Abstract
Considering that proportionality also defines the conditions for a prevalence between norms within a balancing, specifically through the two laws of balancing, the paper contraposes the balancing schemes with a norm conferring a liberty and with a norm conferring a social right. The main claims underlying that contraposition is that both balancing schemes convoke similar sequential proportionality tests and that proportionality is applicable in the same way. The paper also analyses cases of underinclusiveness in social rights, sustaining that they are not a matter of unsuitability, but, differently, a matter of proportionality in the narrow sense.
This paper is a comment to Laura Clérico’s paper in this book (2018). I am grateful to Laura Clérico for the fruitful discussion that led to its drafting.
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Notes
- 1.
A conflict between two norms necessarily means two incompatible deontic statuses for the same action. For this reason, to know if the action is permitted, forbidden or mandatory depends on a solution for the conflict. Naturally, if the legal order forbids unsolved cases, the conflict cannot remain unsolved. See, Zorrilla (2007, p. 88), Duarte (2010, p. 52).
- 2.
Variables of connections between norms such as time, hierarchy, intersection, consumption, or competence.
- 3.
- 4.
Principles create partial ↔ partial conflicts because of the genericity of their antecedents: with limitless disjunctive conditions, they are almost always in intersection with others (except when in consumption, as in a general freedom with a more specific one). On genericity, Lopes (2017, p. 481).
- 5.
- 6.
Alexy (2003, p. 436).
- 7.
On the two laws of balancing, Alexy (2014, pp. 513, 514).
- 8.
See, Abramovich and Courtis (2004, p. 21).
- 9.
On the indeterminacy of the concept of right, d’Almeida (2016, p. 554).
- 10.
- 11.
Presupposing the correctness of the Hohfeldian correlativity. See, Hohfeld (1917, p. 710 and ff.).
- 12.
Alexy (2002, p. 120).
- 13.
Often, these norms are enacted with others imposing duties, creating protected liberties or imposing the State to act in their defense. However, this does not affect that, and for instance, an individuated norm conferring freedom of speech confers in itself a liberty. The same can be said for constitutional norms with exceptions: a prohibition of constituting fascist associations does not affect that, beyond that prohibition, with a norm conferring freedom of association, one has the liberty to constitute associations.
- 14.
For the sake of the example’s correctness, it is worth saying that the right to life differs from the right to live: the first is a right to be alive (not to be killed), the second is a right to make choices while living (a general permission). None related to a right towards the State to protect life, that needs another norm. Differently, Alexy (2002, p. 121).
- 15.
Matching Laura Clérico’s concept of social rights (2018, p. 29).
- 16.
Załuski (2016, p. 78).
- 17.
See, Klatt (2015, p. 364 and ff.).
- 18.
If only a norm can redefine the scope of another, then extent 10 is guaranteed if no norm interferes with the norm conferring the claim right. Of course, limits may come from empirical impossibility, but that is a totally different issue.
- 19.
- 20.
Asymmetric in the sense that, despite the substantive law of balancing, and with different magnitudes (Sartor 2013, p. 1433 and ff.), no absolute equivalence is achieved.
- 21.
Which means that, if “all” constraints are prima facie forbidden, their constitutional normative justification makes them disjunctively acceptable. Differently, Alexy (2007, p. 54).
- 22.
Thus, what matters in a social claim right is also to reach the result. Differently, Clérico (2018, p. 1).
- 23.
On suitability as a test for cutting unreached results, Alexy (2002, p. 398).
- 24.
- 25.
Differently, Clérico (2018, p. 1).
- 26.
- 27.
What would justify the proportionality of very small gains on a social claim right, or even none, when financial capacity is in a very low point at the budget level. Since the amount of losses is, in itself, proportional, then gaining too little, or nothing, can be, in those circumstances, justified. The same reason stands as an argument against the idea of a minimum core.
- 28.
However, under the same limits given by proportionality in the narrow sense: obviously, the court is here also limited by the extent available in financial capacity.
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Duarte, D. (2018). Gains and Losses in Balancing Social Rights. In: Duarte, D., Silva Sampaio, J. (eds) Proportionality in Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89647-2_3
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