Abstract
Once there was guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla fighters were able to stymie powerful, organized armies, like Napoleon’s in Spain in the nineteenth century, or the Germans’ in Europe during the Second World War. Nowadays it’s asymmetric warfare that allows David to challenge Goliath. This is a form of war in which a weak party, as opposed to a strong party, uses a non-conventional instrument of struggle in order to bridge the gap between the two sides. But Asymmetric Warfare takes place in a completely different context from which guerrilla warfare operated, it unfolds in a global society profoundly signed by emergencies. All this produces a socially and politically explosive mixture in many parts of the world, a mixture that often only needs a tiny spark to explode and give rise to wars of the poor against the wealthy, the small against the big one, the weak against the strong. In other words, to what has been defined as asymmetric warfare, whose components and fighting tools are guerrilla warfare, terrorism, media exploitation of the information and communication technologies proper to globalized modern society. From the definition of the new armed forces as a constabulary force proposed in 1960 by Morrris Janowitz to the term new wars used by Mary Kaldor, many are the terminologies used by military literature: from the irregular warfare (IW), stability operations, counterinsurgency (COIN), fourth generation wars, full spectrum wars, small wars, low-intensity conflicts—to those of military theoreticians such as hybrid wars; reaching finally a definition based on the main cause of its spread, the asymmetry of the contending parties, called asymmetric warfare, a term that is preferred here precisely because it gives the reason why more traditional forms of warfare (called “conventional”) were abandoned by one of the parties in conflict. The flourishing of these interpretations, of the debate, of the proposed solutions, in itself provides a measure of the process and, together, of the extent of the change to which our societies are exposed on the level of security policies. The relative certainties of the Cold War have been supplanted in the first decade of the twenty-first century with the general uncertainty of asymmetric conflict. It confirms and configures the passage from an international system centred on the Westphalian state to a post-Westphalian system.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Which can be correctly defined with the words of Rob Wainwright (Wainwright 2012, p. 4): “Terrorism is the attempt to achieve political goals with the use or the threat of violence. The ideologies behind terrorism vary widely, but can be roughly divided into a number of identifiable main drivers. Examples include religiously-inspired terrorism and strong ethnonationalist sentiments leading to separatist terrorism. The identified drivers are not static, however, and can evolve or vanish over time in response to political or socio-economic developments, merge with other ideologies or convictions, or be the building blocks of new and sometimes very specific and highly individual motivations.”
- 3.
They include all the software, interfaces and devices that connect up to computers and make possible, through the use of a technological support aimed at the elaboration of symbolic systems, the construction, negotiation and sharing of significants. Mobile phones should also be included in this list, due to their ability to send text messages to an unspecified number of recipients, as well as dissemination tools like DVDs.
- 4.
But already in 1964 Galula (2006, p. 3) wrote in regard to what was still called “revolutionary war”: “There is an asymmetry between the opposite camps of a revolutionary war. This phenomenon results from the very nature of the war, from the disproportion of strength between the opponents at the outset, and from the difference in essence between their assets and their liabilities. Since the insurgent alone can initiate the conflict, strategic initiative is his by definition” (p. 3).
- 5.
The term “glocalization” stems from Japanese business practices in the 1980s, as a combination of the words “globalization” and “localization”, used to describe a product or service that is developed and distributed globally but is also fashioned to accommodate the user or consumer in a local market. This means that the product or service may be tailored to conform with local laws, customs or consumer preferences. By definition, products or services that are effectively “glocalized” are going to be of much greater interest to the end user. Recently its use has been extended to other contexts (see, for instance, Friedman 2005, or Shawhan 2005).
- 6.
Communicate, from the Latin communis = which belongs to all, properly means sharing, “putting something in common with others” (see Karl Erik Rosengren 2001). The act of communication has the purpose of transmitting information and messages to someone. The ways of communicating are numerous and varied, and are given the name “media”.
- 7.
Where by powers are meant economic and/or industrial powers (such as multinationals), and national states (and/or aggregations of several states), and those that found room to manoeuvre once the frozen equilibria of the Cold War faded away. I mean to refer here to a number of religious movements, revolutionary forces, either internal to states or interstate, and politically organized ethnic groups.
- 8.
