The Case for Theism

Lataster, Raphael

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-90793-2_2

Raphael Lataster⁵

Part of the book series: Sophia Studies in Cross-cultural Philosophy of Traditions and Cultures ((SCPT,volume 26))

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Abstract

Here the focus will be on Craig’s arguments for the ‘generic’ god or gods. That is, it examines the arguments that supposedly demonstrate the existence of Craig’s god, without yet identifying the particular way that this god has revealed itself to humanity. Not only will the individual arguments be judged for their logical validity and soundness, but also the manner in which they support each other and Craig’s case in establishing the truth of theism shall be explored. With these arguments, Craig does not merely wish to convince his audience of a creator, or a designer, or of just ‘some type’ of god. Craig wishes to convince his audience that a particular type of god exists, to wit, the god commonly recognised as ‘God’; that is, the god of classical theism. Craig’s understanding of theism shall be clarified, before the arguments are examined. The arguments that are analysed herein are Craig’s contingency, cosmological, teleological, axiological, ontological, and experiential arguments.

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Notes

1.
Craig later argues that this is the ‘specific God’ of Christianity, as has been revealed in history, which is discussed in Part 4.
2.
Swinburne (EG), p. 7.
3.
The terms ‘god-concept’, ‘god-conception’, and ‘god-model’ are used interchangeably in this book. The terms are primarily used to distinguish between high-level ‘types’ of the divine such as theism, polytheism, alternative monotheisms, including the deisms, and pantheism.
4.
Craig (RF), p. 154.
5.
Ibid., p. 184.
6.
William Lane Craig. “Defining “God”,” accessed 19/11/2013, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/defining-god.
7.
Also see Craig (RF), pp. 155, 300.
8.
Ibid., pp. 249, 258.
9.
Ibid., pp. 50, 108, 111, 152, 264.
10.
Ibid., pp. 152–154, 254.
11.
William Lane Craig. “Two Arguments Against God,” accessed 08/07/2016, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/two-arguments-against-god. Craig prefers the term ‘maximally great’, and here says these terms are essentially synonyms.
12.
This book will avoid exclusively referring to God as a male.
13.
Craig links this to God’s being “free”. See Craig (RF), pp. 275–276. See also Craig (OG), pp. 158–161.
14.
Craig (RF), pp. 106–111; Craig (OG), pp. 53–65.
15.
See Craig (RF), p. 99.
16.
“Leibniz is not seeking a cause at all, but an explanation for the world”. See ibid., p. 99.
17.
Ibid., p. 106.
18.
Ibid., p. 111.
19.
Ibid., p. 107.
20.
Cf. Ludwig Fahrbach, “Understanding Brute Facts,” Synthese 145, no. 3 (2005): 449.
21.
It actually precludes inexplicable things and the self-caused, which shall be discussed further on.
22.
Alternatively, “Anything that exists is either necessary or caused.”
23.
“According to (1) there are two kinds of being: necessary beings, which exist of their own nature and so have no external cause of their existence, and contingent beings, whose existence is accounted for by causal factors outside themselves”. See Craig (RF), p. 107.
24.
It has not yet been established that the universe was created, or caused, which is the focus of the next argument in Craig’s case.
25.
Craig (RF), p. 107.
26.
Ibid., p. 107.
27.
If this is overstating, consider at least that there is no interpretation of ‘necessity’ and ‘explanation’ on which atheists will accept both of the first two premises.
28.
Swinburne (CT), pp. 243–244. Technically, ‘formally contradictory’ may be a clearer term than ‘incoherent’.
29.
Ibid., pp. 260–276.
30.
Craig (OG), p. 70.
31.
Swinburne (CT), pp. 258–259.
32.
This so-called necessity is in actuality a contingency, as it has the question over whether the proposition is true or false built into the definition. In other words, the proposition could be false, and labelling something’s existence ‘ontologically necessary’ is to acknowledge that it might not exist. Furthermore, if God does not exist, the universe, which does exist, can be labelled as ‘necessary’. This definition is also appreciated, as it would be peculiar that something that is not known to exist is declared to be necessary, while something that is known to exist is declared to be unnecessary. Interestingly, in assuming that God is necessary, which by his definition entails that God exists, Craig seems to be merely defining God into existence.
33.
Of course, he has not explicitly claimed that God is necessary in this argument, though it is reasonable to think that he believes so, particularly when being necessary is generally seen as an essential property of ‘God’. More relevantly, his first two premises did assume that the universe is not necessary.
34.
Particularly when God’s existence is in question, he cannot be said to be logically necessary, physically necessary, or ontologically necessary; nor is it appropriate to merely define ‘God’ as necessarily existing. It is unclear in what way Craig can justifiably claim that God is necessary. Naturalists might also claim that the universe is ontologically necessary; that the universe is known to exist may provide them with relatively more justification. In any case, if ‘ontological necessity’ has valid application, it must be explained why it can apply to God and not to the natural universe.
35.
Craig (RF), p. 98.
36.
Carolyn R. Morillo, “The Logic of Arguments from Contingency,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37, no. 3 (1977): 408.
37.
‘Self-explanatory being’ could well be an explanatory solecism, in the vein of “I think that ‘A because A’”. In other words, nothing can be self-explanatory. On the other hand, the notion of an uncaused cause seems reasonable. This is just something that has no explanation, or if it is a necessary thing, has no explanation of its necessity.
38.
Yet, perhaps he is oblivious. The greater context of this quotation refers to the notion of God as a self-caused being, which Craig rejects. See Craig (RF), p. 99. Note again that while ‘uncaused cause’ is coherent, ‘self-explanatory being’ may be an explanatory solecism.
39.
Ibid., p. 107.
40.
Adolf Grünbaum, “The Poverty of Theistic Cosmology,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55, no. 4 (2004): 556–567, 574–575.
41.
As is the case with various hidden variable theories. This however, could support the hypothesis that the universe is necessary and completely deterministic, which shall be explored soon.
42.
There may be shades of a composition fallacy in this tactic, as the existence of the universe might be necessary, with its physical constitution being contingent. See Craig (RF), p. 109.
43.
Quentin Smith, “The Reason the Universe Exists is that it Caused Itself to Exist,” Philosophy 74, no. 4 (1999): 579–586; Ognyan Oreshkov, Fabio Costa, and Časlav Brukner, “Quantum Correlations with no Causal Order,” Nature Communications 3, no. doi:10.1038/ncomms2076 (2012); Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow, The Grand Design (London: Bantam Press, 2010), pp. 226–227.
44.
An argument to the effect that the universe does not exist would be counter-productive and self-defeating, given the existence of the argument itself, and the person, or thing, making it. Some sort of universe clearly does exist, no matter how limited it might be.
45.
Craig (RF), p. 108.
46.
It is ironic that the people Craig appeals to here – strong atheists – are people he might consider deluded, and in any case, disagrees with on such fundamental issues.
47.
Philosopher Matthew McCormick has helpfully explained the many types of atheism and how some atheists go about justifying their non-belief in God. See Matthew McCormick. “Atheism,” accessed 12/12/2015, http://www.iep.utm.edu/atheism.
48.
Craig (RF), p. 108.
49.
By Craig’s reckoning, to say that something has an explanation of its existence is to say that it exists, and it is either caused or uncaused. So (A’) merely says that God and the universe exist together; no monodirectional causal relationship between them is explicit. The converse of (A’) could be true, and it could also be true that the universe causes and explains God. Also, if the converse of (A) is true (Craig does not prove otherwise), then the universe’s non-existence entails God’s non-existence, which means that God does not have to exist after all. Interestingly, at a Craigian debate I attended, I overheard an atheist that was taken in by this flawed logic.
50.
See Craig (RF), p. 107. That there are other things apart from God that are supposedly uncaused leads to some interesting possibilities that Craig does not address. Furthermore, these ‘necessary’ things can only be said to be necessary if they exist. But we do not know with certainty that numbers, or gods, really exist. Also, it may be the case that there are no necessary things that exist.
51.
Ibid., p. 108. Cf. Swinburne (CT), p. 301.
52.
Interestingly, Swinburne asserts that if God does not exist, the universe must be “ontologically necessary”. See Swinburne (CT), p. 259.
53.
Craig (RF), p. 108.
54.
Craig (OG), p. 64. Also, in §2.3, I will briefly discuss Oppy’s distinguishing between ‘causal reality’ and ‘natural reality’.
55.
The mind is only known to be an abstract object – a hypothetical construct – so that referring to the mind as a concrete instantiation is fallacious. In this sense, Swinburne’s similar concept of the “bodiless person” may be marginally superior. See Swinburne (CT), p. 101. Note that even the artificial intelligences of computers rely on a physical central processing unit. Cognitive scientist Marvin Minsky presents a comprehensive argument for the natural and physical underpinnings of mental faculties. See Marvin Lee Minsky, The Emotion Machine: Commensense Thinking, Artificial Intelligence, and the Future of the Human Mind (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006).
56.
Craig (RF), pp. 108–109.
57.
Ibid., p. 109. Incidentally, I am unaware of any physicists that think that there were quarks in the very earliest stages of the universe. The critic could also uphold a necessary singularity, without committing to the view that there are necessarily existing quarks.
58.
Craig kindly gives some examples of what he considers a ‘God-substitute’ to be: “Gaia or the Force from Star Wars”. Unfortunately, this is only one of his few allusions (he does not here mention the term ‘pantheism’) to pantheistic hypotheses. See Craig (OG), p. 60. Note also that Craig is alluding here that pantheism is offensive to atheists, while he elsewhere finds it offensive to theists. See William Lane Craig, “Pantheists in Spite of Themselves? Pannenberg, Clayton, and Shults on Divine Infinity,” American Theological Inquiry 5, no. 1 (2012): 3–23. Clearly, any attempt to frame the debate as a dichotomy is fallacious; there is at the very least a third option.
59.
Craig is doubtless interested in proving the truth of his theistic theory. In that case, he ought to be making a fair comparison between theism and competing theories such as the various pantheisms. It seems somewhat a hollow victory to overcome naturalism, when there are still numerous supernaturalistic alternatives left to argue against. More on this in Part 3.
60.
Craig (RF), p. 107.
61.
Interestingly, Craig’s considerations of both necessary and contingent universes both lead to supernatural implications, revealing his theological presuppositions. It seems that by Craig’s reckoning, whether his God exists or not, the non-existence of a god is simply not possible. Either that, or Craig (unprofessionally) simply wishes to ‘threaten’ atheists with their having to embrace pantheism, in order to persuade them to simply accept his argument. However, pantheisms offer more plausible god-concepts, as is argued throughout this book, to say nothing of strong atheists probably preferring them. If Craig wishes to force atheists to accept either theism or some other god-conception, he perhaps should not be offering them a ‘better’ alternative to theism.
62.
Craig further argues that a stronger argument for the universe’s contingency would be desirable, rather than mere intuition, and thinks he has good grounds for assuming such: his imagination. He constantly refers to the ease of conceiving the contingency of this universe and its components. However, Craig’s conceived logical contingency does not necessarily entail metaphysical or ontological contingency. Also, Craig may be less eager to conceive of a contingent God, or necessary universes, tables and pens. Furthermore, his claim that as quarks are contingent, the universe must be also commits the composition fallacy and is doubly problematic if the universe is not a singular entity. See Craig (RF), pp. 109–110. It is worth noting that Craig fails to provide scholarly references here. Indeed, many philosophers reject the view that Craig defends. Anyone who thinks that there is a necessary initial singularity would reject what Craig claims here.
63.
For more on intuition, see Andrew Shtulman and Kelsey Harrington, “Tensions Between Science and Intuition Across the Lifespan,” Topics in Cognitive Science 8, no. 1 (2016): 118–137.
64.
David Chalmers, “Does Conceivability Entail Metaphysical Possibility?,” in Conceivability and Possibility, ed. Tamar Szabó Gendler and John O’Leary-Hawthorne (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002).
65.
Among other possibilities, this could allow for a contingent God, or an infinite series of contingent causes. See Philipse (GAS), p. 223.
66.
See Emanuel Rutten, “On Philipse’s Attempt to Write Off All Deductive Cosmological Arguments,” Philo 16, no. 1 (2013): 77–94.
67.
Bede Rundle, Why There is Something Rather than Nothing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 110.
68.
Craig also attempted to shift the burden of proof earlier, when he accused those critics who do not accept that something non-physical exists apart from the universe, as “begging the question in favor of atheism”. See Craig (RF), p. 108. My claims about Craig’s assumed burden of proof and question-begging might be taken as invidious; a more nuanced approach may be to weigh numerous well-endorsed theories fairly. However, as an impartial observer, my interest in this research is not in proving or deeming more probable any alternative to Craig’s theism (such as naturalism, or a supernaturalistic alternative), but in whether Craig has proven or demonstrated to be more probable, his brand of theism.
69.
Interestingly, Leibniz was a determinist. See Robert Merrihew Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
70.
Craig gives us no reason to suppose that his terms ‘necessary’ and ‘uncaused’ are not effectively interchangeable.
71.
Craig (OG), p. 56.
72.
It is obvious for Craig’s scenario, where the universe exists, and God is posited as its explanation. Generally speaking, it is not obvious that an existing god would have the intention to create anything (it could actually be argued that a perfect god would prefer not to create anything so as to preserve the perfect world), which affects the prior probability of theism as an explanatory hypothesis, and which shall be explained further in the discussions of Craig’s kalām cosmological argument.
73.
This is not equivalent to the claim “if God exists, the universe must exist” or the claim “if God does not exist, the universe must exist”. To clarify, the existence of a necessary, omnipotent, and immutable God, posited as the causal explanation for the universe’s existence, entails that the universe is necessary, as it could not have failed to exist.
74.
It may be that Craig commits the ambiguity fallacy. When it is most convenient, he might refer to contingency only in terms of being caused, and in other cases, such as arguing for something’s having been caused in the first place, in terms of possibly not existing.
75.
Proving causal determinism is seemingly impossible, even with classical mechanics, let alone quantum mechanics. Nevertheless, it is possible that the world is deterministic, even if it appears to be chaotic. Suppes notes that, “Deterministic metaphysicians can comfortably hold to their view knowing they cannot be empirically refuted, but so can indeterministic ones as well.” See Patrick Suppes, “The Transcendental Character of Determinism,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 18(1993): 254. As discussed earlier, quantum-mechanical considerations could disconfirm determinism and a necessary universe to an extent, though it could also disconfirm the principle of sufficient reason so that Craig’s argument is defeated at the first premise instead of at the second.
76.
Craig (RF), pp. 106–107.
77.
Benedikt Paul Göcke, “Panentheism and Classical Theism,” Sophia 52, no. 1 (2013): 75.
78.
Jordan Howard Sobel, Logic and Theism: Arguments for and against Beliefs in God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 231. Swinburne also agrees that, “you cannot deduce anything logically contingent from anything logically necessary”, which highlights that clarity over the term ‘necessary’ is crucial. See Swinburne (EG), p. 79.
79.
Peter van Inwagen, Metaphysics, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Westview Press, 2002), p. 119. Note that van Inwagen, Göcke, and the soon-referenced Morriston are also Christian philosophers, revealing that not all Craig’s arguments are accepted by his immediate peers, and partially rendering moot his tendency to quote atheistic scholars as support for his premises, which supposedly aids the perception of objectivity.
80.
Cf. Wes Morriston, “Is God Free? Reply to Wierenga,” Faith and Philosophy 23, no. 1 (2006): 93–98.
81.
Including such benign events as Craig grasping, and subsequently releasing, a pen.
82.
There is increasing evidence suggesting that free will is indeed illusory. See Chun Siong Soon et al., “Predicting Free Choices for Abstract Intentions,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110, no. 15 (2013): 6217–6222. For an interesting treatment of free will, fatalism, and the importance of believing in free will, even if it is illusory, see Daniel C. Dennett, Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). There are also resources on free will and its probably being illusory from neuroscientists such as Sam Harris. For example, Sam Harris, Free Will (New York: Free Press, 2012).
83.
There is biblical support for the Christian doctrine of predeterminism. See Ephesians 1:3–6, Romans 8:28–30, Romans 9:16–21, Acts 13:48, 2 Thessalonians 2:13, Revelation 13:8. This doctrine has been very important historically, likely aiding the development of capitalism (and thus also, religious pluralism), via Calvinist predestination. See Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Stephen Kalberg (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
84.
Adding complexity to the issue, confessional discussions about free will tend to involve defending against objections, and describing its nature. Even Christian philosophers of religion admit that there is little discussion of the evidence for free will, partly because there is none. For example, see William J. Wainwright, “Theistic Mystical Experiences, Enlightenment Experiences, and Ineffability,” in Philosophy and the Christian Worldview: Analysis, Assessment and Development, ed. David Werther and Mark D. Linville (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), pp. 241–242. This is one of many instances where a theistic philosopher takes an unproven concept that is simply taken for granted, and builds upon it.
