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A Short History of US Paramilitary Operations

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Abstract

This chapter provides an overview of 25 pro-insurgency PMOs that have been undertaken by the U.S. government since 1949. The chapter is divided into six eras of covert operations: the early Cold War , the ‘golden era’ of covert operations, the Vietnam era, the post-Vietnam era, the Clinton era, and the War on Terror. It is demonstrated that PMOs have been a persistent feature of U.S. foreign policy and it is discussed how PMOs evolved over the course of 70 years. It is argued that covert operations changed in the 1980s and 1990s in the sense that they became more privatized and that other agencies became more directly involved in them. During the War on Terror, PMOs have become more overt and more integrated into conventional military operations, which is sometimes referred to as ‘hybrid warfare.’

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For an excellent and concise overview of OSS PMOs during the Second World War see Clark 2015, 39–56.

  2. 2.

    This effort is known as Operation GLADIO , which originally referred to the Italian branch of the secret armies. GLADIO was a paramilitary program that was led by the CIA in cooperation with intelligence services of respective NATO countries. The program was active until at least 1990 when it was first publicly disclosed by Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti in 1990. GLADIO remains controversial to the present day because of its apparent connections to a few terrorist attacks committed by right-wing groups associated with the GLADIO network. Daniele Ganser has suggested that the terrorism was part of a ‘strategy of tension,’ but there is no strong evidence to support the claim.

  3. 3.

    The OPC favored supporting the NTS over the OUN since Bandera was considered to be anti-American, which meant that Anglo-American cooperation on the Ukraine was difficult . See Prados 2006, 73.

  4. 4.

    The OPC staff even proposed a full-scale invasion of Albania with thousands of men by ship and aircraft, which seemed preposterous to the CIA’s Richard Bissell, who would later head the CIA’s Directorate of Operations. See Dorril 2001, 400.

  5. 5.

    CIA historian Nick Cullather claimed that United Fruit tried to manipulate US foreign policy after the Guatemalan government made law to improve the rights of laborers. After a failed effort to put pressure on the US embassy to declare such a law discriminatory against United Fruit (a major employer in Guatemala ), they enlisted ‘Edward Bernays, the “father of modern public relations,” to direct ‘a campaign to persuade Congress and administration officials that attacks on the company were proof of Communist complicity.’ See Cullather 2006, 16.

  6. 6.

    CIA documents have shown that the agency was prepared to use a range of ‘dirty tricks,’ including the assassination of Guatemalan officials. The CIA even prepared an assassination manual titled ‘A Study of Assassination’ in January 1954 that contained practical advice of how to go about assassination. According to Cullather, the CIA selected and trained some assassin and prepared ‘hit lists.’ See Cullather 2006, 137–142.

  7. 7.

    According to John Knaus, the Tibet issue was never debated in the negotiations with China and was certainly not part of Chinese demands. See Knaus 1999, 309.

  8. 8.

    The CIA spread rumors that Sukarno was being blackmailed by female Soviet spy and even produced a porno that showed an actor with a Sukarno face mask to discredit him. See Blum 2004, 101–102.

  9. 9.

    A detailed account proving the culpability of Belgium and the US in Lumumba’s assassination can be found in Ludo De Witte. 2001. The Assassination of Lumumba. London: Verso.

  10. 10.

    Analyst Joshua Kurlantzick suggested that this PMO had a lasting impact and that the ‘Laos war became an archetype for agency paramilitary operations – and a new way for the president to unilaterally declare war and then secretly order massive attacks, often using aerial weaponry.’ See Kurlantzick 2016, 18. In his view, the CIA became lastingly militarized and an integral part of the American war machine with the war in Laos having become a blueprint for CIA paramilitary operations that combine paramilitary proxy forces with US airpower.

  11. 11.

