Abstract
Tor is a widely used anonymity network providing low-latency communication capabilities. The anonymity provided by Tor heavily relies on the hardness of linking a user’s entry and exit nodes. If an attacker gains access to the topological information about the Tor network instead of having to consider the network as a fully connected graph, this anonymity may be reduced. In fact, we have found ways to probe the connectivity of a Tor relay. We demonstrate how the resulting leakage of the Tor network topology can be used in attacks which trace back a user from an exit relay to a small set of potential entry nodes.
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Biryukov, A., Pustogarov, I., Weinmann, RP. (2012). TorScan: Tracing Long-Lived Connections and Differential Scanning Attacks. In: Foresti, S., Yung, M., Martinelli, F. (eds) Computer Security – ESORICS 2012. ESORICS 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7459. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33167-1_27
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33167-1_27
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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