Abstract
In this chapter we present a simple version of the extended contest where the policy is determined endogenously, not by the government, but rather by one of the contestants. To clarify the relationship between this model and the existing literature and to illustrate its significance, we present the model applying a monopoly–consumer context.
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© 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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(2007). The Social Cost of Rent Seeking when Consumer Opposition Influences Monopoly Behavior. In: Endogenous Public Policy and Contests. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74818-2_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74818-2_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-72242-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-74818-2
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