Abstract
The Austrian system of administrative justice is right now undergoing a vast reform process, with effects that are still difficult to assess. In these circumstances, the report on Austria describes briefly the reform as it was defined by the Government and tries to identify the consequences of ADR tools. Under the hitherto existing system in Austria, review of administrative decisions was normally assured by administrative appeals to higher ranked authorities. In the end, legal subjects had access to the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) or the supreme Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof). Compliance with the European Human Rights Convention (EHRC), however, has forced Austria to establish, during the last decades, more than 100 independent administrative tribunals. And since the 1980s of the last century, the supreme Administrative Court has permanently been congested with pending complaints, which to settle took, therefore, more often than not too long. The reform (effective on January 1st 2014) implements the so-called 9 + 2 model: one Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht), one Federal Fiscal Court (Bundesfinanzgericht), and nine Administrative Courts in the federal states (Landesverwaltungsgerichte) serve now as administrative courts of first instance, under (limited) review done by the supreme Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court. An explicit corollary of the reform is the abolishment of administrative appeals; legislation will, however, be still allowed to provide them for certain areas—e.g., for municipal building procedures. What is more, existing supervisory procedures of reconsideration by the issuing authority itself or by its superior authority could gain more relevance in the future.
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Notes
- 1.
Gesetz betreffend die Einrichtung eines Verwaltungsgerichtshofes—VwGG 1875, Imperial Law Gazette (Reichsgesetzblatt—RGBl) 1876/36. The constitutional basis was Article 15 (2) of the Fundamental Law on the Judiciary (Staatsgrundgesetz über die richterliche Gewalt - StGG, RGBl 1867/144).
- 2.
Section 2 (2) of the Law of 22 October 1875 explicitly stated that one could lodge a complaint not only against decisions of State authorities but also against those of the (autonomous) regional administrations, as well as against those of districts and municipalities.
- 3.
Therefore, this court was competent not only for the territory of the current Republic of Austria (with the exception of the region of “Burgenland,” then belonging to the Hungarian part of the Empire) but also for complete territories of modern Czech Republic and of Slovenia, as well as parts of Italy (Trento/Southern Tyrol as well as parts of Friulia and Trieste), Polonia (Krakow, “Galicia”), Croatia (Dalmatia), Ukraine (Lemberg, Czernovitz), and also Romania (southern part of Bukovina).
- 4.
Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz—B-VG.
- 5.
Federal Law Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt—BGBl) I 2012/51.
- 6.
See, for the major general steps on federal level, BGBl I 2013/33.
- 7.
The only exception explicitly stated in the amended Constitution (Art 118 [4] B-VG in the version of BGBl I 2012/51; cf. also Articles 115 [2] and 132 [6] B-VG in that version) is that for municipal self-government where two administrative instances may persist, as long as legislation does not cancel the second one. By way of analogy (argumento a minori ad maius) one might, however, question whether two administrative instances could also be kept within the structures of professional self-government (Art 120a–120c B-VG).
- 8.
See, in more detail below, Sect. 7.3.2. Already in 2008, the former Federal Independent Asylum Senate (an administrative tribunal) was changed to the “Asylum Court” (the main purpose of this reform being to cancel the Administrative Court’s judicial review in asylum matters). Also, this (specialized) court is now to be dissolved (or, more exactly, serves as institutional basis for one of the two new federal administrative courts of first instance).
- 9.
- 10.
See for the following already Balthasar (2011), pp. 343ff, for the Administrative Court in general, Stelzer (2011), pp. 192ff. Like in France, also in Austria, this separation was not so much an implementation of the rule of law, deemed to protect courts from governmental influence but, right to the contrary, paid tribute to the requirements of efficiency: during the wars against Prussia (1740–1763), the minister of the Interior (supreme chancellor) of the time, F.W. Haugwitz, held that the State authorities then competent for legal, as well as political, and for administrative issues proceeded in too formal a way and were, thus, not flexible (and, perhaps, also not loyal) enough to meet the needs of warfare. So he restricted these authorities to the tasks of ordinary judiciary (private and penal law) while creating new ones for all issues of general administration (1749). See, in more detail, Balthasar (2000), pp. 63ff; Jabloner (2009), p. 3.
- 11.
