Abstract
We consider the problem of secure communication in a network with malicious (Byzantine) faults for which the trust graph, with vertices the processors and edges corresponding to certified public keys, is not known except possibly to the adversary. This scenario occurs in several models, as for example in survivability models in which the certifying authorities may be corrupted, or in networks which are being constructed in a decentralized way. We present a protocol that allows secure communication in this case, provided the trust graph is sufficiently connected.
Research supported by DARPA F30602-97-1-0205. However the views and conclusions contained in this paper are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of the Defense Advance Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Air Force, of the US Government.
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Burmester, M., Desmedt, Y. (1999). Secure Communication in an Unknown Network Using Certificates. In: Lam, KY., Okamoto, E., Xing, C. (eds) Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT’99. ASIACRYPT 1999. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1716. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-48000-6_22
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-48000-6_22
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