Abstract
Russell characterizes The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [PLA] as “very largely concerned with explaining certain ideas which I learnt from … Ludwig Wittgenstein” (PLA, Collected Papers 8, 160, see also 182). However, at least one theme in PLA reflects views he held prior to Wittgenstein’s influence and sharply differentiates his position from Wittgenstein’s in the Tractatus—namely, his understanding of Occam’s Razor, which in his final PLA lecture Russell claims “embodie[s]” a “purpose which runs through all that I have been saying” (PLA, 235). For Russell, Occam’s Razor enables us to avoid assuming “metaphysical entities” without positively denying that there are such entities (see PLA, 237, 243), so that “we shall leave the bare possibility open” (OKEW, 147) that there are such “metaphysical entities”. For Wittgenstein, the “point” of Occam’s maxim is that “unnecessary units in a sign-language mean nothing” (TLP, 5.47321, 3.328), in which case what Russell regards as expressing a genuine if “bare” possibility is meaningless. I argue, first, that Russell’s understanding of Occam’s Razor, which derives from his philosophy of mathematics, depends both on his view of analysis as involving a movement “from the vague to the precise” (PLA, 162) and on his view of quantification, according to which we can quantify over entities with which we are not acquainted; second, the early Wittgenstein rejects both these views and is thereby committed to rejecting Russell’s interpretation of Occam’s razor; and, third, that in his later philosophy, Wittgenstein moves in the direction of Russell with regard to both views.
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Notes
- 1.
In January 1915, Wittgenstein wrote to Keynes: “I’m very interested to hear that Russell has published a book [Our Knowledge of the External World] lately. Could you possibly send it to me and let me pay you after the war? I’d so much like to see it” (Wittgenstein 1995: 79). The entry in the Notebooks on Occam’s razor occurs on a day (April 23, 1915) in which Wittgenstein is commenting on other topics that arise in Our Knowledge of the External World, including the “law of conservation”, and principles of “sufficient reason” and “of continuity in nature”. See (OKEW: 105 (on conservation), and 108–9, 147–50 (on continuity and sufficient reason)); in Our Knowledge of the External World, Russell mentions Occam’s razor twice (OKEW: 107, 146).). On May 1, Wittgenstein makes other remarks apparently stimulated by discussions in Our Knowledge of the External World of skepticism (compare (OKEW: 67)), of the distinction between hard and soft data (compare (OKEW: 70ff)), and of the “scientific method in philosophy” (a theme throughout Our Knowledge of the External World).
- 2.
See Sect. 2.2 below (including note 13) for some discussion of what Wittgenstein means here by an “unnecessary units of a sign-language”.
- 3.
In my (Levine 2016: 168–72), I defend attributing these views to the Moorean Russell.
- 4.
Although on his Principles view, as opposed to the relative theory of number he describes in his Moorean period, similarity is not indefinable but is rather defined in terms of one–to–one correspondence. However, the central point is that Russell has reversed the order of definitional (and metaphysical) priority that he accepted during his Moorean period.
- 5.
In Principles, what is “paradoxical” is counterintuitive; what is now called “Russell’s paradox,” he there regards as a “contradiction” (see PoM: Chap. X).
- 6.
Similarly, in Principia Mathematica, in presenting his interpretation of sentences using class symbols, according to which such symbols do not stand for entities that are classes, Russell does not “assert dogmatically that there are no such things as classes” but only takes himself to have shown that his interpretation of such sentences “yield[s] all the proposition for the sake of which classes might be thought essential” (PM2 Vol. 1: 72; see also IMP: 184). However, as Richard Fumerton pointed out in discussion at the workshop, Russell is not always so “undogmatic” in rejecting various metaphysical views, as, for example, when he criticizes Meinong for a “failure of [a] feeling for reality” in maintaining that there are “unreal objects” designated by such phrases as “the round square” or “the golden mountain” (see IMP: 169–70). While the point merits further discussion, one reason for Russell’s view of Meinong’s view may be that in “On Denoting”, Russell argues that Meinong’s view leads to “intolerable” violations of “the law of contradiction” (OD: 418).
- 7.
Thus, in 1910, Sheffer records Russell as saying (Sheffer 1910):
Perhaps all couples have a predicate, and all trios have another predicate. But: 1) We don’t know this, 2) Calling numbers “classes” fulfills the same for properties of cardinal numbers. Therefore, by Occam’s razor, disregard the philosophical predicates and call numbers “classes of classes”.
Sheffer’s notes are in the Bertrand Russell Archives: I thank the Bertrand Russell Archives in the William Ready Division of Research Collections, McMaster University Library, for permission to use unpublished materials.
Similarly, in 1911, Moore records Russell as indicating generally that by Occam’s razor “entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity” but also that “[y]ou oughtn’t to assert dogmatically that there aren’t those entities” and, more specifically, cites Occam’s razor in justifying his definitions of the cardinal numbers, which “[g]ive [an] interpretation to symbols, which will be true, and which involves [the] least possible assumption” (Moore 1911–1912). The originals of Moore’s notes are in Cambridge University, MS. Add. 8875. I thank the Estate of G. E. Moore for permission to quote from them.