85.
Craig tends to stress the importance of human free will in his discussions on morality and in defending against the problem of evil. See William Lane Craig. “Freedom and the Ability to Choose Evil,” accessed 22/11/2013, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/freedom-and-the-ability-to-choose-evil.
86.
Craig might object that his further arguments do provide support for the existence of at least one unembodied mind. However, this is the first argument of his case, his other arguments are similarly unpersuasive to non-believers, and if persuasive, do not necessitate that the creator/designer/revelator in question is unembodied. Furthermore, any appeal to data on consciousness supporting the existence of unembodied minds would be merely speculative. In fact, consciousness has been linked to the natural and the physical (such as by neural correlates of consciousness), especially brains. See Christof Koch, The Quest for Consciousness: A Neurobiological Approach (Eaglewood, CO: Roberts & Company, 2004). Strictly speaking, the prior probability for such a notion should thus be near zero. This is not, as Craig may object, a display of atheistic favouritism. It is merely a reflection of the evidence that is currently available. Also, the prior probability can be said to be a very small, though unknowable number, meaning that a proper Bayesian analysis is not feasible, and would likely yield negative results even if it were. Note also that God, on account of her unimaginable power, and biblical precedent, should be able to provide direct empirical evidence of her existence, via physical manifestations, so that theoretically, the evidence could outweigh the very low prior probability, and would actually necessitate revising it.
87.
This criticism may be tenuous due to the anthropic principle, but it is still mathematically significant. Furthermore, as explained above, if God does not exist, the universe can be supposed as being necessary, in the sense of ‘ontological necessity’. Also, the universe’s existence is at least known, while God’s existence is not, so it is far more reasonable to declare that the universe is necessary than to declare that God is necessary.
88.
Merely claiming that ‘atheists’ would not feel comfortable with a necessary/uncaused universe is a poor justification indeed. Note that I generally use the phrase ‘begging the question’ in the broader sense of unjustified assumed explicit/implicit premises (which are, in fact, conclusions for lesser arguments), rather than the more specific sense of circular reasoning. Circular reasoning shall be indicated by the term, ‘circular reasoning’.
89.
Though he could not help it.
90.
Craig (RF), p. 111.
91.
Ibid., pp. 111–156; Craig (OG), pp. 73–104.
92.
Craig (OG), p. 71.
93.
Quentin Smith, “Kalam Cosmological Arguments for Atheism,” in The Cambridge Companion to Atheism, ed. Michael Martin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 183.
94.
Craig (RF), pp. 96–97. Craig discusses “the formulation of this argument by al-Ghāzalī (1058–1111)”. It is worth noting that a similar argument was around earlier, as evidenced by the great ‘Hindu’ philosopher Udayana’s Nyayakusumanjali.
95.
Ibid., p. 111.
96.
This has been altered for simplicity. The original text reads, “This cause is an uncaused, timeless, spaceless, immaterial, powerful Personal Creator”. See Craig (OG), p. 104. In Reasonable Faith, Craig concludes his section on this argument by describing it as the “kalām cosmological argument for God as the Personal Creator of the universe”. See Craig (RF), p. 156.
97.
Craig seems inconsistent in that he overlooks that the universe is a special case, when it suits him. Cf. “For the universe is here defined as the whole of material reality.” See William Lane Craig. “Causal Premiss of the Kalam Argument,” accessed 06/12/2013, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/causal-premiss-of-the-kalam-argument.
98.
Whatever Craig means by ‘begins’ and ‘causes’, quantum mechanics allows for completely counter-intuitive possibilities, as explained in the previous section, so that the first premise can already be doubted. But what Craig means by these terms can be deduced and poses far more serious problems.
99.
Craig (RF), p. 111.
100.
Ibid., p. 111.
101.
Cf. “the empirical evidence overwhelmingly confirms the principle that things do not come into existence uncaused out of nothing”. See William Lane Craig, “A Response to Grünbaum on Creation and Big Bang Cosmology,” Philosophia Naturalis 31(1994): 237–249.
102.
Hartshorne also saw the notion of God causing the world out of nothing to be “the phenomenon or supposed phenomenon of magic”, noting that there is no evidential basis for it, and opining that such an important matter should not rely on “a semantic quicksand”. See Charles Hartshorne, Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1984), p. 58.
103.
Craig (RF), p. 111.
104.
Ibid., p. 111–112.
105.
Lawrence Maxwell Krauss, A Universe from Nothing: Why There is Something Rather Than Nothing (New York: Free Press, 2012).
106.
“Popular magazine articles touting such theories as getting “something from nothing” simply do not understand that the vacuum is not nothing but is a sea of fluctuating energy endowed with a rich structure and subject to physical laws. Such models do not therefore involve a true origination ex nihilo”. See Craig (RF), p. 115.
107.
Ibid., p. 112. As discussed above, Craig uses a very similar example (p. 152) when it comes to countering critics who suppose that things, like horses, can come into being from nothing, naturally. Wondering why such naturally caused events are not observed, Craig may also wonder why such supernaturally caused events are similarly not observed. Furthermore, maybe other things do pop into being out of nothing, and Craig just cannot see them. They might be too small, outside the scope of human observations, not possible within this universe, and so on.
108.
Note also that we cannot equate a horse’s coming into existence in time/the universe with the coming into existence of time/the universe.
109.
Craig’s approach is inconsistent. He appeals to the data to support aspects of the first premise that he finds favourable, but overlooks the overwhelming data that scuppers his argument. Namely, that all observed ‘beginnings’ involve material causes (i.e., not nothing), as well as efficient causes. This statement of his seems appropriate: “Should we just ignore the uniform data of experience in support of premiss (1) and behave as if it were just as likely as its opposite? Talk about being blind to the evidence!” See William Lane Craig. “Objections to the Causal Principle,” accessed 13/12/2016, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/objections-to-the-causal-principle.
110.
Some may object to my altering Craig’s premises, but this is done in the interests of clarity and/or to speculate on other possibilities when the premise has already been rejected. Craig does indeed reveal that there may be more nuance in his premises, such as when he says that his first premise “leaves it an open question whether that cause is efficient or material”. See William Lane Craig. “Must Everything that Begins to Exist Have a Material Cause?,” accessed 12/12/2016, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/must-everything-that-begins-to-exist-have-a-material-cause. However, while the ‘efficient cause but no material cause’ scenario suits him, the ‘material cause but no efficient cause’ scenario clearly does not.
111.
Craig (RF), pp. 112–113.
112.
Ibid., p. 113.
113.
It is not particularly clear, what Craig thinks ‘nothing’ is, if anything at all, and how something can come from nothing, even if it was caused by God. He describes nothingness as having “literally no properties at all, since there isn’t anything to have any properties!” See Craig (OG), p. 76. Also, Craig never seems to explain why he favours creatio ex nihilo, which relies on such a tenuous concept, rather than the far more plausible creatio ex deo. He confuses the issue further, ultimately assuming creation out of nothing, yet also asserting that, “ex nihilo nihil fit”, “out of nothing nothing comes”, and that “If something has a cause, then it doesn’t come from nothing”. It seems Craig’s concept of ‘nothing’ is under-developed. See William Lane Craig. “Causal Premiss of the Kalam Argument,” accessed 06/12/2013, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/causal-premiss-of-the-kalam-argument; William Lane Craig, “Cosmos and Creator,” Origins & Design 17, no. 2 (1996), http://www.arn.org/docs/odesign/od172/cosmos172.htm. The concept of ‘nothing’ can be difficult to comprehend and describe, and it could be that Craig does not think that the universe came from nothing. However, his constant railing against things coming into existence “uncaused out of nothing” rather than simply ‘out of nothing’ indicates that he does believe that things, like the universe, can come from nothing, as long as they are caused. This also seems clear from his other writings, where he makes clear distinctions – and I agree with him on this – between creatio ex nihilo and creatio ex materia/deo. Craig upholds creatio ex nihilo. See Paul Copan and William Lane Craig, Creation Out of Nothing: A Biblical, Philosophical, and Scientific Exploration (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004), pp. 13–14ff. This seemingly indicates that Craig is not merely arguing for an efficient cause, but some sort of material cause also. If all these concepts involve ‘creation by God’, they have to differ somehow, and it seems that they differ based on the origins of the material of the universe, i.e., God’s ‘substance’, ‘nothing’, or some other material. Craig elsewhere rejects creatio ex deo and claims, “God is the efficient cause which produced the universe, and there was no material cause.” See William Lane Craig. “Must the Universe Have a Material Cause?,” accessed 12/12/2016, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/must-the-universe-have-a-material-cause. On some pantheistic models, the divine is also the material cause.
114.
Craig (RF), p. 113.
115.
Interestingly, the god of the Tanakh may not be eternal, depending on how Isaiah 43:10 is interpreted. That verse seemingly discusses a time ‘before’ and a time ‘after’ this god, which is more consistent with a polytheistic than a classical theistic view. That Yahweh, the Judeo-Christian god, was originally part of a polytheistic pantheon will be discussed in detail later.
116.
Craig (RF), p. 113.
117.
For example, see Ahmed Farag Ali and Saurya Das, “Cosmology from quantum potential,” Physics Letters B 741, no. 1 (2015): 276–279.
118.
Craig would agree that this substratum, whatever it is, is not nothing. He rightly declares, “if anything at all exists, however ethereal, it is something and therefore not nothing”. See Craig (RF), p. 151.
119.
Ibid., p. 113–114.
120.
Ibid., p. 114.
121.
Ibid., p. 114.
122.
Technically, if eternity is not a separate temporal dimension, then it is not necessarily true that things in eternity exist uncaused.
123.
Craig (RF), p. 114–115. Craig here also asserts that “not all scientists agree that sub-atomic events are uncaused”, which shows his acknowledgement that there are scientists who do think there are uncaused events. In support of his point, Craig then notes that there are many deterministic and non-deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics (all naturalistic), which actually demonstrates greater uncertainty; something Craig ought to avoid.
124.
He posits the following argument in The Best Argument Against God, and further explained his idea to me via email. See Graham Robert Oppy, The Best Argument Against God (Melbourne: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 26; Graham Oppy, personal communication, December 18, 2013. To clarify, if God exists, God belongs to ‘causal reality’ but not to ‘natural reality’. According to many non-theists, however, causal reality just is natural reality.
125.
This conclusion also creates problems for Craig’s contingency argument.
126.
Many questions arise. Does anything non-physical exist? Does anything physical exist? If a god exists, could it be said to be physical, as many pantheists and panentheists might assert? Could an existing god be a part of the universe, or even be the universe itself? Could a quantum vacuum or substratum out of which the universe originated be called the ‘universe’ too? Could this be a god?
127.
Craig (RF), p. 116. Cf. William Lane Craig, Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and Guide (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002), pp. 92–113.
128.
Craig (RF), pp. 116–117.
129.
Ibid., p. 117. Note that many powerful and admirable ideas have been ‘counter-intuitive’ and/or ‘absurd’, compassion for one. Another could be Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection. See Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species (London: Ward Lock & Co., 1911).
130.
Craig (RF), p. 120.
131.
Ibid., p. 118.
132.
Ibid., p. 119.
133.
Ibid., p. 119. Cf. Craig (PR), p. 96.
134.
Václav Potoček et al., “Quantum Hilbert Hotel,” Physical Review Letters 115, no. 16 (2015): doi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.115.160505. See also James East, “Infinity Minus Infinity,” Faith and Philosophy 30, no. 4 (2013): 429–433.
135.
Philipse (GAS), p. 224.
136.
Sobel (LT), p. 187.
137.
Newtonian physics is very useful, but is very often an approximation. It can become very inaccurate at the quantum level. An example of subverted intuitions would be the discovery that the atom is mostly empty space and does not have a rigid structure.
138.
“In many cases, these agedly absurd situations are just what one would ought to expect if there were large and small denumerable, physical infinities”. Indeed, this example merely demonstrates that infinites are counter-intuitive, not logically impossible. See Graham Robert Oppy, Philosophical Perspectives on Infinity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 48. Note also that zero minus zero (as well as multiplications with and divisions from zero) is or can be as absurd as some of the results Craig produces by subtracting from infinity, and yet he does not attempt to argue that zero or ‘nothing’ therefore cannot exist.
139.
Craig (RF), p. 119.
140.
For a discussion of the notorious problem concerning doors and goats, Marilyn vos Savant’s solutions to it, and several disgraceful – and erroneous – comments by professional mathematicians about vos Savant’s solutions, see Jason Rosenhouse, The Monty Hall Problem: The Remarkable Story of Math’s Most Contentious Brain Teaser (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). Rosenhouse does not name names, but the identities are easily discovered via quick online searches. Given the respective genders of vos Savant and her critics, it is hard not to perceive that misogyny played a role in the undue criticisms and ‘mansplaining’. The correct answer, by the way, is to ‘switch’, on account of new information received. Interestingly, Rosenhouse, a professor of mathematics, invokes Bayesian reasoning throughout.
141.
Craig also commits the related fallacy of division when he insinuates that a world in which actual infinities were possible would be “populated with oddities like Hilbert’s Hotel”. See Craig (RF), pp. 119–120.
142.
On such views, time is not some thing to be dissected and analysed, time just is; or rather, time is not. Contrast this with tensed views of time, such as the A-Theory.
143.
He makes his adherence to this view clear in William Lane Craig, Time and Eternity: Exploring God’s Relationship to Time (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2001).
144.
William Lane Craig. “Is the Material World all there is? Arguments for the Existence of God,” accessed 06/12/2013, http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2013/08/06/3819108.htm.
145.
Craig could say that past events did exist, but it does not follow that things that did exist (past events) or will exist (future events) can be subtracted or added to the only temporal thing that does exist (present event). If Craig’s presentism or A-theory (discussed shortly) is to be rejected, and some form of eternalism is true, then all events and things do exist simultaneously, though there would be no clear sequential order, so that the universe could not have had a beginning. Everything would be eternal and Craig’s overall argument is defeated. That Craig does not find that his ‘problems’ with infinite events in time should lead him away from presentist views perhaps reveals his theological presuppositions.
146.
Wes Morriston also recognises that “it does not immediately follow that infinite sets in general are impossible”. See Wes Morriston, “Craig on the Actual Infinite,” Religious Studies 38, no. 2 (2002): 148. Morriston is not the only Christian philosopher who disagrees with Craig about the kalām argument. See also Calum Miller’s and Danny Faulkner’s critiques.
147.
Craig (RF), p. 119.
148.
Note that Craig had earlier admitted that infinites are logically possible, which was noted by Oppy. Craig’s response was to highlight that this is not the same as admitting that infinites are ontologically possible. Craig’s stressing of this and his further comments seem particularly inappropriate, given his support for Plantinga’s ontological argument, which is discussed in §2.6. Concerning the latter argument, Craig demands that critics prove that God’s existence is impossible, so he should expect that critics would similarly demand that he proves that infinites are impossible. See William Lane Craig, “Graham Oppy on the kalām cosmological argument,” Sophia 32, no. 1 (1993): 1–11. Craig here also effectively admits that it is possible that things can begin to exist uncaused, but opposes such appeals to mere possibility. Craig actually appeals to mere possibility very frequently, as shall be discussed throughout. Incidentally, the sceptical agnostic is more justified in appealing to possibility than the proselytising and cocksure theist.
149.
Craig (RF), p. 120.
150.
Ibid., p. 113.
151.
Ibid., p. 120.
152.
Ibid., p. 121.
153.
The B-Theory’s being true would also nullify Craig’s first philosophical argument for the universe’s beginning.
154.
William Lane Craig and James D. Sinclair, “The Kalam Cosmological Argument,” in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, ed. William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp. 183–184.
155.
Craig (RF), p. 121.
156.
The same could be said for this project, that a thorough defense of the B-Theory would be expected. That does not follow, as this project is concerned with Craig’s overall case, and if theists are correct, and I am further doubtful that this problem will ever be solved, just as the issue of determinism may never be resolved.
157.
This is the chapter entitled “The Absurdity of Life without God”, which – as the title implies – is largely an argumentum ad consequentiam/baculum. See Craig (RF), pp. 65–90.
158.
Ibid., p. 121.
159.
Recall that Craig earlier acknowledged that this is “a matter of great controversy”.
160.
Craig doubtless realises the importance of the A-Theory of time to his case for God’s existence and would surely be aware of the implications of the B-Theory on free will. Furthermore, the book soon referenced is theologically motivated, as shall be demonstrated.
161.
Craig (TE), pp. 115–163.
162.
Ibid., p. 167.
163.
Ibid., p. 178.
164.
