al., France, Part I, Chap. 7, pp. 108, 119 ff.

  108. 108.

    See Boudou et al., France, Part I, Chap. 7, p. 121.

  109. 109.

    CAT Case Nos, etc, 1125/1/1/09 Barret Estate Services, Ltd & Ors v OFT (2011), CAT 8; see Bailey, United Kingdom, Part I, Chap. 14, p. 251.

  110. 110.

    See Bailey, United Kingdom, Part I, Chap. 14, p. 244.

  111. 111.

    A. Calvo Caravaca, Derecho Antitrust Europeo, Vol. I, 2010, p. 573.

  112. 112.

    See recent developments of the jurisprudence regarding exchange(s) of information, for instance ECJ, case C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands BV, KPN Mobile NV, Orange Nederland NV and Vodafone Libertel NV v Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, ECR 2009 I-4529.

  113. 113.

    See International Report prepared for the LIDC Congress in Oxford in September 2011 Question A: Fines in Antitrust, p. 26, and A. Calvo Caravaca: Derecho Antitrust Europeo, Vol. I, 2010, p. 574.

  114. 114.

    M. P. Blum, The failing company doctrine, p. 1, in Boston College Law Review 1975 (16).

  115. 115.

    See Van Bael & Bellis, Competition Law of the European Community, 2010, p. 1113.

  116. 116.

    Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2) (a) of Regulation No 1/2003, OJ 2006C 210, p. 2.

  117. 117.

    See, on the international perspective of private enforcement, J. Basedow, S. Franq, L. Idot, International Antitrust Litigation, 2012.

  118. 118.

    J. Basedow, S. Franq, L. Idot, International Antitrust Litigation, 2012, p. 3. E. Castellanos, Competencia Judicial internacional en las acciones de reparación de daños y perjuicios por infracción del Derecho Antitrust in L. Velasco et al.: La aplicación privada del Derecho de la Competencia, 2010, p. 619. Ashton, D. Vollrath, D., Choice of court and applicable law in tortious actions for breach of Community competition law, in ZweR 2006, pp. 1–26.

  119. 119.

    L. Idot, Access to evidence and files of Competition Authorities in J Basedow, S. Franq, L. Idot: International Private Antitrust Litigation, 2012, p. 20. See also J. Suderow: El acceso a las pruebas en expedientes de la Comisión Europea y los límites establecidos por su programa de Clemencia, in L. Velasco et al.: La aplicación privada del Derecho de la Competencia, 2011, p. 535.

  120. 120.

    See Bailey, United Kingdom, Part I, Chap. 14, pp. 253 ff.

  121. 121.

    See Boudou et al., France, Part I, Chap. 7, p. 123.

  122. 122.

    See Boudou et al., France, Part I, Chap. 7, p. 124.

  123. 123.

    See Neyrinck, Belgium, Part I, Chap. 3, p. 58.

  124. 124.

    See Neyrinck, Belgium, Part I, Chap. 3, p. 58.

  125. 125.

    See recent developments in Germany and ECJ, case C-360/09, Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt, ECR 2011 I-5161.

  126. 126.

    See Varanini, United States of America, Part I, Chap. 15, pp. 259 ff.

  127. 127.

    See Varanini, United States of America, Part I, Chap. 15, pp. 259 ff.

  128. 128.

    See Varanini, United States of America, Part I, Chap. 15, pp. 276 ff.

  129. 129.

    See P. Buccirossi, M. Carpagnano, L. Ciari, M. Tognoni, C. Vitale: Collective Redress in Antitrust, Study requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, p. 15, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/fr/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=74351.

  130. 130.

    European Parliament Study on Collective Redress in Antitrust, cit., p. 15.

  131. 131.

    European Parliament Study on Collective Redress in Antitrust, cit., p. 38.

  132. 132.

    European Parliament Study on Collective Redress in Antitrust, cit., p. 64.

  133. 133.

    See Commission Recommendation C(2013) 3539/3. The same approach has been followed by the European Parliament in its Resolution of 2 February 2012 on the coherent European approach to collective redress.

  134. 134.

    European Parliament Study on Collective Redress in Antitrust, cit., p. 69.

  135. 135.

    Equivalent to USD 65,108,405.50 Official exchange rate on 21 October 2012.

  136. 136.

    European Parliament Study on Collective Redress in Antitrust, cit. p. 69.

  137. 137.

    European Parliament Study on Collective Redress in Antitrust, cit. p. 69.

  138. 138.

    See Bailey, United Kingdom, Part I, Chap. 14, pp. 253–255.

  139. 139.

    See Varanini, United States of America, Part I, Chap. 15, pp. 270 ff.

  140. 140.

    See Varanini, United States of America, Part I, Chap. 15, pp. 270 ff.

  141. 141.

    See Varanini, United States of America, Part I, Chap. 15, p. 270, and Zammit, Italy, Part I, Chap. 10, p. 182.

  142. 142.

    See Varanini, United States of America, Part I, Chap. 15, p. 269.

  143. 143.

    See Bailey, United Kingdom, Part I, Chap. 14, p. 255.

  144. 144.

    See, for instance, Neyrinck, Belgium, Part I, Chap. 3, p. 61.

  145. 145.

    See Bailey, United Kingdom, Part I, Chap. 14, p. 256, and OFT, Private actions in Competition Law: a consultation on options to reform, April 2012.

  146. 146.

    See Bailey, United Kingdom, Part I, Chap. 14, p. 256, and Private actions in Competition Law: a consultation on options to reform, April 2012.

  147. 147.

    See Papp et al., Hungary, Part I, Chap. 9, p. 155.

Acknowledgment

The Author is very grateful to Julia Suderow, Rechtsanwältin and Abogada, from the Antitrust Observatory, Trento for her valuable research and academic assistance. The International Reporter wishes to thank Pierre Kobel, Muriel Chagny, and the members of the Scientific Committee of the LIDC for their useful insights and feedback on this report and preliminary research. A warm thanks to all national reporters for their excellent contributions and valuable insights on national legal systems.

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  1. University of Trento and Osservatorio Antitrust, Trento, Italy

    Michele Carpagnano

  2. Gianni, Origoni, Grippo, Cappelli & Partners, Rome, Italy

    Michele Carpagnano

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    Pranvera Këllezi

  2. Addleshaw Goddard, London, United Kingdom

    Bruce Kilpatrick

  3. Etude Hirsch Kobel, Geneva, Switzerland

    Pierre Kobel

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Carpagnano, M. (2014). International Report. In: Këllezi, P., Kilpatrick, B., Kobel, P. (eds) Antitrust for Small and Middle Size Undertakings and Image Protection from Non-Competitors. LIDC Contributions on Antitrust Law, Intellectual Property and Unfair Competition. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54000-4_1

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