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Brazil and the United States during World War II and Its Aftermath

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Abstract

The American military was considerably preoccupied with the security of Northeast Brazil when the war began in 1939. The region was not sufficiently garrisoned and Brazil did not have arms and equipment to place new units there. The Americans pursued various subterfuges to get their troops into the area, but the Brazilians were uncertain that they would leave when the danger passed. The chapter follows the often twisted path of negotiations. The American planners developed elaborate ideas, proposals, and even invasions to secure the region. Such plans could not be put into effect because of the lack of troops, shipping, and extra equipment. The effort led to the rise and fall of the American Military Attaché and Mission Chief L. Miller who went from being a friend of the Brazilian leaders to being declared persona non grata. The chapter discusses the secret role of Pan American Airways and its Brazilian subsidiary Panair do Brasil, under US Army contract, to obtain land and develop a string of air bases that connected north to Florida and east to Africa, which made the air force’s transport system possible.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Ambassador Caffery to Sumner Welles, Rio, June 10, 1940, 832.20/203-1/3, RG 59, NARA. Caffery reported that afternoon Góes and Miller had talked.

  2. 2.

    Eurico Dutra to Getúlio Vargas, Rio, August 29, 1940, Mensagem No. 40-12, in Mauro Renault Leite and Luiz Gonzaga Novelli Jr., eds., Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O dever da Verdade, pp. 402–404.

    The Brazilian generals were putting constant pressure on the British military attaché, Col. Parry-Jones, and his American counterpart Col. Edwin L. Sibert to get the arms on order or stopped by the British allowed through the blockade. Col. Sibert reported that the generals may have had financial as well as patriotic reasons behind their insistence. Supposedly 10% of the total purchase price, or about $4 million dollars, was to go to a select group of officers. Naturally, that made “these officers interested in the continuance of the contract even above any patriotic consideration.” Whether this was true or merely rumor is unknown, but it is an interesting sidelight. Col. Edwin L. Sibert, Rio de Janeiro, Military Attaché, Report: comments on Current Events, Jan. 31, 1941, MID, War Dept. General Staff, 2052-120, RG165, NARA. I am using the rank that Sibert held when he wrote the dispatch.

  3. 3.

    Caffery, Rio, July 8, 1940, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940, p. 608; Caffery, Rio, July 16, 1940, ibid., pp. 49–50.

  4. 4.

    Division of American Republics, Department of State, July 1, 1940: “Attitude of Brazilian Chief of Staff Góes Monteiro and Federal Interventor Cordeiro de Farias towards Nazis,” G-2 Regional File Brazil, 5900–5935, RG 165, NARA. American government officials made statements like this without offering proof that such interpretations had validity.

  5. 5.

    Góes Monteiro to Dutra, Bases de Convenção com os EUA (Basis of Agreement w/ USA), Rio de Janeiro, Sept. 11, 1941, Ofício Secreto 284 e Anexo, p. 1, 2, & 4. Góes Monteiro Archive (or Acervo), Arquivo Historico do Exército, Rio de Janeiro as in Giovanni Latfalla, “O Estado-Maior do Exército e as Negociações Militares Brasil-Estados Unidos Entre os Anos de 1938 e 1942.” Caminhos da História (Vassouras), (Jul.–Dez. 2010), Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 65–66. This document was written in preparation for Góes’s trip to Washington in October 1941.

  6. 6.

    Góes Monteiro to Getúlio Vargas, Rio, July 26, 1940, Relatório do Estado-Maior do Exército, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC.

  7. 7.

    Carlos Martins Pereira e Sousa (Brazilian ambassador to the US) to Getúlio Vargas, Washington, September 24, 1940, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC.

  8. 8.

    Frederick B. Pike, FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy: Sixty Years of Generally Gentle Chaos (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995), pp. 247–250. Stetson Conn & Byron Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1960), pp. 48–56 (hereafter cited as Conn & Fairchild, Framework).

  9. 9.

    Conn & Fairchild, Framework, pp. 49–50.

  10. 10.