Nevertheless, there had been some general attempts in that direction still in 1763/1782 see Balthasar (2000), pp. 72 f, and Article 15 (1) StGG RGBl 1867/144 (as well as Article 94 [2] B-VG, original version of 1920) opened this way again insofar as an administrative authority had to decide on conflicting private rights of individuals. Although the scope of this constitutional provision (which was cancelled in 1929) remained always rather limited [cf. Winkler (1979b), p. 137 (149)], it was never possible to extinguish this path completely. Jurisprudence invented therefore, in order to avoid infringement of the principle of separation of administration from the ordinary judiciary (Article 94 [1] B-VG, original version; cf. Wiederin (2011), pp. 351ff), the scheme of “subsequent competence” (“sukzessive Zuständigkeit,” cf. Öhlinger and Eberhard (2012), point 606). The current reform allows again explicitly legislation to state (though only exceptionally) that an administrative decision is not to be challenged before one of the new administrative courts but before the ordinary judiciary. This provision (Article 94 [2] B-VG in the version of BGBl I 2012/51) is, furthermore, no longer restricted to private law issues but could also be applied to all other sorts of administrative law, including penal (administrative) law. In addition, since 1948 the ordinary courts have been competent to decide on compensation for maladministration (“Amtshaftung”).
- 12.
According to § 10 (4) VwGG 1875, at least half of the members of the Administrative Court had to be qualified as judges (of the ordinary judiciary). This quota (which was later on, as such, inserted in the original version of the B-VG (Article 134 [3]), but only 5 years later lowered to 1/3 (version of BGBl 1925/367, and was now deleted altogether, as part of the reform of 5 June 2012), had not been proposed by the Government but was inserted during parliamentary debate and followed the Prussian model (cf. Balthasar (2000), p. 52, fn 225; Olechowski (1999), pp. 134f. Stelzer (2011), pp. 188f).
- 13.
“Judiciren, … aber nicht administriren”—to decide on the lawfulness of the contested administrative decision but not to take over the role of the administrative authority.
- 14.
This court, also a novelty of the 1867 Fundamental Laws (the “December Constitution”), can be considered as a sort of predecessor of twentieth century constitutional courts.
- 15.
- 16.
Section 6 (1) VwGG 1875; cf. still § 41 (1), first sentence VwGG 1985 (version in force until 31 December 2013). It is true, however, that these legal provisions, as such, would have allowed somewhat more discretion than the Court itself thought it appropriate to make use of, as, in particular, Ringhofer (1976), pp. 363ff and 372ff) had pointed out; see also, quite recently, the Judgment of the Constitutional Court of 28 June 2011, B 254/11 (Official Collection [VfSlg] No. 19.425).
- 17.
§ 6 (2) VwGG 1875.
- 18.
§ 7 (1) VwGG 1875.
- 19.
The Court started with 12 members; in 1918, this number had increased to 49 (see http://www.vwgh.gv.at/Content.Node/geschichte/rechtshistorische-entwicklung/1876-1918/1876-1918.at.php). Just for comparison: nowadays, the Administrative Court (competent only for the territory of the Republic) comprises 67 members.
- 20.
§ 5 (2) and (3) VwGG 1875.
- 21.
This rule survived, although more and more modified by specific exceptions (on constitutional level, as well as by ordinary legislation), as the underlying principle also in the still current administrative law (cf. Hengstschäger and Leeb (2007), point 21).
- 22.
No administrative appeal at all was necessary where the supreme administrative authority (in most cases, a minister or a regional government) was competent to decide as authority of first instance.
- 23.
Cf. still the Judgment of the Constitutional Court of 16 June 1992, B 1319/90 et al. (VfSlg 13.092).
- 24.
The legal basis for this lawmaking turned out to be § 6 (2) VwGG 1875, where the Administrative Court was called to annul the contested decision when major elements of the administrative procedure had been neglected (“wesentliche Formen des Administrativverfahrens außer Acht gelassen”)—an element requiring first the establishment of these “major elements,” either by the legislator or, insofar as it remained silent, by the Court’s case law itself.
- 25.
The so far most important law of this codification is the General Administrative Procedures Code (Allgemeines Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz—AVG), which is, as such, still in force.
- 26.
Complaints to the Constitutional Court have to be based on an (alleged) infringement of a constitutional (fundamental) right or the allegation that parts of the legislation applied is unconstitutional (Article 144 B-VG).
- 27.
See right below Sect. 7.2.2.
- 28.
Cf. still currently Hengstschäger and Leeb (2007), point 91. Already Tezner (1925), pp. 297f. had contested this view. In 1986, the Administrative Court itself developed, by a famous judgment explicitly discarding its former case law, some limits. See, for more details, Hengstschäger and Leeb (2007), point 68.