Ibid., p. 179. Several philosophers of science disagree: “We contend that his reconstruction of Lorentz’s theory and its historical development is fatally flawed and that his arguments for reviving this theory fail on many counts.” See Yuri Balashov and Michel Janssen, “Presentism and Relativity,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54, no. 2 (2003): 327–346.
165.
Craig (TE), p. 196.
166.
Ibid., p. 214. That the opening verses of Genesis refer to creatio ex nihilo is highly contentious, and not all Christians accept the doctrine.
167.
Ibid., p. 214.
168.
Ibid., pp. 214–215.
169.
‘Dressgate’ is a popular term for the controversy surrounding a photograph of a dress that went viral on the internet in 2015. Many observers disagreed over the colours of the dress. For more information about Dressgate, including links to a poll and a scientific explanation, see Susannah Guthrie. “#DressGate: what colours do you see?,” accessed 02/02/2015, http://thenewdaily.com.au/life/2015/02/27/colour-dress. Numerous other articles and associated comments reveal that the issue has caused arguments and that some (fundamentalist?) people refuse to acknowledge the ‘actual’ colours.
170.
A footnote to Plato: Cf. the Analogies of the Sun, the Divided Line, and the Cave.
171.
Kevin Healy et al., “Metabolic rate and body size are linked with perception of temporal information,” Animal Behaviour 86, no. 4 (2013): 685–696.
172.
For one example of an argument against presentism, see Gustavo E. Romero, “On the Ontology of Spacetime: Substantivalism, Relationism, Eternalism, and Emergence,” Foundations of Science, no. doi:10.1007/s10699-015-9476-1 (2015).
173.
PhilPapers. “The PhilPapers Surveys - All Respondents,” accessed 30/11/2013, http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl?affil=All+respondents&areas0=0&areas_max=1&grain=coarse.
174.
PhilPapers. “The PhilPapers Surveys - Philosophy of Religion,” accessed 30/11/2013, http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl?affil=All+respondents&areas0=22&areas_max=1&grain=coarse.
175.
Swinburne (EG), p. 138.
176.
J. Ellis McTaggart, “The Unreality of Time,” Mind 17, no. 68 (1908): 457–474. Again, the possibility of Craig’s ‘undifferentiated time’ or ‘metaphysical time’, which somehow only applies to God, is pertinent.
177.
This argument may also be subject to a problem faced by the first: conceiving of an infinite set on the model of a finite set. Adding, subtracting, and ‘traversing’ (as in ‘traversing the infinite’) are typically understood to being applicable to finite quantities and distances.
178.
For instance, that the universe, or hypothesised substratum, or singularity, is infinitely old according to ‘metaphysical time’, just as God may be.
179.
My preferred substratum hypothesis is not without precedent. There is Aristotle’s philosophical concept of the substratum, religious (typically pantheistic) models where this pre-universal substance may be a panentheistic or pandeistic god, and the scientific notion of the quantum vacuum. For a cosmological hypothesis wherein the universe originates from a quantum vacuum fluctuation, see Edward P. Tryon, “Is the Universe a Vacuum Fluctuation?,” Nature 246, no. 5433 (1973): 396–397.
180.
Craig’s colleague J. P. Moreland has offered several similar arguments in support of (2). For a critique of some of these arguments, see Felipe Leon, “Moreland on the Impossibility of Traversing the Infinite: A Critique,” Philo 14, no. 1 (2011): 32–42. One of the major criticisms is that Moreland effectively assumes that which he is supposed to prove.
181.
Throughout, the term ‘likelihood’ is used informally as a synonym for ‘probability’. The term will be employed more technically when discussing Bayesian analyses.
182.
Craig (RF), pp. 125–126.
183.
Ibid., p. 126.
184.
Ibid., p. 127.
185.
Ibid., p. 127.
186.
J. Richard Gott III et al., “Will the Universe Expand Forever?,” Scientific American, March 1976, 65.
187.
He had earlier indicated just that, supposing that “the initial cosmological singularity is not an existent… the singularity represents the point at which the universe ceases to exist… an object that has no spatial dimensions and has no temporal duration hardly seems to qualify as a physical object at all, but is rather a mathematical conceptualization.” This is, of course, numerously question-begging and results in special pleading for theism; surely Craig does not suppose that his ‘non-physical’ God is a mere ‘mathematical conceptualization’. Why an infinite and timeless singularity could be considered nothing while the infinite and timeless God would not be is left unexplained by Craig. See William Lane Craig and Quentin Smith, Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 227.
188.
George Smoot and Keay Davidson, Wrinkles in Time (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1993), p. 36.
189.
“Popular magazine articles touting such theories as getting “something from nothing” simply do not understand that the vacuum is not nothing but is a sea of fluctuating energy endowed with a rich structure and subject to physical laws. Such models do not therefore involve a true origination ex nihilo.” See Craig (RF), p. 115.
190.
Ibid., p. 128.
191.
It would be difficult, then, even if simplicity were truth-conducive, to claim that God should be the ultimate stopping point on account of God’s ‘simplicity’ (commonly justified by way of infinite properties), as the singularity may similarly be as ‘simple’.
192.
It is odd that Craig does not seriously consider such possibilities. He later admits that the singularity is timeless and strangely uses this as an analogy, to describe God: “The initial Big Bang singularity is not considered to be part of physical time, but to constitute a boundary to time. Nevertheless, it is causally connected to the universe. In an analogous way, we could say that God’s timeless eternity is, as it were, a boundary of time which is causally, but not temporally, prior to the origin of the universe”. See Craig (RF), p. 156.
193.
Ibid., p. 128.
194.
Ibid., p. 139–140.
195.
Ibid., p. 128–129.
196.
In what may literally be the biggest example of the pot calling the kettle black, Craig’s unsubstantiated theory that the Big Bang singularity is or derives from absolutely nothing is one of the most speculative theories of all. See ibid., p. 129–130. Craig may also be asking the wrong questions. He is greatly influenced by Leibniz’s famous assertion, that “The first question which should rightly be asked is: Why is there something rather than nothing?” See Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr von Leibniz, “The Principles of Nature and of Grace, Based on Reason,” in Leibniz Selections, ed. Philip Paul Wiener (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1951), p. 527. Instead of considering why there is something rather than nothing, he might consider why a state of nothingness should be preferred as the most natural scenario. For a compelling treatment of the something-nothing debate, including the flippancy of the intent of the Leibnizian question (which leads to the principle of sufficient reason that props up Craig’s contingency and kalām cosmological arguments), the need for classical theists to discuss the issue, and the assumptions commonly made about nothingness, see Purushottama Bilimoria, “Why Is There Nothing Rather Than Something? An Essay in the Comparative Metaphysic of Nonbeing,” Sophia 51, no. 4 (2012): 509–530. Interestingly, there is only truly one ‘nothing’ scenario, while there are infinitely many ‘something’ scenarios.
197.
Craig (RF), p. 131–132.
198.
Ibid., p. 133. There is no reason to suppose that it is impossible for this observable universe to be part of a greater multiverse. Interestingly, early humankind may have found it difficult to suppose that anything beyond the Earth, our solar system, or the Milky Way galaxy exists, just as animals deep underwater may be ignorant to the existence of land and what lies beyond. Similarly, given the expansion of the universe, it is plausible that the galaxies will become so distant that sentient beings assume that their galaxy is ‘the whole universe’ or the ‘totality of all there is’ when it clearly would not be.
199.
Ranga-Ram Chary’s analysis of the cosmic microwave background revealed anomalies that may have been caused by our universe’s collision with another. This does not prove the multiverse, but it is certainly better evidence than we have for God. See Ranga-Ram Chary, “Spectral Variations of the Sky: Constraints on Alternate Universes,” The Astrophysical Journal 817, no. 1 (2016): doi:10.3847/0004-3637X/3817/3841/3833.
200.
Craig (RF), p. 133.
201.
Ibid., p. 134–135.
202.
Ibid., p. 136–139. Note that Craig eagerly points out the flaws of alternative cosmological theories, which does nothing to address the possible cosmological scenarios not yet conceived. It seems then that Craig’s strategy does rely on some appeal to ignorance; he effectively presents a god-of-the-gaps argument.
203.
PewResearchCenter. “Section 4: Scientists, Politics and Religion,” accessed 09/02/2017, http://www.people-press.org/2009/07/09/section-4-scientists-politics-and-religion.
204.
Craig (RF), p. 140. There are also contemporary models avoiding the absolute beginning of the universe. See Anthony Aguirre and Steven Gratton, “Steady-State Eternal Inflation,” Physical Review D 65, no. 8 (2002): 1–7; Sean M. Carroll and Jennifer Chen, “Spontaneous Inflation and the Origin of the Arrow of Time,” no. arXiv:hep-th/0410270 (2004): 1–36.
205.
Arvind Borde, Alan H. Guth, and Alexander Vilenkin, “Inflationary Spacetimes are not Past-Complete,” Physical Review Letters 90, no. 10.1103/PhysRevLett.90.151301 (2003): 3–4.
206.
Alexander Vilenkin, “Creation of Universes from Nothing,” Physics Letters B117, no. 1–2 (1982): 25–28.
207.
“… the vacuum is not nothing but is a sea of fluctuating energy endowed with a rich structure and subject to physical laws. Such models do not therefore involve a true origination ex nihilo.” See Craig (RF), p. 115. Craig says as much while commenting on the very same Vilenkin article. See William Lane Craig, “The Caused Beginning of the Universe: A Response to Quentin Smith,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44, no. 4 (1993): 623–639.
208.
William Lane Craig, “Vilenkin’s Cosmic Vision: A Review Essay of Many Worlds in One: The Search for Other Universes,” Philosophia Christi 11, no. 1 (2009): 232–238.
209.
Alexander Vilenkin, Many Worlds in One: The Search for Other Universes, 1st ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006), p. 176.
210.
Robert B. Stewart, ed. God and Cosmology: William Lane Craig and Sean Carroll in Dialogue (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2016), p. 70.
211.
Victor J. Stenger, The Fallacy of Fine-Tuning: Why the Universe is not Designed for Us (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2011), pp. 127–130.
212.
William Lane Craig and Lawrence Maxwell Krauss, Life, the Universe and Nothing: Is it Reasonable to Believe there is a God? (Melbourne: City Bible Forum, 2013), Video recording.
213.
William Lane Craig. ““Honesty, Transparency, Full Disclosure” and the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin Theorem,” accessed 03/12/2013, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/honesty-transparency-full-disclosure-and-bgv-theorem.
214.
Ibid.
215.
Ibid.
216.
A speculative thought, but it could be significant that Craig addresses Vilenkin as ‘Prof. Vilenkin’, with Vilenkin addressing Craig as ‘Bill’. Vilenkin might not only be disagreeing with Craig, but subtly reminding him who the cosmological authorities are, just as he previously demarcated between theologians and scientists. See ibid.
217.
Ibid.
218.
Craig (RF), p. 140.
219.
Ibid., p. 150. Craig acknowledges that general relativity “breaks down” at the quantum level and that “no one is sure how this [subatomic physics] is to be done”. It is astounding then, that Craig continues to argue, with such certainty, that this points to an absolute beginning of the universe, from nothing. See Craig (OG), p. 91.
220.
Craig (RF), pp. 140–141.
221.
Such as the universe’s continual expansion preventing a state of equilibrium.
222.
Craig (RF), p. 143.
223.
Ibid., p. 142.
224.
Ibid., p. 142.
225.
Cf. Sean M. Carroll. “The Bayesian Second Law of Thermodynamics,” accessed 23/12/2016, http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2015/08/11/the-bayesian-second-law-of-thermodynamics.
226.
Lisa Dyson, Matthew Kleban, and Leonard Susskind, “Disturbing Implications of a Cosmological Constant,” Journal of High Energy Physics, no. arXiv:hep-th/0208013v3 (2002): 6.
227.
Ibid.: 18.
228.
Ibid.: 3.
229.
Ibid.: 3. Consider also that these laws do not apply at the Big Bang, and also that increasing entropy does not equate to decreasing order. For some discussion of the latter, see the Nobel Prize winning work of Prigogine concerning dissipative systems. As an example, see Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order Out of Chaos: Man’s New Dialogue with Nature (London: Heinemann, 1984).
230.
Craig (RF), p. 148. Cf. Craig (OG), p. 93. Craig acknowledges the possibility of thermal fluctuations and disequilibrium. Given infinite time, it is largely irrelevant how unlikely they might be.
231.
The same objection could be applied to Craig’s supernatural hypothesis. If the universe were created and finely tuned (discussed in the following section) for humankind, why is it bigger than the Milky Way galaxy, or even our solar system? We can also wonder why seemingly random and contingent events, like a meteor eliminating the dinosaurs, would be necessary for the development of humankind. This all seems unnecessary and inefficient. Perhaps God could have exerted less effort in crafting such an unnecessarily-large and old universe, most of which is inhospitable, and focussed more efforts on avoiding the problem of religious diversity and reducing gratuitous suffering. These themes will be discussed throughout.
232.
Craig (RF), p. 149.
233.
Ibid., p. 150.
234.
The theistic philosopher may demand an explanation for the complete series of infinite time-slices, though it is not obvious that one would be needed. The principle of collective causation only obviously holds for finite collections. Furthermore, the same may be demanded of God and his supposedly infinite metaphysical space/time.
235.
Craig (RF), p. 152.
236.
Ibid., p. 152. Note that nothing is known about immaterial or non-physical causation, so that it is not at all obvious that the only viable options must revolve around an external god or gods.
237.
Ibid., p. 152.
238.
Consider also a pantheistic scenario, where the universe is divine. Assuming no ‘external’ god is simpler than postulating an external god. Also, simplicity may not be the only factor in determining the appeal of a hypothesis. Explanatory power may also be critical, and yet Craig makes no attempt here to compare the explanatory power of the various god-models. I shall attempt this in Part 3. Interestingly, Sean Carroll explains that the God hypothesis complicates matters, and explains why most cosmologists are atheists (despite Craig’s using their work to support theism). See Sean M. Carroll, “Why (Almost All) Cosmologists are Atheists,” Faith and Philosophy 22, no. 5 (2005): 622–635. Note also that ‘one cause’ does not necessarily preclude the existence of more than one god.
239.
In fact, while Craig may not use it consistently, Ockham’s Razor can be useful in probabilistic analyses, especially when it aids in determining relative priors in Bayesian calculations. Cf. William H. Jefferys and James O. Berger, “Ockham’s Razor and Bayesian Analysis,” American Scientist 80, no. 1 (1992): 64–72.
240.
Nor could God’s being an unembodied mind be claimed to be simple, so that critics would not claim that the explanation needs an explanation. Perhaps this demonstrates simplicity of structure, but certainly also complexity of function. Even with these distinct notions, it is not clear how such complex functions could derive from so simple a structure.
241.
There are numerous examples of simpler theories being replaced by apparently more complex theories. In classical thought, for example, four or five elements were postulated, though scientists now identify approximately one hundred elements. Young-earth creationism has also been soundly discredited as an explanation for the diversity of species on Earth, by Darwin’s much more complex theory of evolution, which involves billions of years of mutations and bloodshed. Philosopher of science Peter Kosso explains that “Simplicity is clearly a pragmatic virtue, and for that reason it is a good thing to strive for. But we have yet to see the connection between being simple and being true”. See Peter Kosso, Reading the Book of Nature: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 46. Noting that equating truth and simplicity is groundless, van Fraassen argues along similar lines. See Bas C. van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980). For critiques on this notion relating to Philosophy of Religion (specifically Swinburne’s appeal to simplicity), see Julia Göhner, Marie I. Kaiser, and Christian Suhm, “Is Simplicity an Adequate Criterion of Theory Choice?,” in Richard Swinburne: Christian Philosophy in a Modern World, ed. Nicola Mößner, Sebastian Schmoranzer, and Christian Weidemann (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2008), pp. 33–46; Johannes Korbmacher, Sebastian Schmoranzer, and Ansgar Seide, “Simply False? Swinburne on Simplicity as Evidence of Truth,” in Richard Swinburne: Christian Philosophy in a Modern World, ed. Nicola Mößner, Sebastian Schmoranzer, and Christian Weidemann (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2008), pp. 47–60. Paul Draper’s concept of simplicity, concerning objective uniformity, is admitted by him as being controversial, and does not lead to the conclusion that one god is simpler than more than one. It does, however, lead to the conclusion that no god at all is simpler. See Paul Draper. “Natural Selection and the Problem of Evil,” accessed 03/07/2015, http://infidels.org/library/modern/paul_draper/evil.html. Interestingly, in a paper presented at Purdue University, Draper also expressed his doubts about Swinburne’s claims regarding theism’s alleged simplicity: “Swinburne needs to explain why being simple, or having a formulation that is simple, in any of the five ways he describes, makes the hypothesis more likely to be true.” See Paul Draper. “Simplicity and Natural Theology,” accessed 05/07/2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rb1GCxQAN1Y.
