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Practical Remote End-to-End Voting Scheme

  • Conference paper
Electronic Government and the Information Systems Perspective (EGOVIS 2011)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 6866))

Abstract

Recently, remote voting systems have gained popularity and have been used for government elections and referendums in the United Kingdom, Estonia and Switzerland as well as municipal elections in Canada and party primary elections in the United States and France. Current remote voting schemes assume either the voter’s personal computer is trusted or the voter is not physically coerced. In this paper, we present a remote end-to-end voting scheme, in which the voter’s choice remains secret even if the voter’s personal computer is infected by malware or the voter is physically controlled by the adversary. In particular, our scheme can achieve absolute verifiability even if all election authorities are corrupt. Based on homomorphic encryption, the overhead for tallying in our scheme is linear in the number of candidates. Thus, our scheme is practical for elections at a large scale, such as general elections.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Engineering and Science, Victoria University, Melbourne, VIC, 8001, Australia

    Xun Yi

  2. Department of Risk Engineering, University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba, Ibaraki, 305-8573, Japan

    Eiji Okamoto

Authors
  1. Xun Yi
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  2. Eiji Okamoto
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Applied ICT (CAICT) and Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Howitzvej 60, 2000, Frederiksberg, Denmark

    Kim Normann Andersen

  2. Institute of Legal Information, Theory and Techniques, ITTIG-CNR, Italian National Reserach Council, Via de’ Barucci 20, 50127, Florence, Italy

    Enrico Francesconi

  3. ESI/Informatics, Örebro University, 701 82, Örebro, Sweden

    Åke Grönlund

  4. Faculty of Law, Leibniz Center for Law, University of Amsterdam, Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1000BA, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Tom M. van Engers

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Yi, X., Okamoto, E. (2011). Practical Remote End-to-End Voting Scheme. In: Andersen, K.N., Francesconi, E., Grönlund, Å., van Engers, T.M. (eds) Electronic Government and the Information Systems Perspective. EGOVIS 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6866. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22961-9_30

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22961-9_30

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-22960-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-22961-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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