- 8.
In his contribution to this volume, Klement argues that Russell accepts a substitutional theory of quantification, albeit one in which the substitution-instances are sentences in an “ideal language”, which contains a name for each simple object, and hence contains names (and sentences) which a given speaker cannot understand (and moreover, if there are “metaphysical” entities with which no human can be acquainted, it will contain names (and sentences) with which no human can understand). I think it implausible that this is Russell’s considered view of quantification. Thus, while Klement emphasizes that in the logical atomism lectures Russell writes that “a logically perfect language” will have one and only one a name for “every simple object” (PLA: 176), in that same passage, Russell writes that “[a] logically perfect language … would be very largely private to one speaker”, since “all the names that it would use would be private to that speaker and could not enter into the language of another speaker” (PLA: 176). This suggests, that for Russell, there are different “logically perfect” languages for different speakers, that a logically perfect language for a given speaker will only contain names with which that speaker is acquainted, in which case (in the absence of any omniscient speakers), there is no one “logical perfect” language containing a name for absolutely each simple object that provides the basis for our understanding of quantification. However, even on the substitutional theory that Klement attributes to Russell, I can quantify over simple entities with which I am not acquainted (given that the “ideal language” contains names for simples with which I am not acquainted); and that is the central point here. For the remainder of the chapter, in denying that Russell accepts a “substitutional” theory of quantification, I am denying that he accepts the view (which I take to be the standard understanding of a “substitutional” theory of quantification) that an existential quantification will be true in a given language that a speaker understands if it has a true substitution-instance in that language.
- 9.
See Levine (2016: 195–201); see also Levine (2018: 139–141) for discussion of this change in Russell’s philosophy.
- 10.
In attributing the Moorean view of analysis to the early Wittgenstein, I am not thereby attributing to him all aspects of Moore’s (or Russell’s Moorean) view of analysis, such as that every word has as its meaning an entity, simple or complex. Rather, I am only attributing to him the view that analysis makes explicit the meaning that a sentence has prior to analysis, the meaning that we must already, in some sense, be aware of prior to the analysis.
- 11.
See, for example, TLP2: 4.243, 6.232, and 6.2322, where Wittgenstein indicates, with Russell but as against Frege , that there can be no informative identity sentence (where two names flank the identity sign), since anyone understanding those names will kennen their meaning. For a fuller defense of the view that Wittgenstein agrees with Russell that understanding a sentence containing a name requires being acquainted with (kennen) the meaning of that name—while also differing significantly with Russell regarding what acquaintance with an object designated by a name requires—see Levine (2013: §3.1).
- 12.
I defend this claim in my (2013: §3.3).
- 13.
In indicating in TLP2: 5.47321 that the “the point” of Occam’s razor is that “unnecessary units in a sign-language mean nothing”, Wittgenstein is indicating that if, in a given sentence, a “unit in a sign-language” contributes nothing to the sense of that sentence (and so is unnecessary for the expression of that sense by that sentence), then that “unit” in the sign-language is meaningless. Thus, even though a logical connective, such as “⊃” may be defined in terms of other connectives, and thus may be regarded as dispensable in a logical notation, in given sentences it contributes to the expression of sense by those sentences and so is not to be regarded as meaningless by Occam’s razor, as Wittgenstein construes it.
- 14.
Ramsey seems not to be referring here to Russell’s 1924 essay “Logical Atomism” in which there is no discussion of metaphysical entities.
- 15.
In particular, he suggests that, if “metaphysical entities” are different “in type” than those given in experience, we would be unable to quantify over them by means of the variables we can use, in which case it would be “nonsense” to suppose that there are such entities.
- 16.
See in this context Wittgenstein (2005: §107), entitled “Color, Experience, etc., as Formal Concepts”.
- 17.
In my (2013: §3.4), I discuss Wittgenstein’s view of “the truth of solipsism”. In particular, I argue that given his view of quantification, Wittgenstein cannot hold that it makes sense to suppose that there are objects with which he is not acquainted; but I argue as well that he does not thereby hold that he is acquainted with all the objects there are. Nor, I argue, does he hold that while he cannot say that he is acquainted with all the objects there are, that is nevertheless shown. Rather, I argue that, for Wittgenstein, while he is shown the objects he is given, nothing can be said or shown as to whether they are all the objects that there are.
- 18.
For number and object as formal concepts, see TLP2: 4.12721. That Wittgenstein regards proposition as a formal concept follows from 4.1271 (“Every variable is a sign for a formal concept”) and TLP2: 4.53 (“The general propositional form is a variable”).
- 19.
Russell’s remarks here reflect changes that occur in his views after 1918 (to which I allude in note 9). For some discussion as to how these changes are the product of Russell’s application of his post-Peano method of analysis to issues in the philosophy of mind, see my (2018).