242.
This shall be elaborated in Part 3.
243.
For example, see the many revealing contributions in Thomas Jay Oord, ed. Theologies of Creation: Creatio Ex Nihilo and Its New Rivals (New York: Routledge, 2015).
244.
Craig would doubtless point to this being a ‘radical move’ by the ‘atheist’. My contemplations on the possible pre-universal substratum and various pantheistic gods are important, but not so relevant here (they are highly relevant in providing counter-examples to the second premise) as an ex nihilo beginning is assumed at this stage. For an interesting (and technical) treatment of one possible natural cause (though it may not refer to an absolute beginning in the Craigian sense), self cause, see Quentin Smith, “Kalam Cosmological Arguments for Atheism,” in The Cambridge Companion to Atheism, ed. Martin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
245.
Craig (RF), p. 152.
246.
Ibid., pp. 152–153.
247.
Craig has not adequately justified his perceptual distinction between the substance of the universe and whatever substance comprises God. Surely he cannot mean that God is made up of ‘nothing’. There is no good reason to assume that the universe is not of, or derives from, the same substance as the deity.
248.
Craig (RF), p. 153.
249.
Cf. Alexander R. Pruss, The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Reassessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 90–91.
250.
The separation of the mind and the body also cannot be justified by way of grammar. A person might claim that they ‘have’ a mind and that they ‘have’ a body. It would seem that the person is the mind/body, and to claim otherwise is to unnecessarily multiply entities, violating Craig’s beloved Ockham’s Razor. Interestingly, nobody looks at an image of himself or herself in a photograph, declaring, ‘that is my body’. Rather, they would say, ‘that is me’. See Philipse (GAS), p. 112. It is also not known if an immaterial thing could cause material things to exist.
251.
Craig (RF), pp. 153–154. See also William Lane Craig and James D. Sinclair, “The Kalam Cosmological Argument,” in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, ed. Craig and Moreland (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp. 193–194.
252.
Numerous problems arise due to the conflict of free will and immutability or changelessness, as well as omnipotence. If God can exercise her power and free will, it seems doubtful that God could be described as ‘changeless’.
253.
Craig (RF), p. 155.
254.
Ibid., p. 155.
255.
However, if an eternalist view of time is correct, this should count as evidence against theism, since God would not be obviously necessary.
256.
Craig (RF), p. 156.
257.
Compelling arguments relating to this latter notion have been developed. For example, see Matthew McCormick, “The Paradox of Divine Agency,” in The Impossibility of God, ed. Michael Martin and Ricki Monnier (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2003), pp. 313–325.
258.
Such thinking could potentially lead to a monistic or pantheistic model, if we see the universe as being all or a part of god.
259.
Claiming that creating is a good is arbitrary, as the opposite can be said to be true, and in this case seems reasonable. Also, God’s intentions take on additional importance when considering her omnipotence. If he wills it, it is done.
260.
Or so thought humorist Douglas Adams, in Douglas Adams, The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy (London: Pan Books, 1979).
261.
This sort of defence has been used for millennia, as can be seen in the chronicling and commentaries of God’s treatment of Job. See Job 11, Isaiah 55:8–9. Craig does make use of this defence, particularly when countering the argument from evil: “God could have overriding reasons for allowing the suffering in the world”. See Craig (OG), p. 156. Cf. “because of our limitations in space and history, we may not see God’s purposes emerge in our lifetime. Therefore we’re not in a good position to assess the probabilities of why He permitted a certain evil”. Strangely, immediately prior Craig attempts to distance himself from the claim that ‘God is mysterious’, though this amounts to the same thing. See William Lane Craig and Kai Nielsen. “Does God Exist? The Craig-Nielsen Debate,” accessed 05/02/2014, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/does-god-exist-the-craig-nielsen-debate.
262.
This retreat to mysteriousness is thus highly counter-intuitive. Not only can the believer no longer hope to present a good inductive case for God’s existence, they would seemingly have good reasons for altering their status as a believer.
263.
For example, most humans are not Judeo-Christians. Also, would a deceiving god still be considered omnibenevolent? Perhaps, but by some unknown – though obviously very good – reason.
264.
God’s omniscience entails that God would know what would happen and can also experience any associated positive feelings indirectly, though this relies on a disputed notion of omniscience. For a discussion of different interpretations of the term ‘omniscience’, see Joseph Runzo, “Omniscience and Freedom for Evil,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12, no. 3 (1981): 131–147.
265.
Furthermore, if there is no beginning at all, certain (non-pandeistic and perhaps non-panentheistic) versions of pantheism are more plausible still, as shall be explored in §3.5. This reveals the catch-all ‘hypothesis’ of pantheism to be very robust. There is a coherent pantheistic scenario for almost any set of evidence (including that god ‘no longer’ exists, as in pandeism), which is not the case for theism.
266.
Craig could argue that the explanatory scope of his theistic hypothesis is so vast that there is no relevant background knowledge and a low prior probability cannot be assigned. Whilst it does not avoid the problem of alternative god-concepts, such a strategy would otherwise be unadvisable, as then the hypothesis would be open to innumerable possibilities for disconfirmation, and might be expected to predict trivial future events, such as at what time Craig will eat breakfast tomorrow. In reality, the hypothesis that simply says ‘God did it’ is the answer that answers everything that answers nothing; it has a very limited explanatory scope. Cf. Philipse (GAS), pp. 207–212.
267.
Ibid., p. 246.
268.
This concept is expanded in §3.3, though charitably and necessarily with relatively smaller numbers, compared with infinity. Craig should meet this with agreement, as he disputes the existence of actual infinites.
269.
Craig is comfortable with this principle, and even invokes it when elaborating on his fine-tuning argument. See Craig (RF), p. 164. Note also that he could have done this when he was worried about the apparently inscrutable priors in a Bayesian analysis, on pp. 54–55. He also alludes to inscrutable figures on pp. 275–280.
270.
The first principle is used due to insufficient background knowledge; all possibilities are thus to be considered equiprobable. They might not be, of course, but with the limited evidence we have, and our desire to avoid a simple agnosticism (this actually suits the atheist, but not the theist attempting to demonstrate theism’s being probably true), this is the best that we can hope for. Recall that Bayesian reasoning does not necessarily reveal the truth; it declares what is most reasonable to believe based on the currently available – and admittedly very limited – evidence. While there are those that declare that in full generality the principle of indifference is false, often appealing to the paradox of Joseph Bertrand, this need not apply to a subjectivist Bayesian or frequentist approach, and there are also those that defend the principle. For example, see Greg Novack, “A Defense of the Principle of Indifference,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 39, no. 6 (2010): 655–678; Wolfgang Tschirk, “The Principle of Indifference Does Not Lead to Contradictions,” International Journal of Statistics and Probability 5, no. 4 (2016): 79–83. In any case, we either invoke the principle and continue with our calculations, or the theist can admit agnosticism, and thus, admit failure. The second principle is used, as the prior probabilities of all exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses must add to 100%. As such, each prior is almost zero.
271.
Swinburne adds that questions over cooperation make polytheistic explanations less simple. This does not necessarily affect the background knowledge, however, as it alludes to a complete unknown. See Swinburne (EG), p. 147. There are even reasons to think that the lack of co-operation/uniformity in the world could increase polytheism’s probability.
272.
A similar Bayesian argument concerning apparent design shall be considered in the following section.
273.
Quentin Smith, “A Big Bang Cosmological Argument for God’s Nonexistence,” Faith and Philosophy 9, no. 2 (1992): 217–237. Craig’s response is partly to deny the singularity’s existence, which is unconvincing and arbitrary given the Standard Model he endorses. See William Lane Craig, “God and the Initial Cosmological Singularity: A Reply to Quentin Smith,” Faith and Philosophy 9, no. 2 (1992): 238–248. Note that this scenario poses no problems to a pandeistic god-as-singularity who is content to allow her fate to be determined by chance. Nor would it pose a problem to a hypothesised morally indifferent god who may prefer the excitement of random processes. In fact, ceteris paribus, based on the evidence of the singularity, both these alternatives would seem more plausible than theism.
274.
As indicated earlier, this strategy produces a theory that better fits the current evidence, but that also must contend with a higher prior improbability, so that the overall probability is not actually raised.
275.
Without needing to resort to a technical discussion on the logic of counterfactuals, the proposition that God could have opted for a more direct route holds also when the theist claims, ad hoc, that God’s omniscience allowed her to know that the desired universe would result out of the lawless and random singularity, without the need for intervention. For a public disagreement on theistic counterfactuals between Smith and Craig, see Quentin Smith, “Atheism, Theism and Big Bang Cosmology,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69, no. 1 (1991): 48–66; William Lane Craig, “God and the Initial Cosmological Singularity: A Reply to Quentin Smith,” Faith and Philosophy 9, no. 2 (1992): 238–248.
276.
Given the failure of this first cause argument, Craig may wish to argue for a sustaining cause of the universe, as Swinburne does. This would also violate Ockham’s Razor, as Rundle explains: “no form of causation, divine or otherwise, is in general required to ensure persistence in being”. See Rundle (WTSRN), p. 93.
277.
This is a problematic analogy. For one, it is known that watches have intelligent designers and manufacturers, a multitude of them, in fact, while the environs can be comfortably explained, naturally. Curiously, Paley thought that this designer/s had a designer, so that critics may wonder if the otherworldly Designer was also designed. Note that to assert that what applies to the watch must apply to the universe also is to commit the fallacy of composition. The watch was also created ex materia by a bodied person or persons, who was not all-knowing, all-powerful or all-good; the postulated creator/designer of the universe need not be either. Moreover, there appears to be something self-defeating about a disanalogous example that relies on the surprise of finding an obviously-designed watch or similar item amid stones, sand and water, when the theist assumes that those other things were also designed. See Craig (RF), pp. 101–103; William Paley and Frederick Ferré, Natural Theology: Selections (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), pp. 3–4. For more discussion of Paley’s watchmaker argument, including the importance of background knowledge, see Oppy (AAG), pp. 174–187.
278.
Craig (RF), pp. 157–172; Craig (OG), pp. 105–126.
279.
Steven Weinberg, Facing Up: Science and its Cultural Adversaries (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 232.
280.
Craig (RF), p. 157.
281.
Manson takes issue with the term, ‘fine-tuned for life’. See Neil A. Manson, “There Is No Adequate Definition of ‘Fine-tuned for Life’,” Inquiry 43, no. 3 (2000): 341–352.
282.
Craig (RF), p. 158.
283.
Ibid., p. 159.
284.
Ibid., pp. 160–161.
285.
Ibid., p. 161.
286.
Ibid., p. 159.
287.
Alonso Ricardo, “Self-Replication (Chemical),:” in Encyclopedia of Astrobiology, ed. Muriel Gargaud, et al. (Berlin: Springer, 2011), pp. 1501–1502.
288.
Tracey A. Lincoln and Gerald F. Joyce, “Self-Sustained Replication of an RNA Enzyme,” Science 323, no. 5918 (2009): 1229–1232.
289.
Philosopher David Benatar also challenges the assumption that human life is a good. He essentially argues that only a life free of pain and suffering would be good, and that non-existence inherently does away with the issue of ‘deprived goods’. See David Benatar, Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Cf. Christoph Fehige’s antifrustrationism and Peter Singer’s preference utilitarianism. Interestingly, Ecclesiastes 4:1–3 indicates that the dead are happier than the living, and those not born have it best of all, as they have avoided exposure to evil. This raises questions about why an all-good God would commit such an apparent evil in creating us, and in tampering with the presumably perfect pre-Creation world.
290.
Perhaps, unlike humans, their sins were unforgivable.
291.
No sufficient reason is given for why the constants and quantities may be altered, with all else (namely, the laws of nature) being equal. Possibly adding to the confusion is that ‘the natural laws’ are merely descriptive, and it would seem obvious that different universes would be described differently. It is unknown if changes can be made to the parameters without also changing ‘the laws’. See Craig (RF), p. 159.
292.
Ibid., p. 159.
293.
A number of philosophers realise that the ‘local area’ needs to be specified, non-arbitrarily. See Mark Colyvan, Jay L. Garfield, and Graham Priest, “Problems With the Argument from Fine Tuning,” Synthese 145, no. 3 (2005): 329.
294.
Another interesting possibility is that the shooter aimed for the blank area, and only accidentally hit the fly therein. The creation of humans might have been a mistake, by a less than perfect deity.
295.
William Lane Craig. “Does the Vastness of the Universe Support Naturalism?,” accessed 11/07/2016, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/does-the-vastness-of-the-universe-support-naturalism.
296.
Craig (RF), p. 160.
297.
Ibid., p. 161. The term ‘fine-tuning’ may, to many people, indicate design to some extent. It seems to imply that the universe has somehow conspired to produce human life. From another perspective, rather than contemplating the ‘mystery’ of the universe being ‘fine-tuned for humans’, the philosopher could contemplate the far less surprising notion of humans, and whatever else exists in the universe, merely complying with the limitations of the universe, and being ‘allowed’ to exist. For example, stones, slugs, and insects, who are far more numerous than humans, also comply with the universe’s parameters, yet nobody seems to wonder about the universe’s being miraculously ‘fine-tuned’ for slugs. And yet, if it is less surprising that simple life exists, the philosopher might consider that it ought not be surprising that more advanced life exists, given well-known evolutionary processes. Note also that if Earth were annihilated, the rest of the universe would be relatively unaffected. From this perspective, it may be easier to accept that intelligent or human life is a fortuitous side effect; after all, a life-permissible universe might still not yield life. Those clumps of molecules that do not comply, fail. Fortuitous side effects are common in pharmacology; the experimental drug designed to combat hypertension, sildenafil, is an example, and is now commonly known as Viagra. Such is the power of perspective. Some may find prolonged penile erection an uncomfortable side-effect, preferring the previously primary anti-hypertensive properties of the drug (which are now ironically perceived as being dangerous side-effects), and others will see the side-effect as being the desirable primary effect. See Nicholas K. Terrett et al., “Sildenafil (Viagra), a Potent and Selective Inhibitor of Type 5 CGMP Phosphodiesterase with Utility for the Treatment of Male Erectile Dysfunction,” Bioorganic & Medicinal Chemistry Letters 6, no. 15 (1996): 1819–1824.
298.
Craig’s theistic colleague, T. J. Mawson, agrees that this supposition is crucial to the success of fine-tuning arguments. See T. J. Mawson, “The Case Against Atheism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Atheism, ed. Stephen Bullivant and Michael Ruse (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 30.
299.
That human life is an unpleasant side effect of a universe fine-tuned for cockroaches is plausibly demonstrable. Cockroaches predate and outnumber humans, thrive in varying conditions, and do not – yet – threaten the destruction of their planet with nuclear weaponry. Indeed, humans may destroy themselves through nuclear warfare, possibly catalysed by arguments over which non-existent god granted what disputed piece of land to which group of people. The cockroaches endure, eventually helping to rebuild the injured planet, restoring it to former (pre-human) glories. In actuality, while some cockroaches did seemingly survive the nuclear attack on Hiroshima, today’s sophisticated weaponry would likely destroy them as well. A more promising candidate for survival is the appropriate named Deinococcus radiodurans. See May Berenbaum, “Rad Roaches,” American Entomologist 47, no. 3 (2001): 133.
300.
Craig (RF), p. 161.
301.
As Oppy notes, we could consider ‘brute contingency’, which is not equivalent to ‘chance’. This could be the result of uniform symmetry breaking in the early universe (personal communication, May 12, 2015).
302.
Craig (RF), p. 160.
303.
For example, Craig is listed as a fellow on the Discovery Institute website. See DI. “Fellows,” accessed 18/01/2017, http://www.discovery.org/about/fellows. Craig lauds William Paley’s “conclusive” and thorough “evidence of design”, found “throughout the animal and plant kingdoms”, despite Darwin’s theory of evolution by way of natural selection offering a highly plausible and natural explanation, and also fails to applaud Darwin’s monumental achievement, finding only time to criticise “neo-Darwinism”. See Craig (RF), pp. 101, 157. For some criticisms of intelligent design, particularly on the key concept of ‘irreducible complexity’, see Oppy (AAG), pp. 187–200. Note that half an eye (photoreceptors, for example), part of a wing, and so forth, can be very advantageous to various creatures at certain times, even if they become less useful for future descendants. Also, compared with the eye of a bird, the human eye may be perceived as being ‘half an eye’. Anthropocentrism again seems to play too large a role. Finally, the eye seems very unintelligently designed and inefficient, which is more expected on naturalism.
304.
Craig (RF), p. 161.
305.
He also misinterprets Stephen Hawking as arguing that physical necessity is “a vain hope”, when his quotations of Hawking only reveal that string theory cannot provide scientists with all the answers. That does nothing to show that the physical necessity option is impossible or implausible. See ibid., p. 162. Note also the irony that Craig himself believes in a Theory of Everything, which lacks evidence: theism.