- 29.
See above fn 2.
- 30.
Cf. Hengstschäger and Leeb (2007), point 9ff.
- 31.
§ 30 (2) VwGG 1985.
- 32.
§ 64 (2) AVG.
- 33.
To be precise, paragraph 24 (2) VwGG 1985 (version in force until 31 December 2013) required only that the complaints had to be submitted by a legal representative, and paragraph 23 (1) leg cit allowed parties to act during the proceedings without representation. But in practice (in particular, considering that oral hearings were very rare), paragraph 24 (2) VwGG 1985 had the effect that almost every party opted for full representation.
- 34.
See Annual Report, 2012, p. 7.
- 35.
See Annual Report 2011, p. 9; Annual Report 2012, p. 6.
- 36.
See Annual Report 2011, p. 8; Annual Report 2012, p. 6.
- 37.
Regarding asylum and expulsion cases.
- 38.
Note that the Administrative Court did not allow itself to take evidence (see above Sect. 7.2.1.1).
- 39.
See Balthasar (2010), p. 191, fn 953.
- 40.
Now, however, a similar provosion is applicable also in relation to administrative authority/administrative courts of first instance. See below Sect. 7.4.5.
- 41.
In its Article 131 (1), the B-VG (original version) inserted the relevant content of § 3 lit h, second element VwGG 1875 into constitutional law. The major difference was that since then also participation of citizens being neither “administrators” nor “judges” as members of these authorities has been allowed (see closer Pernthaler (1977), pp. 19ff: “bürgerschaftliche Komponente”).
- 42.
- 43.
- 44.
Pernthaler (1977), p. 47, 133.
- 45.
By the first two amendments of the B-VG, subsequently, cf., Balthasar (2003), p. 262 (fn 69).
- 46.
See Winkler (1979c), pp. 116ff.
- 47.
This constitution (of 1st May 1934, BGBl II 1934/1) established the “Federal State of Austria,” which lasted till March 1938 and was not restored in 1945 after the end of the German period.
- 48.
The principle of exhaustion of legal remedies within the administration was transferred to this constellation.
- 49.
Legal protection against delay of lower instances was already provided by § 73 AVG.
- 50.
Under the Constitution 1934, the tasks of the Constitutional Court were also conferred upon the Administrative Court, and the institution was named, more generally, “Federal Court” (“Bundesgerichtshof”).
- 51.
§ 51 (2) of the Law of 12 July 1934 on the establishment and procedure of the Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshofgesetz—BGG).
- 52.
Article 132.
- 53.
Cf paragraph 42 (4) VwGG 1985 (version in force until December 2013).
- 54.
§ 41 (3a) VwGG 1985 (version in force until December 2013) had already been applicable since 1 July 2012 (see § 80 (10) leg cit); see now § 42 (4) VwGG (current version).
- 55.
It is true, however, that since 25 December 1946 (the coming into force of the constitutional amendment BGBl 1946/211) the principle outlined supra in Sect. 7.2.1.1. was not stated clearly any more on constitutional level, the relevant wording being the quite general “erkennen”, i.e. “to judge”. Hence, the Constitutional Court had indeed stated that there was no constitutional provision restricting the Administrative Court to cassation (Judgment of 19 June, G 183/94 et al., Official Collection No. [VfSlg] 14.164, referring to VfSlg 8202).
- 56.
See the two Judgments of 4 September 2012, 2012/12/0032 and 2012/12/0007, respectively.
- 57.
BGBl 1929/392.
- 58.
Cf. Balthasar (2000), pp. 15f.
- 59.
Cf. the Judgment of the Constitutional Court of 15 February 1999, VfSlg 16.189 (“Deren Zahl steigt neuerdings im Bereich des Bundes an. Auch das Gewicht der von ihnen zu besorgenden Angelegenheiten nimmt deutlich zu, …” [“within the federal administration, their number is recently increasing, as well as the importance of the issues conferred to them …”]). Some of these senates, like the fairly newly founded one for environmental affairs or the Senate for Patent Affairs (which has enjoyed already a long tradition), had an excellent record and a high quality of members (a mixture of university professors, high-ranking administrators of different kind, and judges of the ordinary judiciary, including members of the supreme court), which will be impossible to maintain under the new structure. For a warm appraisal, see, in detail, Pernthaler (1977) and, in particular, pp. 93ff.
- 60.
