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Voluntary Delisting and Agency Costs: The Case of the London Stock Exchange

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The Decision to Delist from the Stock Market

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Abstract

This chapter analyzes the link between delisting operations and agency costs by using a sample of non-financial firms which voluntarily delisted from the London Stock Exchange main market between 2010 and 2016. This chapter also explains the level and variability of ROA and the ratio between free cash flow and total assets as a proxy for agency costs through leverage and market-to-book ratio as proxies for market access, intangible assets on total assets as proxy for asymmetric information, and the company’s listing age.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Business Studies, Roma Tre University, Rome, Italy

    Alberto Pezzi

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  1. Alberto Pezzi
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Pezzi, A. (2018). Voluntary Delisting and Agency Costs: The Case of the London Stock Exchange. In: The Decision to Delist from the Stock Market. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95049-5_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95049-5_4

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  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-95048-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-95049-5

  • eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)

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