    These studies give a vivid portrait of life and organization of those cities in 1940–1941. The ones on Rio de Janeiro and Belém, Pará, were typical: War Department, “Survey of Rio de Janeiro Region of Brazil,” Vol. 1 – Text, Military Intelligence Division (MID), August 6, 1942, S30-772, and “Survey of the Pará Region of Brazil,” Vol. 1 – Text, MID, June 6, 1941, S30-770, RG 165, NARA. Lt. Col. Archibald King (WPD, Judge Advocate General) to Asst. Ch. of Staff –G2, Washington, August 15, 1940, 2052-121, MID, General Staff (GS), War Dept. RG165, NARA. Lt. A. R. Harris (Liaison Branch) to Military Attaché (Rio), Washington, March 25, 1941: “Priority for Strategic Surveys” 2052-121, MID, GS, War Dept., RG165, NARA. For example, Col. Edwin L. Sibert (Military Attaché), Rio, May 3, 1941 Rpt.2704: “Narrative of a Trip by the MA Across Bahia and Piauhy [sic] during early March, 1941” 2052-121, MID, GS, War Dept. RG 165, NARA. That American officers were allowed to make such trips was an indication of Brazilian cooperation.

  11. 11.

    Lt. Col. Lehman W. Miller to Chief of General Staff, Brazilian Army, Rio, September 19, 1940, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC.

  12. 12.

    Thomas D. White went to Brazil in April 1940 as the air attaché and then became chief of the military air mission. After Brazil he served on the general staff as one of its Brazil specialists. He was promoted to four-star general in 1953 and chief of Air Force Staff from 1957 to 1961.

  13. 13.

    Caffery, Rio, September 6, 1940 #3538, 832.20/224 ½, RG 59, NARA.

  14. 14.

    Caffery, Rio, September 23, 1940, Telegram 476, 711.32/91, RG59, NARA.

  15. 15.

    Ciro de Freitas Vale to Getúlio Vargas, Berlin, October 23, 1940, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC. The ambassador’s choice of words showed the typical attitude of Brazilians toward Spanish speakers by referring to them as “Castelhanos,” Castilians, as in people of Castile, Portugal’s ancient enemy.

  16. 16.

    “War Department – Pan American Aviation Contract for Latin American Aviation Facilities,” November 2, 1940, WPD 4113-3, World War II RS, NARA. For an interesting discussion of the development of Pan American, see Rosalie Schwartz, Flying Down to Rio: Hollywood, Tourists, and Yankee Clippers (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2004), pp. 221–257.

  17. 17.

    Memo, Chief of Staff for Secretary of War, Washington, September 7, 1940, as quoted in Conn & Fairchild, Framework, p. 252.

  18. 18.

    F.P. Powers (Panair business manager) to Evan Young (responsible for PAA’s foreign relations), Rio de Janeiro, December 18, 1940, “ADP,” Cauby C. Araújo Papers; author’s interview with Cauby C. Araújo, Rio de Janeiro, October 4, 1965. Presumably a copy should be in the PAA archives at the University of Miami.

  19. 19.

    The foregoing came from my interview with Cauby C. Araújo, October 4, 1965. Vargas appointed Joaquim Pedro Salgado Filho as the Minister of Aeronautics in late January 1941. Góes Monteiro regarded this appointment as Getúlio’s way to weakening the influence of the armed forces. There is a fascinating collection of news clippings attached to A.W. Childs, “New Air Ministry,” January 22, 1941, 832.00/1332, RG 59, NARA.

  20. 20.

    Petition to Minister of Transportation and Public Works, January 20, 1941, “Requerimento 30/31” and “Requerimento 28/41 ao Presidente, Conselho Superior de Segurança Nacional,” January 20, 1941, both in “ADP,” Araújo Papers. Unfortunately this private collection is now apparently missing.

  21. 21.

    Prior to the cabinet meeting, Vargas had asked Aranha to sign the decree below his own signature, but at the meeting Aranha saw that the president’s name had disappeared. Aranha took out a photostat of the original showing his signature and forcefully told him that he would not stand alone before the army as the supporter of the United States. Vargas signed the document again and the cabinet approved it as Decree-Law 3462 (July 25, 1941). It appeared in the Diário Oficial on July 26, 1941. The story about the signatures was told to me by the foreign minister’s son Euclydes Aranha in Rio de Janeiro on November 15, 1965. Oddly the only reference in Vargas diary to a cabinet meeting at that time in July was on July 26. Vargas, Diário, 1937–1942 Vol. II, p. 410.

