Abstract
In this work we present a novel timing attack against the McEliece public key cryptosystem (PKC). In contrast to former works investigating timing attacks that aim at recovering the message, we devise how to exploit a vulnerability in the Patterson algorithm that allows the attacker to gather information about the secret permutation through a timing side channel. This information can be used to dramatically reduce the cost of a brute force attack against the secret key. We also describe the results obtained from a proof of concept implementation of the attack and give an appropriate countermeasure.
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Strenzke, F. (2010). A Timing Attack against the Secret Permutation in the McEliece PKC. In: Sendrier, N. (eds) Post-Quantum Cryptography. PQCrypto 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6061. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12929-2_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12929-2_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-12928-5
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