306.
The alternative in this case could be a necessary universe (this universe is necessary in all aspects), or simply a universe that necessarily permits life.
307.
Craig goes on to make the very strong (and fallacious) claim that “all the evidence indicates that life-prohibiting universes are not only possible but far, far more likely than any life-permitting universe”. See Craig (OG), p. 113.
308.
Note that this would entail a multiverse, which could then be argued as being necessary, and again, the contingency of the multiverse cannot be demonstrated. This is a similar tactic to that employed by Craig in critiquing multiverse objections to his attempted refutation of the chance hypothesis; he claims that the hypothesised multiverse would be fine-tuned. Craig (inconsistently) uses approaches that aid him in his objections to certain alternatives, while they would hinder him concerning others.
309.
Introducing ‘God’ before Craig does (it is his ultimate conclusion in any case) presents no serious problems for this critique.
310.
Collins presents a Bayesian teleological argument, which shall be examined in the Bayesian analysis subsection. See Robin Collins, “The Teleological Argument: An Exploration of the Fine-Tuning of the Universe,” in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, ed. Craig and Moreland (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).
311.
Craig (RF), p. 164.
312.
As earlier indicated, Craig would be aided by demonstrating the existence of other universes that are not life permitting. That would confirm this universe’s improbability, yet would simultaneously ‘justify’ its existence.
313.
Craig (RF), p. 164. Swinburne also believes in the relative improbability of this universe, but acknowledges that this cannot yet be quantified. See Swinburne (EG), p. 182.
314.
The desired extent of the constraints would no doubt differ greatly between proponents and critics of theistic design.
315.
Victor J. Stenger, God - The Failed Hypothesis: How Science Shows that God does not Exist (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007), pp. 148–149. Stenger further criticises teleological arguments in a later book. See Stenger (FFT). Also, the theist might suppose that tweaking one constant will inhibit life, but that might necessarily be accompanied by other tweaks, which results in another combination of constants that allows life.
316.
Craig (RF), p. 163. Note that there could be an unimaginable amount of universes so that life-permitting universes are not truly improbable, but almost unavoidable. See Andrei Linde and Vitaly Vanchurin, “How Many Universes are in the Multiverse?,” Physical Review D 81, no. 8 (2010): 83525.
317.
Craig reinforces his point with Leslie’s analogy of “your” unlikely survival while being fired upon by numerous trained marksmen. This is a false analogy (for example, it is certainly improbable that all the marksmen missed, but the improbability of life-permitting universes is unknown) and a detailed refutation is unnecessary, as it is commonly accepted that the anthropic principle does not fully explain the universe or argue for the high probability of life-permitting universes. Indeed, the conditions necessary to observe fine-tuning say nothing of the causes of it. We could also ask why we ought to assume a firing squad exists at all. See Craig (RF), pp. 165–166.
318.
A related question may be, “What is life?” It may be something that, like human life, is not objectively significant. Scientists still have not been able to decisively draw a distinction between life and non-life, allowing for the possibility that such a distinction may not actually exist (as with the mind-body distinction). See Jack W. Szostak, “Attempts to Define Life Do Not Help to Understand the Origin of Life,” Journal of Biomolecular Structure and Dynamics 29, no. 4 (2012): 599–600. The possibly illusory nature of life may also support monistic (i.e., pantheistic) models, rather than theistic or polytheistic models. This is a complex question, and the following could be considered: the confusion over whether viruses are living beings, the notion of robots developing intelligence and emotions equal to that of humans (or at least other animals), and also the possibility – perhaps best illustrated by plants transforming light and soil nutrients into ‘living material’ – that there is no such thing as life; all we observe is a transformation of one form of energy/matter to another.
319.
Craig (RF), p. 164.
320.
Ibid., p. 165.
321.
See ibid., p. 165. Please note that due to racial sensitivities, I have replaced Craig’s white and black balls with red and blue balls (as per his earlier dot analogy), respectively, similar to how I avoid exclusively referring to God as a man so that those of other genders are not unnecessarily offended. Notably, Craig eventually reverses the colours in his later work, associating the single black ball with life, and the numerous white balls with death. See Craig (OG), p. 115.
322.
Perhaps if all of the very few red balls rolled down successively, there would be more cause to be suspicious, though that too is one of many possibilities. The origin of life, even simple life, only had to happen once, whether on this planet or elsewhere in the universe. From there, Darwin’s theory of evolution by way of natural selection largely explains ‘complex’ or ‘intelligent’ life. It is also possible that this universe, if oscillating, has had numerous ‘attempts’ at becoming life permitting. Note that most outcomes can be said to be improbable (such as that a man’s mother gave birth to him), but it does not follow that the hypotheses they are conditioned upon must also be improbable (such as this man’s mother giving birth).
323.
Craig and his peers typically place a very high (objective) value on human life; the largely inhospitable universe may not agree. To those who are not so sure of the primacy of human existence, such arguments should not be convincing at all.
324.
He also seems to indicate his opinion that Vilenkin’s model provides the “best shot” at a plausible multiverse hypothesis. See Craig (RF), pp. 166–167. Recall also that Craig is committed to the A-Theory of time.
325.
Ibid., p. 168.
326.
David K. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). Modal realism merged with the theory of infinite possible universes yields interesting results. Note that Craig should not necessarily reject the notion of infinite (and possibly eternal) actualised universes, given his assertions that infinity is simpler than some arbitrary finite number, at least in matters of the divine (this infinity of actualised universes could be a pantheistic god). Note that if there are indeed infinitely many universes, probabilistic reasoning may not be particularly helpful, as the chance of any such universe existing would be around zero (if infinitely many universes are merely possible), or because any improbable event happens very regularly (if the infinitely many universes are actualised). But then there will be universes where probabilistic reasoning seems very useful a lot of the time; we happen to be in one.
327.
Such scenarios might even me more parsimonious, as ‘limitations’ would not need to be explained.
328.
Any percentage is possible here. Craig might also interject, correctly, that a multiverse that includes only one life-permitting universe is itself a fine-tuned life-permitting multiverse. This claim would be vacuous, however, as such a multiverse would be ‘fine-tuned’ for all (or many) possibilities, so that the concept loses power, thus presenting no obvious challenges to chance or multiverse hypotheses. This also echoes my notion in the previous subsection, which says that a necessary multiverse might be filled with what prima facie appear to be unnecessary universes. Craig does make the ‘fine-tuned multiverse’ claim in his more recent On Guard. See Craig (OG), pp. 117–118.
329.
Craig (RF), p. 169.
330.
See for example Lee Smolin, “Did the Universe Evolve?,” Classical and Quantum Gravity 9, no. 1 (1992): 173–191.
331.
Matt Young and Paul K. Strode, Why Evolution Works (and Creationism Fails) (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2009), p. 171.
332.
This is not an endorsement of exceedingly primitive forms of Young Earth Creationism. It might also be expected that clear messages would exist on Earth or in the heavens, in lieu of the uninspiring, accidental nature of nature. Cf. Benjamin S. Cordry, “Theism and the Philosophy of Nature,” Religious Studies 42, no. 3 (2006): 273–274. For example, God may have crafted constellations to read “God loves you”, rather than having them vaguely resembling frying pans or, counter-productively, creatures of ‘pagan’ Greco-Roman mythology. Appropriately, mountain ranges could reveal permanent engravings of the Ten Commandments. Cf. Deuteronomy 9:10.
333.
William Lane Craig. “Does the Vastness of the Universe Support Naturalism?,” accessed 11/07/2016, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/does-the-vastness-of-the-universe-support-naturalism. Note that Craig here leaves out the background information “for simplicity’s sake”, though it further tips the scales away from theism. Also, a similar point could be made about the unnecessarily low – but still non-zero – entropy of the initial state of the universe.
334.
Craig (OG), p. 119.
335.
Craig (RF), pp. 169–170.
336.
Ibid., p. 170. Craig also makes the surprising claim that “to be rationally acceptable, the many worlds hypothesis needs God”. See Craig (OG), p. 120.
337.
This is not a slight on Dawkins, but a comment on his fields of expertise. While it is fashionable for the intelligentsia to heavily criticise Dawkins, I do not join the bandwagon, and even commend his efforts in promoting ‘atheist pride’. He says, “Being an atheist is nothing to be apologetic about. On the contrary, it is something to be proud of, standing tall to face the far horizon, for atheism nearly always indicates a healthy independence of mind and, indeed, a healthy mind. There are many people who know, in their heart of hearts, that they are atheists, but dare not admit it to their families or even, in some cases, to themselves. Partly, this is because the very word ‘atheist’ has been assiduously built up as a terrible and frightening label.” See Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (London: Bantam, 2006), pp. 3–4.
338.
Craig (RF), p. 170.
339.
Ibid., p. 170; Dawkins (GD), pp. 157–158. Craig continues to avoid presenting a positive case for design, instead preferring to criticise Dawkins, in his later work. See Craig (OG), pp. 120–123.
340.
This is supposed to be a case for design, not a case for the inadequacy of an irrelevant argument presented by a non-expert. Craig’s misguided attempt to pick low-hanging fruit is regrettable. Perhaps Craig perceives Dawkins, on account of his fame, as being some authority figure for all who might disagree with his arguments (though some of those are Christian theists). He also criticises Dawkins’ handling of the ontological argument. See Craig (RF), p. 183.
341.
Ibid., p. 171. Craig seems to apply this principle inconsistently, asserting that the possible multiverse – an explanation for the universe – itself would be fine-tuned, indicating that it too needs an explanation.
342.
Ibid., p. 171.
343.
The reader might suppose that his second comment on Dawkins’ objection is relevant to the plausibility of the design hypothesis, though Craig himself acknowledges that this “raises all sorts of questions about the role played by simplicity in assessing competing explanations” (which would have served him well in his previous arguments), imploring the reader to “leave those questions aside”. See ibid., p. 171. On p. 172, Craig again makes clear that he is not in this case arguing for his hypothesis’ plausibility, saying that, “postulating a divine mind behind the universe most definitely does represent an advance in simplicity, for whatever that is worth”. Emphasis mine. Contrary to his earlier claims, Craig asserts that simplicity may not be particularly important when assessing competing theories. See Craig (OG), p. 123.
344.
Those pointing to the lack of cameras at the time ought to remind themselves that the posited designer just created the entire universe. Related comments could be made about video recordings of Jesus’ miracles and the like. Such evidence would be particularly impressive, if available before humans had invented video. Similarly, I am not the first to notice that the biblical texts seem only to be aware of technologies and facts that were commonly employed and known at the time.
345.
Of course, many religious adherents believe that the Sun is divine. They would probably not be theists, however.
346.
Craig (RF), p. 172.
347.
This is all the more surprising given Craig’s mentioning of Dawkins’ “lack of philosophical depth”, and his indication that Dawkins presents what may be the worst atheistic argument. See Craig (OG), pp. 121, 123.
348.
William Lane Craig, “The Teleological Argument and the Anthropic Principle,” in The Logic of Rational Theism: Exploratory Essays, ed. William Lane Craig and Mark S. McLeod, Problems in Contemporary Philosophy (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), pp. 127–153; William Lane Craig. “Transcript: Fine Tuning Argument,” accessed 17/08/2016, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/transcript-fine-tuning-argument; William Lane Craig. “Excursus on Natural Theology Part 17: The Teleological Argument Part 4,” accessed 17/08/2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vigLbIn4qAA. Dawkins is again focussed on in the latter reference.
349.
Craig interestingly quotes Aristotle in commenting that the grandeur of the world indicated the “handiwork of the gods”. See Craig (RF), p. 101. Emphasis mine.
350.
In the Septuagint, it appears that there are seventy gods to rule over seventy nations, with one of the gods being Yahweh, the god later associated with Christian theism. See Deuteronomy 32:8–9. William Paley’s ‘watch-maker argument’ also allowed for polytheistic scenarios: “there must have existed, at some time, and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers”. See Paley and Ferré (NTS), p. 4. Emphasis mine.
351.
Tooley discusses numerous aspects of ‘bad design’ relating to pain sensations, such as not deactivating when the subject is alerted to bodily damage, and not activating in certain life-threatening instances. See Alvin Plantinga and Michael Tooley, Knowledge of God (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), pp. 111–112.
352.
See, for example, Gordon G. Gallup, Rebecca L. Burch, and Tracy J. Berene Mitchell, “Semen displacement as a sperm competition strategy,” Human Nature 17, no. 3 (2006): 253–264.
353.
Cf. Leviticus 20:10, Deuteronomy 22:22, Romans 7:2–3, and Quran 4:24.
354.
Oppy (AAG), p. 207.
355.
Given the minuscule space and time that the human species occupies, it could be argued that human life is certainty not the universe’s most pressing concern. Indeed, much of the universe is inhospitable to human life, so that it may be supposed that it is fine-tuned for human death. Furthermore, there are numerous extinct species in the evolutionary history of Homo sapiens. This inefficiency may be unlikely if a Designer intended for humans to live, but would be exactly what is expected if human life were not such a great objective. The same can be said for instances of ‘poor design’. Despite these concerns, the universe does indeed permit human life, and is thusly ‘fine-tuned’. Though it is also ‘fine-tuned’ for the existence of faeces, so that the concept of fine-tuning becomes less awe-inspiring.
356.
Elliott Sober, “The Design Argument,” in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Religion, ed. William Mann (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005); Michael Ikeda and William H. Jefferys, “The Anthropic Principle Does Not Support Supernaturalism,” in The Improbability of God, ed. Michael Martin and Ricki Monnier (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2006); Elliott Sober, “Absence of evidence and evidence of absence: evidential transitivity in connection with fossils, fishing, fine-tuning, and firing squads,” Philosophical Studies 143, no. 1 (2009): 63–90.
357.
Note also that if the theist may wish to overlook this vital piece of background evidence it becomes enormously difficult to assert that God would and/or did fine-tune the universe for human life, so that the entire argument is undermined.
358.
Isaiah 28:21, 55:8, Mark 4:26–29.
359.
The theistic critic might then declare that we would not know if the universe was fine-tuned or not; maybe it really is all held together by God’s ‘magic’. Firstly, this appears to be a devastating and counter-intuitive retreat, as the overall argument would be undermined, on account of its assumption of fine-tuning. If not, perhaps because I falsely equate ‘fine-tuning’ with ‘physical fine-tuning’ or ‘natural fine-tuning’, but note that we are unable to distinguish between the latter option/s and ‘magic’. Also, referring to ‘magic’ is certainly begging the question in favour of supernaturalism. This also wreaks havoc with the first premise since we would have the incoherent notion of naturalistic options explaining supernaturalistic ‘fine tuning’. At best for the theist, we can retreat a step and say that both hypotheses are equally likely; the fine-tuning argument is still unhelpful to the theist. Secondly, my point could be ontological, not epistemological, so may not be dependant on our knowing or observing that the universe is or is not fine-tuned, so that my argument might only need minor tweaking in this case. Nevertheless, both contentions seem reasonable. If we exist and God does not, natural fine-tuning must have occurred. If we exist and God also exists, it is not a given that such fine-tuning occurred. There is also the possibility that God obscures the evidence of the ‘magic hypothesis’ and intends to deceive us, but that hardly looks like (the all-good) God anymore.
360.
God supposedly sustained the lives of Jonah, and Daniel’s associates (Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego), despite them being in environments (digestive acid and fire, respectively) inhospitable to human life. See Jonah 1:17-3:1, Daniel 3:19–28. Consider also that Heaven would likely not rely on the sort of natural fine-tuning we observe in the universe.
361.
Arguing along similar lines, Kelly Clark is far less charitable, seemingly claiming that P(e|~h.b), despite b kindly including the knowledge of God’s intentions to create persons, is effectively zero. Indeed, as God could have created the universe with any values for the constants, theism seems to explain no better than naturalism, the seeming improbability of the fact that the universe’s constants and quantities are set at the values they are. See Kelly James Clark, “The Explanatory Power of Theism,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 25, no. 3 (1989), p. 134. Note that if the existing god lacks the intention to create humans, or rather, specifically wishes to avoid creating human or intelligent life, P(e|~h.b) will be exactly zero. The unknowable intentions of the divine are clearly of great import, as it would appear impossible to argue for supernaturalism or theism in a probabilistic manner.
362.
Note that in this paragraph e could be replaced with b, depending on whether the theist focuses on the evidence of the fine-tuned universe or on the fact that we exist in a life-permitting universe, which are not equivalent.
363.
And just as with miracles, observers might be unsure if something unnatural really did occur. The woes of arguing for God in a scientific and probabilistic fashion.
364.