Socialization corresponds to the learning of values, norms and cultural models by the members of a collectivity. They are not only known but also internalized, so that most desires, expectations and needs conform to them, and individuals perceive adopting certain choices rather than others as “natural”.
- 9.
To the Latin term, used in the plural to designate the various means of communication, was then added the word “mass” to indicate a pluralistic communication, theoretically, at the time the term was created, from one to all.
- 10.
Social networks, understood as means of public communication (i.e., from many to many), may be identified with the most well-known ones, Facebook and Twitter, but the category also includes media reserved to narrower categories of professionals and/or intellectuals, such as LinkedIn, Academia, etc.
- 11.
See the research “Officer and Commander”, the report on which will be published in 2016 in the volume Officer and Commander: The Leadership in Asymmetric Warfare Operations.
- 12.
See Caforio (2008).
- 13.
In the multidisciplinarity which is the salient characteristic of research in the behavioural sciences sector today, also other disciplines have dealt with this phenomenon. First and foremost psychology, which is especially interested in the psychological (and psychiatric) impact of this new form of struggle on military personnel and their families, but also cultural anthropology, political science and contemporary history.
- 14.
J. David Singer is best known as founder of the Correlates of War (COW) Project, dedicated to the systematic accumulation of scientific knowledge about interstate and civil military conflict, which had its genesis in a 1963 grant from the Carnegie Corporation to the University of Michigan’s Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, a portion of which went to Singer and for the study of war.
- 15.
- 16.
The group is named “Working Group on the Military Profession” and is part of the institution called European Research Group On Military And Society (acronym ERGOMAS).
- 17.
The research report was published in the volume Soldiers Without Frontiers. See Caforio (2013a).
- 18.
The choice of the participating countries was made by excluding the strongest powers and the countries who are the largest contributors, which seem to have been studied extensively before: we tried to find out more about the experiences of soldiers from middle-sized powers and small countries, not so dominant in the international arena.
- 19.
See Bartone and Adler (1994).
- 20.
The terrain-centric approach is not taken into consideration here, as it is applicable to past wars but not to COIN.
- 21.
Such as the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual Paperback—July 4, 2007. Five years later, the armed force most interested in COIN, the Army, although remaining anchored to the enemy-centric approach, is beginning to show some openness to a more updated conception of the adversary. Indeed, ADRP 3-0 Unified Land Operations (ADRP 3-0 2012), defines the menace that the Army must face as a “hybrid threat” and describes the adversary (p. Glossary-3) as “The diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects.”.
- 22.
In Afghanistan, since other missions carried out in various countries have instead had success. One obvious example is the pacification of the Balkans.
- 23.
This mindset appears very clearly in the responses to the interviews carried out, for example, in the research published in the book Soldiers Without Frontiers (Caforio 2013a). Many interviewees in fact call for a much softer approach by European armies to local populations in the various mission theatres as compared to the Americans, as well as greater attention to avoiding collateral damage. And it is interesting to note that also in the European armies a different approach is taken by reservists and career military. For example, Joseph Soeters writes, in the chapter “Organizational Cultures in the Military” in this volume: “Still, also in real operational action, reservists can make a difference. Farrell (2010) describes how the British ‘reservists brigade’ (52nd Infantry Brigade) in Afghanistan province Helmand could change the course of the hostilities because they did not rely on the traditional combat repertoire that the previous British brigades had applied with so much conviction, yet with so little success (Farrell 2010: 588; King 2010; Soeters 2013). The 52nd Infantry Brigade’s staff was not inclined to look at the situation in Afghanistan only through ‘the scope of a rifle’. Their mindsets were not framed to rely on the messages and doctrines that dominate the culture in the traditional UK brigades, rooted in practices from the Second World War (King 2010: 326). The reservists were responsible for introducing a number of non-kinetic innovations in the British military performance in Helmand (Catignani 2012: 16–17).”
- 24.
- 25.
See in this volume, “The Order of Violence, Norms and Rules of Organized Violence and the Civil-Military Paradox” by Wilfried von Bredow.
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Caforio, G. (2018). The Sociology of the Military and Asymmetric Warfare. In: Caforio, G., Nuciari, M. (eds) Handbook of the Sociology of the Military. Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71602-2_26
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