  22. 22.

    “Official History South Atlantic Division Air Transport Command,” Part I, II, p. 71, US Army Center for Military History.

  23. 23.

    Vargas, Diário, 1937–1942 Vol. II, entry July 23, p. 409.

  24. 24.

    War Department, “A Survey of the Natal Region of Brazil,” May 14, 1941, I, p. 35 as in History SADATC, Part I, II, p. 72.

  25. 25.

    As quoted in General Estevão Leitão de Carvalho, A Serviço do Brasil na Segunda Guerra Mundial (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra A Noite, 1952), p. 63. The author was chief of the Brazilian delegation on the Brazil-United States Defense Commission during the war.

  26. 26.

    MG, Relatório…Dutra…1940, pp. 4–6. For a deeper analysis of Brazil’s arms situation, see my “The Brazilian Army and the Pursuit of Arms Independence, 1899–1979,” in Benjamin F. Cooling (Ed.), War, Business and World Military-Industrial Complexes (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1981), pp. 171–193.

  27. 27.

    The army did have 129,085 carbines, 8732 automatic rifles, 5738 Madison and Hotchkiss machine guns, 20 anti-aircraft machine guns, 13,986 swords, and 7797 lances. Col. Ralph C. Smith (Executive Officer, G-2, General Staff), Memo for Army War College: “Brazilian Army: Armament and Munitions on hand, Status of Training,” Nov. 3, 1941, G2 Regional Files, Brazil 6000, RG 165, NARA.

  28. 28.

    On September 20, Dutra bought Miller’s documents to Vargas, who found the questions “um tanto impertiente” (rather impertinent, insolent, or rude). The next day Vargas discussed the matter further with the ministers of war, navy, foreign affairs, and Góes; see Vargas, Diário, 1937–1942, Vol. II, p. 339 (entries Sept 20 & 21, 1940). Memorando, Col. L. Miller to Góes Monteiro, Rio de Janeiro, Sept. 19, 1940 and Report of General Staff of US Army on Military Cooperation with Brazil, Rio, Sept. 19, 1940 (translation in Portuguese of report done in Washington) in Góes Monteiro archive (or Acervo), Arquivo Histórico do Exército, Rio de Janeiro as in Giovanni Latfalla, “O Estado-Maior do Exército e as Negociações Militares Brasil-Estados Unidos Entre os Anos de 1938 e 1942.” Caminhos da História (Vassouras), vol. 6, no. 2 (Jul./Dez. 2010), pp. 61–78.

  29. 29.

    Likely Dutra was confusing Mongolia with Manchuria, which Japan had invaded in 1932 and had set up the puppet state of Manchukuo.

  30. 30.

    There is a detailed review of the arms contract with Germany and the processes of the British blockade that entrapped the arms en route to Brazil in Major Edwin L. Sibert, Rio de Janeiro, Jan. 21, 1941 Military Attaché Report: Comments on Current Events, MID, War Dept. General Staff, 2052-120, RG165, NARA.

  31. 31.

    Eurico Dutra to Getúlio Vargas, Rio, November 20, 1940, No. 58/19, in Mauro Renault Leite and Luiz Gonzaga Novelli Jr., eds., Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O dever da Verdade, pp. 404–407.

  32. 32.

    For a careful study of those bases from South America to Newfoundland, see Steven High, Base Colonies in the Western Hemisphere, 1940–1967 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

  33. 33.

    On the complicated politics leading to the passage of the Lend-Lease legislation, William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War, 1940–1941 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), pp. 252–289.

  34. 34.

    William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation: The World Crisis of 1937–1940 and American Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Row, 1952), Vol. II, p. 614.

  35. 35.

    General George C. Marshall, Memoranda by the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Under Secretary of State (Welles): Military Cooperation of Brazil, Washington, June 17, 1941, as in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. VI, (Washington: GPO, 1963), pp. 498–501. This assessment ignored the fact that the sufficient German immigrant population that could possibly provide such a fifth-column force lay thousands of miles south in Paraná, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul. How they could be assembled, trained, and transported to the Northeast does not seem to have been considered.