As mentioned before, at this stage, the theist could object that we could not decide whether our existence is due to natural fine-tuning or God’s magic. Of course, that means that neither side can appeal to fine-tuning, or the lack thereof. However, it does seem that the appearance of natural fine-tuning should still count against God’s existence, as God would surely not be expected to make it harder for her creations to believe in her.
365.
Craig (RF), p. 160. Craig actually edited the essay. See Robin Collins, “The Teleological Argument: An Exploration of the Fine-Tuning of the Universe,” in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, ed. Craig and Moreland (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp. 202–281.
366.
Robin Collins, “The Teleological Argument: An Exploration of the Fine-Tuning of the Universe,” in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, ed. Craig and Moreland (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), p. 203.
367.
He presents, at best, a mere likelihood argument, which cannot speak to how probable is the truth of theism. See ibid., p. 206.
368.
For a more thorough critique of Collins’ argument – from a fellow Christian philosopher – see Mark Douglas Saward, “Collins’ core fine-tuning argument,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 76, no. 2 (2014): 209–222.
369.
We just do not know that other non-human universes are possible, that there is not a modal realism type multiverse so that our little humanophilic universe is necessitated, and so forth. Furthermore, we cannot know that ‘godly’ universes would yield such fine-tuning; this would be ad hoc. So for that question, we cannot decide between the options. Both Craig and Collins understand the limitations of ad hoc hypotheses. See Craig (RF), pp. 132, 188, 233; Robin Collins, “The Teleological Argument: An Exploration of the Fine-Tuning of the Universe,” in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, ed. Craig and Moreland (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), p. 206. While Collins here admits that independent motivations (apart from the confirming data, e) are needed in formulating a non-ad hoc hypothesis, he offers no convincing independent motivations for the probability of theism or the notion that an existing god would create, fine-tune, and so forth. Nor does Craig. Note also how I am being careful in describing ‘this sort of fine-tuning’. This is because theists could claim the ‘magic’ approach as a type of fine-tuning. I am perhaps overly cautious, since Craig did appeal to physical constants, so that a ‘magic’ approach would nullify his argument in assuming that which it is supposed to prove, and necessitate a new – questing-begging – one. e.g., The Argument from the Miracle That Humans Exist despite the Universe’s Physical Constants Being Life-Prohibitive. As explained earlier, however, that may actually be a more fruitful approach.
370.
When restricting the evidence to be considered, and evaluating an ad hoc hypothesis that perfectly predicts such evidence, it should not be a surprise that the hypothesis would appear very probable, post-calculations. This is not in the spirit of Bayesian reasoning, and is ultimately futile, due to the necessary acceptance of a higher inherent implausibility. Note also that many other philosophers endorse Bayesian reasoning, though they do not always know how to use it correctly. For example, philosopher John Hawthorne argued inexplicably against the notion that absence of evidence could be used as evidence that affects the probability calculation, despite this effectively being entailed by the use of likelihoods in Bayesian reasoning, and despite him actually proving the point with one of his own calculations (he used the absence of evidence to change odds of 50:50 to 40:60). See John Hawthorne. “Reflections on Fine-Tuning,” accessed 30/06/2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=youtu.be&v=3Gl_w1yMgCg. I can allow that he meant only that the notion would not necessarily be conclusive proof, which would be correct, though that is not what he expressed, and this would be a redundant point given that he is already endorsing Bayesian probability theory.
371.
As Monton indicated, if it was known that God created the universe for human life, it would seem unavoidable that he designed (via natural fine-tuning or supernatural methods) it to allow human life. See Bradley Monton, “God, Fine-Tuning, and the Problem of Old Evidence,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57, no. 2 (2006): 421. Note also that if the universe is eternal, as in oscillating universe models, some sort of cosmological natural selection could occur, and there would thus be no need to postulate intelligent design. Cf. Lee Smolin, “Did the Universe Evolve?,” Classical and Quantum Gravity 9, no. 1 (1992): 173–191.
372.
The latter refers to Craig’s experiential argument. See William Lane Craig. “Is the Material World all there is? Arguments for the Existence of God,” accessed 06/12/2013, http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2013/08/06/3819108.htm.
373.
Craig (RF), pp. 104–106.
374.
No argument is offered as to why this view is logically incoherent or even undesirable. In fact, on the previous page, Craig himself interprets Sorley as recognising that what people may desire does not indicate what is or ought to be: “In other words, just because we are not happy about some situation does not imply that the situation ought not to be”. See ibid., pp. 105–106.
375.
Ibid., p. 172.
376.
Ibid., p. 172.
377.
For example, see Erik J. Wielenberg, “In Defense of Non-Natural, Non-Theistic Moral Realism,” Faith and Philosophy 29, no. 1 (2009): 23–41.
378.
Craig (RF), pp. 172–173.
379.
This simplification for ease of exposition does not disadvantage the argument. In fact, this move can benefit Craig, who would arguably face greater challenges in proving the existence of moral duties or obligations, particularly with regards to the second premise, as the non-theist objecting to the first premise could struggle with demonstrating objective moral duties apart from God without referring to a deterministic universe. Deontic theorising on what it is that people ‘ought’ do is fraught with problems. For technical treatments of the difficulties posed by deontic logic, see David Makinson, “On a Fundamental Problem of Deontic Logic,” in Norms, Logics and Information Systems: New Studies in Deontic Logic and Computer Science, ed. Paul McNamara and Henry Prakken (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 1999), pp. 29–53; Jörg Hansen, Gabriella Pigozzi, and Leendert van der Torre, “Ten Philosophical Problems in Deontic Logic” (paper presented at the Normative Multi-agent Systems Conference, Wadern, Germany, 2007). Note also that Craig’s differentiation is possibly to address the Euthyphro Dilemma, which is not of primary concern here.
380.
Once again, Craig’s speciesism and human exceptionalism is revealed. Craig (RF), p. 173. Peter Singer has long spoken against speciesism, and how it is difficult to distinguish between that and sexism or racism. For example, see Peter Singer, “Why Speciesism is Wrong: A Response to Kagan,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 33, no. 1 (2016): 31–35.
381.
Craig (RF), p. 173. Note that any intended appeal to emotion could work against Craig, as his critics could produce similar examples, intending to question and disparage the morality of his Judeo-Christian god, focussing on the ‘Pagan holocausts’ and crimes against humanity committed on peoples such as the Canaanites, the Hittites, and the Midianites. See Deuteronomy 7:1–2, 20:16–18, Numbers 31. Interestingly, while Craig seems appalled at genocides directed at Israelites, he seems to approve of and defend certain genocides allegedly enacted by them. See William Lane Craig. “Slaughter of the Canaanites,” accessed 06/11/2012, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/slaughter-of-the-canaanites. Note also that Craig’s defence of the Israelite soldiers’ actions, and his effectively pleading for them to be shown sympathy for the harsh actions they were forced to take, is eerily similar to the Nazi soldiers’ defence against charges relating to their slaughter of innocent Jews, that they were ‘only following orders’. Upon later being given the opportunity to shed his reputation as ‘the apologist who defends genocide and infanticide in the Old Testament’, partly by way of alternative interpretations of the relevant biblical passages, Craig instead affirms his hard-nosed and literalist approach. See William Lane Craig. “The “Slaughter” of the Canaanites Re-visited,” accessed 07/01/2014, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/the-slaughter-of-the-canaanites-re-visited. Craig might counter that sceptics who deny objective morality (though sceptics can accept objective morality as shall soon be shown) cannot call God’s actions or commands objectively wrong, but that says nothing of such critics labelling those actions or commands as subjectively wrong and disagreeable, and does not prevent critics appealing to the pragmatic ethic of reciprocity.
382.
Craig seems to be accusing sceptics of making a false equivocation between human subjective morality and objective morality, when it is he who errs, in assuming that the former is the only way the latter could be actualised without God, and dismissing the possibility of a God-independent objective morality. See Craig (RF), pp. 173–175. There is also the issue raised earlier, that humans may not be the ultimate aim of God or the universe, so that a God-independent objective morality may have no relation with the human species at all. This objective morality could instead concern slugs or aliens, and the possibility that no species is aware of or has access to it must also be entertained. Craig also again fallaciously conflates naturalism with atheism. Disproving naturalism is hardly sufficient for adopting theism. Finally, evolution is not inconsistent with theism, as many contemporary theists will attest.
383.
Craig does not dispute this, though other theists might. For a brief discussion on the difficulties posed by evolutionary altruism, and the subsequent use of arguments from ignorance, as well as multi-level evolutionary selection theory, and the role of language and intellect on morality, see Philipse (GAS), pp. 288–290. Also, there are animals that display traces of ‘human morality’, despite not being human, and seemingly being irreligious. See Frans de Waal, The Bonobo and the Atheist: In Search of Humanism Among the Primates (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2014).
384.
In a more recent piece written for the benefit of general audiences, Craig relies heavily on J. L. Mackie’s opinion that objective morals “make the existence of a God more probable”, which does not at all support the very strong first premise. See William Lane Craig. “Is the Material World all there is? Arguments for the Existence of God,” accessed 06/12/2013, http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2013/08/06/3819108.htm. Relevant to (2), Mackie also said that the “claim to objectivity, however ingrained in our language and thought, is not self-validating”. See J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), p. 35.
385.
Craig (RF), p. 175. Note that the latter is incorrect, at least when considering that some atheists believe in an objective standard of morality.
386.
Ibid., p. 176. This tactic allows Craig to avoid subjective notions of consequentialism and more unsophisticated objections, such as “but atheists often lead more moral lives than their religious counterparts” and “even believers disagree on what the objective morals are”. This ‘ontological-epistemological trap’, however, will be used against Craig’s argument throughout the remainder of this critique. Also, Craig acknowledges that non-believers may lead moral lives “that put ours to shame”. See Craig (OG), p. 127. In doing so, Craig wisely avoids criticising atheists for supposedly basing their morality on ‘Darwinism’. Phenomena such as ‘survival of the fittest’ are observed to occur in nature; not all atheists view them as being the ideal basis for modern society.
387.
It appears unreasonable to demand an explanation for something that is not known to exist. There would also be pragmatic concerns. It would seem cruel for God to have created objective morals for the benefit of human persons, without making clear to them all that objective morality exists, and what it comprises. Furthermore, the ‘ontological-epistemological trap’ may be a technically correct, though entirely unreasonable approach. There seems to be little basis for discussing the existence of something, and what it implies about other somethings, when the knowledge of that something’s existence is impermissible, and possibly lacking.
388.
Craig (RF), pp. 176–177.
389.
This is another footnote to Plato. The Euthyphro Dilemma shall be discussed below, and derives from Plato, Euthyphro 10A. See Plato, G. M. A. Grube, and John A. Cooper, Five Dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Phaedo, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2002), p. 12.
390.
Craig (RF), p. 178.
391.
A superior term may be ‘ethical naturalism’. However, these may all refer to similar – albeit different – concepts. Platonism may refer to abstract objects, for example, while my hypothesis can involve physical moral constants. In any case, there are numerous alternatives to an objective morality that is grounded in God.
392.
Craig (RF), p. 178.
393.
Ibid., pp. 178–179.
394.
Ibid., p. 179.
395.
Made all the more plausible when not assuming the great importance of the human species, as discussed in the critique of Craig’s teleological argument. Consider that we might live in a deterministic and uncaring universe but evolved to believe that our lives matter because those without the belief were more prone to dying childless. Similarly, we may have evolved to believe in a god, such as one that grants us with an objective standard of morality, because of its boost to our survival prospects and not because such a being does exist.
396.
Craig also declared that it is difficult to even comprehend this view. He seemed to have no difficulties in earlier accepting that there are set properties of the universe, such as the physical constants. See Craig (RF), p. 178.
397.
Ibid., p. 179. Craig further implies that the ‘natural order’ and the ‘moral order’ are on equal footing, as they both cannot be conclusively proven to exist. It would seem that appealing to uncertainty is the job of the sceptic, and not the believer. This is a poor argument indeed, particularly as the price for the sceptic (who also wishes to avoid theism) in rejecting certainty is not too great to pay. Sceptics tend to be sceptical, by definition. Cf. Craig (OG), p. 128.
398.
Craig (RF), p. 179.
399.
Note that this alteration is still acceptable even if objective morality could only be supplied by God, and could exist independently of her. Recall also that my altering of Craig’s premises is not necessarily intended to improve the arguments (as they are seemingly unsalvageable), but to better reflect the state of the evidence and/or Craig’s meaning.
400.
Arif Ahmed and William Lane Craig, Is Belief in God More Reasonable than Disbelief? (La Mirada, CA: Biola University, 2005), Audio CD. Cf. “Most of us think that in moral experience we do apprehend objective values and obligations”. See Craig (RF), p. 180.
401.
Craig here defers to Ruse as support for the existence of objective morality, despite earlier quoting him as referring to morality as “a biological adaptation” (p. 174). Craig (RF), p. 180; Michael Ruse, Darwinism Defended: A Guide to the Evolution Controversies (London: Addison-Wesley, 1982), p. 275. Note that Craig prefers quoting atheistic scholars in order to bolster his case, as this seemingly gives the illusion of objectivity. Recall that there are numerous Christian and theistic scholars that disagree with Craig’s arguments, so that Craig’s atheistic critics could do likewise. For example, Wes Morriston is unconvinced by Craig’s solution to the Euthyphro Dilemma, which is discussed in its own subsection below. See Wes Morriston, “God and the Ontological Foundation of Morality,” Religious Studies 48, no. 1 (2012): 20. Back to Ruse, the philosopher of science actually thinks that our moral norms are influenced by natural selection, and that we may even see our morality as objective because this serves as an evolutionary advantage. See Michael Ruse, “Evolutionary Ethics: A Phoenix Risen,” Zygon 21, no. 1 (1986): 95–112.
402.
Craig (RF), p. 181; David O. Brink, “The Autonomy of Ethics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Atheism, ed. Michael Martin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 149–165.
403.
Tara Smith, “The Importance of the Subject in Objective Morality: Distinguishing Objective from Intrinsic Value,” Social Philosophy and Policy 25, no. 1 (2008): 126–148.
404.
Those who disagree, or at least do not agree, could also include people who are moral non-cognitivists, agnostics, or error-theorists. Note also that, depending on which god exists, such activity could be objectively good and right.
405.
Appeals to authority can be valid. However, as noted by philosopher of science Wesley C. Salmon, who is sometimes quoted by Craig as supporting appeals to authority, “Authorities may express opinions about matters concerning which they could not possibly have any evidence” and “Authorities who are equally competent, as far as we can tell, may disagree… Ignoring the judgment of opposed authorities is a case of biasing the evidence”. Further criticising the related arguments from consensus (the consensus is perceived as being an authority), Salmon stresses the importance of directly examining the evidence. See Wesley C. Salmon, Logic, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1984), pp. 100–101.
406.
George W. Bush was President at the time.
407.
Arif Ahmed and William Lane Craig, Is Belief in God More Reasonable than Disbelief? (La Mirada, CA: Biola University, 2005), Audio CD. Incidentally, this drew rare applause and laughter from the typically reserved Cambridge audience.
408.
Craig (RF), pp. 179–180. Craig feels that as sensory experience points to the objective reality of the physical world, so too does moral experience point to the objective reality of morality, despite the fact that moral experience is not as well described and understood. He also employs the notion that “moral values are gradually discovered, not invented”, which, in the case of objective morals, and amongst other problems, merely assumes that humans would discover them.
409.
Ibid., pp. 179–180.
410.
Ibid., p. 180. As explained above, naturalists are not actually required to eschew necessity and objective or necessarily moral truths. In particular, it is consistent with naturalism to suppose that there are at least some necessary moral truths. Clarke-Doane has argued that moral realism is in better shape than mathematical realism, and yet few think that there is not a decent core of mathematics that is objectively true. For example, see Justin Clarke-Doane, “Morality and Mathematics: The Evolutionary Challenge,” Ethics 122, no. 2 (2012): 313–340.
411.
Craig (RF), p. 180.
412.
Ibid., p. 180; Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 216–237; Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 227–240.
413.
To morality we can add mathematics and logic, as in other transcendental arguments for the existence of God.
414.
The possibility that the creator god wishes for us to be ignorant or misinformed must also be entertained. Cf. Genesis 3.
415.
On the glory of agnosticism, cf. Bertrand Russell, Mortals and Others, Volume II: American Essays 1931–1935 (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 28: “The fundamental cause of the trouble is that in the modern world the stupid are cocksure while the intelligent are full of doubt.”
416.
Elaborated on in §2.7.
417.