- 20.
Thanks to the participants at the Iowa Seminar on The Philosophy of Logical Atomism for helpful comments.
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Appendix: Ramsey’s (and Russell’s) and Wittgenstein’s Changing Views of Analysis
Appendix: Ramsey’s (and Russell’s) and Wittgenstein’s Changing Views of Analysis
In the early 1920s, Ramsey followed the early Wittgenstein in accepting a Moorean conception of analysis (that he criticizes Russell for failing to recognize Wittgenstein accepted); however, by the late 1920s Ramsey accepts a view of analysis very close to (and plausibly influenced by) that of the post-Peano Russell. Moreover, it is plausible that Ramsey not only played a role in influencing Wittgenstein to reject his earlier Moorean view of analysis but also provided the model of analysis against which Wittgenstein reacts when he denies that in analysis we are “moving towards a particular state, a state of complete exactness” (Wittgenstein 1953: §91).
At the outset of Ramsey’s essay “Philosophy”, written in 1929 (the last full year of his life), he writes (Ramsey 1929: 263–4):
I do not think it is necessary to say with Moore that the definitions explain what we have hitherto meant by our propositions, but rather that they show how we intend to use them in future. … [P]hilosophy should clarify and distinguish notions previously vague and confused, and clearly this is meant to fix our future meaning only. … I used to worry myself about the nature of philosophy through excessive scholasticism. I could not see how we could understand a word and not be able to recognize whether a proposed definition of it was or was not correct. I did not realize the vagueness of the whole idea of understanding…
In the final paragraph, he adds (Ramsey 1929: 269):
The chief danger to our philosophy, apart from laziness and woolliness, is scholasticism, the essence of which is treating what is vague as if it were precise and trying to fit it into an exact logical category. A typical case of scholasticism is Wittgenstein’s view that all our everyday propositions are completely in order …
Thus, Ramsey indicates that while he once accepted the Moorean conception of analysis, he now regards it as a form of scholasticism; further, he attributes that conception of analysis to Wittgenstein; and he advocates a view of analysis according to which we replace “notions previously vague and confused” by ones that are exact or precise. That is to say, these comments indicate that Ramsey has changed his view of analysis in the same sort of way that Russell had done almost three decades earlier, when he abandoned the Moorean view of analysis that was central to his rejection of Idealism in favor of the style of analysis he presents in his post-Peano philosophy of mathematics.
Moreover, it is plausible that Ramsey was led to reject the scholastic Moorean conception of analysis at least in part as a result of the influence of Russell. Ramsey ends his 1927 paper “Facts and Propositions” by writing that “[e]verything that I have said [in the paper] is due to [Wittgenstein], except the parts which have a pragmatist tendency”, adding that “[m]y pragmatism is derived from Russell” and that “the essence of pragmatism I take to be this, that the meaning of a sentence is to be defined by reference to the actions to which asserting it would lead, or, more vaguely still, to its possible causes and effects” (Ramsey 1927: 170). In that paper, Ramsey cites Russell’s 1921 book The Analysis of Mind; and there Russell writes that “[t]he relation of a word to its meaning is of the nature of a causal law governing our use of the word and our actions when we hear it used” (AMi: 198); that “a person understands a word when (a) suitable circumstances make him use it, (b) the hearing of it causes suitable behavior in him” (AMi, 197); and that “the meaning of a word is not absolutely definite: there is always a greater or lesser degree of vagueness” (AMi, 197–8).Footnote 19 And remarks such as these license the view that analysis in the style of Moore (and the early Wittgenstein) is “scholastic”.
Further, it seems clear that Ramsey’s critique of “scholasticism” had an impact on Wittgenstein. Thus, for example, in 1941, Wittgenstein writes (quoted in Misak 2016: 247):
Ramsey was right in saying that in philosophy one should be neither ‘woolly’ nor scholastic. But yet I don’t believe that he has seen how this should be done; for the solution is not: being scientific.
(In this connection see also Wittgenstein 1953: §81). While the later Wittgenstein follows Ramsey (and Russell) in rejecting the “scholastic” Moorean conception of analysis and in accepting a form of analysis that can involve a movement from the “vague” or “inexact” to the more precise, he does not follow Ramsey (or Russell) in accepting a single ideal of precision or a conception of analysis in the service of “scientific philosophizing”. That is, while Wittgenstein’s view of analysis moves away from the Moorean conception of analysis in a direction similar, in certain respects, to Russell’s, he does not accept Russell’s (or Ramsey’s) conception of how analysis involves a movement from “the vague to the precise”—and hence does not accept the conception of analysis that provides the context for Russell’s understanding of Occam’s razor.Footnote 20
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Levine, J. (2018). Russell and Wittgenstein on Occam’s Razor. In: Elkind, L., Landini, G. (eds) The Philosophy of Logical Atomism. History of Analytic Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94364-0_14
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