To start with, in 1988 nine “unabhängige Verwaltungssenate” (“independent administrative tribunals”)—one for each region—were established, to deal with appeals in administrative penal law proceedings, complaints against administrative orders, and acts of direct enforcement outside formal administrative proceedings; in addition, legislation was enabled to confer all other sorts of subject matters to these senates. In 1998, a federal independent senate was added to deal with asylum cases. In 2002, this structure served as a slightly modified model for a specialized senate for federal procurement matters (which have, in most regions, been conferred upon the administrative senates; only in two regions exist separate independent bodies), in 2003 followed the “independent taxation senate.” See Larcher (2012); Kahl and Rosenkranz (2012), pp. 121ff; Brunner and Pavlik (2004); Balthasar (2000), pp. 81ff.
- 61.
Note that originally the Government did not even propose a quota of judges for the Administrative Court (see above fn 12).
- 62.
Nevertheless, it is remarkable how long it took until the seed of the reform of 1929 really gained ground: already Article 11 (5) B-VG in the version of BGBl 1929/392 provided for independent senates (although composed not of full-time but of avocational members) competent for the decision in administrative penal law cases; this constitutional promise, however, was never implemented until, six decades later, the reform of 1988 took place, and the first competence the independent administrative senates had aimed for in the then governmental proposal was exactly these decisions in administrative penal law cases. For the overall motivation of this reform—which was very much the same as that of the current reform—see below Sect. 7.4.1.
- 63.
In some areas, in particular where the establishment of a new senate was accompanied by the creation of a new administrative authority of first instance as it was the case in asylum matters, the case law of the senate stimulated a considerable increase of quality also of the first instance decisions. On the other hand, the obligation of the new senates to decide on the merits, in combination with their competence to establish all the necessary facts by themselves, in particular by an oral hearing, and the lack of any power to give instructions to the administrative authorities could also have the effect that the procedure of first instance lost a lot of its former quality (this happened mostly in administrative penal law cases), so that the proceedings before the new senate turned out to be the real “first instance,” with only an insignificant administrative prelude. If one does not compare the senates with the first, but with the highest instance of the former system, the assessment is even more complicated: while it is beyond question that senate decisions show more quality than former appeal decisions of subordinate bodies, it may be different when one compares with former decisions of ministerial departments, which disposed of lots of information and resources senates often lack.
- 64.
It is worth noting that Article 6 ECHR and, most recently, also Article 47 EUCFR do not require the two stages structure: as the Constitutional Court ruled quite recently (see above fn 16), the Administrative Court has always disposed of sufficient competences to secure alone compliance with the mentioned provisions (apart from administrative penal law proceedings). But Article 267 TFEU could indeed speak strongly in favor of two stages of administrative courts (cf. Balthasar (2000), p. 351).
- 65.
Article 131 (3) B-VG.
- 66.
The Administrative Court did not make use of this provision to dismiss the complaint a limine but continued to carry out its regular procedure and referred only to this provision in case of rejection (in order to spare itself to give elaborated reasons).
- 67.
Cf. Article 2 (2) B-VG: Burgenland, Carinthia, Lower Austria, Upper Austria, Salzburg, Styria, Tyrol, Vorarlberg, Vienna.
- 68.
Cf. Article 151 (5) (5) B-VG (version of BGBl I 2012/51), read in conjunction with the preceding subparagraphs.
- 69.
Cf. Article 151 (5) (2) (b) B-VG (version of BGBl I 2012/51). Hence, the president of the “independent taxation senate” was appointed president of the Taxation Court.
- 70.
Cf. Article 151 (5) (2) (a) and (5) (7) B-VG (version of BGBl I 2012/51). Hence, the president of the Asylum Court and the president of the procurement senate were appointed president and vice president of the General Administrative Court, respectively.
- 71.
The contemporaneous comment of Kelsen et al. (1922), p. 244, clearly points out the background of three or even four administrative instances (cf. above fn 23), and even if it might be true, from a mere legal point of view, that legislation could have done the desired reductions also without this specific constitutional provision, its existence shows how deeply rooted had been, at that time, the principle mentioned above (at the end of Sect. 7.2.1.1).
- 72.
Article 103 (4) B-VG (version of BGBl 1974/444), covering the huge field of federal administration carried out by regional authorities.
- 73.
It was only due to the semantic artifice to consider the “independent senates” not as tribunals outside the administration but as a court-like form of administrative bodies (see above Sect. 7.3.2) that the abolishment of administrative appeals allowed for already by Article 129a (2) B-VG was still disguised until the reform of 2012.
