Abstract
Finding an explanation for human cooperation in highly competitive contexts has become one of the main challenges for economics. Many field studies and laboratory experiments with strategy games have shown that human beings are predisposed to cooperate with their peers in a competitive context like the economic one, and that this is a conduct which most agents consider to be desirable. For many economists, behind this diversion of the theoretical model based on the self-interested rationality of homo oeconomicus lies the human capacity to reciprocate. This allows agents to establish interpersonal relationships to meet common objectives. The objective of this chapter will be to analyse the main reciprocity approaches proposed from sociobiology , evolutionary economics and humanistic economics from the ethical-critical viewpoint as a plausible explanation for cooperation in different areas of activity, particularly economics.
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Notes
- 1.
To learn the basic aspects of this argument, see Olson (1965).
- 2.
As Camilo J. Cela-Conde (1989) explained, sociobiology coined the inclusive fitness concept with the intention of attempting to offer a plausible explanation about the paradox aroused by altruism . Natural selection is assumed to have a tendency to favour individual fitnesses, so it seems paradoxical that so many people who display this non-individualistic fitness exist.
- 3.
The term kin selection was coined by John Maynard Smith in Group Selection and Kin Selection (1964) to refer to the idea expressed by Hamilton .
- 4.
As Dawkins argues, “(…) in the world of Darwinism, gains are not paid in money, but in descendants” (2016).
- 5.
The inclusive fitness or kinship rule would be related to both the direct fitness and the indirect fitness (Curtis et al. 2008: 836).
- 6.
Different studies indicate that reciprocal altruism has very little to do with uninterested disinterested attitude because the person performing the act does so expecting a future behavioural response from the other person in case of need. They therefore suggested that the most suitable name would be weak reciprocity (Bowles 2006, 444, 433) or direct reciprocity (Becchetti et al. 2010: 289).
- 7.
Well-known theorists were among the participants, like Dawkins , Rapoport or Maynard Smith .
- 8.
It should be borne in mind that tournament players were not human beings, but computer programmes representing the strategies developed by each theorist in the group (Dawkins 2016: 271).
- 9.
As Axelrod explained, this particular characteristic defined the so-called round-robin-type tournament (2003: 30).
- 10.
Friedman ’s resentful strategy proposal did not work well at all (Dawkins 2016: 274).
- 11.
Although all the participants from the first tournament were asked to participate, they did not all agree to compete again; e.g. Dawkins presented a strategy in the first tournament but rejected Axelrod ’s offer to compete again (Dawkins 2016).
- 12.
Maynard Smith presented an extremely merciful version of tit-for-tat but did not manage to beat Rapoport ’s original strategy (Dawkins 2016: 275).
- 13.
An ESS cannot be invalidated by other mutant or rare strategies. The tit-for-tat strategy cannot be considered a ESS because it comes over as being unyielding with “nasty” strategies, but not with “nice” ones (Dawkins 2016: 280–281).
- 14.
- 15.
Zero or close to zero rates.
- 16.
Axelrod argued that “(…) the reciprocity that works well in the Bipersonal Prisoner’s Dilemma simply does not work in the n-persons game version when there are more than just a few people involved” (2003: 60).
- 17.
One type of dual relationship could be the mutual exchange of assets.
- 18.
Ostrom’s first explorations into reciprocity are found in the article “A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action ”, published in 1998.
- 19.
Ostrom ’s relationality would be framed within a limited two-way rationality that considers both rational interest in personal well-being and interest in others’ well-being (which, despite being self-interested, introduces feelings and pro-social emotions as something rational). Sen , however, argues that another level of rationality exists that is not self-interested, committed to that which we consider is right and fair. Ostrom does not consider this level.
- 20.
- 21.
As previously mentioned, Adam Smith seemed to suggest one kind of transitive reciprocal behaviour – inclusive reciprocity – which was strikingly similar to that developed by Zamagni . Smith warned about was how unfruitful it was for society to both give without expecting and to receive without acting. So, benevolence is positive, as long as it is used in the context of relationships controlled by the logic of reciprocity.
- 22.
There are studies in economic and business ethics about other reciprocal behaviours in humans. For example, work is being done about the possibility of institutional-type reciprocity ; in other words, an indirect form of relationality which, based on the act of offering help to others in exchange for this help benefitting the development and enrichment of a given institution, requires that the reciprocator should pay the high costs.
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Calvo, P. (2018). Reciprocity Approaches: The Possibility of Human Cooperation. In: The Cordial Economy - Ethics, Recognition and Reciprocity. Ethical Economy, vol 55. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90784-0_4
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