Abstract
Within van Inwagen’s theory of fictional characters, we can distinguish between two claims: First, van Inwagen claims that fictional characters such as Mrs. Gamp do exist. Second, he claims that these characters are theoretical entities of literary criticism. The main target of this paper is to show that this second claim is misleading. In particular, we will argue that the analogy between fictional entities and other theoretical entities in scientific disciplines, for example, electrons, does not help us get a better understanding of the nature of these characters. Moreover, van Inwagen’s picture leaves many pending questions about the ontological status of fictional characters and about the nature and aims of literary discourse. In light of our criticism, Mrs. Gamp and electrons do not have as much in common as van Inwagen’s theory suggests.
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Notes
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A note on van Inwagen’s terminology: As he introduces the label “theoretical discipline” (van Inwagen 1977, 303), it is not meant to contrast with “experimental discipline” (viz., a discipline mainly focused on experimentation), since he speaks of physics tout court as a theoretical discipline. The label is rather meant as an umbrella term for scientific and other theoretical endeavors like literary criticism. He does not specify any criterion for the application of that label.
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To be sure, there are indeed anti-realistic interpretations of physical theories. Since van Inwagen, however, presents his arguments within a realistic framework we shall not consider these interpretations in more detail.
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Van Inwagen (1977, 305) says here, for example, that fatness is ascribed to Mrs. Gamp. But this is a misleading way to put things, because fatness is ascribed to a character in a novel to which is also ascribed the property of being called “Mrs. Gamp”. Saying that fatness is ascribed to Mrs. Gamp is precisely committing the mistake of thinking that Mrs. Gamp exists as someone who has properties like “being a character in a novel”. If we follow van Inwagen’s line of thought here, then we should say, strictly speaking, that there is something, an entity, which has the property of being a character in a novel and which holds the properties of being called “Mrs. Gamp” and of being fat. But directly saying that Mrs. Gamp has the property of being a character in a novel is a mistake. To summarize, there is the unfortunate tendency to say that Mrs. Gamp is a fictional character, while one should say that there is a fictional character called “Mrs. Gamp”. Note that van Inwagen (2003, 146) is more cautious by replacing “Mrs. Gamp” with “fictional characters”.
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See also van Inwagen (2009). Van Inwagen doubts that creationism about abstract objects in general can be true.
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Jung, EM., Pellet, F. (2018). Theoretical Entities of Literary Criticism and Science: What Mrs. Gamp and Electrons Do Not Have in Common. In: Jansen, L., Näger, P. (eds) Peter van Inwagen. Münster Lectures in Philosophy, vol 4. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70052-6_6
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