- 74.
RV 1618 Blg NR XXIV. GP.
- 75.
Federalism comes into play because wide areas of administrative law have been executed by regional authorities. So when creating administrative courts of first instance, it was felt the need to establish them under the responsibility of the regions. In contrast, all courts of the ordinary judiciary belong to the federation.
- 76.
See, in more detail, Balthasar (2011), pp. 348f. with further references.
- 77.
See above Sect. 7.2.1.2.
- 78.
Cf. the references given by Balthasar (2011), p. 353, fns 97f.
- 79.
It was first the former judge Robert Walter who, as a most influential professor of constitutional and administrative law, proposed in 1986 to establish administrative courts following the example of the ordinary judiciary. See Balthasar (2011), 348f.
- 80.
This is, of course, not true to the extent that “independent administrative authorities” (cf. Article 20 [2] B-VG) are competent to act in first instance.
- 81.
See Part IV, section 1 of the AVG (§§ 63–67).
- 82.
See above Sect. 7.1.
- 83.
See above fn 7.
- 84.
The Government draft bill (RV 1618 Blg NR XXIV. GP, 4) of the 2012 reform held, in its explanatory memorandum, that regarding administrative appeals “the Draft proposes to change the system and to abolish it completely. With the sole exception of municipal self-government there shall be, in the future, only one administrative instance. Each administrative authority shall be ‘first and sole’ instance the decisions of which can be appealed against before the respective administrative court.”
- 85.
Article 130 (1), (2) in conjunction with Article 132 (1) (1) B-VG (future version).
- 86.
Article 130 (4) B-VG (current version).
- 87.
One of the traditional arguments in favor of reformation in peius in all other fields of administrative law was the fact that reformatio in peius was only explicitly excluded in paragraph 51 (6) of the Administrative Penal Law Procedures Code (Verwaltungsstrafverfahrensgesetz, VStG; see Hengstschäger and Leeb (2007), point 91). This legal situation, however, was transferred to the new law where we find a prohibition of the reformation in peius only in the section dealing with administrative penal law (paragraph 42 VwGVG, see below fn 97). What is more, the Explanatory Memorandum (RV 2009 Blg NR XXIV. GP, 8) explicitly states that the new provision was shaped against the model of the old one.
- 88.
Article 133 (1), (4) B-VG (current version).
- 89.
I.e., rights granted on constitutional level; most of them are human or fundamental rights.
- 90.
Article 144 B-VG (current version).
- 91.
Article 131 (3) B-VG (version in force until 31 December 2013).
- 92.
Article 133 [4] B-VG (current version).
- 93.
Usually, it is a core task of the president of a court to motivate, while fully respecting the independence of the judges concerned, consistency of jurisprudence; in addition, deviation of the well-established case law may be made difficult by the requirement to enlarge the chamber.
- 94.
See paragraph 68 (2) AVG.
- 95.
See paragraph 68 (3) AVG.
- 96.
See paragraph 68 (4) AVG.
- 97.
The corollary is that the “petition” is not needed altogether in case the authority has made up its mind to act, the competences being construed as exclusively ex officio ones.
- 98.
Article 2 of the Fundamental Law on the General Rights of Citizens (Staatsgrundgesetz über die allgemeinen Rechte der Staatsbürger—StGG, RGBl 1867/142); Article 7 B-VG; Article 1 (1) of the Constitutional Law on the Implementation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (BGBl 1973/390); Articles 20, 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EUCFR).
- 99.
Cf. the case law of the Austrian Supreme Court (in private and penal laws), i.e. its Judgment of 24 February 2003, 1 Ob 272/02 k (SZ 2003/17), where the State is considered to be obliged, by virtue of the principle of nondiscrimination, to conclude contracts with every subsequent applicant in the same way as it was done in a comparable situation in a preceding case even when legislation has explicitly denied any right to contract.
- 100.
See above Sect. 7.2.1.3, last paragraph.
- 101.
See above Sect. 7.4.2, first bullet.
- 102.
Bundesgesetz über das Verfahren der Verwaltungsgerichte—Verwaltungsgerichts-verfahrensgesetz.
- 103.
The Explanatory Memorandum (RV 2009 Blg NR XXIV. GP, 5) states on that provision: “the administrative authority against the decision of which a complaint was lodged shall have the option to decide on that complaint, even to reject it or to give additional reasons.” From the fact that the administrative court is competent to decide by applying the principle reformatio in peius, it may be inferred that this element will be within the powers of the administrative authority acting under § 14 (1) VwGG as well.
