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Drones as Future Air Power Assets: The Dawn of Aviation 2.0?

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Power in the 21st Century

Part of the book series: Global Power Shift ((GLOBAL))

Abstract

As the B-52 bomber and the ICBM were the symbols of the Cold War, the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) is often prensented as an icon of military power at the beginning of the 21st Century. It epitomises a new way to wage war, as current operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan have put the spotlight on UAVs. Although largerly used by military forces – mainly U.S. and Israeli – since the Vietnam War, UAV acquired this renewed status very rapidly in the last decade, and is henceforth considered as a key asset for military and political leaders, a “force multiplier” and a deciding factor for a military, if not political, victory on the ground.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The most appropriate expression would be “drone system”: the term UAV is currently changing into “Unmanned Air System” (UAS) as drones have initially been mainly air vehicles, but new systems are being developed as ground or naval vehicles. Furthermore, the core value for an UAS/V is increasingly the payload and less the platform. The term “drone”, UAV or UAS used in this study will have the same acceptance, as this study will focus mainly on air vehicles: a precision will be used if the more exact term of the flying machine is employed – be it the platform itself or the onboard systems.

  2. 2.

    C4I stands for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence.

  3. 3.

    A term used by the US Armed Forces, which stands for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance.

  4. 4.

    IED: Improvised Explosive Device.

  5. 5.

    Radar detection of moving targets (Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)/Ground Moving Targets Indication (GMTI)), infrared video, coupled with a satellite link for real time transmission of images, laser designator, etc.

  6. 6.

    A propos the closely relation between Air Power and American strategic culture, see Cohen 1994.

  7. 7.

    On the 1991 Gulf War Air operations and their assessment, see Keeney and Cohen 1993.

  8. 8.

    During the First Gulf War, ca. 17,000 Precision Guided-Munitions were used in action, of which 9,342 were Laser-guided versions. By comparison, approximately 210,000 unguided bombs were dropped in the same war (Keeney and Cohen 1993: 226). Of the coalition forces’ total weapons expenditures (guided bombs, antiradiation missiles, and air-to-surface missiles), US expenditures amounted from 89% to 99% (Keeney and Cohen 1993: 203).

  9. 9.

    This problem may be solved by using UAVs in networks: one UAV allows to maintain the liaison with others drones.

  10. 10.

    Conference on “MALE drones: challenges and European perspectives”, 7 April 2010 at Ifri Paris. See also Drew 2010.

  11. 11.

    UAVs accounted to 70% of mobilised aircraft during Operation “Cast Lead”, and were responsible for one third of air mission realized by Tzahal (see Vandewalle and Viollet 2009: 27).

  12. 12.

    This enables drone operators to know the habits of the inhabitants, and to distinguish a “normal” behavior of a civilian inhabitant from the behavior of an insurgent. This quality is particularly useful in the context of “war among the people” and COIN operations. Drones are also useful tools against Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) as they watch the roads that are used by allied forces in Afghanistan.

  13. 13.

    According to this report, the US Air Force plans to purchase 288 Reapers (48 per year from 2011 through 2016) and 28 Global Hawks from 2011 through 2018. In 2002, the US Army had only three deployed systems, over 200 in 2005 and has roughly 490 medium-sized unmanned aircraft in its inventory in 2011. Through 2016, the US Army plans to purchase 20 Shadows to replace losses, upgrade the existing Shadows, and purchase 107 more of the medium-altitude Grey Eagles.

    The US Navy plans to purchase 36 BAMS aircraft at a cost of about $9.4 billion by 2020 (a Global Hawk warrant optimized for naval operations) and 61 MQ-8B Firescout unmanned helicopters, and, through 2026, the Navy’s plans call for purchasing a total of 65 BAMS and 168 Firescout.

  14. 14.

    For the time being, UAVs cannot compete with manned aircraft: Seven Georgian drones were reportedly shot down by Russian fighter aircrafts in April and May 2008. This shows that UAVs are not appropriate if air dominance is not achieved (see International Institute for Strategic Studies 2009, Boutherin 2010: 17–18).

  15. 15.

    This may include reconnaissance, signals intelligence, mine detection and counter-measures, precision target location and designation, battle management, chemical/biological reconnaissance, counter cam/con/deception, electronic warfare, Combat Search and Rescue (SAR), communications/data relay, information warfare, digital mapping, littoral undersea warfare, SOF team resupply, weaponization/strike, act as GPS pseudolites or insert covert sensors.

  16. 16.

    With regards to arms procurements this also poses a problem of independence for those close allies, which (like France) have an own aeronautic industry and want to keep a relative autonomy for the procurement of equipments for own armed forces.

  17. 17.

    The MTCR is an informal and voluntary political agreement among 33 countries to control the proliferation of unmanned rocket and aerodynamic systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (see U.S. Department of Defense 2009: 39).

  18. 18.

    Considering only MALE UAVs and UCAVs in Europe: Dassault, partnered with Saab and other European manufacturers, is developing a UCAV demonstrator called Neuron and is also looking to position itself in the MALE drones market with the SDM (System of MALE drone): the sensor was developed in cooperation with Thales and Indra, on a Heron platform offered by IAI. BAE Systems has its own MALE drone programme Mantis and is now beginning to develop a Franco-British MALE UAV on this basis. Finmeccanica is developing an Italian drone Molynx. EADS is developing the “Advanced UAV” drone Talarion, working with Thales and Indra for the on-board radar; this drone has been the subject of a €60 million risk assessment study financed in tripartite by Germany, France and Spain.

  19. 19.

    See notably Center for Strategic and International Studies 2009.

  20. 20.

    The integration of drones into air space presupposes the development of powerful artificial intelligence capacities, in particular for the “sense and avoid” “systems” intended to avoid in flight collisions. Such systems are currently on the agenda of the European Defense Agency.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri), Paris, France

    Dr. Louis-Marie Clouet (Research Fellow)

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  1. Dr. Louis-Marie Clouet
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Global Studies, Institute for Political Science, Bonn University, Walter-Flex Str. 3, Bonn, 53113, Germany

    Enrico Fels

  2. Center for Global Studies, Institute for Political Science, Bonn University, Walter-Flex Str. 3, Bonn, 53113, Germany

    Jan-Frederik Kremer

  3. Center for Global Studies, Institute for Political Science, Bonn University, Walter-Flex Str. 3, Bonn, 53113, Germany

    Katharina Kronenberg

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Clouet, LM. (2012). Drones as Future Air Power Assets: The Dawn of Aviation 2.0?. In: Fels, E., Kremer, JF., Kronenberg, K. (eds) Power in the 21st Century. Global Power Shift. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25082-8_10

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