Abstract
The paper investigates general properties of power indices, measuring the voting power in committees. Concepts of local and global monotonicity of power indices are introduced. Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf-Coleman, and Holler-Packel indices are analyzed and it is proved that while Shapley-Shubik index satisfies both local and global monotonicity property, Banzhaf-Coleman satisfies only local monotonicity without being globally monotonic and Holler-Packel index satisfies neither local nor global monotonicity.
This research was undertaken with support from the European Commission’s Phare ACE Programme, project No. P96–6252–R and cosponsored by the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic, project No. 402/98/1470. The author benefited significantly from the comments of Manfred Holler from University of Hamburg on the earlier draft of the paper.
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Turnovec, F. (1998). Monotonicity of Power Indices. In: Stewart, T.J., van den Honert, R.C. (eds) Trends in Multicriteria Decision Making. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 465. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45772-2_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45772-2_17
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