    DCI Stansfield Turner announced a major staff cut for the Directorate of Operations in October 1979 (known as the ‘Halloween massacre’), which marked a shift away from HUMINT and covert operations to technology. Altogether 820 positions were eliminated in two years, mostly through normal attrition or through transfer into other departments in the agency. See Ranelagh 1986, p. 790, n. 13.

  12. 12.

    The Toyota pick-up trucks became a trademark for CIA PMOs. The CIA supplied Toyota trucks to the Mujahideen before switching to the use of mules, which were more versatile. The Toyota pick-ups were a feature of the Libyan and Syrian civil wars. In fact, when ISIS was showcasing hundreds of new Toyota land cruisers in a parade in Ramadi a request in the Senate discovered that the vehicles had been originally supplied by the State Department to the Free Syrian Army. See Snyder 2014.

  13. 13.

    The Carter administration, which had initially approved a $75 million aid package to the new Nicaraguan government, became alarmed when the Sandinistas began to provide weapons and training to Communist guerrillas in El Salvador in the middle of 1980. President Carter suspended the aid to Nicaragua before leaving office. His successor, Ronald Reagan , was also wary to avoid a crisis in Central America, but a Communist offensive in El Salvador in January 1981 made a response necessary. See Rodman 1994, 231–235.

  14. 14.

    Eleven US government officials and other individuals connected to Iran -Contra were convicted for felonies, mostly related to false statements and perjury before Congress, including Clair George (CIA), Thomas Clines (CIA), Richard Secord (Air Force), Robert McFarlane (National Security Advisor), and Elliot Abrams (State Department). Most of them were subsequently pardoned by President George H.W. Bush .

  15. 15.

    Geraint Hughes has argued that ‘[t]here is little to substantiate Brzezinski’s subsequent claim that the administration’s intention was to provoke the USSR and to suck it into a debilitating insurgency; unlike IAFEATURE in Angola in 1975, covert US assistance to the Afghan rebels did not force the Soviets to intervene.’ See Hughes 2014, 115.

  16. 16.

    The CIA had accused the State Department in 1995 to have undertaken an illegal covert action to support the Bosnian Muslims. See Hicks 2005.

  17. 17.

    If the Bush administration would not have had a strong policy preference to invade Iraq with an inclination to ignore intelligence that did not fit their agenda, one could potentially argue that the failed uprising in Iraq was responsible for one of the greatest US foreign policy blunders, namely the Iraq War.

  18. 18.

    A Senate investigation looking into the matter determined that ‘the Committee found no tangible evidence that US military forces or the CIA provided material support or training to Croatia or to the Bosnian Muslims.’ See US Senate 1996. This claim seems dubious in the light of newer research carried out by Dutch intelligence expert Cees Wiebes, who found evidence of direct US support to Bosnian Muslims. See Aldrich 2002.

  19. 19.

    Press reports suggested that despite a NATO-policed UN arms embargo American C-130 planes were delivering weapons to the Bosnians through the airport at Visoka. See Eagar 1995.

  20. 20.

    The ‘bulldozer revolution’ was the first of the ‘color revolutions’ that were supported by the US government. The protest movement Optor!, which is credited with organizing the revolution, had received several million dollars from the US through USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy, and the International Republican Institute. See Cohen 2000.

  21. 21.

    According to Ahmed Rashid, the Afghan commanders used by the US had been bribed by al Qaeda to allow them to escape to Pakistan . ‘Between six hundred and eight hundred Arabs were escorted out of Tora Bora by Pashtun guides from the Pakistani side of the border, at an average cost of $1,200 each.’ See Rashid 2009, 98.

  22. 22.

    Journalist Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman have argued in their book Spies Against Armageddon that the assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists were planned by the Israeli Mossad with the objective of sending a message to Iran and other nations ‘that working for the nuclear program was dangerous.’ See Raviv and Melman 2014, 14.

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Krishnan, A. (2018). A Short History of US Paramilitary Operations. In: Why Paramilitary Operations Fail. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71631-2_2

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