  36. 36.

    Darlene J. Sadlier, Americans All: Good Neighbor Cultural Diplomacy in World War II (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2012), p. xii. This is the best study of the OCIAA.

  37. 37.

    Harriet M. Brown & Helen Bailey, Our Latin American Neighbors (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1944), p. 1. Before saying that citizens of Brazil and the United States are both Americans, the authors said that the term “America” should be applied “to both the continents in the Western Hemisphere.” And so the peoples of all the hemisphere’s nations are Americans. For an excellent analysis of the Rockefeller office and its archival records, see Gisela Cramer and Ursula Prutsch, “Nelson A. Rockefeller’s Office of Inter-American Affairs (1940–1946) and Record Group 229,” Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 84, No. 4 (November 2006), pp. 785–806.

  38. 38.

    For a recent study of the translation program, see Eliza Mitiyo Morinaka, “Ficción y política en tiempos de guerra: el proyecto de traducción stadunidense para la literatura brasileña (1943–1947),” Estudos Históricos (Rio de Janeiro, setembro-dezembro 2017), Vol. 30, No 62, pp. 661–680. For an excellent study of the Rockefeller Office’s Brazilian programs see Alexandre Busko Valim, O Triunfo da Persusão: Brasil, Estados Unidos e o Cinema da Políatica de Boa Vizinhança durante a II Guerra Mundial (São Paulo: Alameda Casa Editorial, 2017).

  39. 39.

    Darlene J. Sadlier, Americans All: Good Neighbor Cultural Diplomacy in World War II (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2012), p. 75.

  40. 40.

    Darlene J. Sadlier, Brazil Imagined 1500 to the Present (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2008), pp. 215–233. The unfinished Welles film was “It’s All True”; see Catherine Benamou, It’s All True: Orson Welles Pan-American Odyssey (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). For the part of the film about the Cearense Jangadeiros, see José Henrique de Almeida Braga, Salto Sobre O Lago e a guerra chegou ao Ceará (Fortaleza: Premius Editora, 2017), pp. 147–152. For Carmen Miranda’s adventures and misadventures as a cultural go-between: Bryan McCann, Hello, Hello Brazil: Popular Music in the Making of Modern Brazil (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2004), pp. 129–150; and the excellent biography by Ruy Castro, Carmen: Uma Biografia (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2005), especially pp. 258–349. The Brazilian elite criticized her for becoming too Americanized; see Castro, pp. 244–251.

  41. 41.

    Saludos Amigos premiered in Rio de Janeiro on August 24, 1942. For an in-depth study of Disney activities, see J. B. Kaufman, South of the Border with Disney: Walt Disney and the Good Neighbor Program, 1941–1948 (New York: Disney Editions, 2009). “What Walt Disney Learned from South America” Walt & El Grupo; Documents Disney Diplomacy” NPR, September 17, 2009. https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=112916523. Disney and his artists visited Brazil, Argentina, and Chile in August–October 1941. The Disney party was swept up in admiration for Brazil’s infectious samba; see Kaufman’s South of the Border. Barroso’s 1939 Aquarela was Americanized as simply Brazil and entered the playlists of the big bands.

  42. 42.

    David J. Epstein, Agency of Fear: Opiates and Political Power in America (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1977), p. 36. The author did not provide his source, but his statement appears credible.

  43. 43.

    John Baxter, Disney During World War II: How the Walt Disney Studio Contributed to Victory in the War (New York: Disney Editions, 2014), pp. 173–174.

  44. 44.

    See, for example, Police Chief Filinto Müller to Benjamin Vargas, Caxambú, April 30, 1941, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC, Rio. He warned that Fairbanks was coming as a propaganda agent for both the United States and Britain. He met with Getúlio. For more on Fairbanks and other Hollywood people sent on missions, see Darlene J. Sadlier, Americans All: Good Neighbor Cultural Diplomacy in World War II (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2012), pp. 34–36.

  45. 45.

    Antonio Pedro Tota, O Imperialismo Sedutor, A Americanização do Brasil na Época da Segunda Guerra (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2000), p. 90.

  46. 46.

    James Reston, “Our Second Line of Defense,” The New York Times Magazine, June 29, 1941, p. 7.

