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Direct and Indirect Effects of Job Complexity of Senior Managers on Their Compensation and Operating Performances

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Innovative Mobile and Internet Services in Ubiquitous Computing (IMIS 2018)

Part of the book series: Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing ((AISC,volume 773))

Abstract

This paper explores the relationship among the job complexity of senior managers on their compensation and operating performances. The job complexity of senior managers is measured with proxy variables associated with operating activities. Simultaneous equations are then constructed to validate the endogenous relationships among these three factors. The empirical study indicates that the job complexity of senior managers is relevant to the improvement of operating performances and the level of executive compensation. This finding should serve as a reference for the information and electronics industry in the planning of executive compensation programs in order to enhance operating performances.

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Acknowledgments

This research was supported by Ministry of Science and Technology of the Republic of China under contract MOST 106-2813-C-468-077-H.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Finance, Asia University, 500, Lioufeng Rd., Wufeng, Taichung, 41354, Taiwan

    Ying-Li Lin & Yi-Jing Chen

Authors
  1. Ying-Li Lin
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  2. Yi-Jing Chen
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Ying-Li Lin .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Information and Communication Engineering, Fukuoka Institute of Technology, Fukuoka, Japan

    Leonard Barolli

  2. Technical University of Catalonia, Barcelona, Spain

    Fatos Xhafa

  3. Department of Computer Science, COMSATS Institute of Information Technology, Islamabad, Pakistan

    Nadeem Javaid

  4. Rissho University, Tokyo, Japan

    Tomoya Enokido

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Lin, YL., Chen, YJ. (2019). Direct and Indirect Effects of Job Complexity of Senior Managers on Their Compensation and Operating Performances. In: Barolli, L., Xhafa, F., Javaid, N., Enokido, T. (eds) Innovative Mobile and Internet Services in Ubiquitous Computing. IMIS 2018. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 773. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93554-6_81

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