Abstract
The 1980s brought a series of economic shocks, beginning with Mexico’s historic debt default and subsequent economic crash in 1982 and continuing with its rapid trade liberalization in 1985. In response, local officials, business associations, and labor organizations in Querétaro developed effective mechanisms for coordination, which smoothed the state’s adjustment to economic hardship and laid the groundwork for a globally competitive economy. The most visible manifestation of local cooperation was the Tripartite Commission, a monthly forum for consultation and dialogue among government, business, and labor that lasted into the twenty-first century. Coordination allowed the state to implement a clear strategy to enhance productivity, build industrial infrastructure, and promote technological sophistication, a set of policies strongly influenced by Querétaro’s modernizing business associations, which were led by large, globally integrated manufacturing firms. As a result, the state economy recovered rapidly from the 1982 crisis and experienced remarkably fast growth during Mexico’s “lost decade.”
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Notes
- 1.
Camacho Guzmán had served as the official radio announcer for the presidency, and his friend Fidel Velázquez advocated for his candidacy directly with the president (González Arias 2008).
- 2.
At the time of the 1979 election, the opposition had never held a single position in Querétaro’s state legislature and had failed to even field a candidate in the previous gubernatorial elections.
- 3.
Espinosa Medina had worked as human resources manager for Massey Ferguson, a multinational that had been a stalwart of the state’s metal-mechanic industry since the 1970s, and Grupo Spicer, a large domestic grupo. He later served as the president of Canacintra and Secretary of Government under the Burgos administration.
- 4.
Burgos would become governor in 1991 and remained an influential figure even after the PAN took control of the state in 1997. He also served as an important conduit between business leaders, with whom he maintained close personal ties, and the labor sector, which he was connected to via affiliation with the CTM, during the government of Mariano Palacios Alcocer (1985–1991).
- 5.
- 6.
Ramón Eberstadt recalls the Club de Industriales forged close links, both personal and commercial, among a group of “visionary business people…who [were] contributing to the industrialization of the state” (Club de Industriales 2001, 76).
- 7.
The integration of big players was so pervasive that the chamber’s president from 1982 to 1984, Víctor Manuel Amieva Pérez, felt compelled to make Canacintra more responsive to the needs of small firms to counter the impression that large firms were dominant in the organization (Canacintra-Querétaro 1996).
- 8.
The FTEQ had been founded in 1936, a year before the local CTM, on the basis of a Catholic-inspired doctrine that stressed non-aggression and a spirit of “sacrifice” among workers. Both the FTEQ and the CTM in Querétaro shared a conciliatory view of labor relations that emphasized compromise over confrontation. State officials regularly touted Querétaro’s labor tranquility to attract investment, and labor problems in other parts of the country were often a motivation for firms to relocate to Querétaro (Díaz Aldret 2011).
- 9.
At the national level, union activism was on the rise throughout the 1970s, encouraged by the more tolerant approach of President Luis Echeverría (1970–1976) towards independent unions (Middlebrook 1995).
- 10.
The presence of a prominent labor leader in the governor’s office may have made Querétaro a target for national labor activists seeking to bring about a broader revolt against corporatist labor organization in Mexico (González Arias 2008).
- 11.
The Kellogg plant, one of the first foreign investments in the state, had been established in the early 1950s. As in the case of the Celanese conflict, the complaints motivating the Democratic Current were excessively demanding working conditions at the plant and lack of basic amenities such as a functioning cafeteria (Silva 1984).
- 12.
The Tremec union, with almost 5,000 members, was far and away the state’s largest (Díaz Aldret 2011).
- 13.
Interview with Eduardo Miranda, 3 August 2016.
- 14.
Interviews with former state Secretary of Labor official (21 July 2016) and Secretary of Economic Development (20 July 2016). The former official describes the spirit of the Commission as follows: “instead of having a confrontation, it was about understanding the situation that [each side] was experiencing, and looking for [a solution].”
- 15.
The decisions reached in the Commission were therefore informal. The participants themselves were responsible for enforcement among their respective affiliates. Monitoring of agreements was likewise informal. The secretary responsible for organizing the monthly sessions would report on the status of the agreements reached previously at the opening of each session (Interviews with former Secretary of Economic Development, 20 July 2016, and Ignacio Loyola Vera, 22 April 2016).
- 16.
Interview, 21 July 2016.
- 17.
According to Alejandro Espinosa, business leaders acknowledged the role of management in provoking the labor disputes of the early 1980s and understood the need to change course (Interview, 15 April 2016). Similarly, an official in the CTM in Querétaro reports that its leaders during the 1980s promoted the view that “it was important to look after the interests of the worker, but also the interests of the employer” (Interview, 27 April 2016).
- 18.
It is important to acknowledge that what is being described is a vision of the common good held by elites—in government, the private sector, and organized labor—that cannot be assumed to have been shared among all the state’s workers, firms, or society writ large. See Chapter 6 for more discussion of this point.
- 19.
Of course, dialogue did not resolve every conflict. During a 1983 strike at Industries Astral, which lasted for two months, local authorities sent security forces to break up picketers and leaned on the local arbitration council to declare the strike void (Diario de Querétaro 6 August 1983, “Se quejan los obreros de Astral”).
