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Smart Grid Security: Attacks and Defenses

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Smart Grid Control

Part of the book series: Power Electronics and Power Systems ((PEPS))

Abstract

Electric grids in the future will be highly integrated with information and communications technology. The increase in use the of information technology is expected to enhance reliability, efficiency, and sustainability of the future electric grid through the implementation of sophisticated monitoring and control strategies. However, it also comes at a price that the grid becomes more vulnerable to cyber-intrusions which may damage the physical system. This chapter provides an overview of cyberattacks on power systems from a system theoretical perspective by focusing on the tight coupling between the physical system and the communication network. It is demonstrated via several attack scenarios how the adversary may cause significant impacts on the power system by intercepting the communication channel and without possibly being detected. The attack strategies and the corresponding countermeasures are formulated and analyzed using tools from optimization, dynamical systems, and control theory.

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Acknowledgements

This work is supported in part by U.S. Department of Transportation (award DTRT13GUTC51), by U.S. National Science Foundation (grant ECCS-1308928), by U.S. Department of Energy (awards DE-EE0006340 and DE-EE0007327), by L-3 Communication Coleman Aerospace (contract 11013I2034), by Texas Instruments’ awards, and by Leidos (contract P010161530).

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Gusrialdi, A., Qu, Z. (2019). Smart Grid Security: Attacks and Defenses. In: Stoustrup, J., Annaswamy, A., Chakrabortty, A., Qu, Z. (eds) Smart Grid Control. Power Electronics and Power Systems. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98310-3_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98310-3_13

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