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Fully Secure Threshold Unsigncryption

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Provable Security (ProvSec 2010)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 6402))

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Abstract

Signcryption is a very studied primitive in cryptography, which simultaneously performs the functionalities of encryption and signature, in a more efficient way than encrypting and signing separately. The variant of signcryption where the unsigncryption power is distributed among a group of users, through a (t,n) threshold process, has received very few attention (maybe surprisingly).

In this work we consider this task of threshold unsigncryption. First we describe the (strong) security requirements that such a protocol should satisfy: existential unforgeability and indistinguishability, under insider chosen message/ciphertext attacks, in a multi-user setting. We then show that the existing threshold unsigncryption protocols in the literature (including generic constructions obtained by composing a signature scheme and a threshold decryption scheme) do not achieve this strong level of full security. Finally, we propose a new protocol for threshold unsigncryption, which we prove to be fully secure -as described above- in the random oracle model.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. Matemàtica Aplicada IV, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, C. Jordi Girona 1-3, Mòdul C3, 08034, Barcelona, Spain

    Javier Herranz, Alexandre Ruiz & Germán Sáez

Authors
  1. Javier Herranz
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  2. Alexandre Ruiz
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  3. Germán Sáez
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Information Science and Technology, Jalan Ayer Keroh Lama, Multimedia University, 75450, Malacca, Malaysia

    Swee-Huay Heng

  2. Department of Computer and Information Sciences, Ibaraki University, 4-12-1 Nakanarusawa, 316-8511, Hitachi, Ibaraki, Japan

    Kaoru Kurosawa

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Herranz, J., Ruiz, A., Sáez, G. (2010). Fully Secure Threshold Unsigncryption. In: Heng, SH., Kurosawa, K. (eds) Provable Security. ProvSec 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6402. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16280-0_18

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16280-0_18

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-16279-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-16280-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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