- 20.
Anuario Estadístico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, various years.
- 21.
The quotation is from Miguel Weinstein, the president of Coparmex-Querétaro at the time (Coparmex-Querétaro 2013, 140).
- 22.
These comments were attributed to Coparmex President Miguel Weinstein and an unnamed representative of Canacintra. Diario de Querétaro 20 August 1983, “Enfoque.”
- 23.
Diario de Querétaro 9 August 1983, “Ponderan los empresarios el equilibrio social.”
- 24.
- 25.
Díaz Aldret (2011) argues that the business sector in Querétaro has traditionally been more concerned with economic conditions than seeking political power, which she attributes to business leaders’ ability to influence policy through public-private bodies such as the Economic Council of Querétaro and other interactions with local authorities.
- 26.
This is not to say that his record was unblemished. Questions over the financing of key public works such as the emblematic Corregidora stadium clouded Camacho Guzmán’s legacy, as did his ownership of properties and bank accounts in Miami (see Proceso 22 June 1985, “Las cuentas en dólares de Camacho Guzmán en Miami” http://www.proceso.com.mx/141502/las-cuentas-en-dolares-de-camacho-guzman-en-miami).
- 27.
Calculations are based on Germán-Soto (2005).
- 28.
These calculations are based on appendices to federal Informes de Gobierno (1979–1985).
- 29.
Palacios canceled several projects begun by his predecessor, citing concerns over the source of their financing (see González Arias 2008).
- 30.
A native queretano, Amieva worked his way up the ranks of Tremec, eventually rising to the position of Manager of Manufacturing in the Querétaro plant. He later left to found an independent firm, and his connections to both large national industrial groups and small local firms allowed him to secure the presidency of Canacintra in 1982. This same combination of local bona fides and ties to the state’s industrial powerhouses also made Amieva an attractive candidate to enter the new administration. Increasingly, individuals with this profile would occupy top posts in the state’s economic bureaucracies, further solidifying the developmental alliance between state government and local business (Canacintra-Querétaro 1996).
- 31.
Diario de Querétaro 28 August 1986, “Hay que evitar disputas absurdas de los sectores y satanización de actividades.”
- 32.
State officials and business leaders in Querétaro were acutely aware of the challenges surrounding the scarcity of water resources in the state and incorporated this limitation into their plans for industrial development beginning in the 1980s. On the other hand, the governor’s emphasis on industries that would bring a critical mass of relatively well-paying jobs reflects the relevance of the concerns of organized labor and the imperative of preserving harmony in labor relations.
- 33.
The doctrine of “total quality” reflected current trends in industrial organization and management theory, drawing heavily on the Japanese experience during its post-World War II industrial boom. In practical terms, it entailed a focus on improving human resources, new management techniques and philosophies, and the incorporation of advanced technology in the state’s industries.
- 34.
This link is confirmed by José Rivera Frausto, president of Canacintra in 1985 and 1986, who recalled that “the quality movement arises in Querétaro well before the national level, as its precedents date back to 1986, when the Mexican government implemented a significant decrease in tariffs” from 100 percent on average to 30 percent (Canacintra-Querétaro 1996, 94).
- 35.
The group of firms that organized and funded the Japan mission featured five of the state’s fifteen largest exporters in 1989.
- 36.
The firms behind this initiative included Vidriera Querétaro, Celanese Mexicana, Industrias Astral, Autoforjas, Tremec, Singer, and Kostal Mexicana, again reflecting the participation of the state’s most important firms and collaboration between representatives of national and foreign capital. See Canacintra-Querétaro (1996).
- 37.
Interview, 17 March 2016.
- 38.
Interview with Alejandro Espinosa Medina 15 April 2016.
- 39.
Interview with MNC manager and Canacintra official, 9 February 2017.
- 40.
Noticias de la Mañana 24 September 1986, “Los contratos de exportación, prueba de la capacidad productiva de los mexicanos.”
- 41.
Noticias de la Mañana 23 September 1986, “Debemos producir con calidad competitiva: Coparmex.”
- 42.
He continued that success would be determined more by a “change of attitude” than financial resources. Noticias de la Mañana, 9 December 1988, “Los industriales de SJR, dispuestos a propiciar el crecimiento del país.”
- 43.
The hallmarks of Salinas’ economic policy were an extensive program of privatizations, financial market liberalization, and a free trade agreement with the United States and Canada (see González 2008).
- 44.
Noticias de la Mañana 3 December 1988, “Buenas noticias para los industriales el mensaje de CSG expresó Lomelí Pozo.” The views of local Canacintra leaders thus diverged considerably from the stance of the national leadership, as discussed in Chapter 3. This division was on display during the Querétaro delegation’s 1988 assembly, where the national Canacintra president denounced “unfair competition” as a result of the rapid reduction of tariffs since 1986. Queretano industrialists at the very same assembly stressed the importance of a “new culture” among business that embraces risk and modernization (Noticias de la Mañana 9 December 1988, “Estamos seguros que saldremos del bache: presidente de Canacintra”).
- 45.