Craig (RF), p. 181. On p. 173, he also commented that an atheistic view of life seems “depressing”, possibly revealing some of his motivation for desiring the existence of objective morality and God. It may be that Craig simply finds it too taxing a thought that the natural world is indifferent and that the universe cares not for him or his species, preferring that there are objective ideals of good, purpose, and meaning, and that human existence is of the utmost importance. This is actually reason to further doubt Craig. Note that Craig flippantly exaggerates atheistic would-be attitudes towards rape in his later work, claiming that (without God) “The rapist who goes against the herd mentality is doing nothing more serious than acting unfashionably, like the man who belches loudly at the dinner table”. See Craig (OG), p. 133.
418.
This is no great presumption, as Craig indicates the primacy of the Bible, directly quoting the teaching (Romans 2:14–15) that “God’s moral law is ‘written on the hearts’ of all men, so that even those who do not know God’s law ‘do naturally the things of the law’”. See Craig (RF), p. 176.
419.
Numbers 15:38, Deuteronomy 6:8, Deuteronomy 22:11, Leviticus 15:19–24. Laws concerning sacrifices are found throughout the Torah. Of course, not all believers live by such commands today.
420.
There was seemingly no room in the Ten Commandments or the 613 mitzvot, but there are ‘negative’ mentions of these issues in the Bible, in that God and/or God’s people seem to condone such behaviour, including genocide and paedophilia. See Numbers 25:1–13, Exodus 22:20, Leviticus 20:13, and Numbers 31. Regarding rape, God’s objective moral standard seems to indicate that in many cases, raped women are to be either killed or purchased, whereby the victim of rape is forced to marry their rapist, exposing a loophole for certain amoral opportunists, who would otherwise have had no chance in obtaining such a desirable wife. See Deuteronomy 22:23–29. It would seem that Craig’s attempt to goad sceptics into accepting objective morality by claiming certain acts are ‘really wrong’ is fallacious for another reason, namely that his own god seems to approve of them. The Bible also has some choice things to say about slavery and torture, as in Ephesians 6:5–8 and Exodus 21:20–21. Many would see contemporary, secular, progressive, and yet subjective, morals as being superior to the objective morals of the sacred texts.
421.
Craig also attempts to persuade the sceptic by referring to scholarly moral relativists’ “hardness of heart” when discussing the alleged objective wrongness of abusing children. Not only is this behaviour unprofessional, but the moral relativist certainly cannot be fairly described in this manner if they consider such actions to be subjectively wrong, would never commit such atrocities themselves, and would try to prevent such actions from happening, wherever possible. See Craig (OG), p. 142. Furthermore, Craig’s phrase, “hardness of heart” is especially unfortunate, since the Bible makes it clear that God can be responsible for this. For example, see Exodus 9:12–16 and Romans 9:18. Also, in On Guard (p. 161), Craig presents an altered form of his moral argument, arguing that the existence of evil proves the existence of objective morality. Craig fails to present any evidence for the existence of ‘objective evil’. Note that this is largely irrelevant to arguments from evil, which do not necessarily appeal to the existence of objective evils.
422.
Craig (RF), p. 181. For a useful discussion of the Euthyphro Dilemma and its religious consequences, see George W. Harris, “Religion, Morality, and the Euthyphro Dilemma,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 15, no. 1–2 (1984): 31–35.
423.
Craig (RF), p. 181.
424.
Ibid., pp. 181–182. This may be Anselm’s ‘third horn’. Cf. Katherin A. Rogers, Anselm on Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 8. This ‘solution’ may also place limitations on God’s omnipotence and perfect freedom, namely, God’s ability to be evil. This solution also would support my switching ‘objective morality’ for ‘God-given morality’.
425.
William Lane Craig. “Slaughter of the Canaanites,” accessed 06/11/2012, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/slaughter-of-the-canaanites. By pointing to Deuteronomy 7:3–4, Craig seems to endorse the Israelites’ efforts to retain ethnic purity. Clearly, positing an unjustified objective standard of morality may have disastrous consequences in the real word. See Regina M. Schwartz, The Curse of Cain: The Violent Legacy of Monotheism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Hector Avalos, Fighting Words: The Origins of Religious Violence (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005).
426.
Craig (RF), p. 182. Cf. Numbers 31. If it were not yet obvious that Craig sees at least elements of his supposed objective morality in the Bible, he implies as much when reminiscing about his attendance at a meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature. See Craig (OG), pp. 141–142.
427.
With arguments that rely on later arguments, that rely on earlier arguments, it becomes ever more obvious that Craig is fond of circular reasoning. Also, we really should not be discussing “God” at this stage. Craig should be content to prove some sort of supernaturalism true.
428.
Craig (RF), pp. 182–183. Note that the impartial critic who has not assumed the existence of the god of theism may entertain similar ideas, but involving ‘evilness’. Another counter of Craig’s is the rather unsophisticated claim that “God is by definition worthy of worship, so that He must be the embodiment of perfect moral goodness”. See Craig (OG), p. 139.
429.
Isaiah 45:7, Amos 3:6. Note that one of Craig’s responses to such challenging biblical passages is to admit that the Bible may not be inerrant, preferring to hold to the validity of his argument. See Craig (RF), p. 195. This is a reasonable course of action, though the price he pays is surprisingly great. Despite being a religious conservative who humbles himself before God, he would seemingly prefer that God’s Word – on which his entire worldview is predicated – were errant, rather than his own. This approach is also counter-productive, given Craig’s reliance on the ‘truth of the Bible’ as his main source of evidence for the climactic argument in his case for Christian theism, as we shall see in Part 4, and his views on time, which are crucial to his philosophical cumulative case. It would seem that Craig would rather cast doubt on his god’s intentions and omnipotence (even if God was not responsible for the errors in the Bible, he is still accountable for the fact that people today do not have access to his ‘true Word’) than to simply admit that his argument is fallacious. This also staves off concerns that I unfairly appeal to the Bible when these arguments have not yet argued for the ‘Christian God’. Craig’s reliance on the Bible is evident throughout his case.
430.
It is still important that the theist avoids the second horn of the Dilemma, and the implied independent standard of morality, if they wish to argue from morality to God, and perhaps to further argue that God is perfectly free and omnipotent.
431.
The possibility of an ‘evil god’, along with the associated problem of good, parodied on the problem of evil, has also been raised. For example, see Stephen Law, “The Evil-God Challenge,” Religious Studies 46, no. 3 (2010): 353–373.
432.
As explained in §3.2.
433.
Craig (RF), p. 95.
434.
Challenge accepted.
435.
Craig (RF), pp. 96, 183. For typical objections to ontological arguments, such as the assumption that existence is a predicate and those concerning the definition and description of God and God’s properties, see T. J. Mawson, “The Ontological Argument,” in Belief in God: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Clarendon, 2005), pp. 125–132; Graham Robert Oppy, Ontological Arguments and Belief in God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Sobel (LT), pp. 29–167. Note that if it is accepted that existence is characteristic of greatness, so that an existing entity is greater than one that is merely conceived or imagined, then it seems to become impossible to imagine a maximally great being; that thing that is imagined is not great at all, and probably finite on account of human mental limitations, as well as differing from person to person, and is – as an idea – not equivalent to any real-world counterpart. It would also become obvious that positing an actual maximally great being would be unnecessary in discovering a greater being than the imaginary ‘maximally great being’; even the humble tufted titmouse would be greater than an infinite, though imaginary (and thus causally effete and impotent), god. The correct approach would then be to empirically verify which is the greatest actually existing being, and to contrast it with that ‘not really great’ imagined entity. Note also that, in a sense, imagined entities do actually exist, as collections of particles or electrical impulses in the brain, and are less great than the brain itself. Consider also that such theorising would very probably lead to an inadequate and incorrect conception of God, and thus, depending on the religious tradition, to idolatry and blasphemy.
436.
Craig (RF), pp. 184–185.
437.
Ibid., p. 184.
438.
Ibid., p. 185. Cf. p. 196, “We could grant, if we wish, that we can’t prove in a non-question-begging way that God’s existence is possible”. Saul A. Kripke recognised that the philosopher need not be committed to the existence of a possible world merely because it can be visualised. See Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 15–16, 43–45. Recall also David Chalmers’ essay, concluding that conceivability does not entail metaphysical possibility. See David Chalmers, “Does Conceivability Entail Metaphysical Possibility?,” in Conceivability and Possibility, ed. Gendler and O’Leary-Hawthorne (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002). Cf. Swinburne’s opinion: “All ontological arguments known to me that purport to show the logical necessity of God’s existence seem to me unsound”. See Richard Swinburne, The Christian God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 145.
439.
Within the framework of possible worlds, Craig says that all the possible worlds, including the actual world, form a “maximal description of reality”. See Craig (RF), p. 184. This is a strange notion as it is essentially ‘reality’ coupled with ‘non-realities’. In other words, this maximal description of reality is reality only. This should be made clearer upon realising that non-realities do actually exist, in reality, as mere ideas in the real brains of real philosophers such as Craig. This is somewhat similar to how apologists refer to ‘contemporary and near-contemporary sources’ for Jesus, which reduces to ‘near-contemporary sources’, which reduces further to ‘not-contemporary sources’.
440.
Ibid., p. 185. Craig finds explicit disagreement with his colleague, Richard Swinburne: “the existence of God is a tremendous thing, the most fundamental truth about the universe. It seems to trivialize it to say that it holds for the same reason as does the truth that all bachelors are unmarried”. See Swinburne (CT), p. 275.
441.
This is even more overt in a recent article written for general audiences, where Craig declares that “The atheist has to maintain that it’s impossible that God exists. He has to say that the concept of God is incoherent, like the concept of a married bachelor or a round square”. See William Lane Craig. “Is the Material World all there is? Arguments for the Existence of God,” accessed 06/12/2013, http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2013/08/06/3819108.htm. McCormick explains that theistic appeals to possibility are not sufficient, and that it is unjust when theists deny atheists this luxury, and further expect that atheists provide absolute proof to support their non-belief. See Matthew McCormick. “Reasonable Belief, Proof, and Uncertainty,” accessed 31/05/2016, http://www.provingthenegative.com/2008/03/reasonable-belief-proof-and-uncertainty.html. Note that God’s existence may indeed be impossible, on account of conflicting properties, or due to the problem of evil, which shall be discussed later. For an example of the former, see Kenneth Einar Himma. “Anselm: Ontological Argument for God’s Existence,” accessed 14/01/2014, http://www.iep.utm.edu/ont-arg. Himma explains that God’s ability to create a being with free will (omnipotence) might conflict with his knowing what such a being will do (divine foreknowledge and omniscience), which eliminates the free will; hence such a God cannot exist.
442.
Craig (RF), pp. 185–187. A popular example of this metaphysical excess is that of a maximally great god-destroying weapon that necessarily exists in all possible worlds.
443.
Ibid., p. 187. Note that his possibly overcoming and defeating such objections and alternatives does nothing to solve the problem he had himself highlighted: the assumption of metaphysical possibility.
444.
This argument primarily concerned omniscience, saying nothing of omnipotence and omnibenevolence, so that it may only refer to Craig’s undesired quasi maximally great being. See ibid., pp. 187–188. Note also that Craig is no Platonist. For example, see his many contributions in Paul M. Gould, ed. Beyond the Control of God?: Six Views on the Problem of God and Abstract Objects (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014).
445.
Craig (RF), p. 188.
446.
Ibid., p. 188. Note that a circular argument may still be logically valid, and even sound. It just would not offer anything original and convincing to the critic.
447.
Ibid., p. 188. This hints at the circularity of his approach, particularly when the previous arguments were found to be unconvincing, so that Craig is rather in possession of a collection of broken links.
448.
Ibid., p. 188–189.
449.
Cf. “I’ve not used it in evangelism simply because it’s so difficult for people to understand and because there are other, more compelling arguments”. Ibid., p. 196.
450.
Alvin Plantinga and James F. Sennett, The Analytic Theist: An Alvin Plantinga Reader (Grand Rapids, MI: W. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1998), pp. 65–71.
451.
William Lane Craig. “Necessary Existence and the Ontological Argument,” accessed 13/01/2014, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/necessary-existence-and-the-ontological-argument.
452.
He does seem to recognise more limitations of such arguments than he indicates here, as revealed by earlier writings: “But if we are talking about logical possibility, then to say that the proposition ‘A maximally great being exists’ is possible is to say that He does exist. For if He exists in any possible world, then by definition He exists in all. Thus, if this proposition is possibly true in the logical sense, it is necessarily true. Now I agree with Leslie that the ontological argument seems to fail because all we intuit is that a maximally great being is epistemically possible, but we cannot say if His existence is logically possible. But how is this even relevant to the issue at hand? The coherence of the logical necessity of God’s existence does not depend on the success of the ontological argument or our intuitions. It is possible that the ontological argument fails to prove God’s existence, and yet for all we know God’s existence is logically necessary.” See William Lane Craig, “The Teleological Argument and the Anthropic Principle,” in The Logic of Rational Theism: Exploratory Essays, ed. Craig and McLeod, Problems in Contemporary Philosophy (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), pp. 150–151.
453.
William Lane Craig. “Necessary Existence and the Ontological Argument,” accessed 13/01/2014, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/necessary-existence-and-the-ontological-argument. Note that by Craig’s own reasoning and earlier burden-shifting, Craig should accept the challenge to show that God’s non-existence is an incoherent notion. If he cannot, he ought to accept that God does not exist…
454.
Ibid.
455.
Pantheism would also be supposed if omniessence were arbitrarily assigned as one of the maximal being’s definitive properties, alongside omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence, and necessity.
456.
This entity might also be merely the sum of all possible worlds, such as in the scenario of modal realism, and is only superficially called a ‘god’, as in a naturalistic pantheism.
457.
Recall that it seems particularly unthinkable that a perfect being would desire an imperfect world, i.e., one in which anything other than the perfect being exists.
458.
Some would even consider that the argument leads to polytheism. For example, see Brian Leftow, “Anselmian polytheism,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 23, no. 2 (1988): 77–104. Also see R. Harwood, “Polytheism, pantheism, and the ontological argument,” Religious Studies 35, no. 4 (1999): 477–491.
459.
For example, there is no unnecessary multiplying of entities in pantheistic views that equate God and the universe. For some discussion on pantheism, see Levine (Pantheism). Remember also that Craig believes God is Yahweh, yet there seems to be numerous ways in which a maximally great entity could be greater than Yahweh. For example, a being that does not need to create at all, and a god that does not need to constantly address his mistakes.
460.
For his opinion on this not being an argument, see William Lane Craig. “Is the Material World all there is? Arguments for the Existence of God,” accessed 06/12/2013, http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2013/08/06/3819108.htm. Note that Craig does view this ‘argument’ as a reason to think that God exists. For example, see Arif Ahmed and William Lane Craig, Is Belief in God More Reasonable than Disbelief? (La Mirada, CA: Biola University, 2005), Audio CD.
461.
William Lane Craig. “Is the Material World all there is? Arguments for the Existence of God,” accessed 06/12/2013, http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2013/08/06/3819108.htm. Note that the focus is on the ‘biblical God’, but the argument could just as easily apply to the god of ‘bare theism’.
462.
For various divine appearances, manifestations and miracles, see Genesis 2–3, 1 Kings 18:21–39, Mark 1, and Acts 9:3–9.
463.
William Lane Craig. “Is the Material World all there is? Arguments for the Existence of God,” accessed 06/12/2013, http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2013/08/06/3819108.htm.
464.
See ibid. Perhaps only the subject’s mind exists, and perhaps all things the subject recalls are false memories, implanted just a few seconds ago. Metaphysical solipsism, both indefensible and irrefutable, appears to be more of a problem for the theist than for the sceptic.
465.
Ibid.
466.
The theist could object that all such experiences derive from God, and are misinterpreted by all but the devout theists, which merely begs the question. This would also be counter-intuitive for the exclusivist theist as this would mean that God is deceptive and/or apathetic to the religious beliefs of her people. Furthermore, it could then be that Christian theists are in actuality experiencing Gaia or one of the Hindu gods. It would seem that in arguing from personal religious experiences to God, the exclusivist theist (or Christian) needs to demonstrate the veridicality of their experiences, and prove that the experiences of non-theists (or non-Christians) are non-veridical. For a balanced discussion of various issues relating to the ‘problem’ of religious diversity, including forms of religious pluralism, see Philip L. Quinn and Kevin Meeker, eds., The Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
467.
For an intriguing discussion about intense feelings of God’s non-existence, see Stephen Bullivant, “Introducing Irreligious Experiences,” Implicit Religion 11, no. 1 (2008): 7–24.
468.
Craig (RF), p. 189.
469.
This allows differentiation, and the focus to be moved from the notion of properly basic beliefs, to the veridicality of experiential claims.
470.
Arif Ahmed and William Lane Craig, Is Belief in God More Reasonable than Disbelief? (La Mirada, CA: Biola University, 2005), Audio CD.
471.
There are also numerous possible supernatural explanations that do not imply the involvement of God.
472.
