Abstract
In this chapter I defend the second premise of the kalām cosmological argument, namely, that if the universe came into existence, then God brought it into existence. In defence of this premise, I appeal to a version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) that states that every contingent concrete object that exists has a sufficient explanation in an external state of affairs why it exists. I argue, first, that we have a strong intuition for the PSR, second, that we have no evidence that the PSR is false and, third, that the denial of the PSR is inconsistent with atheism. I then argue that, even if the PSR is false, the incredible fine-tuning of the universe renders it highly unlikely that the universe lacks a sufficient explanation. Finally, by way of a conceptual analysis of what an explanation of the universe involves, I show that it must be God who brought the universe into being.
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Notes
- 1.
However, Craig sometimes presents the kalām cosmological argument in terms of a stronger PSR , such as (P1). See, for example, Craig (1999:737).
- 2.
Of course, one may try to discredit any argument that rests on an intuition with the simple remark, ‘I do not share that intuition’. What could one say in response to such a remark? Probably very little. One could, perhaps, note that philosophy is not possible without relying on one’s intuitions. Every philosophical argument rests on some type of intuition, such as a logical intuition, a modal intuition, or a moral intuition, although it must also be said that some of our intuitions are more fragile than others. Nevertheless, the point is that everyone relies on an intuition at some point, and an argument that rests on an intuition is not necessarily a bad argument.
One may note, furthermore, that the purpose of a philosophical argument is not always to try to convince others (including those who do not share one’s intuitions). One may use a philosophical argument in an attempt to convince only those who share one’s intuitions, or simply to explain to others why one believes something. Thus, I readily admit that, what I find intuitively obvious regarding the PSR , some others might not. However, the purpose of this section is (i) to try convince only those who share my intuitions (and not everybody), and (ii) to explain why I affirm the PSR .
- 3.
This example was adapted from Schaffer (2000:40).
- 4.
Pruss (2012:54–56) presents a similar response to the randomness objection.
- 5.
A sufficient cause brings forth its effect as soon as all the relevant conditions are in place. For example, a man placing his foot in sand is sufficient for a footprint in the sand. As soon as the sufficient cause occurs (i.e. the man placing his foot in the sand), the effect occurs (i.e. a footprint appears in the sand). Hence, if the man’s foot is in the sand from eternity, the footprint must be eternal. This illustrates that, if a sufficient cause is eternal, its effect must be eternal.
- 6.
See, for example, Psalm 33:11; 102:26–27; Numbers 23:19; Malachi 3:6; James 1:17.
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Erasmus, J. (2018). God as the Explanation of the Universe. In: The Kalām Cosmological Argument: A Reassessment. Sophia Studies in Cross-cultural Philosophy of Traditions and Cultures, vol 25. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73438-5_10
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