The participants in these dialogues reflect the closeness among government, business, and labor leaders, as well as the active engagement of managers of multinationals and large domestic grupos in the state’s governance. They included Mario Rodríguez (a manager at Autoforjas, a leading auto parts firm, and former Canacintra president), José Berrondo Mir (the corporate director of Industrias Mabe for Latin America and president of the Club de Industriales from 1981–1982), Juan Alberto Quezada (director of human resources for Black and Decker), Guillermo Escalona (director of human resources for Celanese Mexicana), and Abel Baca (a director in several large firms, including Massey Ferguson, and Secretary of Economic Development between 1994 and 1997). Former officials such as Alejandro Espinosa and Enrique Burgos also participated, as did CTM leader Ezequiel Espinoza and other union leaders. They met regularly over the course of several years, often spending Saturdays at a ranch in Huimilpan, outside the city of Querétaro, owned by the CTM . Interview with Alejandro Espinosa, 8 August 2016.
- 46.
In this way, the philosophy linked cooperation between labor and capital to the broader goal of achieving global competitiveness. These efforts in Querétaro foreshadowed the promotion of the “New Labor Culture” by Coparmex at the national level beginning in 1996, which similarly aimed to adapt labor relations to an environment of international competition (see Chapter 6).
- 47.
For example, Massey Ferguson managers decided to make contract revisions open to all workers and employees to enhance transparency and also discontinued the use of time cards in an effort to foster an atmosphere of trust. Interview with Canacintra official, 9 February 2017.
- 48.
Interview, 17 March 2016. Espinosa had familial ties to local CTM leader Ezequiel Espinoza, which facilitated contacts between the business and labor sectors.
- 49.
According to Alejandro Espinosa: “contract revisions that had lasted a month began to be resolved in eight days, then three days, and today, revisions last one day” (Interview, 17 March 2016).
- 50.
Noticias de la Mañana 2 December 1988, “Gran parte de los obreros cuentan con un 60% de capacitación.”
- 51.
Interview with former Secretary of Labor official, 21 July 2016.
- 52.
Scholars have emphasized that the culture of Querétaro prioritizes order and tranquility as core values, a characteristic captured in the idea of queretaneidad (Díaz Aldret 2011). These features thus did not originate in the 1980s, but the events of this period and the response of business, labor, and officials represent an adaptation of these cultural traits to a new socioeconomic milieu, via mechanisms such as the Tripartite Commission.
- 53.
After two years of recovery in 1984 and 1985, Mexico’s economy contracted by 3.8 percent after a collapse of oil prices in 1986.
- 54.
The Club de Industriales had evolved by the mid-1980s from a mainly social organization to an important actor in the state’s public life. In 1986, the Club’s Board began holding regular meetings with its ex-presidents and Governor Palacios (Club de Industriales 2001).
- 55.
Noticias de la Mañana 4 September 1986, “MPA exhorta a industriales combatir el desempleo.”
- 56.
Gómez also outlined several of the concrete actions the organization had taken to attack unemployment: “in Coparmex we have a complete structure for training, because in general people who are left without work are the least trained; we are providing consulting to firms, and we have a job bank that brings together employers with potential workers, to accelerate hiring” (Diario de Querétaro 15 August 1986, “Baja la demanda de productos por el bajo poder adquisitivo”; see also Diario de Querétaro, 26 August 1986, “Descapitalización por falta de crédito bancario,” and Noticias de la Mañana 4 September 1986, “Empieza a ser ya grave el índice de desempleo en Querétaro.”
- 57.
The pacts were negotiated among federal officials and national-level peak business and labor organizations and were a strategy, ultimately successful, to rein in triple-digit inflation (see Lustig 1992).
- 58.
Noticias de la Mañana 19 December 1988, “Exhorto de Canacintra a empresarios.”
- 59.
Noticias de la Mañana 6 December 1988, “La alineación de precios evitará desalenar la producción: GLP.”
- 60.
Noticias de la Mañana 22 August 1986, “Si los empresarios no entienden que ahora quienes deben soportar la situación son ellos: E. Espinoza.”
- 61.
The construction of a new industrial park, its near full occupation, and the provision of supporting infrastructure and services during a single administration was not an insignificant accomplishment. As discussed in later chapters, industrial park projects in Puebla were routinely left incomplete or unoccupied. The source for statistics on Querétaro’s industrial parks is the Secretaría de Desarrollo Económico’s Anuario Económico, various years.
- 62.
- 63.
Maquilas are factories that import inputs duty-free and receive other fiscal incentives provided they export the resulting products. The maquila program had been in place for decades but increased dramatically with Mexico’s trade opening and has since become synonymous with low-cost, labor-intensive production.
- 64.
These calculations are based on FDI statistics from Mexico’s Economy Secretary. See http://datos.gob.mx/busca/dataset/inversion-extranjera-directa.
- 65.
Calculations are based on estimates in Germán-Soto (2005).
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Kahn, T. (2019). Building Institutions for Cooperation in Querétaro, 1979–1991. In: Government-Business Relations and Regional Development in Post-Reform Mexico. Latin American Political Economy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92351-2_4
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