  47. 47.

    McCann, The Brazilian-American Alliance, pp. 246–249. OCIAA efforts were not aimed at getting Brazil into the war, but they increased Brazilian concerns about Nazi Germany. There has been little effort to see how its programs affected local attitudes. There is useful local emphasis on Fortaleza in José Henrique de Almeida Braga, Salto Sobre O Lago e a guerra chegou ao Ceará (Fortaleza: Premius Editora, 2017), pp. 153–169. For more documentation and interpretation, see http://cpdoc.fgv.br/producao/dossies/AEraVargas1/anos37-45/AGuerraNoBrasil/TioSam.

  48. 48.

    General Amaro Soares Bittencourt to Eurico Dutra, Washington, March 2, 1941, in Mauro Renault Leite and Luiz Gonzaga Novelli Jr., eds., Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O dever da Verdade, pp. 407–409. General Amaro had been sent to handle the day-to-day details of the arms purchases. He mentioned a story in the Washington Times-Herald of Feb. 28, 1941.

  49. 49.

    The Lend-Lease Act permitted any country whose defense that the president considered vital to that of the United States to receive arms, equipment, and supplies by sale, transfer, exchange, or lease.

  50. 50.

    Eurico Dutra to Getúlio Vargas Rio, March 8, 1941 in Mauro Renault Leite and Luiz Gonzaga Novelli Jr., eds., Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O dever da Verdade, pp. 410–411.

  51. 51.

    Col. Trent N. Thomas & Lt. Col. Charles F. Moler, “A Historical Perspective of the USAWC Class of 1940” (US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, April 15, 1987), ADA183148.pdf. p. 47. Miller’s classmates included Maxwell Taylor, Lyman Lemnitzer, Anthony C. McAuliffe, and Charles Bolte. Miller graduated from West Point in 1915, the class the stars fell upon. He ranked ninth in that class of 164 cadets. His classmates, Dwight Eisenhower, Omar Bradley, Joseph T. McNarney, and James Van Fleet were ranked 61st, 44th, 41st, and 92nd. Order of class ranking clearly did not determine success in their military careers. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_class_the_stars_fell_on.

  52. 52.

    Colonel L. Miller to Colonel M. B. Ridgway, Washington, February 13, 1941, WPD 4224-122, RG165, NARA.

  53. 53.

    Col. Trent N. Thomas & Lt. Col. Charles F. Moler “A Historical Perspective of the USAWC Class of 1940” (US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa, 15 April 1987), ADA183148.pdf. p. 81.

  54. 54.

    George C. Marshall to BG Lehman W. Miller, Washington, May 6, 1941, 2–441, Marshall Papers, Pentagon Office Collection, General Materials, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Va.

  55. 55.

    The German-Vichy agreement was announced on May 15, 1941.

  56. 56.

    Improvement in air travel made the Washington-Rio de Janeiro journey faster than Marshall’s ten days by boat in 1939. Until 1940 the air trip had been five days via the coastal route, because night flying was not possible. In 1940 Pan American opened a land route from Belém to Rio, using the new DC-3 that cut the time in half.

  57. 57.

    Welles to Caffery, Washington, May 22, 1941, 868.20232/206:Telegram and Caffery to Welles, Rio de Janeiro, May 28, 1941, 862.20232/2061:Telegram as in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. VI, (Washington: GPO, 1963), pp. 494–496.

  58. 58.

    Milton Freixinho, Instituições Em Crises: Dutra e Góis Monteiro, Duas Vidas Paralelas (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1997), p. 382. Colonel Milton wrote “grave incidente pela visita inamistosa [unfriendly visit] do chefe da Missão Militar Americana no Brasil….”

  59. 59.

    For a detailed study of German activities in Brazil, see Leslie B. Rout and John F. Bratzel, The Shadow War: German Espionage and United States Counterespionage in Latin America during World War II (Frederick, Md.: University Press of America, 1986), pp. 106–172; and a contemporary report Aurélio da Silva Py, A 5a Coluna no Brasil: A Conspiração Nazi no Rio Grande do Sul (Porto Alegre: Edição da Livraria do Globo, 1942). The author was chief of police in Rio Grande do Sul and led the anti-Nazi efforts.