Some interesting discussion on false memories, particularly pertaining to Christian fictions, can be found in Bart D. Ehrman, Jesus Before the Gospels: How the Earliest Christians Remembered, Changed, and Invented Their Stories of the Savior (New York: HarperOne, 2016). Therein Ehrman also explains how eyewitnesses misremember, that we do not have access to eyewitness accounts about Jesus, that tradents chop and change the stories to suit themselves and their communities, and that not everything in the holy texts is intended to be taken literally. A recent ‘mega-analysis’ seemingly indicates that around 50% of people are amenable to suggestion, and form false memories/beliefs, which are often indistinguishable from true memories. See Alan Scoboria et al., “A mega-analysis of memory reports from eight peer-reviewed false memory implantation studies,” Memory 25, no. 2 (2017): 146–163.
473.
Note that substance abuse and fasting are routine in several religious traditions. Interestingly, Jesus was said to have been fasting in the wilderness, alone, for an unlikely forty days and nights. The hungry Jesus hallucinated an interaction with a non-existing being (Satan), and suffered from delusions of non-grandeur. See Matthew 4:1–11. It may seem strange today, but behaviours and actions leading to delusions/hallucinations were normal and even praiseworthy in ancient religious communities.
474.
Oxygen deprivation and the levels of other chemicals in the body are often considered to contribute to near-death experiences. See Zalika Klemenc-Ketis, Janko Kersnik, and Stefek Grmec, “The effect of carbon dioxide on near-death experiences in out-of-hospital cardiac arrest survivors: A prospective observational study,” Critical Care 14, no. 2 (2010): R56. doi: 10.1186/cc8952. This suggests that artificial religious experiences are possible.
475.
It is worth noting that artificial religious experiences can arise from certain cerebral stimulations. See Michael A. Persinger et al., “The Electromagnetic Induction of Mystical and Altered States within the Laboratory,” Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research 1, no. 7 (2010): 808–830.
476.
Some form of telepathy may be naturally possible, via a similar phenomenon to quantum entanglement, as speculated by some unconventional scientists. See Dean Radin, Entangled Minds: Extrasensory Experiences in a Quantum Reality (New York: Pocket Books, 2006). This seems even more plausible if the hypothesized human hails from the far more technologically advanced future. If theorising about time travel and psychic abilities seems counter-productive, recall that this is all still naturalistic theorising, unlike Craig’s appeals to the supernatural.
477.
E. Carrazana et al., “Epilepsy and Religious Experiences: Voodoo Possession,” Epilepsia 40, no. 2 (1999): 239–241; Shahar Arzy and Roey Schurr, “‘God has sent me to you’: Right temporal epilepsy, left prefrontal psychosis,” Epilepsy & Behavior 60, no. 1 (2016): 7–10; Paul Chadwick and Max Birchwood, “The Omnipotence of Voices. A Cognitive Approach to Auditory Hallucinations.,” The British Journal of Psychiatry 164, no. 2 (1994): 190–201. We could also consider the roles that schizophrenia and dissociative identity (‘split personality’) disorder may have played in some alleged revelations.
478.
Jason M. Tangen, Sean C. Murphy, and Matthew B. Thompson, “Flashed face distortion effect: Grotesque faces from relative spaces,” Perception 40, no. 5 (2011): 628–630.
479.
Scott Atran and Joseph Henrich, “The Evolution of Religion: How Cognitive By-Products, Adaptive Learning Heuristics, Ritual Displays, and Group Competition Generate Deep Commitments to Prosocial Religions,” Biological Theory 5, no. 1 (2010): 18–30; Dean H. Hamer, The God Gene: How Faith is Hardwired into Our Genes (New York: Doubleday, 2004); Evan Fales, Divine Intervention: Metaphysical and Epistemological Puzzles (London: Routledge, 2010). One noteworthy pattern occurs when measuring religiosity against existential security, which is “the degree to which individuals feel that their survival and well-being can be taken for granted”. See Jonathan A. Lanman, “The Importance of Religious Displays for Belief Acquisition and Secularization,” Journal of Contemporary Religion 27, no. 1 (2012): 51. People may feel more of a need to commit to religious ideologies, increasing the chance of ‘divine experiences’, when living uncomfortable lives filled with multiple threats.
480.
Deborah Kelemen and Cara DiYanni, “Intuitions About Origins: Purpose and Intelligent Design in Children’s Reasoning About Nature,” Journal of Cognition and Development 6, no. 1 (2005): 3–31; Tapani Riekki et al., “Paranormal and Religious Believers Are More Prone to Illusory Face Perception than Skeptics and Non-believers,” Applied Cognitive Psychology 27, no. 2 (2013): 150–155. Several psychologists note “the readiness with which we attribute intentionality to objects on the basis of minimal cues.” See Christopher C. French and Anna Stone, Anomalistic Psychology: Exploring Paranormal Belief and Experience (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 197.
481.
Those who get things exactly right will do better still. Perhaps we can expect that greater precision will eventually emerge. It is up for debate whether humans are currently at that level of accurate – if expensive – general processing. Contrast this with Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism.
482.
Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, “Blaming God for Our Pain: Human Suffering and the Divine Mind,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 14, no. 1 (2010): 9.
483.
Consider the aphorism, “better safe than sorry”, which incidentally is one of the key themes of Pascal’s Wager. Though it is outside the scope of this project, Pascal’s Wager seems to set up a false dichotomy, between Christianity on the one hand, and a strong form of atheism on the other; there are many other options. Perhaps Islam is ‘true’ and Christians will be condemned to Hell. Perhaps the existing god is evil and counter-intuitively punishes believers. I prefer Homer’s Wager, which states that choosing the wrong god – which is easy on account of the infinitely many god-model/revelatory tradition combinations possible – is more detrimental than abstaining from making a choice. After all, if the gambler chooses wrongly, which is almost certain, he commits the great ‘crimes’ of disbelief and idolatry, as opposed to the agnostic who at least is not guilty of idolatry; she could even attempt to shift the blame for her single sin of disbelief. Homer’s Wager thus highlights the importance of evidence in this decision-making. It was not the Greek poet Homer that inspired me here, but the fictional Homer Simpson. See Jim Reardon, “Homer the Heretic,” in The Simpsons (Los Angeles, CA: FOX, 1992). For more on how humans may be hard-wired to believe, see F. LeRon Shults, Theology after the Birth of God: Atheist Conceptions in Cognition and Culture (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). According to my understanding, and echoing my own spiritual journey, Shults is now an atheist, after being a Christian theist, with a pantheistic stint in between. Again recall the earlier note about Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism. Here, evolution seems indeed to lead us to some false beliefs, which aided our survival; a mechanism that may have influenced Plantinga’s beliefs about God and about the soundness of his arguments.
484.
Peter Brugger and Christine Mohr, “The Paranormal Mind: How the Study of Anomalous Experiences and Beliefs may Inform Cognitive Neuroscience,” Cortex 44, no. 10 (2008): 1291–1298. For more on how the natural affects alleged experiences of the supernatural, see Dan Flores, “Correlations and Conclusions: Neuroscience and the Belief in God,” Philo 17, no. 1 (2014): 5–22.
485.
Andrew B. Newberg, Eugene G. D’Aquili, and Vince Rause, Why God Won’t Go Away: Brain Science and the Biology of Belief (New York: Ballantine Books, 2001). Craig is aware of this, and asserts that these artificial experiences do “absolutely nothing to undermine the fact that there are veridical experiences”. See Craig (RF), p. 50. It does not appear that there is a non-question begging way to differentiate between the two.
486.
For more on the proclivity towards and impact of pre-existing beliefs, and other psychoanalytic issues, see Sigmund Freud, Todd Dufresne, and Gregory C. Richter, The Future of an Illusion (London: Broadview Press, 2012). Note the likelihood that a Christian would identify a perceived spiritual threat as Satan, rather than figures they do not believe exists or have even heard of, such as Shiva, Hades, Angra Mainyu, and Quetzalcoatl. Also see Pehr Granqvist et al., “Sensed presence and mystical experiences are predicted by suggestibility, not by the application of transcranial weak complex magnetic fields,” Neuroscience Letters 379, no. 1 (2005): 1–6. There are many more resources that make the link between contextual priming and supernaturalistic beliefs, such as: Wieteke Nieuwboer, Hein T. van Schie, and Daniël Wigboldus, “Priming with Religion and Supernatural Agency Enhances the Perception of Intentionality in Natural Phenomena,” Journal for the Cognitive Science of Religion 2, no. 2 (2014): 97–120; Michael A. Nees and Charlotte Phillips, “Auditory Pareidolia: Effects of Contextual Priming on Perceptions of Purportedly Paranormal and Ambiguous Auditory Stimuli,” Applied Cognitive Psychology 29, no. 1 (2015): 129–134; Michiel van Elk et al., “Priming of supernatural agent concepts and agency detection,” Religion, Brain & Behavior 6, no. 1 (2016): 4–33. See also Mark Blagrove, Christopher C. French, and Gareth Jones, “Probabilistic reasoning, affirmative bias and belief in precognitive dreams,” Applied Cognitive Psychology 20, no. 1 (2006): 65–83. Finally, journalist Nathan Schneider recognised that for many philosophical apologists like Anselm, Craig, and Swinburne, a conversion experience long preceded their discovery of supporting proofs, around the time of a possible ‘mid-life crisis’, which seems to imply that such figures began to retroactively rationalise their faith, conveniently finding evidence for their already-held religious beliefs. See the chapter, “Coming of Age”, in Nathan Schneider, God in Proof: The Story of a Search from the Ancients to the Internet (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2013).
487.
Similarly, just as with alternative therapies such as crystal healing, the power of suggestion may play a role. See Christopher C. French, H. O’Donnell, and L. Williams, “Hypnotic susceptibility, paranormal belief and reports of ‘crystal power’” (paper presented at the British Psychological Society Centenary Annual Conference, Glasgow, 28th-31st March 2001).
488.
The philosopher may also wonder if it is even possible to perceive what is supposedly an immaterial being. There are also difficulties in attributing an experience to an infinite or maximally great being, which is to do far more than what is required. For a related discussion on the impossibility of perceiving God as God, see Nick Zangwill, “The Myth of Religious Experience,” Religious Studies 40, no. 1 (2004): 1–22.
489.
Kimberly Fisher, “To Save Her Children’s Souls: Theoretical Perspectives on Andrea Yates and Postpartum-Related Infanticide,” Thomas Jefferson Law Review 25, no. 3 (2003): 599–634.
490.
Theresa Porter and Helen Gavin, “Infanticide and Neonaticide: A Review of 40 Years of Research Literature on Incidence and Causes,” Trauma, Violence, & Abuse 11, no. 3 (2010): 101.
491.
Wendy Hollway, “‘I Just Wanted to Kill a Woman.’ Why? The Ripper and Male Sexuality,” Feminist Review 9, no. 1 (1981): 33–40.
492.
For an overview of George W. Bush’s presidency, see Robert Draper, Dead Certain: The Presidency of George W. Bush (New York: Free Press, 2008).
493.
The sections referred to are the most relevant from Reasonable Faith, which – while presenting all the other arguments so far discussed – does not outline an experiential argument per se.
494.
I refer to his evidentialism. Craig, through his philosophical work, actually intends to persuade others to take on his beliefs, to persuade those who will not to at least concede that his beliefs are not irrational, and to persuade those who share his beliefs that serious scholarship underwrites their confidence that they are in possession of the truth. Technically, that Craig thinks that he has personal experiences of God need not have negative implications for any of these ends.
495.
Craig (RF), p. 43. On p. 190, Craig goes so far as to say that the arguments make the Christian believer “look smart”.
496.
Ibid., p. 44.
497.
Ibid., p. 47.
498.
Ibid., pp. 47–48.
499.
The Christian scriptures possibly encourage confirmation bias, with the popular teaching, ‘seek and ye shall find’. See Matthew 7:7–8.
500.
Craig (RF), p. 48. It would appear that Craig’s beliefs are truly intended to be non-falsifiable. It is worth considering if the internal witness of the Holy Spirit would even supersede Craig’s direct empirical observations, such as if he were able to personally witness a disappointingly uneventful (first) Easter morning. An online critic of Craig’s claims just that; that he asked such a question – involving a time machine – of Craig, who allegedly responded that it must have been some sort of trick. See Mark Smith. “Contra Craig,” accessed 28/2/2016, http://jcnot4me.com/page83.html. Of course, it is possible that Craig has already been tricked; it could be that an evil god tricked Craig into believing in the non-existing all-good God.
501.
Craig (RF), p. 49.
502.
See William Lane Craig and Peter Slezak, “Your God Raised Jesus from Death?,” (Sydney: University of Technology, Sydney, 2013).
503.
William Lane Craig, personal communication, November 27, 2013.
504.
See Craig (RF), pp. 277–278.
505.
Ibid., p. 50. While unseemly, Craig’s charge of culpability also assumes the truth of doxastic voluntarism, which is highly controversial. Proponents have included Thomas Aquinas, John Locke, and Søren Kierkegaard, while opponents number David Hume and Bernard Williams among their ranks. See Heinrich Wansing, “Action-Theoretic Aspects of Theory Choice,” in Logic, Epistemology and the Unity of Science, ed. Shahid Rahman, et al. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), p. 420.
506.
See Neil Van Leeuwen, “Do religious “beliefs” respond to evidence?”, forthcoming in Philosophical Explorations. Also of interest, is Neil Van Leeuwen, “Religious Credence is not Factual Belief,” Cognition 133, no. 3 (2014): 698–715.
507.
Craig (RF), pp. 72–84. These are red herrings; if Craig were correct, it says nothing whatever of God’s existence. Note also that Craig’s desire to be “loved by others” may also play a role in his experiences. See Craig (OG), p. 47. Finally, the many great disagreements about meaning and the like could be counted as evidence against God, leading towards the soon to be discussed arguments from inconsistent revelations and hiddenness.
508.
Craig (RF), p. 82.
509.
Cf. “we need not postulate any supernatural source or sources for these experiences, since they can be fully explained on purely natural grounds, by reference to otherwise familiar psychological processes and forces”. See J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism: Arguments For and Against the Existence of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 197.
510.
Compare with the comments of Lasonen-Aarnio, who effectively endorses a Bayesian approach: “Overall, it would be much better to follow a policy recommending the revision of belief in the light of new evidence. This is why reasonable subjects adjust their beliefs in defeat cases.” See Maria Lasonen-Aarnio, “Unreasonable Knowledge,” Philosophical Perspectives 24, no. 1 (2010): 15. Note that when I refer to evidence of false experiences, I refer to claims that have been debunked, the cognitive tendency for false positives regarding supernatural agency, and the religious diversity that necessitates that many or most – if not all – such beliefs are mistaken. Note also that Stephen Law has, independently, made a very similar case, though it is not explicitly (it is implicitly) Bayesian. The evidence he utilises in his argument against religious beliefs is the same evidence that I assert justifies a low prior in a probabilistic analysis, which incidentally serves as an example of how numerous arguments can be spun out of prior and consequent probabilities. See Stephen Law, “The X-claim argument against religious belief,” Religious Studies, no. doi: 10.1017/S0034412516000330 (2016).
511.
If most of the interpretations of such supernatural experiences are incorrect, and they are even by an exclusivist Christian’s reckoning, then these experiences count as evidence against theism or Christian theism, and it seems fairly unavoidable that there is precedent that naturalism allows for – what are perceived as – religious experiences. It could well be that all these supernaturalistic interpretations are incorrect. Indeed, that may be a properly basic belief of the naturalist, so that this sort of (not an) argument is self-defeating.
512.
For but a handful of examples, see Genesis 27, 1 Kings 22:23, Jeremiah 4:10, 20:7, Ezekiel 14:9, 2 Thessalonians 2:11, John 7:8–10.
513.
Cf. philosopher John Shook’s claiming that, “In the end, he [Craig] thinks his mission is witnessing. I don’t think he really cares about the arguments.” Quoted in Schneider (GP), p. 214. For a far more substantial argument from personal religious experience, see Swinburne (EG), pp. 293–327. My criticisms of Craig’s argument largely apply to Swinburne’s formulation also. For a thorough critique of Swinburne’s argument and its many insuperable challenges, including discussions on credulity, testimony, witness reliability, and the impossibility of perceiving an immaterial being that is radically transcendent, see Philipse (GAS), pp. 310–337.
514.
Craig (RF), p. 189.
515.
As before, consider this first proposition of a possible – and logically valid – atheistic argument, ‘The god of Christian theism does not exist’, which leads to the unsurprising conclusion, ‘Therefore, the god of Christian theism does not exist’.

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Department of Studies in Religion, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia
Raphael Lataster

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Lataster, R. (2018). The Case for Theism. In: The Case Against Theism. Sophia Studies in Cross-cultural Philosophy of Traditions and Cultures, vol 26. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90793-2_2

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