Abstract
Up to now we have only considered the merits of various solutions. We have not explicitly asked how the players may arrive at (a point of) a particular solution of a given game. One possibility is that the players meet and discuss which solution to adopt. If a single-valued solution is chosen, then it is implemented. However, if a multi-valued solution is adopted, then an additional round of negotiation is necessary in order to completely determine the final payoff distribution.
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© 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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(2007). Dynamic Bargaining Procedures for the Kernel and the Bargaining Set. In: Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games. Theory and Decision Library, vol 34. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72945-7_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72945-7_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-72944-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-72945-7
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