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Some Ideas on Virtualized System Security, and Monitors

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Book cover Data Privacy Management and Autonomous Spontaneous Security (DPM 2010, SETOP 2010)

Abstract

Virtualized systems such as Xen, VirtualBox, VMWare or QEmu have been proposed to increase the level of security achievable on personal computers. On the other hand, such virtualized systems are now targets for attacks. We propose an intrusion detection architecture for virtualized systems, and discuss some of the security issues that arise. We argue that a weak spot of such systems is domain zero administration, which is left entirely under the administrator’s responsibility, and is in particular vulnerable to trojans. To avert some of the risks, we propose to install a role-based access control model with possible role delegation, and to describe all undesired activity flows through simple temporal formulas. We show how the latter are compiled into Orchids rules, via a fragment of linear temporal logic, through a generalization of the so-called history variable mechanism.

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Benzina, H., Goubault-Larrecq, J. (2011). Some Ideas on Virtualized System Security, and Monitors. In: Garcia-Alfaro, J., Navarro-Arribas, G., Cavalli, A., Leneutre, J. (eds) Data Privacy Management and Autonomous Spontaneous Security. DPM SETOP 2010 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6514. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19348-4_18

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19348-4_18

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-19347-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-19348-4

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