- 104.
This is clearly stated in the explanations forming part of the government draft bill (RV 2009 Blg NR XXIV. GP, 5): “Beschwerdegegenstand im Bescheidbeschwerdeverfahren der Verwaltungsgerichte soll – sofern die Behörde von der Ermächtigung des vorgeschlagenen § 14 Gebrauch macht – die Beschwerdevorentscheidung sein.”
- 105.
Note that, at least in theory, both doors may be opened simultaneously because even action of the administrative authority under § 14 (1) VwGVG does not affect the decisive element of § 68 (1) AVG that the decision concerned is “final” in the sense that no administrative appeal can be lodged against it any more.
- 106.
This feature seems to be a major difference to comparable institutes in other legal orders, where the choice is up to the party (cf., for the German “Widerspruchsverfahren,” e.g. Wolff et al. (2010), point 14ff, Langbroek et al. (2012), pp. 76ff; for the French “recours administratif préalable” Langbroek et al. (2012), pp. 44f.
- 107.
Cf. Hengstschäger and Leeb (2007), commentary on paragraph 64a, point 6, for the predecessor of § 14 [1] VwGG.
- 108.
As to the current § 64a AVG, the element “within two months” is interpreted strictly (see Hengstschäger and Leeb (2007), commentary on paragraph 64a, point 8); as a consequence, after the expiry of this time limit, the administrative authority loses any further competence ex lege. This is a remarkable difference to the provisions on administrative delay (§ 73 AVG; § 8 VwGVG), where a complaint is to be rejected in cases where the delay is objectively justified (not due to maladministration).
- 109.
In 2011, 8,377 cases were completed, and in 1,041 cases the Board stated maladministration.
- 110.
See Report of Ombudspersons, 16ff.
- 111.
No. 2000/483/EC, OJ 2000 L 317, p. 3, as amended by OJ 2010 L 287, p. 10.
- 112.
- 113.
Bundschuh-Rieseneder (2008), pp. 26 (27f); Cotonou Partnership Agreement, Art 9.3; Dolzer (2004), p. 535 (535ff); Rothstein and Teorell (2008), pp. 168ff; Wimmer (2010), pp. 249ff; Bundschuh-Rieseneder (2011) 253ff; Frederickson (2007) 283ff, 292ff; Jann (2003) 449ff; OECD (1997) 60ff; OECD (1999) 11ff; OECD (2005a) 10ff, 27ff.
- 114.
- 115.
Performance orientation and transparent procedures are key facts of effective public management. Further, an associated element of regulatory effectiveness is the need to minimize unintended outcomes. That means avoiding the creation of unnecessary barriers that can frustrate and inhibit reforms, repress economic activity by reducing entry, and exit to particular sectors and markets. Therefore, effectiveness is also ensuring that regulations are precise, not only in identifying the right targets but also in confining the extent of their impact. In fact, that means doing the right things in the right way.
- 116.
- 117.
- 118.
For the exact meaning of this term, with regard to “effectiveness” as well as to “efficiency”, see closer Isak (2013), pp. 242ff.
- 119.
Bresser-Pereira (2004), p. 274.
- 120.
Gesetz über das Bundesamt zur Korruptionsprävention und Korruptionsbekämpfung—BAK-G, BGBl I 2009/72 as amended by BGBl I 2013/65.
- 121.
Unvereinbarkeits- und Transparenzgesetz, BGBl 1983/330 as amended by BGBl I 2012/59.
- 122.
Lobbying- und Interessenvertretungs-Transparenzgesetz, BGBl I 2012/64.
- 123.
See BGBl III 2006/47 as amended by BGBl III 2011/59.
- 124.
See, e.g., http://derstandard.at “Justiz startete Whistleblower-Website” 20.03.2013; http://www.diepresse.com “Website für Whistleblower geht in Betrieb” 20.03.2013.
- 125.
See, in more detail, Administrative Justice & Tribunals Council, pp. 7ff; further, Fabunmi and Araromi (2009), pp. 197ff.
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Bundschuh-Rieseneder, F., Balthasar, A. (2014). Administrative Justice in Austria in the Stage of Transition: From Administrative Appeals to Administrative Courts or the Final Stage of “Tribunalization” of Administrative Disputes. In: Dragos, D., Neamtu, B. (eds) Alternative Dispute Resolution in European Administrative Law. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34946-1_7
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