  60. 60.

    Góis Monteiro to Eurico Dutra, Rio, June 2, 1941, Ofício No. 82 “Entendimento com o Chefe da Missão Militar Americano” in Mauro Renault Leite and Luiz Gonzaga Novelli Jr., eds., Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O dever da Verdade, pp. 425–431. It may be noteworthy that before Miller had this conversation with the chief of staff, Ambassador Caffery had asked President Vargas if he would authorize it. Why the president would need to authorize a meeting between the head of the military mission and the chief of staff remains unclear.

  61. 61.

    Ibid. p. 429.

  62. 62.

    Ibid. p. 431.

  63. 63.

    “Sizes of the Brazilian Armed Forces in July 1941,” Intelligence Branch, MID, Combat Factor, Brazil, July 1, 1941, 6010, G2 Regional, RG 165, NARA.

  64. 64.

    Leite and Novelli Jr., eds., Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O dever da Verdade, p. 430. The British attaché was Lt. Colonel Parry-Jones. The reality was that the Brazilian army had never conducted such large-scale training maneuvers in the northeast.

  65. 65.

    For military competition between Brazil and Argentina, see Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, Brasil, Argentina e Estados Unidos: Conflito e Integração na América do Sul (Da Tríplice Aliança ao Mercosul 1870–2003) (Rio de Janeiro: Revan, 2003), pp. 197–217.

  66. 66.

    By the spring of 1942, the Brazilian government agreed to an extensive photomapping program from French Cayenne to Uruguay of a stretch 100 km inland and along the Amazon up to Iquitos, Peru. War Dept., Special Staff, Historical Division, “History of United States Army Forces South Atlantic,” (1945), p. 30.

  67. 67.

    Eurico Dutra to Getúlio Vargas, Rio, June 5, 1941, No. 35-25 (Pessoal e Secreta), and Getúlio Vargas to Eurico Dutra, Rio, June 6,1941 in Mauro Renault Leite and Luiz Gonzaga Novelli Jr., eds, Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O dever da Verdade., pp. 418–425.

  68. 68.

    Joachim von Ribbentrop to Prüfer, Berlin, June 11, 1941, 235/157214, telegram as in Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, Vol. XII, p. 41. He is replying to Prüfer’s telegram of June 6. Getúlio Vargas, Diário, 1937–1942, Vol. II, p. 398 (5 June 1941). The president gave no hint as to what he discussed with the German ambassador.

  69. 69.

    The Lend-Lease comment was in Vargas, Diário, 1937–1942, Vol. II p. 399 (10 June 1941) and the conversation with the Japanese ambassador in ibid. pp. 396–397 (29 May 1941).

  70. 70.

    Col. Paul M. Robinett, Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Washington, June 14, 1941, BCD 5400, RG218 (Records of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff), NARA. This set of records of the joint chiefs was declassified August 20, 1973. Colonel Robinett was closely associated with General Marshall, was involved in the Arcadia Conference (1941), later fought and was wounded in North Africa. It is noteworthy that the Brazilian Army awarded him its Order of Military Merit. See Biographical Sketch, Paul M. Robinett Papers, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Va.

  71. 71.

    Stetson Conn & Byron Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1960), pp. 286–287.

  72. 72.

    Sumner Welles to Jefferson Caffery, Washington, June 26, 1941, 810.20 Defense/892a:Telegram as in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. VI, (Washington: GPO, 1963), pp. 501–502.

  73. 73.

    Caffery to Welles, Rio de Janeiro, June 27, 1941 (3 p.m.), 810.20 Defense/892 1//2:Telegram as in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. VI, (Washington: GPO, 1963), p. 502.

  74. 74.

    Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper, 1948), pp. 303–304.

  75. 75.

    Stetson Conn & Byron Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1960), pp. 286–287.

  76. 76.

    Ibid. p. 287.

  77. 77.

    Ibid. p. 291. The American members returned to the United States on October 5, 1941.

  78. 78.

    Commission of Officers of the North American General Staff to Commission of Officers of the Brazilian General Staff, Rio de Janeiro, September 25, 1941, with attached memo by Góes Monteiro, same place and date, BDC5700, 5740 Reports The Defense of Northeastern Brazil, Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG218, NARA.

  79. 79.

    Jefferson Caffery, Rio, September 24, 1941, No. 5437, Brazil 5900, G2 Regional, RG 165, NARA. The phrase the ambassador reported was “tapeação de aviação,” which I translated as “aviation scam.”

  80. 80.

    Getúlio Vargas, Diário, 1937–1942, Vol. II, pp. 415–416 (August 19, 1941), pp. 424–425 (August 22–26, 1941).

  81. 81.

    Ibid., 424, entry for August 22, 1941. “Em resumo: os americanos querem nos arrastar à Guerra na Europa sob o pretexto de defesa da América.”

  82. 82.

    Memo, WPD for GHQ, 17 Dec 41, WPD 4516-38; Report of G-3 GHQ, 18 Dec 41, GHQ 337 Staff Conferences Binder 2, MMB, RG 165, NARA.

  83. 83.

    Ibid. 425, August 25, 1941. Góes had Miller recalled; see Stetson Conn & Byron Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, pp. 301–302.

  84. 84.

    Getúlio Vargas, Diário, 1937–1942, Vol. II, pp. 440–442 (entries December 7–12, 1941).

  85. 85.

    Ibid. p. 443 (December 21, 1941). American distrust of Dutra and Góes was persistent.

  86. 86.

    Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), Vol. I, 332. At the end of December 1941, the British-American Arcadia Conference that set the strategy for the war designated the route through Brazil as the most important one between the hemispheres; Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense, p. 304.

  87. 87.

    Conn & Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, pp. 292–293. The previous Rainbow 4 series was based on the assumption that Great Britain would collapse. The shift of focus to the South Atlantic necessarily increased the importance of Brazil’s security in US Army thinking.

  88. 88.

    WPD study, Dec 21, 1941, subject: “Immediate Military Measures,” OPD Exec 4, Book 2, MMB, RG 165, NARA.

  89. 89.

    Remarks of Gen Marshall at Standing Liaison Committee meeting, January 3, 1942, SLC Minutes, Vol. II, Item 42, MMB, RG165, NARA.

  90. 90.

    Brief Joint Estimate (General Marshall and Admiral Stark), December 20, 1941, WPD 4402-136, MMB, RG 165, NARA. This was presented at the Arcadia Conference, where Roosevelt met with Churchill. They agreed that the Iberian Peninsula and Africa were likely targets.

  91. 91.

    Memo from WPD for Chief of Staff, December 21, 1941, WPD 4224-208, MMB, RG 165, NARA.

  92. 92.

    The Selective Training and Service Act was approved on Sept. 16, 1940, providing one year of training for 1,200,000 men between 21 and 35 years of age. This was the first time in history that the United States enacted a peacetime draft.

  93. 93.

    Conn & Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, pp. 146–148.

  94. 94.

    Ibid. p. 149. The other preliminary operations were completion of the occupation of Iceland, occupation of Dakar, and protective occupation of the Portuguese Azores and Cape Verdes, as well as the Spanish Canaries. Obviously to move anywhere in the South Atlantic, Northeast Brazil had to be secure as a base of operations.

  95. 95.

    The US embassy delivered the proposal for this to President Vargas on Nov. 13 and he discussed it with Dutra that day; see Getúlio Vargas, Diário, 1937–1942, Vol. II, p. 435 (13 November 1941).

  96. 96.

    On Clay and Candee’s trip to Brazil, see Oral History Interview, Major General Kenner F. Hertford by Richard D. McKinzie, June 17, 1974, Truman Presidential Library, Independence, Mo. For the building of American air bases, see McCann, The Brazilian-American Alliance, 221–239.

  97. 97.

    Getúlio Vargas, A Nova Política do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1943), Vol. 9, pp. 187–190. He presented an optimistic face to his military and reminded the United States that he was still waiting for arms. Simmons, Rio, January 2, 1942, #6172, 832.00/1454, RG59, NARA. Dramatically Vargas told the officers “I shall be with you, ready to fight, to win, to die.”

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    Frank D. McCann

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McCann, F.D. (2018). Search for Mutual Benefits. In: Brazil and the United States during World War II and Its Aftermath. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92910-1_3

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